EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
Department of Political and Social Sciences

Pressing Matters
Environmental Organisations, Public Communication Strategies and Media Discourse in Contemporary Britain

by
Paul Statham

Thesis submitted for assessment with
a view to obtaining the Degree of Doctor of the
European University Institute

Florence, May 1996

301-1610942

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
Department of Political and Social Sciences

Pressing Matters
Environmental Organisations, Public Communication Strategies and Media Discourse in Contemporary Britain

by
Paul Statham

Thesis submitted for assessment with
a view to obtaining the Degree of Doctor of the
European University Institute

Examining jury:
Prof. Klaus Eder, EUI, Supervisor
Prof. Bernd Giesen, Justus-Liebig Universität Gießen
Prof. Christian Joppke, EUI
Dr. David Morrison, University of Leeds
Prof. William Outwhaite, University of Sussex

Florence, May 1996

Pressing Matters: Environmental Organisations, Public Communication Strategies and Media Discourse in Contemporary Britain

Acknowledgements iii

A) The 'Shifting Sands' of Environmentalism: nature and social norms

1. Introduction: 1990 - the age of environmental communications in Britain 001
2. Nature, Culture and Society: environmentalism as symbolic action 004
3. Social Movements and Mass Media: towards a 'public agenda-building' perspective for political activism 014

B) Environmental Mobilisation in the Public Discourse: a methodology for retrieving qualitative data on a 'collective actor' from news

1. Sample Definition and Retrieval 026
2. Social Theoretical basis of the Model 031
3. The Model for Public Discourse Analysis 036
4. The Model for Newstext Analysis 042
5. Newstext Coding and Analysis 047
   - 5.1 environmental mobilisation sample 047
   - 5.2 text contents 048
     - 5.2.1 actors and events - contents indicators 049
       - 5.2.1.i environmental mobilisation indicators 050
       - 5.2.1.ii contested field indicators 051
       - 5.2.1.iii. media coverage indicators 051
     - 5.2.2 environmental discourse - contents indicators 052
       - 5.2.2.i. environmental news narratives 054
       - 5.2.2.ii discursive stunts and explict framing devices 055
   - 5.3 the "weighting" technique for discourse elements in a newstext 056
   - 5.4 visual databases: Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the WWF 059
   - 5.5 research strategy 062
6. Content Analysis - Preliminary Indicators 063
   - 6.1 environmental mobilisation indicators 063
   - 6.2 contested field indicators 064
   - 6.3 media coverage indicators 066

C) 'Public Campaign Cultures' in the Mass Media Discourse: theme mobilisation, target construction and environmental framing patterns

1. Introduction 069
   - 1.1 "Public campaign cultures" 069
   - 1.2 Framing environmental issues and social contests 072
2. Mobilising environmental themes into news coverage: environmental issue cultures, frames and campaigns 075
   - 2.i Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace 087
   - 2.ii the World Wide Fund for Nature 092
3. Targeting government responsibility contexts in news coverage: environmental campaign targets and contested fields 097
   - 3.i Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace 104
   - 3.ii the World Wide Fund for Nature 113
4. Environmental framing patterns in news campaigns: environmental issue frames "linking" contested fields 120
   - 4.i Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace 123
     - 4.i.a) supra-national environmental issue framing patterns 124

4.i.b) national environmental issue framing patterns 130
4.ii the World Wide Fund for Nature 136
4.ii.a) supra-national environmental issue framing patterns 137
4.ii.b) national environmental issue framing patterns 142
5. The Public Campaigns of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the WWF: globalising, personalising and moralising the environmental discourse 143

D) 'Telling Tales' - Environmental organisations and communication strategies in an emergent policy agenda: claim packaging in the Dirty Man of Europe event

1. Introduction: discourse patterns, mobilisation and "news events" 151
1.i Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace 156
1.ii the World Wide Fund for Nature 157
a) prior to the "news cycle": business as usual 158
a.i) Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace 159
a.ii) the World Wide Fund for Nature 163
b) the "prologue": themes 'speaking for themselves' 165
b.i) Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace 166
b.ii) the World Wide Fund for Nature 174
c) the "news event": blaming the Government 184
c.i) Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace 185
c.i.1) prelude: the week before 185
c.i.2) news event: the White Paper versus the Dirty Man of Europe 187
c.i.2.1) newsweek: an overview 187
c.i.2.2) headline news: leading opinions 188
c.i.2.3) news reports: balancing views 196
c.i.3) postscript: the week after 206
c.ii) the World Wide Fund for Nature 207
c.ii.1) prelude: the week before 207
c.ii.2) news event: the White Paper versus the Dirty Man of Europe 208
c.ii.3) postscript: the week after 212
d) the "epilogue": signs for the future? 212
d.i) Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace 213
d.ii) the World Wide Fund for Nature 226

E) 'Speaking in Tongues' - Image Politics: Accessing and biasing the news by cultural critique

1. Introduction: from collective identity to "public image" 230
2. Discursive practices in public texts: explicit framing devices and discursive stunts 234
2.i Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace 238
2.ii the World Wide Fund for Nature 260
3. "Image Politics" - introducing a moral reflexivity into the public culture 268

F) 'Talking Dirty' - Environmental Organisations, Political communication and Policy Change.

1. Introduction 275
2. Beyond the Dirty Man: symbolic action and policy outcomes 279
3. Environmental Organisations: towards a 'new' type of collective actor? 286

Bibliography 294

Acknowledgements

This thesis dissertation has benefitted from my involvement in a comparative research project conducted under the aegis of Klaus Eder at the EUI. Although my thesis dissertation is distinct from this body of research, many ideas were developed in the course of frequent discussions with researchers from across Europe who have been studying the changes in the environmental discourse in recent times. I would like to thank Klaus personally for creating such a convivial work environment that has been conducive to my taking on a career in social research.

In addition to supervision by Klaus Eder, I would like to acknowledge the personal support and comments of my co-supervisor William Outhwaite, University of Sussex, and the structural backing of David Morrison at the Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds, which enabled me to finish off the thesis after my departure from Florence. It is to these three people that I am indebted most in the development of past, present and future research activities.

Social research was not necessarily top of my personal agenda when I arrived in Florence at the age of twenty two in 1989. On the learning curve from then until now, I managed to fall in love, break a leg as 'stopper' of the International Heroes F.C., and demolish a car against the wall of an ancient monastery. Many friendships sustained me through the highs and lows of Florence life and the burden of the thesis. Perhaps this is not really the place for such dedications, but in retrospect it is clear that they were part of the fabric of life, and 'survival' in the distinct and peculiar worlds of Florence and the EUI would not have been possible without them. The patience and support of my parents deserves a special mention.

Paul Statham, Berlin April 1996.

Please note that all graphics mentioned in the text in fact appear separately. This is due to difficulties experienced by the printers for the final copy of the thesis. Here is an index of where they should appear:

Section	Title	after page
B.6.1	graph B.1: environmental mobilisation indicators	063
B.6.2	graph B.2: contested field indicators	064
B.6.3	graph B.3: media coverage indicators	066
C.2.i	pie chart f: types of environmental issue cultures mobilised in Friends of the Earth's media campaigns	087
C.2.i	pie chart g: types of environmental issue cultures mobilised in Greenpeace's media campaigns	087
C.2.ii	pie chart w: types of environmental issue cultures mobilised in the World Wide Fund for Nature's media campaigns	092
C.3.i	graph f: types of contested fields targeted by Friends of the Earth's media campaigns	104
C.3.i	graph g: types of contested fields targeted by Greenpeace's media campaigns	104
C.3.ii	graph w: types of contested fields targeted by the WWF's media campaigns	113
C.4.i	graph f2: environmental issue frame 'linking' across different types of social context Friends of the Earth's media campaigns	123
C.4.i	graph g2: environmental issue frame 'linking' across different types of social context Greenpeace's media campaigns	123
C.4.ii	graph w2: environmental issue frame 'linking' across different types of social context the World Wide Fund for Nature's media campaigns	136
C.5	graph fgw.1: types of environmental issues mobilised by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature	
	graph fgw.2: types of contested fields targeted by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature	143
D.1	graph D.I: Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature: distribution of article references 01/08/90 to 31/10/90	
	graph D.II: Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature: article references and major environmental 'news events'	151
D.1.i	discourse patterns: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" over sample graph f: Friends of the Earth graph g: Greenpeace	156
D.1.ii	discourse patterns: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" over sample graph w: World Wide Fund for Nature	157
D.a.i	discourse patterns: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek graph f.a: Friends of the Earth graph g.a: Greenpeace	159
D.a.ii	discourse patterns: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek graph w.a: World Wide Fund for Nature	163
D.b.i	discourse patterns: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek graph f.b: Friends of the Earth graph g.b: Greenpeace	166
D.b.ii	discourse patterns: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek graph w.b: World Wide Fund for Nature	174
D.c.i	discourse patterns: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek graph f.c: Friends of the Earth graph g.c: Greenpeace	185
D.c.ii	discourse patterns: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek graph w.c: World Wide Fund for Nature	207
D.d.i	discourse patterns: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek graph f.d: Friends of the Earth graph g.d: Greenpeace	213
D.d.ii	discourse patterns: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek graph w.d: World Wide Fund for Nature	227

graph B.1: environmental mobilisation indicators

Friends of the Earth



Greenpeace



World Wide Fund for Nature



graph B2: Contested Field indicators

Friends of the Earth



Greenpeace



World Wide Fund for Nature



graph B.3: Media Coverage indicators

Friends of the Earth



Greenpeace



World Wide Fund for Nature



Pie chart f: Types of Environmental issue cultures mobilised in Friends of the Earth's media campaigns



Key for environmental issue culture "types":

			percent total
•	res "green politics":	green political affairs/democracy/pressure group ethics	04%
•	"green business":	green market affairs/green developments/green tourism	06%
•	"car":	car use/car technology/car emmissions/transport/shipping/road use	12%
•	"natural env":	destruction of natural environment (national)/flora & fauna/landscape	13%
•	"ag waste pollution":	agricultural waste emissions/pesticides/slurry/nitrates/farming tech	16%
•	"ind waste pollution":	industrial waste emissions/toxic/chemical/sewage processing	11%
•	"energy":	energy affairs (non-nuclear)	11%
•	"nuclear":	nuclear power/nuclear testing/nuclear waste	09%
•	"mining":	extraction of natural resouces/mining	03%
•	"rare fauna":	endangered rare exotic animal species	01%
•	"rainforest etc.":	endangered exotic habitat (flora & fauna)/tropical rainforest/Arctic	05%
•	"global warming":	global warming/ozone hole/greenhouse effect/CO2/CFCs	09%

Pie chart g: Types of Environmental issue cultures mobilised in Greenpeace's media campaigns



Key for environmental issue culture "type":

			percent total
	res		
•	"green politics":	green political affairs/democracy/pressure group ethics	07%
•	"green business":	green market affairs/green developments/green tourism	02%
•	"car ":	car use/car technology/car emmissions/transport/shipping/road use	05%
•	"natural env":	destruction of natural environment (national)/flora & fauna/landscape	03%
•	"ag waste pollution":	agricultural waste emission/pesticides/slurry/nitrates/farming tech	01%
•	"ind waste pollution":	industrial waste emmission/toxic/chemical/sewage processing	20%
•	"energy":	energy affairs (non-nuclear)	06%
•	"nuclear":	nuclear power/nuclear testing/nuclear waste	31%
•	"mining":	extraction of natural resouces/mining	01%
•	"rare fauna":	endangered rare exotic animal species	01%
•	"rainforest etc.":	endangered exotic habitat (flora & fauna)/tropical rainforest/Arctic	11%
•	"global warming":	global warming/ozone hole/greenhouse effect/CO2/CFCs	12%

Pie chart w: Types of Environmental issue cultures mobilised in the World Wide Fund for Nature's media campaigns



Key for environmental issue culture "types":

		percent total
res		
• "green politics":	green political affairs/democracy/pressure group ethics	02%
• "green business":	green market affairs/green developments/green tourism	05%
• "car":	car use/car technology/car emmissions/transport/shipping/road use	05%
• "natural env":	destruction of natural environment (national)/flora & fauna/landscape	09%
• "ag waste pollution":	agricultural waste emmission/pesticides/slurry/nitrates/farming tech	--
• "ind waste pollution":	industrial waste emmission/toxic/chemical/sewage processing	--
• "energy":	energy affairs (non-nuclear)	--
• "nuclear":	nuclear power/nuclear testing/nuclear waste	02%
• "mining":	extraction of natural resouces/mining	02%
• "rare fauna":	endangered rare exotic animal species	37%
• "rainforest etc.":	endangered exotic habitat (flora & fauna)/tropical rainforest/Arctic	31%
• "global warming":	global warming/ozone hole/greenhouse effect/CO2/CFCs	07%

Graph f: Types of Contested fields targeted by Friends of the Earth's media campaigns



Key for contested fields (refer also to bottom of visual database):

				percent total res o	x
•	**energy**	**n**	nuclear energy production/nuclear industry/nuclear testing	7 %	2 %
		y	fossil fuel/renewable (non-nuclear) energy production	9 %	2.5 %
•	**production**	**a**	agriculture/farming/fishing production	12.5 %	1.5%
		i	heavy/chemical industry production (inc. mining & waste)	7 %	8 %
•	**services**	**t**	transport/shipping/vehicle activities	2 %	--
		b	business/market/commerce/media/consumer activities (inc. tourism)	2 %	9 %
•	**political rel.**	**p**	party political "politics" activities	10 %	0 %
		l	labour/trade union/welfare/"jobs" activities	0 %	4.5%
•	**gov/institution**	**e**	government policy decision-making/"internal" discussions	17 %	1.5%
	activities	**d**	public & private sponsorship/funding/aid/development /research	0 %	4.5%
				66.5 %	**33.5%**

Graph g: Types of Contested fields targeted by Greenpeace's media campaigns



Key for Contested fields (refer also to bottom of visual database):

				percent total res o	x
•	**energy**	**n**	nuclear energy production/nuclear industry/nuclear testing	7.5 %	29 %
		y	fossil fuel/renewable (non-nuclear) energy production	--	4 %
•	**production**	**a**	agriculture/farming/fishing production	--	--
		i	heavy/chemical industry production (inc. mining & waste)	18.5 %	6.5 %
•	**services**	**t**	transport/shipping/vehicle activities	--	--
		b	business/market/commerce/media/consumer activities (inc. tourism)	--	2 %
•	**political rel.**	**p**	party political "politics" activities	11.5 %	--
		l	labour/trade union/welfare/"jobs" activities	--	--
•	**gov/institution activities**	**e**	government policy decision-making/"internal" discussions	15.5 %	5.5 %
		d	public & private sponsorship/funding/aid/development /research	--	--
				53%	**47%**

Graph w: Contested fields targeted by the World Wide Fund for Nature's media campaigns



Key for Contested fields (refer also to bottom of visual database):

				percent total res o	x
•	**energy**	**n**	nuclear energy production/nuclear industry/nuclear testing	--	--
		y	fossil fuel/renewable (non-nuclear) energy production	--	--
•	**production**	**a**	agriculture/farming/fishing production	--	--
		i	heavy/chemical industry production (inc. mining & waste)	15.5 %	--
•	**services**	**t**	transport/shipping/vehicle activities	10.5 %	--
		b	business/market/commerce/media/consumer activities (inc. tourism)	04.5 %	29.5 %
•	**political rel.**	**p**	party political "politics" activities	--	--
		l	labour/trade union/welfare/"jobs" activities	--	--
•	**gov/institution activities**	**e**	government policy decision-making/"internal" discussions	16.5 %	--
		d	public & private sponsorship/funding/aid/development /research	--	23.5 %
				47%	**53%**

Graph f2: Environmental issue frame "linking" across different types of social context - Friends of the Earth's media campaigns



Key for contested fields (refer also to bottom of visual database):

- **energy** — **n** nuclear energy production/nuclear industry/nuclear testing; **y** fossil fuel/renewable (non-nuclear) energy production
- **production** — **a** agriculture/farming/fishing production; **i** heavy/chemical industry production (inc. mining & waste)
- **services** — **t** transport/shipping/vehicle activities; **b** business/market/commerce/media/consumer activities (inc. tourism)
- **political rel.** — **p** party political "politics" activities; **l** labour/trade union/welfare/"jobs" activities
- **gov/institutional activities** — **e** government policy decision-making/"internal" discussions; **d** public & private sponsorship/funding/aid/development/research



Graph g2: Environmental issue frame "linking" across different types of social context - Greenpeace's media campaigns



Key for contested fields (refer also to bottom of visual database):

- **energy** — **n** nuclear energy production/nuclear industry/nuclear testing; **y** fossil fuel/renewable (non-nuclear) energy production
- **production** — **a** agriculture/farming/fishing production; **i** heavy/chemical industry production (inc. mining & waste)
- **services** — **t** transport/shipping/vehicle activities; **b** business/market/commerce/media/consumer activities (inc. tourism)
- **political rel.** — **p** party political "politics" activities; **l** labour/trade union/welfare/"jobs" activities
- **gov/institutional activities** — **e** government policy decision-making/"internal" discussions; **d** public & private sponsorship/funding/aid/development/research



Graph w2: Environmental issue frame "linking" across different types of social context - the World Wide Fund for Nature's media campaigns

supra-national environmental issue framing pattern



Key for contested fields (refer also to bottom of visual database):

- **energy** — **n** nuclear energy production/nuclear industry/nuclear testing; **y** fossil fuel/renewable (non-nuclear) energy production
- **production** — **a** agriculture/farming/fishing production; **i** heavy/chemical industry production (inc. mining & waste)
- **services** — **t** transport/shipping/vehicle activities; **b** business/market/commerce/media/consumer activities (inc. tourism)
- **political rel.** — **p** party political "politics" activities; **l** labour/trade union/welfare/"jobs" activities
- **gov/institutional activities** — **e** government policy decision-making/"internal" discussions; **d** public & private sponsorship/funding/aid/development/research

national environmental issue framing pattern



Graph fgw.1: Types of environmental issues mobilised by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace & WWF.



Key for environmental campaign issue categories:		per cent total res.
green politics:	green political affairs democracy pressure group ethics	04 %
green business:	green market affairs green developments green tourism	05 %
car:	car use car technology car emmissions transport shipping road use	08.5 %
natural env:	destruction of natural environment (national) flora & fauna landscape	09 %
ag waste pollution:	agricultural waste emmission pesticides slurry nitrates farming tech	08.5 %
ind waste pollution:	industrial waste emmission toxic chemical sewage processing	11 %
energy:	energy production affairs (national non-nuclear)	07 %
nuclear:	nuclear power nuclear testing nuclear waste	13.5 %
mining:	extraction of natural resources mining	02 %
rare fauna:	endangered rare exotic animal species	09.5 %
rainforest:	endangered exotic habitat (flora & fauna) tropical rainforest Artic	13 %
global warming:	global warming ozone hole greenhouse effect CO2 CFCs	09 %

Graph fgw.2: Types of contested fields targeted by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the WWF.



Key for government/industry contested fields:			per cent of total resonance
energy	n:	nuclear energy production nuclear industry nuclear testing	15.5 %
	y:	fossil fuel renewable (non-nuclear) energy production	06.5 %
production	a:	agriculture farming fishing production	06.5 %
	i:	heavy chemical industry production (inc. mining & waste)	18 %
services	t:	transport shipping vehicle activities	03.5 %
	b:	business market commerce media consumer activities (inc. tourism)	13 %
political rel.	p:	party political "politics" activities	08.5 %
	l:	labour trade union welfare "jobs" activities	02 %
gov/institutional activities	e:	government policy decision-making "internal" discussions	19 %
	d:	public & private sponsorship funding aid development research	07.5 %

Graph D.I: Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace & the World Wide Fund for Nature: distribution of article references 01/08/90 to 31/10/90



Graph D.II: Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace & the World Wide Fund for Nature: article references and major environmental "news events"



Discourse patterns: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" over news sample
graph f: Friends of the Earth



graph g: Greenpeace



Discourse pattern: distribution of discourse elements resonance over news sample graph w: World Wide Fund for Nature



Discourse patterns: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek

graph f.a: Friends of the Earth - prior to the "news cycle"



graph g.a: Greenpeace - prior to the "news cycle"



Discourse pattern: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek

graph w.a: World Wide Fund for Nature - prior to the "news cycle"



Discourse patterns: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek
graph f.b: Friends of the Earth - the "prologue" phase



graph g.b : Greenpeace - the "prologue" phase



Discourse pattern: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek

graph w.b : World Wide Fund for Nature - the "prologue" phase



Discourse patterns: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek

graph f.c: Friends of the Earth - the "news event" phase



graph g.c: Greenpeace - the "news event" phase



Discourse pattern: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek

graph w.c: World Wide Fund for Nature - the "news event" phase



Discourse patterns: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek

graph f.d: Friends of the Earth - the "epilogue" phase



graph g.d: Greenpeace - the "epilogue" phase



Discourse pattern: distribution of discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek

graph w.d: World Wide Fund for Nature - the "epilogue" phase



A) The 'Shifting Sands' of Environmentalism: nature and social norms

"All science rests on shifting sand." Karl Popper.
"Public opinion exists only where there are no ideas." Oscar Wilde.

1. Introduction: 1990 - the age of environmental communication in Britain

It is well established in social research, that whether it is manifest in an emerging social movement or in the increasing issue salience of media coverage, environmentalism historically occurs in fluctuating "cycles" or waves (Downs 1972) (Brand 1990). Similarities have been drawn between the peak of attention for the set of environmental issues relating to the 'limits of growth' in the late sixties/early seventies and the peak of attention for a new range of global environmental issues and in particular 'global warming' in the late eighties/early nineties (Ruedig 1995). For the period of the case study of this dissertation, the popularity of environmentalism in Britain was at the crest of a tidal wave that threatened to submerge the policy agenda with a new basis for political claims and leave an indelible imprint on British public life. By the early nineteen nineties the British public had indicated an aptitude for the "new environmental consciousness" (Jamison, Eyerman et al. 1990) that appeared to be becoming an irreversible social trend.

In the 1989 European elections fifteen per cent of the population voted for the Greens, an unusual event for British politics in contrast to other Northern European countries that have proportionally representative electoral systems. Public opinion polls repeatedly highlighted public concern for the environmental issue relative to other social issues.[1] Perhaps more importantly, people were beginning to take the environment into account for making everyday decisions and choices. This cultural shift in values introduced changes into the social structure of British society. Industry was beginning to discuss environmental standards for practices and products, as politicians were threatening environmental regulation, and consumers, investors and employees demanded changes. The established environmental

[1] The "highs" in the opinion polls were when thirty five per cent responded that pollution environment was the most or second most important issue facing Britain today in July 1989, and 31 per cent claimed to have taken part in five or more environmental activities in the last year or two in July 1991 (MORI *The Independent* 10/09/91).

organisations, such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature witnessed an unparalleled increase in membership, funds and resources, audiences with politicians and businessmen and unprecedented access to journalists and editors. The mushrooming of green chip investment funds, environmental consultancies, and the emergence of organisations such as Media Natura and Panos offering communication and campaign design services and quality publicity and photographic services to other environmental organisations, highlighted the professionalisation, specialisation and market orientation of a developing movement sector. Increasing vegetarianism and the use of nature symbolism and environmental ethics by advertisers indicated that environmentalism was becoming a form of cultural consumption. The assertion that "we are all environmentalists now!" was never voiced with more enthusiasm, confidence or cynicism than in 1990.[2] Even a Prime Minister whose name in "Thatcherism" had become synonymous with the neo-liberal policies of the New Right had joined the environmental bandwagon.[3]

Public discourse was making environmental problems increasingly visible in the early nineties, as environmental meanings penetrated different spheres of everyday experience and social life. Whether this involved wearing T-shirts exhibiting potent green symbols, writing academic philosophy that theorised about the moral relation of man to nature, or making political decisions that reduce the price of lead-free petrol, it is clear that meanings relating to environmental problems were increasingly being used as a resource in the social construction of meaning in all spheres of culture in British society.

The explosion of public communication about environmental concern provided a new opportunity structure for the political actions of the environmental organisations. As the established experts on the production of environmental critique, the new cultural legitimacy of environmental claims produced a favourable context for Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature to pressurise the Government for changes in public

---

[2] "We are all environmentalists now!" is the common rallying call for the new actors making environmental claims. It was the title of a chapter in Porritt and Winner's (1988) green classic *The Coming of the Greens*, but also fulfils a similar function in the 'joke-book' *The Green Bluffer's Guide* (Milsted 1990). The duplicity of this usage aptly demonstrates that the catchphrase implies a range of meanings from the sincere to the ironic/cynical. This perhaps covers the range of motives available for the new adherents to the "new environmental consciousness" in British culture at the time.

[3] Thatcher's speech to the Royal Society in September 1988 is taken as the initial turning point in the Conversative Government thinking towards an acknowledgement of the significance of the environment as a political issue (Flynn and Lowe 1992) (Grove-White 1993).

policy and the introduction of 'ecological modernisation'. The popularity and increasing resonance of public debate on the "new environmental consciousness" in the mass media offered an action context for the organisations to mobilise environmental critiques and define their preferred policy options. As well as promoting the global environmental perspective and utilising their international organisational links, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilised critiques into media 'packages' that were relevant to the national policy discourse. One example of this was the attempt to criticise British policy practices by referring to European Community environmental standards (Haigh 1984). The production and mobilisation of environmental information through the media discourse became the basis of a political strategy for incorporating the new environmental perspective into Government and industry practices. In this sense the 'success-oriented'[4] sector of the environmental movement, started to act as a set of "cultural pressure groups" in British politics. In an era when the definition of what precisely is environmentally problematic and non-problematic constitutes a currency for social communication, the specialism of the environmental organisations as collective actors was manifest in shaping the public culture of environmental problems into a strategic resource for achieving specific political objectives. The mass media discourse became a key arena for the actions of environmental organisations.

It is neither original nor controversial to cite the media as an influential factor in the ascendancy of environmental issues on the public agenda over the last two decades.[5] However, the media is often introduced as an 'ad hoc' explanatory factor for the development

---

[4] Smelser (1962) makes the distinction between 'success-oriented' and 'value-oriented' movement organisations. The professionalised environmental organisations Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the WWF may be defined as 'success-oriented' for this period in the early nineties. The 'value-orientations' of the British public had become a resource for the goals defined by their political strategies.

[5] This is the finding of many analyses of the environmental movement organisations and the media e.g. (Lowe and Goyder 1983), (Lowe and Morrison 1984), (Greenberg 1985), (Burgess et al. 1993), (Hansen ed. 1993), and the issue salience of environmental issues and technological risks in news discourse e.g. (Downs 1972), (Brookes et al. 1976), (Atwater, Salwen et al. 1985), (Strodhoff, Hawkins and Schoenfeld 1985), (Peltu 1988), (Lichtenberg and Maclean 1988), (Gamson and Modigliani 1989), (Burgess 1990). The movement sector itself appears in little doubt over the value of public communication resources for advancing environmental claims, the first edition of the public directory *Green Pages: the business of saving the world* states (Elkington, Burke et al. 1988:p.196): "The overall conclusion must be that the printed word, whether in the form of books, newspapers, magazines or computer print-outs, remains a tremendously powerful medium for communicating environmental information."

of an environmental movement[6], or seen as part of a linear mono-causal social process of which environmental protest is the outcome[7]. The deficit in such analyses has been partially rectified by the introduction of the constructivist perspective into media sociology on the production and communication of environmental meanings, e.g. Hansen (1991), Anderson (1991), Burgess et al. (1990), Burgess and Harrison (1993), Einseidel and Coughlan (1993), an increasing emphasis on the construction of collective identities, e.g. Melucci (1989), Eder (1993; 1995), and the dynamics of communication about technological risks, e.g. Beck (1992) Krimsky and Plough (1988), Nohrstedt (1991; 1993). Starting from these insights I develop a 'public agenda-building' perspective for environmental communication in the media and operationalise this perspective to analyse the mobilisation activities of the three major environmental organisations in a key policy event. This will contribute to our understanding of the actions of the 'success-oriented' sector of a social movement during a phase of media-heightened environmental critique. First I consider the role of nature as a symbol in the cultural code of a society.

2. Nature, Culture and Society: environmentalism as symbolic action

In the early 1990s the environmental critique carried by nature symbolism appeared to be an ascendant political ideology in British culture. What does it mean that people seemed to be more inclined to be mobilised by issues concerning nature than issues concerning the treatment of other human beings in the society of which they are part? What is special about nature, and what makes conflicts about nature different from social conflicts about the distribution of resources?

The relationship between man and nature is a key cultural code of modernity (Passmore 1974) (Pepper 1984) (Eder 1988; 1995). The dominant tradition in the modern

---

[6] This is understandable for early studies of environmental organisations using traditional pressure group models that predate the dynamic explosion of environmental issues in the news in the late eighties and early nineties, such as Lowe and Goyder (1983). It is less forgivable in more recent studies, such as those of Yearley (1990) and McCormick (1991).

[7] For example Mazur's (1990:p.295) research on the news coverage of nuclear and chemical risks relates 'quantity of coverage' to 'quantity of demonstrations' to infer that news coverage translates via 'audience beliefs' directly into public protest actions: "My thesis is that the amount of reporting about an environmental or technological hazard, rather than what is reported about the topic, is the primary vehicle of communication about such risks, and that the beliefs of the audience follow directly from the intensity and volume of reporting."

discourse on nature has been the subordination of nature to man. However the scientific knowledge which has allowed the rationalisation and instrumentalisation of man's relationship to nature throughout the course of modernity has also sustained a counter-code for a more sentient and expressive relationship to nature.[8] Green political theorists often argue for a reversal of this cultural code for society and advocate an 'ecocentric' approach that prioritises nature, e.g. Eckersley (1992). Others have adopted the 'anthropocentric' perspective that there is a distinction between the expansion of productive forces per se, and the expansion of productive forces that transform nature in a way that leads to worse life-conditions for human beings, e.g. Grundman (1991). That culture offers more than one way of viewing the world indicates that the knowledge basis of social experience is dependent on the culturally organised and shared symbols which give the world meaning. This means that the potential for mobilising an environmental critique, i.e. a claim for a different relation to nature, is therefore also dependent on a culture and the worldviews that are resonant within a particular society.[9]

Anthropology tells us that nature is a key symbol for mediating social relationships in what are sometimes referred to as primitive societies. For example, the work of Mary Douglas (1966; 1975) shows us that symbols of nature are used for defining the taboos and rituals which regulate the patterns of social behaviour in primitive societies. The hierarchy and social stratification of such societies is negotiated by references to nature - which animals

---

[8] Historical research by Thomas (1983) defines the modern relationship of man to nature by four dichotomies which illustrate the dual basis of the dominant cultural code of modernity and its counter-code: town/country; cultivation/wilderness; conquest/conservation; and meat/mercy. Fiddes' (1991) work defines meat-eating as an expression of man's domination over nature. Much of the work on the imagery of landscape, e.g. Williams (1972), Olwig (1984) on Denmark, illustrates that the wilderness of nature becomes the focus for the expression of liberation from existing dominant political norms. Eder (1995a; 1995b) has characterised the cultural code of European culture by distinguishing between the dominant Greek model for a 'bloody culture' and its counter code the Jewish model for a 'non-bloody culture'.

[9] This perspective is supported by Eder (1995:p.9) who for the special case of environmentalism where there are 'contradictory certainties' (i.e. competing sets of scientific facts) extends the notion of the social construction of norms to the social construction of facts: "Culture organises man's relationship to nature, including his way of conceptualising it: this consequently implies that facts are dependent on culture." Such a perspective avoids charges of 'relativism' by seeing culture as a limiting condition for knowledge and action, a view which is supported by the empirical work of Thompson (1984) on energy policy actors. This culturalist perspective relates to both the cognitive and action levels of social reality and is therefore superior to descriptive behavioralist accounts that simply translate conditions in the natural world into public opinion. For example, Yearley (1991:p.3) is guilty of such a flaw when he states: "It is probably possible to identify a list of more-or-less agreed central environmental issues. And the sense that they are related is no doubt enhanced by some of the complexities thrown up by the natural world. Thus, concern about ozone has entered the public's conscience through the destruction of the ozone layer high up in the atmosphere."

are sacred, which may be eaten, which may not and which may only be eaten on special occasions. Taboos and rituals defining the relationship between mankind and nature regulate the standards of social behaviour.[10] Nature is the source of values through which people are able to negotiate their social position relative to others in the society. It is by referring to nature that people are able to communicate across the boundaries of social distance. Douglas refers to this process whereby symbols of nature are used to enforce a hierarchical system of social stratification - primitive societies are relatively 'closed' from the outside world - as the "purity rule".[11]

Taboos and rituals define how people interact with nature to reproduce the specific sets of social relationships that define the structure of a society. Dirt is 'matter out of place'. So wherever there is impurity, there are rituals of communication to negotiate this problem. This indicates that nature is not only a symbolic resource for defining the 'polluting' aspects of social life, but that this process of definition gives rise to a language and communication. Pollution is a social construct that is given meaning through culture. Moreover there is no reason why the logic of modern societies should consider itself too rational for this type of analysis. The rituals and taboos of modernity may simply be produced by a more highly complex arrangement of social relationships than those of primitive societies. Complex societies still have to use symbolic mechanisms to communicate the exchanges which produce their specific sets of social relationships.[12]

Nature is the reference by which people define what is 'pure' and 'impure' in their

---

[10] See also Eder (1988; 1995b), Rappaport (1979) and Richards (1993) for further accounts on the role of nature symbolism in the regulation of primitive societies.

[11] Douglas (1975: p.214/216) states: "In Hinduism .. wherever the organic erupts into the social, there is impurity; birth, death, sex, eating and defecating incur impurity and so are hedged with rituals ... All other media express the purity rule... The purity rule is a control system to which communicating humans submit. It imposes a scale of values which esteem formal relations more than intimate ones... (I)t is an apparently necessary part of our common system of communication to distance our social life from animal origins."

[12] This extension of the application of the purity rule to contemporary societies is in part acknowledged by a development in Douglas' own perspective, she states (1975: p.239): "When I first wrote *Purity and Danger* about this moral power in the tribal environment, I thought our own knowledge of the physical environment was different. I now believe this to have been mistaken. If only because they disagree, we are free to select which of our scientists we will harken to, and our selection is subject to the same analysis as that of any tribe." The perspective of Melucci (1989) on collective identities is also pertinent here in that it takes the 'appeal to nature' as a key element in identity construction in contemporary societies. For Melucci the 'appeal to nature' as an expression of need is a reaction to the psychological pressures on the individual of the processes of hypersocialisation at a stage of complex modernity.

culture. The way that we use these purity rules, what we commonly refer to in everyday language as 'laws of nature' such as our perceptions of beauty and health, regulates how we interact with nature and provides the moral standards by which we are able to negotiate our relationships with other actors in our society. Nature is a cultural element that enables us as a collectivity, as a community, and as a society to morally reconstitute what we refer to as "civilisation" by our individual and collective actions.

Though it is built around the authority of the rationality of scientific knowledge and man's domination over nature, the Western cultural tradition for modernity has always since its origins in the Enlightenment maintained a counter-cultural tradition arguing for a more mystical and sentient relation with nature (Eder 1988; 1995). The eighteenth century Romantic movement is just one example of this counterculture. Deep ecology[13], new religious sects, travelling people, alternative medicines and the Gaia hypothesis are more contemporary examples. It is worth noting that these countercultural movements in the West draw inspiration and symbols from the Oriental and Indian cultures over which the dominant Enlightenment tradition deems itself to be more rational (Young 1990). For example, the name "Greenpeace" is taken from a North American Indian mythology where the 'warriors of the rainbow' will return to restore the land to its former glory.

The important point to make with regard to contemporary societies is that people are increasingly referring to nature to construct identities and define their social relationships and that this is occurring in the mainstream rather than at the margins of public life. Concern for nature, "environmentalism", is no longer lentils and sandals or a mystic retreat from the rational society, but may be pineapple face wash or sandalwood shaving cream on the shelves of the Body Shop. The ethical retreat of the 'sect' has given way to acts of cultural consumption. Environmental ethics are fashionable. People are referring to nature to communicate about the changes that are occurring in their everyday lives in contemporary societies. Ethical standards are changing, and this is impacting on the social structure of societies, even if the outcome is that people choose to buy unleaded petrol or fit a catalytic converter to their BMW rather than undergo a profound spiritual conversion. It becomes clear then that the 'return to nature' does not necessarily indicate a retreat to 'primitivism', nor is it simply a cynical marketing ploy, but it is a way that people negotiate the boundaries

[13] On the movements for deep ecology, see Luke (1988) and Devall and Sessions (1985).

that define what is "new" to society as a collectivity. It is a way that people deal with the moral dilemmas that are thrown up by processes of social change.

The so-called primitive societies were relatively 'closed' to external cultural influence, apart from the prying presence of anthropologists from the West. At the same time such societies tended to be in a condition of stasis, having a stable order and hierarchy of social relationships. Today's complex societies are clearly different. Nonetheless, nature plays the same role today as it did in the primitive societies: nature is the key symbolic code for our morality, it gives us lessons on how to conceive of social differences. In the rapidly changing contemporary world that has been described as a 'postmodern condition' (Lyotard 1984) (Harvey 1984), 'late modernity' (Giddens 1990; 1991; 1995) and 'risk society' (Beck 1992; Beck et al. 1995), people have to negotiate more differences - nature/society; private/public; race; gender; insider/outsider - in constituting the social relationships which make them part of a society, and define them as a citizen, as a person, and as an individual.

In contemporary societies, nature becomes the source of moral arguments for actors to stake a claim for a "new" social space in the changing society, but each individual or collective actor is in competition with other actors. Conflicts arise over what we understand as the 'quality of life' - e.g. what sort of towns do we want to live in?[14] Political communication becomes necessary to negotiate the differences between competing actors in the collective search to establish a consensus for society. It is for this reason that what has been refered to as 'life politics' (e.g. Giddens 1991) has become one of the most characteristic features of late modern, complex or contemporary societies.

One might wish to argue that environmental problems are not just social constructions: they are real. The natural world is under attack - the seas are rising, the climate and seasons are less predictible, exhaust fumes do cause asthma and lung problems. Indeed the scientific consensus tells us today that environmental problems do exist. That environmental problems, such as global warming, CFCs, and the ozone hole are constructed in the language, symbols and cultural authority of science does not make them less real. But

[14] Initially such types of social conflicts were thematised, carried and introduced by "new social movements" that appeared across Western Europe and the United States in the early eighties. On the characteristics of the "new social movements" which organise and mobilise themselves around issues concerning contradictions in the social relationships of gender, modern uban living, and the nature/society relationship, see Brand, Buesser et al (1983), Olofsson (1988), Moscovici (1990), Melucci (1989) and Eder (1993). Such concerns are now articulated in mainstream discourses.

why is the science that has served mankind so well since the Enlightenment unable to find 'technical fix' solutions to these environmental problems? And why does the selection of environmental problems in the public sphere seem to shift and change as much at the whim of cultural novelty as by the rational design of mankind? The answer lies in the disagreement by scientists over the 'hard' factual evidence that is the basis of environmental problems (Eder 1995). 'Hard science' is itself in internal conflict over the basis of environmental problems; the naturalistic 'objectivity' models of scientific analysis produce contradictory results. This means that science is not able to legitimate a single course of action - a 'solution' - that will eradicate an environmental problem. Instead people contest the facts. Furthermore, the basis of scientific models are themselves defined within the socially defined culture of a discipline (Thompson 1984) (Wynne 1990). Scientists are also motivated by goals that are strategically defined. When the experts disagree, the task of legitimating a course of action moves from the expert discipline of science and the policy community to the public sphere, where politicians, industrialists, trade unions, environmental pressure groups, and members of the public, employ 'softer' logics to mobilise competing claims about how to tackle an identified environmental problem.

This illustrates that environmental problems are constructed in a complex social process whereby public actors communicate, interact and contest specific sets of social relationships in a society. In this production of a collective project for 'ecological modernisation', society takes on a responsibility for the unknown damage that its present actions may cause in the future. This is a historically 'new' perspective. Society begins to negotiate the 'risks' which its own technological development poses to its survival. It is the articulation and definition of such 'risks' to collective and individual life that is the substance of environmental politics. To the question of what makes the environmentalist project different as an ideology from its predecessors in Western political cultures, we may answer that 'environmentalism' does not find belief in the liberation of one class of mankind from another but in the desire to save the world from itself. What then is the substance of environmental politics?

Public actors are able to draw on different resources than scientists when they attempt to legitimate their arguments in the public sphere. Obviously, protest actions such as using human chains to block the roads to ports where animals are exported to be eaten as veal in France are symbolic and ritual collective actions that are designed to raise the contentious

issue of animal welfare and rights on the public agenda. Such struggles and demonstrations tend to occur at the early stage of the public mobilisation of an environmental problem.[15] Once problems appear in the public discourse, and the increasing prominence of coverage for environmental topics in the mass media is a self-evident feature of recent years, public actors are able to use moral and aesthetic appeals to nature as well as appeals to scientific facts to legitimise environmental problems. This constitutes an appropriation of cultural authority from natural science, a de-mystification of the legitimacy of scientific knowledge for political claims. It also makes the basis of the actions which public actors use to raise environmental problems a type of political communcation that is symbolically mediated. Environmental action is a type of symbolic politics.

Historically the force of environmental critique has come from the public protest. Indeed for the case of environmental critique, it appears that rather than the 'system' penetrating the lifeworld, we witness the symbols of nature - symbols of the lifeworld - penetrating and extending the system of public communication. The Body Shop Ltd did not receive its name nor its success as a commercial enterprise purely by chance. It seems that in contemporary societies people are increasingly willing to find 'impurity' - i.e. 'pollution', environmental problems - in the changing social relations that bind their societies as the basis for constructing identities.[16] Environmentalism becomes the cultural expression of fear changes in the basis of everyday social life. Thus the Britain which prioritises the welfare of its animal livestock and the beauty of its Twyford Downs over profit from export trade and better road links for commuters, and sometimes over the plight of the socially disadvanted and homeless, is a Britain in flux and change. Not only is this a Britain which is concerned for nature, but a Britain which is concerned for the future, which feels threatened by the imminent integration with mainland Europe and a lack of cultural distinction from the traditional enemy of the veal eating French.

Drawing initially from an analysis of structural change in the Federal Republic of

---

[15] See the discussion on social movements and media research below for a description of the usual patterns of phases of development in an environmental movement.

[16] This applies both to the advent of environmentalism and to the recent resurgence of xenophobic movements in mainland Europe. Whereas environmentalists refer to nature in advocating the purity of a global society, racists refer to nature for advocating the purity of one ethnic grouping within a society. Both define the present condition of society as 'impure' as a demand for social change. As Douglas (1966:p.162) states: "Purity is the enemy of change."

Germany, Beck (1992; et al. 1995) refers to this condition where conflicts over the distribution of resources are replaced by conflicts over the distribution of risks as "risk society". In the imminent 'veal' wars with the French at the EC level that were promised by the British Minister for Agriculture in response to the livestock transportation campaigns, it is possible to identify one example of a symbolic form for national identity that is constructive for the British variant of the "risk society". In this case, the risks that have been publicly defined at the nature/society boundary are taken up by the national Government to define Britain as a culture and a society that is in conflict with the French. The problem concerns the moral treatment of animals: it is a risk to the moral values of the British if the French turn British born calves into 'veal' using methods that we British consider ro be cruel. The protestors claim that the Government has a responsibility to defend the rights of animals that are born in Britain. The British Government wishes to displace responsibility or blame for the 'impurity' of the moral risks that have been raised publicly in Britain from themselves and their farmers to the French.[17] It is perhaps worth noting that a week later the public discourse in Britain was able to demonstrate that not all the French are tainted by this moral 'impurity' of 'veal eating' by highlighting the presence of Brigitte Bardot, a famous animal rights activist and vegetarian, at the funeral of the killed woman protestor. This indicates that the political disputes between the Government and the protestors at the national level are mediated within symbolic exchanges in the media discourse.[18]

Two further points arise from this example regarding how environmental critiques affect and impact upon social structure. Firstly, at the national level the public mobilisation of an environmental critique reintroduces the business rationale of farming practices back into the ethical sphere of social life. Farmers must become responsible for the animals in a "new" moral way that operates beyond economic interests in profitable trade. This may be seen as

---

[17] When national Governments take up such claims the game becomes one of displacing the responsibility for risks to another country behind a thinly veiled nationalism. One might argue that the bizarre alliance of the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Greenpeace in the recent *Brent Spar* international dispute is another example of a politician's 'free-riding' opportunist attempt to displace the responsibility for environmental concerns to a foreign national arena - in this case the Dutch and British.

[18] *Brigitte pays tribute to Animal Rights Woman* was the front page headline in the popular press. Women are good signifiers of purity because they have a different, wholesome, less wasteful relation to nature than men. In addition to satisfying 'news values', the presence of Bardot was a symbolic attempt by the campaigners to detract from the anti-French nationalism of the Government's response and re-focus on the issue of animal rights.

evidence that environmental critique introduces a de-differentiation of the national culture of modernity, whereby the different spheres of expert knowledge lose their traditional authority and become re-moralised in the public sphere. The populist impetus of environmentalism disembeds the experts from their positions of power. Indeed environmental critique is often strategically initiated by 'movement intellectuals' (Jamison, Eyerman et al. 1990) who are excluded from the existing institutions of power.

Secondly, at the international or supra-national level, British values are placed in opposition to French values, and for trade to continue (and there are supposed to be no barriers to trade within Europe now!) such conflicts must become regulated by a common European public policy over which there is a degree of political consensus. In this case, then, a nationally defined environmental problem becomes the basis for a cross national European conflict. Although they are based in culture, environmental problems have a role in shaping the social relationships which define societies not only as collective identities but also as collective actors with national public policy interests. This is why at the European level disputes, such as the one over the standards for 'eco-labelling' are so difficult to solve. They appear to be based on incommensurable claims that arise from different national cultural perspectives on the relationship to nature.

It is tempting to argue that environmental problems acknowledge no geographical boundaries, indeed this was a lesson that the Western world was taught by the radioactive fall out from the explosion of the Chernobyl reactor. The unknown threats that were, and still are, posed to human life by radioactive fallout, which in Britain contaminated the uphill pastures of Cumbria and North Wales, then the sheep, and then three years later the human foodchain through the sale of lamb were not predicted by the scientists. However, if environmental problems know no geographical boundaries, they are nonetheless defined within a national cultural setting. Each European nation has a cultural myopia in the selection of environmental problems. The British have empathy with the animals and defend the aesthetic beauty of the nation's landscape - "the Garden of England" - against the scourge of redevelopment, but are content to distribute raw sewage and radioactive waste from Sellafield along the beaches of the west coast and Ireland. Italians consistently rank top in the Eurobarometer scales for environmental concern, but beat to death thousands of birds in a ritualistic slaughter at the start of the hunting season. The French seem less concerned about the risks of nuclear power than any other European nation, whereas the Germans

appear to be more concerned about the threat to life of any form of modern technology but happily drive their cars faster than any other European nation. This shows that although environmental problems may be viewed as part of a historical countercultural tendency against the rationality of modernity and the ethos of scientific progress, they are nonetheless are defined, communicated and contested through sets of social relationships in specific historical and cultural settings. Furthermore, environmental protest feeds on the tradition for political mobilisation against the state within a national political culture, thus the women protesters at the British ports have their sororial predecessors in the anti-nuclear protests at Greenham Common in the early eighties.

The 'veal' type of public protest which is characterised by human chains and non-violent actions may be seen as a 'ritualised' event, a symbolic form of protest action. Rituals and symbolic action have been noted as the specific form of protest action for environmentalists (Wynne 1982), and the staging of dramatic symbolic events by environmental organisations such as Friends of the Earth is well documented, e.g. Greenberg (1985). Referring to such cases of protest as 'ritualised' does not trivialise their significance or undermine the value of the political pressure which they have brought to bear on the Government. On the contrary, symbolic production and the staging of cultural rituals is a rational form of action in conditions of 'uncertainty'. When people are unable to draw conclusively on scientific reasoning, 'rituals' serve as the most rational form of cultural expression for legitimising an actor's political claims. 'Ritualised' actions that highlight the 'impure' and unpalatable aspects of the treatment of nature by farmers constitute a potent way of communicating dissent within British society. This type of political action readily achieves a cultural resonance within society because of its 'novelty'. The forum where environmental protest becomes manifest as a critique against specific actors, 'the polluters', is the institution of public communication, the mass media and public discourse. It is for this reason that the exponential growth of environmental concern that we have witnessed and experienced in Britain over the last decade has been carried in the public texts that are news. It is from the news that we learn about environmental problems, and either accept or ignore their significance to our patterns of social behaviour. One day we may eat veal in blissful ignorance and with cultural impunity, the next we may not.

To recap on the argument: Nature is a resource that actors in contemporary societies are increasingly turning to in the attempt to construct "new" political identities that are an

expression of the changing basis of their social relationships. The complex social process whereby environmental problems are identified within a national culture brings scientific knowledge into the public sphere. When environmental problems enter the mainstream system of public communication in the mass media, actors may appeal to other types of resonance in the culture of a society than the rationality of scientific facts. For example they may make aesthetic or moral claims. This does not make scientific knowledge an illegitimate basis for founding a political consensus, but means that it must achieve a *cultural reflexivity*. Furthermore, the involvement of lay actors in this process of the definition of environmental problems, and the often futile quest for a political consensus on 'solutions', has the effect of rendering the previously hidden world of policy communities and their scientific experts visible and accountable in public. It is at this point where 'life politics' (Giddens 1991) impacts upon the public policy decisions that are made by national Governments, and at the same time is part of the process which redefines the "new" basis of social relationships that constitute a society.

In this dissertation I shall analyse the production and mobilisation of environmental critique by the environmental organisation as a form of symbolic action and attempt to gauge the potential it has to influence politics.

3. Social Movements and Mass Media: towards a 'public agenda-building' perspective for political activism

The substantive aim of the following research is to reconstruct the media communication strategies of the three major environmental organisations over the duration of a specific public policy episode. A primary source of data will be the news texts in which the environmental organisations lodged their claims against the public policy proposals of the Government. The "Dirty Man of Europe" case study will attempt to show that environmental organisations maintain the potential to affect public policy decisions by discursively shaping the news coverage of environmental affairs. This process of framing the contents of the news discourse as part of a political strategy is the dimension of the environmental organisations' actions which is the object of inquiry.

Such a perspective runs against the conventional wisdom of much empirical social movement research which tends to use news coverage as a primary data source for verifying

the empirical existence of a specific number of protest events - i.e. mobilisations - which have occurred on the public stage for a social problem over a given time.[19] The social movement perspective that I propose does not take the mobilisations of protestors on the streets, the number of demonstrators or even shifts in public opinion polls on an issue, as an empirical indicator for measuring the existence or 'success' of the movement. Building on the insights of the political process (McAdam 1982) and political opportunity structure (POS) (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1991; Kriesi Koopmans et al 1992) models for social movements which emphasise the structural opportunities that facilitate or resist the challengers[20], the measure for 'success' will be defined by the ability of the movement organisations to introduce changes in the Government's public policy stance on the environment. What then is the theoretical model for how the actions of the environmental organisations may serve to introduce changes into public policy?

According to the POS model the political system provides an institutional context which determines the potential for repression or incorporation of the collective actions of the challengers and a measure for the 'take-up' or political effectiveness of the strategies which challengers may employ. The strength of the political opportunity structure model is that it defines the significance of collective action in relation to the institutional structures of political power within a society, and that it provides a context for measuring the 'effects' of collective action by analysing the realignments that occur between actors in the conventional party political system and interest group politics.[21] The weakness of the political opportunity structure model lies in an overemphasis on political institutions and politics (in the narrow sense of the party political system) as the context for the mediation of ideas and claims of challengers. In contrast the frame alignment model (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford

---

[19] Here I refer to the empirical tradition of social movement research following Tilly (1978) that analyses waves and cycles of protest that occurred as public events in the social world e.g. Tarrow (1989), Franzosi (1990). In contrast to this perspective, Gitlin's (1980) pathbreaking research uses the notion of hegemony to analyse the rise and fall of a movement through television coverage.

[20] Kriesi (1990; et al. 1992), a distinguished advocate of the POS model, identifies three broad sets of properties that define the opportunity structure for 'challenging' a political system: a formal institutional structure; informal procedures and prevailing strategies for dealing with 'challengers'; and a configuration of power that is relevant for confrontation with the 'challengers' - i.e. a party political system. The 'members' of the political system produce strategies for dealing with 'challengers' on the basis of these three components.

[21] For a discussion of the organisation and political 'effectiveness' of social movements from a similar structural perspective, see Gundelach (1989). Huberts' (1989) discussion of the political influence of the Dutch environmental movement also takes participation in the policy process as the yardstick for 'effectiveness'.

1988, 1992) for social movements emphasises the active role that is played by movement organisations in defining and constructing social problems. According to this perspective collective actors need resources and access to networks, so that the meaningful interpretations of social problems which they define - frames[22] - serve to build a consensus for the participatory mobilisation of other actors in a specific campaign.

The ideational elements or interpretative frames (Snow and Benford et al. 1986; Gamson 1988; Gamson and Modigliani 1989) that are mobilised by the protest actions of challengers introduces a process of identity formation and consensus building into the public sphere, whereby social problems become defined and the boundaries of conflict are drawn between the opposed collective actors in society. Extending this perspective, social movements not only exist within a political opportunity structure, but may also be seen as a form of political expression that is constructive of the political opportunity structure. When actors protest they mobilise a collective identity which appears as a "sign" in the public sphere. This symbolic expression of protest renders 'visible' the contradictions which are produced by the structural cleavages that exist in contemporary societies.[23] As nature is increasingly defined as problematic for social relationships (Jamison and Eyerman et al. 1990; Eder 1993), the political expression of environmental protest becomes part of the process which defines social problems and sets public policy agendas in contemporary societies.

The status that is attributed to frames by Snow and Benford (1992) whereby they are said to require an 'empirical credibility' to be consensus building, has been criticised for

---

[22] Snow et al (1986: p.464) take the concept of framing from Goffman (1972) "to denote 'schemata of interpretations' that enable individuals 'to locate, perceive, identify, and label' occurences within their life space and the world at large. By rendering events or occurences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective". Frames are the conceptual tools which actors use to convey, interpret and evaluate information.

[23] Social movement theorists who emphasize the process of identity formation through collective action, e.g. Touraine (1981) and Melucci (1980) (1989) consider that the "visibility" of a social movement in the public domain serves as a symbolic means for building a constituency during periods of mass mobilisation. For Melucci this collective identity is a resource which is constructed through collective action and relates the cognitive level of strategy formation and emotional experience to the action level of making networks and negotiating decisions and outcomes with other actors. He states (1988:p.342/3), "Collective identity provides the base for shaping expectations and for calculating costs and benefits of the action. The construction of a collective identity involves continual investment and occurs as a process. As it approaches the more institutionalized forms of social action, an identity may crystallize into organisational forms, system of rules, and leader relationships. In less institutionalized forms of action its character is closer to a process which must be continually activated to make the action possible."

wavering between positivist epistemology and radical constructivism (Gamson 1992; Koopmans and Duyvendak 1994). For the case of environmental problems which are social constructs because the scientific experts disagree over the basis of "facts" (Eder 1995), the notion of the 'empirical credibility' of frames in producing a mobilisation potential becomes a question of whether a frame has what Snow and Benford (1988) themselves refer to as 'narrative fidelity'. This means simply that to succeed frames must achieve a resonance in the culture of a society. They must relay the 'new' message of the movement in a way that communicates, builds on and challenges the existing traditions and discourses in a society.[24] Questions of whether a frame is a true factual representation of an objective condition of environmental degradation are bypassed in the arena of incommensurable claims that is environmental news. Environmental claims achieve (or do not achieve) legitimacy as a meaningful definition of a problem as competing 'as if' realities. This means that getting a message across to a constituency may depend more on a collective actor's ability to utilise the cultural tools (Swidler 1986) available - e.g. by making references to nationalist sentiment, tradition, resonant cultural narratives - than on the truth or scientific accuracy of the claims that are made.

Snow and Benford's frame alignment model was originally designed to explain the mobilisation of individual participants and consensus-building within a social movement.[25] In its later formation the notion of "master frame" (Snow and Benford 1988, 1992) is introduced to identify the key frame which serves to organise the series of frames that are produced by the movement into a sustained protest campaign. This notion of "masterframe" has been used to analyse the process of mobilisation between networks of groups in the

---

[24] A key contribution of the Jamison and Eyerman et al. (1990) perspective is that from their comparative analysis of knowledge interests (an identity indicator) and political strategies (a political action indicator) for the Swedish, Danish and Dutch environmental movements, the combined cognitive and strategic dimensions of an environmental movment's actions become visible whilst the comparative dimension indicates that such movements are bound to emerge and act within the specificities of a national political cultural setting.

[25] This initial restriction of frame potency to 'building the group from within' has a hint of the determinist 'shared grievance' as the explanatory variable for mobilisation potential. The emphasis on internal identity as a resource was intended to contradict the tendency in the resource mobilisation perspective for seeing grievances as omnipresent and on that basis dismissing identity as a relevant factor for mobilisation. Resource mobilisation perspectives focus on the effectiveness of the organisation's use of available internal resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977), but do not adequately cover the role of identity in mobilisation (Ferree and Miller 1985). Contemporary social movement theories, including resource mobilisation, political process, POS and also frame-alignment models, have all attempted to explicitly distance themselves from the traditional focus on 'grievance' as the explanatory variable for collective behavior (see discussion in McAdam 1982).

development of a specific campaign of action (Gerhards and Rucht 1991). Building on the Snow and Benford framing perspective and McAdam's (1988) work on recruitment to social movements in "micro-mobilization contexts", Gerhards and Rucht (1991) re-emphasise the importance of frames as resources for building networks between different established social movement organisations in the development of a campaign.[26] They develop the concept of "meso-mobilization contexts" to refer to the mobilisation of groups rather than individuals. These meso-mobilization contexts facilitate: structural integration by linking groups together, pooling resources, and enabling a preparation for protest activity and public relations exercises; and ideological integration by developing a common frame of meaning which serves for the interpretation of the problem and the linking of concerns to its definition of a public issue (Gerhards and Rucht 1991: pp.2-3).

The function of a meso-mobilization context is as an *intermediary structure* that fulfils the tasks of developing campaign ideas and linking the core groups who have the responsibility for collecting organisational and material resources (1991: p.31). The theoretical impetus to draw from Gerhard and Rucht's notion of meso-mobilization contexts is that social movements should no longer necessarily be seen as being structurally bound into a single unified protest group or set of groups. On the contrary as a collective actor the protest groups exhibit a flexibility in their organised potential for mobilisation through networking across a wider public domain. The empirical analysis of Gerhards and Rucht deals with two short-lived localised protest events in Berlin. If meso-mobilization contexts are discernible within relatively short-term protest events, then for a sustained long-term national protest campaign, such as the environmental protest, it seems plausible that meso-mobilization contexts may themselves inhere into relatively stable structures and constitute the networks, frames and structures of an emergent organised social movement. What we may be witnessing in the intermediary structure of meso-mobilization contexts is the dynamic transformation and professionalisation of a movement as it extends its campaign activities to target the mainstream rather than the margins of public life as the arena for consensus building.

---

[26] This constitutes a self-conscious attempt to operationalise a model that draws on an the integration of elements from both the identity-oriented and resource mobilization-oriented paradigms of social movement research. Researchers in the field of social movements had been advocating such a shift in social movement research for some time, e.g. Cohen (1985), Klandermans and Tarrow (1988), McAdam (1988), Zald and McCarthy (1988), Jamison, Eyerman et al. (1990).

As the 'life cycle' of a social movement develops over time, on the other hand it may remain a closed private sect and not build a broad constituency, the social movement organisations become established, organised and professional public actors.[27] Protest activism becomes characterised by the actions of professionalised social movement organisations which seek to build consensus across a broad public constituency. This specialisation of protest activism into 'experts' and 'followers' tends to replace the intermittent cycles of mass public protest demonstrations against a series of 'one-off' targets that were prevalent, for example, in the protests against the proposed building of nuclear power plants in the early eighties. Such a transformation in the organisation and structure of activism within a movement necessitates that we re-evaluate our notion of what constitutes *mobilisation* over a social problem.

The process of an historically sustained environmental protest may be seen as part of a complex process whereby broader constituencies of actors with different interests and levels of commitment are built up into the interrelated networks of a public campaign. At this phase of an environmental movement the notion of individual *participation* for the broad constituency of movement supporters is largely displaced to the cognitive level which shapes perceptions rather than the level of direct action for the movement's goals. Political strategies and goals become the specialist activity of the small band of professional 'movement intellectuals' who act as entrepreneurs in the mass media discourse to place their strategic environmental claims on the political agenda.[28] For the mass constituency commitment may

---

[27] Jamison and Eyerman et al. (1990:p.9-11) describe four phases in the historical development of the environmental movments in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands. In brief these may be characterised as an initial public education; a new kind of organised ecology movement; a social movement at its high point marked by increasing specialisation and a practical orientation to politics; and a fragmentation of the movement into a cluster of specialised and competitive organisations. My present discussion refers to an environmental movment that is somewhere between the latter two stages but without adhering to the pessimistic conclusion of Jamison and Eyerman et al. that sees the movement in inevitable decline as the conflicting interests of the specialised environmental organisations are increasingly prevalent. Such a 'life cycle' is characteristic of the development of the environmental movements in Western Europe and at the beginning of the nineties the movments may be seen to be dominated by five types of organisation: conservation associations, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, a national umbrella organisation, and the World Wide Fund for Nature (van der Heijden, Koopmans et al. 1992). Descriptive accounts of the contemporary environmental movement in the UK confirm the primacy of these professionalised organisations (McCormick 1991; Szerszynski, Miles et al. 1995).

[28] Jamison and Eyerman et al. (1990:p.11-12) refer to these actors as 'movement intellectuals' and emphasize their creative role in the mobilisation of a protest movement: "their status as intellectual as well as the role they perform emerges in the spaces, the organisations, and the networks, which themselves constitute the movement. Movement intellectuals are in an important sense creators of the movement, for in their work as publicists, spokespersons, organisers, and so on, they mediate between the individual activist and event and

constitute an ethical conviction or be limited to a passing fancy, thus producing a myriad of part-time or inconsistent beliefs in the public culture. Supporters require little investment in terms of protest action beyond paying their subscription fees. However, over the long term the embedding of environmental claims within the culture of a society provides a resource for actors to evaluate their beliefs and monitor their everyday decisions by environmental criteria. Acts of consumption such as the purchase of an environmental light bulb may in time appear more rational. In a sense the environmental movement becomes a process of social learning in which the organisations offer to teach the public moral lessons. Much depends on the cultural depth which the environmental claims of the specialist activists are able to reach.[29] Such a perspective for environmental protest makes the stimulus/response and 'grievance' models of public attitudes and social change (e.g. Inglehart 1990; 1992) appear oversimplistic. Rather than individuals, it is the environmental problems which are *mobilised* into the public discourse as part of a complex process of agenda-building.[30]

At this phase of public protest one might argue that the mass media discourse itself constitutes a "macro-level mobilisation context" of public communication by linking the environmental organisations, the "master frames" which they mobilise, and the networks of actors and constituencies who support, oppose or are indifferent to their political claims.[31] As the constituency becomes generated within the media mainstream, cultural identification

---

the formation of the collective." Their earlier analysis (1989) of Greenpeace, the most hierarchically structured, professionalised and specialised of the environmental organisations, supports this perspective for a 'success-oriented' type of social movement organisation. See also Rucht (1995) for similar findings on Greenpeace.

[29] Klandermans (1988:p.193) concludes on consensus formation and mobilisation: "Consensus is not created by convincing individual after individual; rather, groups of individuals linked by social networks learn to move together in the direction of the movment organization. Individuals must choose whether to go along or deviate from the groups they are involved in." Social learning remains a collective entreprise even when achieved through interaction with the public discourse rather than involvement in a movement network.

[30] Agenda-building (cf. also agenda-setting) is an established concept for the negotiations between networks actors in the establishment of public policy agendas and the definition of social problems (Cobb and Elder 1983) (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988) (Kingdon 1984). Similarly, the concepts of media agenda-setting (McCombs and Shaw 1972) (Lang and Lang 1983) and media agenda-building (Weaver 1978) have been prominent in communications research. It seems a profitable development to combine these perspectives for analysing how social movements make claims in the public discourse which affect public policy decisions and outcomes.

[31] This perspective extends the frame alignment model (Snow and Benford) from the mobilisation of individual participants *within* social movement groups, and extends the meso-mobilisation of groups into networks through the production of a joint "masterframe" (Gerhards and Rucht) to the specialist sustained campaign activity of mobilising environmental frames into the mainstream public discourse.

with environmental claims is opened up as a discursive opportunity and resource to all actors. Rather than aiming to attract activists on the streets in public demonstrations, this type of specialist mobilisation and protest activity is engaged at a discursive level of political debate. Mobilisation may be seen as a form of 'public agenda-building'.[32] Mobilisation seeks to build consensus and legitimacy for a specific way of viewing a social problem by placing the cognitive tools - i.e. frames - for its definition and interpretation into the public discourse. This process of consensus mobilisation is distinct from consensus formation where consciousness is raised in networks of movement subcultures (Klandermans 1984; 1988). As an organisational strategy, it is no longer oriented towards legitimating the existence of the movement by forming a mobilisation potential, but towards legitimating the political strategies of the established movement that are defined by its action goals. Consensus mobilisation becomes a strategic resource which environmental organisations use against their political opponents.[33]

Social conflicts characterised by demonstrations or strikes against the policies of the state on a defined problem - e.g. nuclear power, privatisation of state-owned industries - appear on the public stage as series of periodic or fluctuating "cycles of protest". When a specific collective actor contests a state's public policy agenda, the "visibility" of a social movement in the public sphere, i.e. its framing strategies[34], serve as a "sign" for building consensus among constituencies of supporters and dissent from opponents among the actors who are part of society. In this way, the social conflicts over a state's public policies which may over time result in institutional and structural changes in the political system, are at the

---

[32] In the following I shall use the term mobilisation in this sense of the mobilisation of meaning into the public discourse, i.e. "agenda-building". This follows in a tradition of a constructivist model for political communication that has developed from a combination of social movement and media analysis perspectives, e.g. Strodhoff, Hawkins and Schoenfeld (1985), Gamson (1988; 1992; 1995), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Hansen (1993) and Cottle (1993).

[33] Introducing widespread public support becomes the aim behind the mobilisation of consensus for environmental knowledge that is produced by the agenda building activities of social movement organisations. Klandermans (1988:p.182) indicates that, "However important the adequate dissemination of knowledge may be, it is of course never more than a condition for the actual objectives of consensus mobilization, which create a widespread positive attitude toward the action goals."

[34] The concept of framing is widely used as the analytic category for the ideological constructs and normative argumentations that are mobilised by social movements in the media to contest public policies, e.g. Snow and Benford (1986), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), and Eder (1995). Frames have also been used as a conceptual tool in media analysis (Altheide 1976; Gans 1979; Glasgow University Media Group 1976) though sometimes in ways that tend to focus on the media at the expense of the audience (Neuman, Just et al. 1992).

same time the "visible" reference point for actors to relate these political confrontations to their own social lives. The competing political claims of actors in a social conflict exist as a cultural resource for people to rationalise the actions which reconstitute their social relationships in specific social settings. This indicates that as well as being manifest in a structural institutional configuration of political parties and interest groups, politics also works at the more latent level of the process of social change that is initiated by everyday decisions and actions. The cognitive appeal of a social movement's frames may not translate directly into mass protest activism, but by sustaining the "visibility" of a social problem within a political culture the organisations' actions are a constructive factor in maintaining the potential for policy change within the political opportunity structure.

The communications-based perspective which I propose applies a cognitive twist to the concept of political opportunity structure, by emphasizing framing and network-building as part of the discursive process which builds the agenda for and *mobilises* a social problem. Such a theoretical model acknowledges the increasing role of communication resources in the construction and mediation of politics.[35] Public discourse is more than a process which consists of a variety of intertextual activities, it is a cultural field that specific actors are able to use to dominate others. It is through the public discourse that political actors frame problems, make claims and contest social relationships. News has a special role in this process of communication. The social function of news is to represent the contests that are pertinent to a society at a given time. News is a cultural resource or "tool kit" (Swidler 1986) which is available to the actors in a society for relating the significance of public events to their own social lives. In societies where politics is increasingly based on mediated information, the role of the mass media provides an important link between the political actors who hold power, the collective actors who challenge them, and the constituencies who provide them with electoral and cultural legitimacy.

The process of news reporting continuously assigns meaning to issues, constructs and reconstructs social problems, defines the available political options and serves to provide public visiblity to collective actors and their claims. News is an interesting form of public

---

[35] Following Habermas (1987) (1989) the thesis for the increasing importance of communicative action in the reproduction of relationships in "late modern" (Giddens 1989, 1991) or complex societies (Melucci 1989) is an established tenet of social theory. This is relevant both in relation to individual and collective action and in the process of the social reconstruction of society as a collective project, that Touraine (1981) refers to as the "self-production" of society.

discourse.[36] The news is different every day. Events in the news are permanently ephemeral, but when placed repeatedly, daily, in a time series, the news signifies what is pertinent to the society to which we belong. The news has a potentiality: it is our point of access and our resource to the knowledge about the world of which we are part and to which our actions contribute. Politics is a societal critique which is lodged in the news. In this sense the news is a 'reflexive' resource for actors to locate themselves and their actions in a shared political environment. News discourse is pervaded by a moralising agenda which makes it particularly suited for the normative critiques that are mobilised by moral protest actions (Lee 1989). It is in the news that "the corrupt" are named and blamed. It is by the news that we are confronted by the moral polemics of collective actors, party politicians and interest groups. And it is from the news that we learn about social problems, and either accept or ignore their significance to our patterns of social behaviour. In a world of communications-driven politics the role of the news as the key resource of mediated information for individuals to experience events, monitor their social actions and form opinions ought not to be understated. The validity of such a perspective is supported by descriptions of the society which is emerging from the current process of structural transformation as an 'informational society' (Luke 1989).[37] The increasing communicative basis and media transmission of politics has even led some commentators to lament the popularisation of politics and suggest that political communication in contemporary societies is devoid of normative intent to the extent that it has become reduced to the value of a symbolic spectacle.[38]

The mass communication research tradition (e.g. Blumler 1983) has been criticised for separating the fields of production and reception of news and for being excessively media-centric at the expense of an understanding of how collective identities are constituted

---

[36] News discourse has its own thematic forms and structures. See van Dijk (1988) (1991). Cottle (1995) discusses the role of 'new formats' as discursive contexts for vying social interests in a mediated public contestation.

[37] Luke (1989) directly links the rise of new social movements to the 'informationalizing of postindustrial societies'.

[38] This is the perspective of Edelman (1989). Commenting on the American case his outlook is too pessimistic in that it claims that the symbolic basis of political communication denies the possibility for meaningful participation as a basis for collective action. On the contrary, as the identity perspective - e.g. Melucci (1989) - indicates, it is the symbolic basis of politics which provides collective actors that exist outside the party system, e.g. Greenpeace et al., with the cultural resources for voicing their opinions through the media.

(Schlesinger 1991). Recently emphasis has been placed on the role of 'source strategies' in the production of news contents (Schlesinger 1990)[39] and the role of the audience as interpreting, meaning-constructing actors (Rosengren, Wenner et al. 1985; Jensen and Jankowski eds. 1991; Neuman Just et al. 1992). Complementary to this perspective the news-based analysis of social movements has developed explanatory models for the emergence of interpretative frames as an element of political discourse (Donati 1992, Gamson 1988).

Starting from such a public discourse perspective, this dissertation will use the newsprint media coverage as a data source for reconstructing and analyzing the agenda-building information which three established social movement organisations mobilised during the three-months cycle of a campaign against the British Government's policy agenda. I argue that a key factor determining the relative success of the organisations' campaigns were the cognitive, identity and communications resources that were available to the professional activists for constructing political claims and mobilising them into the public discourse. The success of such agenda-building activism depends not only on receiving favourable coverage from journalists who report the news, but more importantly on penetrating the thematic structures of news with biased information - i.e. frames - so that the reports on environmental topics are open to favourable interpretation by the actors who 'read' the news. Established environmental organisations use their specialist knowledge and communication skills for building an extensive cognitive network of latent support in the public domain. In this way an 'as if' consensus is established for the organisations' political goals. It is this constructed resource of public legitimacy that enables the organisations to exert influence on the policy agenda through coverage in the mass media.

At this phase of an environmental movement characterised by professionalised media-oriented organisations, the strategic dimension of the construction of political action is defined by the 'issue salience' of the organisations' media messages - its agenda-building properties - rather than the participation by individuals (or small networks of amateur grass roots activists) in protest events. Instead of an integrated large-scale movement structure, it becomes more accurate to refer to the specialised mobilisation function of the small network

[39] In a comparative analysis of the 'mediatization' of the public debate on climate change based on interviews with scientists, journalists and environmental protection agencies, Mormont and Dasnoy (1995) conclude that the role of the press in problem definition is limited relative to the source actors and their communication strategies.

of professionals in the organisations - 'movement intellectuals' (Jamison, Eyerman et al. 1990) - and the receptive function of public constituencies to whom they appeal for funds, part-time commitments, membership and credibility.[40]

In the following I attempt to operationalise this perspective into an analysis of the news coverage of the three major movement organisations in the British Dirty Man of Europe policy event. Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilised claims into the national news media as part of a relatively unified campaign against the Government's new policy proposals for the environment. This "Dirty Man of Europe" campaign was a discursive protest cycle, it was rendered visible in the semantic contents and arguments of news discourse. The empirical object of analysis for this research is the strategic dimension of the communication which was lodged in the news by the environmental organisations in a discursive campaign against the Government's policy thinking.

[40] Of course different phases of activism may still be present within the same movement. For example the grass-roots public demonstrations against the exportation of live animals in early nineties Britain co-exist with the activities of the established professional movement sector of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, the WWF and other environmental organisations which have a political campaign agenda which is more specialised and strategically oriented to the public policy arena. The relationships between the two levels of actism is not necessarily competitive and may even be complementary. Indeed the specialist organisations may feed off the grass-roots protest against the conditions of exported animals and act to shape this message for the political discourse. What we witness are two different but related levels of environmental agenda-building.

B) Environmental Mobilisation in the Public discourse: a methodology for retrieving data on a 'collective actor' from news

Here I present a methodology for retrieving data on the communicative actions of the environmental movement from a sample of news texts. These introductory comments are extended in the following sections of the analysis **C**, **D** and **E**.

1. Sample Definition and Retrieval

The news sample was collected from the CD ROM package for *The Guardian* newspaper covering August, September and October 1990. *The Guardian* is acknowledged as having a higher quality and quantity of environmental coverage than other British newspapers (Lowe and Morrison 1984). It may be considered as an "opinion leader" on environmental matters. Furthermore, as environmental matters have been consistently shown to be a "middle class concern"[1], *The Guardian* may be considered as a discursive field where the debates for the environmental contest are enacted. A strategic factor in the choice of the sample concerned its "time span". The three months August, September and October 1990 cover the period of the public launch of *This Common Inheritance*, which was intended to be the first integral policy statement on the Environment by a British Government.[2] As such the news sample spans a period when the claims-making activities of the environmental organisations in the media are likely to be heightened.

The sample was retrieved by searching for the names of all the environmental organisations in the United Kingdom in the CD ROM for *The Guardian*. The list of names for all the British environmental organisations was initially compiled from the indices of the

---

[1] No matter how one defines "middle class" - by occupational indicators (Cotgrove and Duff 1980; 1981), by value indicators (Milbrath 1984), or as a culturally embedded social construction or "habitus" (Eder 1993) - the findings show that concern for the environment is a characteristic of the "middle classes". Furthermore the theory of "new social movements" claims that the latest wave of environmentalism is carried by the "new middle classes", see e.g. Offe (1985), Brand, Buesser et al. (1983).

[2] More detail on the policy events which culminated in the Conservative Government's publication of *This Common Inheritance* on the environment is given in sections **D**, **E** and **F**. For an overview of environmental politics in Britain prior to this, see Flynn and Lowe (1992) for a descriptive account of Conservative Party thinking, Lowe and Flynn (1989), O'Riordan (1988) and McCormick (1991) for background on British environmental policy, and Grove-White and Burke (1989) and Grove-White (1993) for the movement's thinking on the opportunities for making interventions into policy matters.

following sources: *Environmental Groups in Politics* (Lowe and Goyder 1983); all environmental organisations that appeared in the EUI British news data-base on environment 1987-91 (Statham 1993); *The World Handbook on Environmental Organisations* (1990); *A Year in the Greenhouse: An Environmental Diary* (Elkington 1991); *The Green Consumer Guide* (Elkington and Hailes 1988); *The Environmental Directory* (1991); and *Greenpages* vol. I (Elkington, Burke et al. 1988) and vol. II (Button 1989); *Die Friedens- und Umweltbewegung in Grossbritannien* (Rothgang 1990); and the *Friends of the Earth Handbook* (1990). In addition to the names of the organisations common abbrieviations or common misrepresentations, such as "WWF" and "World Wildlife Fund" for the World Wide Fund for Nature, were also searched. Each article that was retrieved by this method was read to confirm the validity of the reference. References to other environmental organisations that appeared in articles but were not in the original list of organisations were then searched and added to the original sample. Non-British organisations that appeared but were not active in the United Kingdom were excluded. This searching strategy provided a sample of references to the environmental organisations that were active in the British media discourse in the key period in August, September and October, 1990.

The overall number of article references to environmental organisations in the news sample is given in Table **B.I**. This list of environmental organisations represents the organisations that are active in the news discourse during the period of the Government's White Paper Publication.[3]

The emergence of a new set of organisations with multi-national concerns and the revitalisation of conservation organisations has been noted as a characteristic feature of the cycle

[3] The British Green Party which is a political party and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament which is the prime organisation of the peace movement are excluded from the sample of environmental organisations. The British Greens do not have the same significance to the environmental movement as their European counterparts since they are permanently excluded from power by the British electoral system. Although the public protests of the peace movement in the early eighties served as a precursor to the contemporary environmental movement, CND is not strictly nowadays an organisation which engages in environmental activities. In 1990 CND was re-activated to voice opposition against the Gulf War in Britain.

Table B.I: Environmental Organisations in *The Guardian* August, Sept. & Oct., 1990

environmental organisation	total number of article references
Friends of the Earth (FoE)	56
Greenpeace	35
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)	23
Nature Conservancy Council (NCC)	18
National Trust (NT)	15
Countryside Commission	14
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA & SRSPCA)	14
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB)	14
Council for the Protection of Rural England/Wales (CPRE & CPRW)	13
English Heritage	13
The Ramblers' Association	12
Regional Wildlife Trusts	10
The Body Shop Ltd.	7
The Campaign for Real Ale (CAMRA)	6
Country Landowners' Association	6
The Forestry Commission	6
Association for the Conservation of Energy (ACE)	5

Four article references: Centre for Alternative Technology; Green Alliance; Institute of Environmental Health Officers; Royal Horticultural Society; Royal Society for Nature Conservation; Henry Doubleday Research Foundation/National Centre for Organic Gardening.

Three article references: Earthscan; Media Natura Ltd.; League Against Cruel Sports; Soil Association; The Vegetarian Society; Women's Environmental Network (WEN).

Two article references: British Field Sports Association; Civic Trust; Groundwork Trust; Institute of Terrestrial Ecology; Food Commission; Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission; International Council for Bird Preservation (ICBP); Learning Through Landscapes Trust; National Food Commision; Open Spaces Society; Pesticides Trust; Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB); Transport 2000.

One article reference: Advisory Committee on Releases in the Environment; Agricultural and Food Research Council; Anglers' Co-operative Association; Ark; Babymilk Action Coalition; Broads Authority; British Horse Society; British Trust for Ornithology; British Wind Energy Association; Campaign for Lead Free Air (CLEAR); Clean Technology Unit; Cleanaway Ltd.; Company of Imagination; Concord Films; Council for National Parks; Council for Posterity; Council for Independent Archaeology; Cranfield Institute of Technology; Cumbrian's Opposed to a Radioactive Environment (CORE); Earth First!; Ecology Building Society; ECOTEC Research and Consulting; Ecover Ltd.; Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS); Environmental Resources Ltd.; Environmental Transport Association; Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group; Fauna and Flora Preservation Society; Findhorn Association; Friends Provident; Grassland Research Institute; Homeowners' Friendly Society/Green Chip Investment Fund; Historic Churches Preservation Trust; Institute of Biology; Institute of Virology; National Council for Voluntary Organisations; National Housing and Town Planning Association; National Playing Fields Association; National Society for Clean Air; Naturalists Trust; Noise Abatement Society; Panos; Peace Pledge Union (PPU); Pure Meat Company; Research in Food and Agriculture; Red Deer Commission; Science and Engineering Research Council; Scottish Scenic Trust; SustainAbility Ltd.; Traidcraft Ltd.; Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust; Whale Club of the World; The Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society; Zoological Society/Hawk and Owl Trust.

of environmental concern in the eighties and early nineties.[4] The crude figures for media resonance indicate that for the British case this characterisation broadly holds true. Friends of the Earth ought to be considered along with Greenpeace as organisations that have experienced exponential growth in membership and national prominence. The World Wide Fund for Nature seems to be a prime case for a revitalised version of a more traditional conservation organisation but has experienced a period of growth comparable to that of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.[5] It is also worth noting that alongside the organisations for the traditional national concerns for animal treatment (e.g. Royal Society for the Protection of Birds), landscape aesthetics (e.g. Council for the Protection of Rural England) and access (e.g Ramblers' Association), and the national cultural heritage (e.g. National Trust), new types of organisation based on consumer preference (e.g. Campaign for Real Ale CAMRA), publishing and producing about nature (e.g. Earthscan, Panos), ethical consumption (Ethical Investment Research Service EIRIS), ethical production (e.g. The Body Shop) and alternative science (e.g. Centre for Alternative Technology) have also emerged over the last decade.[6]

The three most prominent environmental organisations in the overall news sample are Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. Broadly speaking these three organisations may be considered as the media-oriented sector of the British environmental movement. The news texts covering these three organisations were retrieved in full and analysed in a comparative context by the methodology described below.

In addition to being the most resonant organisations in the media, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature are also the three organisations which have have cross-national concerns, and mobilise campaigns across a broad range of environmental issues, that can be local, national, international and global in scope.

---

[4] Concerning contemporary environmental movements, Eyerman and Jamison (1989: pp.89) state: "(T)he current environmentalist wave is characterised, on the one hand, by a revitalisation of the older, more traditional conservation societies and, on the other hand, by the meteoric rise of a multi-national environmentalist corporation, namely Greenpeace International."

[5] In the period from 1986 to 1990 Friends of the Earth's membership increased from 25 000 to 200 000 and Greenpeace's from 70 000 to 380 000. Over the same period the membership of the World Wide Fund for Nature increased from 107 000 to 231 000 (McCormick 1991; Szersynski, Miles et al. 1995).

[6] Compare for the list of organisations cited in the work of Lowe and Goyder (1983) with those that appear in this three months of media discourse as proof of the emergence of these new types of organisation in the British environmental movement.

Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth often deal with environmental issues that arise from uncertain scientific findings and which therefore take the form of a controversy in public debate. Environmental issues concerning nuclear power, global warming, or the detrimental effects of pesticide use in farming are a few examples of this type of "risk" issue. The World Wide Fund for Nature on the other hand takes up issues that are less "controversial" within the national context, but are focused beyond the limits of national concerns, such as the preservation of the black rhino, the conservation of Amazonian rainforest, and the funding of Nature Parks in Tanzania. Such concerns are unlikely to achieve national media attention unless they are mobilised by an environmental organisation and highlighted for editorial and journalistic attention. Like the controversial "risk" issues, this "world wide" type of environmental issue is more likely to be covered in the news when the issue or controversial opinion can be attributed to publicly known third party.

Public image is a primary capital for these environmental organisations. They must cultivate their public identity by exerting control over the way that the media represents them and their environmental campaigns. They are keen to remain the "goodies" in the public eye, whilst at the same time portraying their targeted opponents which may be the government, the farming lobby, or a polluting factory etc., as the "baddies" (see below section E). Since their opponents are often powerful public actors with ready access to the media, such as the Government or multi-national companies, this maintenance of a favourable public image in the news is in itself a considerable achievement. Not only is this achievement indicative of an impressive array of communication skills, but when one also considers that the major source of validation for environmental organisations' legitimacy claims comes from an ethical stance, the organisations need to be remarkably skilled to avoid being 'hoisted by their own petard'.

The production of environmental communication is a complex process that ought not be reduced to a simplistic linear model of production and reception (Hansen 1990). In the following I analyse the contents of *The Guardian* media coverage of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. The aim is to learn about the social relations between the environmental organisations, media actors and other actors, in the production of environmental communication as newstext. Emphasis will be placed on text analysis in the attempt to reconstruct how a critique became lodged in the news in the 'Dirty Man of Europe' policy event.

2. The Social Theoretical Basis of the Model

It is widely accepted that media communication plays an important role in raising environmental awareness (Lowe and Goyder 1983) (Lowe and Morrison 1984) (Hailes, Elkington et al. 1988). Less work has been done on the textual *content* that is produced by this "processing" of environmental concern in the public media, and the active role that is played by the environmental movement - i.e. their 'source strategies' (Schlesinger 1990) - in this communicative process.

Existing analyses of environmental organisations in Britain and their communication activities tend to be based on the "pressure group" model, e.g. (Lowe and Goyder 1983), (Grant 1990). This assumption from the political science tradition that environmental organisations are "pressure groups" may be unnecessarily prescriptive in determining our interpretation of their actions. As I have mentioned in section A, environmental problems are social constructions (Everden 1992) and the production of environmental meaning in a national cultural setting is a complex societal process (Hansen 1990). Building on a social movements perspective, e.g. (Touraine 1980) (Melucci 1989) (Brand, Buesser et al. 1983) (Jamison, Eyerman et al. 1990), theorists in the rest of Europe, Scandinavia and the United States have been less reliant than their British counterparts on the "pressure group" model for interpreting the significance of environmentalism as a form of political protest action.[7]

Following in the social movements tradition, I claim that there is a strong case for arguing that environmental organisations act as "cultural agents" rather than "pressure groups". The actions of contemporary environmental organisations are primarily designed to communicate to the public discourse rather than gain discrete attention from actors in the

[7] In the analysis of the British case, I think that this deficit is due more to a bias in British academic culture towards using the "pressure group" model for analysing political action rather than an essential difference in the activities of the British movement from its European counterparts. Historically, this may be due to the influence of the "civic culture" thesis (Almond Verba 1963) which defined rational British political behaviour as "playing within the rules of the game". Early analyses of the British environmental movement, such as Lowe and Goyder's excellent study (1983), rightly used the "pressure group" model as they were dealing at that time with nature conservation rather than the more politically activist type of environmental organisation. Lowe and Goyder's model even had the foresight to stress the importance of the media and what they refer to as the "attentive public" to environmentalism. Ruedig's (1990) review essay on the analyses of political activisim and social movements in Britain is in my opinion mistaken to conclude that the social movement perspective in Britain is lacking due a lack of political activism. Suffice it to say that two other German authors Murphy (1985) and Rothgang (1990) found ample data for analysing the British case of political activism and the environmental movement in the eighties using a "new social movements" perspective.

policy making process. Over the long term these two political aims may not be incompatible, but it is mistaken to assume that the aim of achieving media resonance may be interpreted solely as an aspect of the aim to become an internal policy actor. Indeed in contemporary societies, environmental protest action appears increasingly to consist in a form of "cultural agenda-setting" or "cultural agenda-building".[8]

Environmental organisations mobilise normative arguments into the public discourse. As "cultural agents" their intention is to 'bias' the representation of the environmental contest in the national culture, so that Government and Industry actors are forced not only to legitimate activities which damage the environment, but also to seek legitimation from the public on the basis of environmental values that are set by the organisations. In this sense the environmental organisations construct the "public" as a constituency who legitimate or delegitimate social claims by environmental critieria. To the extent that this is their intention the environmental organisations may be considered as a "cultural pressure group".[9]

Achieving media resonance is a well documented aim of environmental organisations (Anderson 1990) (Greenberg 1985). Media resonance is not simply appearing in the news, but the ability to present arguments in the public discourse. Environmental organisations use the media resonance which their actions achieve as a resource for shaping the public discourse on "environmentalism". By mobilising environmental claims into news texts the organisations "shape" the structure of the public discourse on the environment in Britain. This means that other actors in the public discourse - citizens, businesses, government, political parties and even scientists - must refer to the information and arguments that have been mobilised by the organisations when they too attempt to legitimise their actions by environmental values. As more actors are confronted by environmental "problems" in the public discourse, the more need there is to attempt to legitimise actions by referring to environmental values. The mobilisation activities of the environmental organisations can be seen as a deliberate attempt at "cultural agenda building". Their communicative actions seek to predetermine the basis by which other actors are judged in the public discourse. In this way, the actions of the environmental organisations affect the set of social relationships

---

[8] On agenda-setting and agenda-building see the discussion in section A.

[9] I first coined the term "cultural pressure group" in an earlier pilot version of the methodology for this study (Statham 1992).

which constitute the environmental contest in a national setting. At the present historical stage in the British environmental debate, the "politics" of the environmental contest occurs primarily in the public discourse which is prior to the policy discourses of Government.

The public discourse on the environment may be seen as an ongoing process of social learning in a society, the forum where the competing claims are contested and possible courses of action legitimated or delegitimated. However, social learning in the language of environmental discourse does not guarantee that society is taking a path towards sounder environmental practices. It merely guarantees that more different types of collective actors are able to engage in environmental discourse. This means that an environmentally "sustainable" future is maintained as a theoretical possibility for society but it certainly does not predetermine the outcome of the historical event.

In contemporary societies "nature" has increasingly become a cultural resource for actors to find "problems" with the existing set of social relationships (Melucci 1989) (Beck 1992). References to "nature" are important symbolic carriers of such identity formations and serve to communicate a collective identity to the rest of a society.[10] They redefine society as a collective project. The use of nature symbolism to mobilise ideas about society induces a *reflexivity* into political culture. When actors refer to ideas of nature they identify a 'new' project for modernity. This produces an increased *reflexivity* in social communication because it mobilises a "new" political ethic into public discourse which relates back definitively to the social world. It is for this reason that the environmental movement is cited by social theorists as a proof for the thesis of an increasingly *reflexive modernity* in late modern societies (Giddens 1989; 1990) or the coming of the "postmodern" condition (Featherstone 1991). Furthermore, talking about the so-called "problem of nature" (Eder 1993) has even become fashionable. It is plausible therefore to see environmental meanings as a special key feature of the national political cultures of contemporary societies.

Figure 1 is a model for the process whereby media resonance on environmental "problems" is produced by the mobilisation activities of the environmental movement in the public discourse.

A prerequisite for environmental agency is that nature is identified as the basis for a "problematic" in the existing set of social relationships in a society. Environmental agency

---

[10] On the construction of collective identity see Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995).

produces the resource of meanings which actors construct to define the environmental problematic as a deep structural cleavage in contemporary societies. It is this type of agency which constitutes the environmental movement as an active element of national culture. To put it simply, there is a social contest between actors over the definition of environmental "problems". The main competitors in this contest are the environmental movement and the Government, the movement uses the "problem of nature" to mobilise a critique against the public policy stances of the Government.

Figure 1.

Social Theoretical Model

Environmental Mobilisation in Public Discourse



The environmental movement is sustained by an institutional structure of organisations at times when the "cycles" of activism[11] among the wider constituency of the movement may be at a low ebb. Environmental organisations[12] are the structures in which the force

[11] On 'cycles of protest' see Tarrow (1985; 1989). See Buerklin (1984) for an overview of the analytic use of the notion of 'cycles' in social science.

[12] In this dissertation I use the simple term "environmental organisations" for the social movement organisations which as structures sustain the cultural movement of "environmentalism" (e.g. Friends of the Earth). Others have in the pressure group tradition described them as Non-Governmental Organisations, NGOs, (Grove-White and Burke 1989) (Princen and Finger 1994) and Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations, ENGOS, (Harries-Jones 1993). However, I find it unhelpful to label a collective actor by what it is not rather than by what it is. One attempt that tries to label the environmental collective actor by what it does is

of the movement is sustained as a collective actor. Environmental organisations draw on the resource of environmental meanings in a national culture and mobilise selected information about environmental "problems" (e.g. scientific facts) into the public discourse. This mobilised critique contests the activities of Government and Industry by refering to environmental value criteria as the legitimate basis for action. In other words, environmental agency produces a specific type of media resonance in the public discourses of contemporary societies, namely that which is produced by a "countercultural opposition". The structural location of this 'special' media resonance which sustains a countercultural bias in the public discourse is illustrated in **Figure 1**.

The actions of Government (and its responsibility for regulating the actions of Industry) also draw legitimacy from elements of national culture which appear in the public discourse. However, government policy formation and implementation is not based on environmental values but on a different rationale (e.g. free market values or social justice values). This brings the Government into a cultural opposition with the mobilisations of the environmental organisations in the public discourse. In other words, the critique of the environmental organisations which resides in their media resonance constructs the environmental contest against Government actors in the public discourse. It attributes a political specificity to the notion of the environmental contest by relating environmental claims to contemporary social events. When faced by judgement that is based on environmental criteria, the policy making activities of the Government and the practices of Industry no longer appear as legitimate or rational decisions. The task of an environmental organisation is to use media resonance to make the cultural contradiction of the environmental problematic into a social opposition against the actions of Government and Industry actors. This means, firstly, that environmental organisations make a cultural contradiction into a social contest, and secondly, that Government and Industry actors are the primary targets of their communicative actions. In this sense the environmental organisations carry the environmental contest into contemporary political debate and into

---

Environmental Meaning Producing Institutions, EMPIs, (Szerszynski 1991:p2), in addition to being rather cumbersome, this term lacks precision and analytic utility refering indiscriminately to "pressure groups, government bodies, industries, advertising agencies and media organisations". Furthermore, the environmental organisations do not simply "produce meaning", they mobilise selected information on environmental problems which is a resource in the public discourse for other actors to use for "producing meanings" by relating the environmental contest to their social relations.

wider society.

Environmental mobilisation is not simply a case of appearing in the public discourse, so that the organisations can 'lead' public opinion by magic like the Pied Piper of Hamelyn. On the contrary, environmental mobilisation is a process whereby the organisations attempt to transform the legitimating function of the public discourse towards an environmental basis. Environmental mobilisation is a strategic type of political action that is designed to have influence on the outcome of specific events in the environmental contest. Furthermore, the potential for mobilising "novel" aspects of contemporary culture into the public discourse is enhanced for environmental organisations relative to other social actors, since this potentiality for innovation inheres in the structural location of their media resonance in the public discourse which serves to mediate notions of "ecological uncertainty" or "risks" from the level of cultural symbols into the everyday practices and contests of social life.

This indicates that the media resonance which is produced by acts of environmental mobilisation in public discourse has a special definitive role in the "self production" (Touraine 1980) of contemporary societies. Environmental organisations do not appear in the news by chance. Regardless of the, at times, banal social relevance of the 'plots' in which they appear at the surface of newstexts, the debates which environmental organisations raise in the newsmedia are never politically benign. They are a key element in the 'public agenda building' process and the emergent "politics" of contemporary societies.

3. The Model for Public Discourse Analysis

From this brief introduction to the social theoretical basis of the thesis for environmental mobilisation in the public discourse, I now take a step towards identifying how environmental claims-making activities become specific empirical instances of media resonance. This involves moving from social theoretical considerations to the methodological implications for the analysis of public discourse, and more specifically the media resonance of environmental claims.

The strategic dimension of environmental claims is by necessity always evident in the media resonance which they sustain and produce in the public discourse. This is because media resonance is not just an indicator for 'events' that occur in social reality, it is part of the process by which actors constitute social reality in a cultural setting. As an active element

of public discourse, the notion of an environmental problematic only makes sense to the reading public as a contest between competing social actors. Indeed, unless they are seen as part of a contest between real social actors, there is no reason for environmental problems to appear in the news.[13] Media resonance may be seen as a 'collective' discursive field that is reproduced by the strategic communicative acts of competing actors in a society. By achieving media resonance environmental problems are produced in relation to the contemporary events in the social world. This means that media resonance is an indicator for the 'cutting edge' of a political culture, it gives 'life' to the social relationships which are contested in a national setting.

Figure 1 identified the structural location of media resonance as an arena of public discourse produced by the social contest that is waged by the environmental movement against Government actors in a national cultural setting. Following on from this, **Figure 2** illustrates the field of media resonance that is produced by acts of environmental mobilisation in the public discourse. Furthermore, **Figure 2** represents the strategic dimension of the claims which are used to mobilise the environmental contest as a political event in this empirical sample of newstexts.

As the set of newstexts were collected by coding the names of the environmental organisations, the sample of media resonance covers the field of public discourse in which the organisations are active and not the whole public discourse on "environmentalism".[14] In other words, my sample of newstexts is biased towards the media resonance of the strategic communicative actions of environmental organisations. This is taken as an indicator for the communicative actions of the "political wing" of the environmental movement.[15]

---

[13] To achieve media resonance environmental problems must have a "news value". This means that they are related to current events and deemed pertinent to a society. On the concept of "news values", see Fowler (1991). Environmental problems can achieve a "news value" by being a topical political 'event', e.g. at the time of a piece of environmental legislation, an International Conference on Global Warming etc.. Sometimes such 'events' are deliberately staged by environmental organisations as a means for achieving a specific type of media resonance. The following analysis will attempt to extend our knowledge of this process as a type of political action.

[14] For a sample and descriptive account of the whole public discourse on "environmentalism" in Britain from 1987-91 inclusive, see Statham (1993; 1995).

[15] Eder (1995) distinguishes three "packages" of environmental framing devices: the "conservationist"; the "fundamentalist"; and the "political ecology". At the present stage of environmental communication the two former "packages" tend to be becoming superceded by the dynamism of "political ecology" in the public discourse. I take the sample of media resonance covering the environmental organisations as an indicator for analysing one specific aspect of the dynamism of "political ecology" in public discourse: the agenda-building

The discursive field for environmental claims-making through the media is shown in **Figure 2**. Empirically, the semantic contents of my sample of media resonance may be seen as a discursive field where *environmental themes* appear in a strategic relation to *government responsibility contexts*.

Figure 2.

Macro-Representation of News Sample on Environmental Contest

Environmental Mobilisations in Media Resonance



Following the earlier discussion on the social theoretical basis of the environmental mobilisation thesis, it is clear that the social contest which appears in my sample of media resonance is produced by the strategic attempts of the environmental movement to oppose Government (and Industry) actors. Making the Government actors responsible and responsive is a social function of the media resonance which is intentionally produced by the strategic activities of the organisations. Furthermore, the bias in the news sample means that the specific sets of *environmental themes* and *government responsibility contexts* which achieve media resonance as a result of this type of political action have a strategic relation: the *environmental themes* are raised to **promote** the *government responsibility contexts*. In this sense, environmental mobilisation may be considered as the initiation of a "promotional

properties of the media-oriented environmental organisations.

culture" that favours specific environmental claims in a national political setting.

The relation between *environmental themes* and *government responsibility contexts* is a key axis of my empirical sample of media resonance on the environmental contest. It is by this axis that meanings at the level of text are related to social events, both in the process of environmental mobilisation (making the "text" - production of news) and in the process of interpreting the claims as part of a social contest (reading the "text" - public reception of news). Hence I use this axis which relates meaning at the level of text (specific "news events") to meaning at the the level of social reality (the contest between actors) for constructing the analytic categories for retrieving the empirical contents of the organisations' environmental claims from the news sample.The remainder of this section will develop a brief outline of this method for the analysis of the process of environmental mobilisation by the organisations. More detail is given in the sections **C**, **D** and **E** which undertake this public discourse analysis.

The field of public communication which is constructed between *environmental themes* and *government responsibility contexts* in the news sample is represented schematically in Figure 2. When the organisations make claims that refer to *environmental themes*, they are engaged in a process of **encoding** the media resonance of the environmental contest. At the same time, when *environmental themes* are the source of claims they are raised as "problems" with reference to social contexts. Environmental claims are not just *environmental themes*; they have empirical targets, both at the level of text (in "news events") and in the reading of the text by actors as part of a social contest (in events that affect peoples social relationships). Environmental claims-making is a process which necessarily makes existing social relationships conflictual, otherwise it would not achieve the "news value" to resonate as a news topic. The environmental organisations' claims-making activities maintain a specific impetus for the **delegitimation** of their opponents in the social contest. *Environmental themes* and *government responsibility contexts* are thus present in the public discourse as elements of the same communicative process. They make sense together as the components of a news narrative that mediates from text to social reality, and may be considered respectively as the "source" and "target" elements of my sample of empirical

media resonance.[16]

In short, the set of political meanings which resonates in the media (as a result of the organisations' environmental mobilisations) are based on claims which encode *environmental themes* that legitimate *government responsibility contexts*, i.e. delegitimate Government actors. Hence the environmental mobilisations of the organisations induce a process of encoding and delegitimation into the public discourse on the environmental contest. *Environmental themes* and *government responsibility contexts* constitute the strategic orientation of the organisations' communicative actions which resonate in the media. Other actors may then use this communication as resource for the construction of political meaning about the environmental contest.

In Figure 2 I represent the empirical set of "newstexts" in the centre of the diagram. This is the empirical form of resonant public discourse, i.e. "news", that is constructed by the organisations' influence over the relation of *environmental themes* to *government responsibility contexts*. In addition to this, newstexts have a specific location in time and place, they are socially embedded. This brings to light another aspect of the mobilisation activities of environmental organisations: by making claims that relate environmental problems to contemporary social events, the organisations attribute a specificity to the environmental contest in the national setting. As a result of the organisations' actions, the environmental contest is not only made pertinent to contemporary political debate, but 'real' as a social contest and series of events that people can associate with their lives and their own actions. This process of making the environmental contest specific in its relevance to the contemporary social world may be refered to as "framing"[17] the environmental discourse

---

[16] Gusfield's (1981) seminal work on the example of drink-driving laws defines a notion of the "ownership" and "responsibility" for public problems. In my schema, problem "ownership" would be akin to the mobilisation of *environmental themes* by environmental organisations, and causal and political "responsibility" to the *government responsibility contexts* which are mobilised into the public discourse. I refrain from the term "ownership", since this overstates the monopoly of power which environmental organisations may exercise in the process of defining environmental problems. As social constructions environmental problems are "owned" by everybody (and by those who are held responsible for serving the public interest, i.e. Government) to the extent that they may be "owned" at all.

[17] "Framing" has been used by sociologists to refer to how actors perceive the social world (Goffman 1972), how social movements use their collective identity as a strategic resource (Benford and Snow 1988) and as a unit for analysis and interpretation of public discourse (Gamson 1988) (Johnston 1992). "Framing" is how actors relate the cognitive level (culture) to the social world in their strategies for competing in the public discourse. Eder (1995) has outlined a theory for the political transformation of modern environmentalism based on framing and communicating nature in the public discourse.

as part of social reality. The framing process performs a 'problem specification' function in the environmental discourse by identifying specific related sets of environmental issues and contested fields in relation to social events.

As the "political wing" of the environmental movement, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature tend to frame the environmental discourse as a contest against Government and Industry actors. They do this differently and have distinct "images" in the public discourse. I refer to the *range of contents* of an environmental organisation's mobilisations as its **"public campaign culture"**. These will be compared for Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature in section **C**.

The structural location of the collective "public campaign culture" for the media-oriented sector of the environmental movement is shown in **Figure 2**. This "public campaign culture" constructs the *environmental themes* and *government responsibility contexts* that resonate in the news. Each organisation has a "public campaign culture" which is a resource for making environmental claims that are politically contentious. An organisation's "public campaign culture" is an analytic category for its discursive action *repertoire* in the news media. This means that the three organisations' environmental claims mobilise specific "types" of **environmental issue cultures** and specific "types" of **contested fields** which define environmental problems as political "events" in the public discourse. In this way the mobilisations of the environmental organisations perform a role of "environmental problem specification" for British society.

Environmental issue cultures and contested fields are the "units" which constitute the "public campaign culture" of an environmental organisation (see section **C** for detail). They are categories for the specific ways in which the organisations construct environmental issues to dispute the action-contexts over which Government has influence. These are the strategic *contents* of news which are raised when the organisations make environmental "problems" by referring to specific social events.

Since environmental "problems" are 'real' only as social constructions, their political existence is dependent on how they are defined. For example, the difference between references to "global warming", the "greenhouse effect" or the "ozone hole" that appear in the news is not a scientifically based distinction about the natural world. On the contrary, it is a social preference for "wording" which is used by an actor for communicating an environmental "problem" in the public discourse. Environmental organisations mobilise

specialist "expert" knowledge on the environmental contest (e.g. the claims of scientists or deep ecologists) into the wider public discourse. Legitimating claims in the public discourse requires a different language than legitimating claims on the basis of natural science or as a religious creed. Environmental organisations perform this task of "framing" environmental problems in a national culture. This implies that an environmental issue which is named in the news, e.g. "global warming", is a symbolic framing device that is used for making claims about the social contest on the environment resonate in public. It is environmental agency - acts of mobilisation - that 'produces' how an issue is named in the news. This is the process by which an identified problem is mediated from an expert discourse into the broader public discourse. It also indicates that the environmental contest is socially constructed.

To summarise, the role of the "public campaign cultures" which are mobilised by environmental organisations is that of defining and shaping what is considered to be the environmental contest in a national cultural setting. This process of mobilising political meaning through news texts may be refered to as environmental framing, which is a type of public agenda building that is specific to contemporary societies.

4. The Model for Newstext Analysis

The thesis for environmental mobilisation focuses on a special case of "news source" actors, namely the environmental organisations, and how they are able to use their *source* status to "frame" the environmental contest as a political event in Britain. How can we analyse the "affective" properties of this *source communication*, and the strategies on which it is based as a type of communicative action, from the set of empirical newstexts which it produces?

Quantitative levels of coverage can tell us neither about the *contents* of environmental communications nor about the strategic properties of claims that are made by actors in specific cases during a political event. In order to add qualitative detail to the quantitative occurences of media resonance in the sample, the following analytic model is used which combines content analysis and text analysis methods. This research strategy facilitates a reconstruction of the public discourse that is produced by the environmental organisations' actions within the context of their contested social relationship to Government actors in a key policy event.

Figure 2 showed a macro-level representation of the location of the newstext sample as a discursive field of media resonance in the public sphere. Furthermore this media resonance was seen to be produced by the organisations' campaign activities against Government actors in the social contest on the environment and be constituted by the relation of *environmental themes* to *government responsibility contexts*. **Figure 3** is taken from the the centre of **Figure 2**, and represents an analytic model for an individual newstext taken from the overall sample of newstexts that appear in **Figure 2**.

This means that **Figure 3** gives a representation of an individual text (micro-level unit of discourse) from the sample of newtexts that is produced by the claims-making activities of the environmental organisations. All the newstexts in the sample are constructed by the relation of *environmental themes* to *government responsibility contexts*. The strategic information on the environmental contest that is constructed by this relation inheres into a news narrative. It is this relation which mediates meaning from the level of text to the level of the social actors in the environmental contest and their relationships. In short, this is the axis by which a text achieves the 'duality' to exist both as a cultural element (news discourse level) and gain access to the process by which actors construct reality in their social relationships (actor level). **Figure 3** introduces *four discourse elements*, namely "O" the organisation's *name*; "A" *issues* relating to the organisation's activities; "E" *issues* relating environmental problems; and "G" *issues* relating to the responsibility of Government actors. These four *discourse elements* are analytic constructs. Together the four *discourse elements* constitute the components of a standard model for a news narrative on the environmental contest that appears in the overall news sample.[18] In other words, they are designed to retrieve the components of the relations between *environmental themes* and *government responsibility contexts* that appear in the set of newstexts in the sample. This requires further explanation. First I introduce the four discourse elements.

[18] This standard model for the narrative which appears in a newstext from the sample was constructed on a "trial and error" basis of coding and classifying the information of the actual sample of newstexts.

Figure 3.

Micro-Representation of an Individual Text

News Narrative on an "Event" in Environmental Contest: the four discourse elements "O", "A", "E" and "G"

In news narratives produced by acts of environmental mobilisation, *environmental theme(s)* relate to *government responsibility context(s)* to construct the environmental problematic as a social event. Four analytic categories were constructed as dimensions for coding the elements of these news narratives. These four discourse elements are:

"O" the environmental organisation's *name*

"A" *issues* relating to the organisation's activities

"E" *issues* relating to environmental "problems"

"G" *issues* relating to the responsibility of Government (& Industry) actors



[Note: an environmental claim is produced by the three discourse elements "E", "A" and "G". These discourse elements relate issues that construct "bias" into the news narrative on an episode from the environmental contest. As such they are indicators for the claims which the organisations mobilise to produce "bias" in the reporting of an environmental event.]

The discourse element "O" is simply the organisation's name. It is by this discourse element that the sample was retrieved and defined. Obviously the organisation's name has less scope for being an elaborate discourse element in the narrative of the text than "A", "E" and "G" which represent the different types of issues that construct the environmental

contest.[19]

The "A" issues are the "activity issues" of the organisation. This discourse element refers to the activities and actions of the environmental organisations that appear in the text. Like the discourse element "O", the "A" issues refer to the environmental organisation. The issues relating to the organisation's activities "A" constitute the component of the news narrative in which the environmental organisation appears as an "actor". Hence the discourse element "A" is an indicator for the **self-legitimation strategies** of the environmental organisations that are mobilised into newstexts. This concerns what an environmental organisation is reported as doing in the text, whether this action involves staging an event, liasing with the Opposition Party Leader, criticising the activities of another environmental organisation, publishing a report, commissioning a piece of scientific research, engaging in a practical environmental development or conservation programme etc..

The "E" issues refer to environmental problems that appear in a text. This discourse element "E" is a component of the news narrative that serves as an indicator for the **issue legitimation strategies** of the organisation. These are the types of environmental issue topics that are named and elaborated in a newstext. They are raised by the environmental organisation to publicise themes and contest its opponent actor, Government. Examples include traffic noise and pollution in the countryside, destruction of the aesthetic beauty of the natural landscape, health risks of food grown using pesticides, the imminent extinction of a rare species, the threat of global warming, the risk of nuclear power. A content analysis of this analytic category is undertaken in Section C to ascertain the environmental thematic range of concern that is mobilised by the campaigns of the three major environmental organisations.[20]

The "G" issues are those which construct the responsibilities of Government (and

---

[19] Indeed the organisation's name element "O" only becomes an elaborate element of a news narrative when it is used so that the "name" itself symbolises the organisation and actions in a way that attributes a given normative value to them. For example the name "Greenpeace" is a symbol that as a "public image" represents more in the public discourse than a description of an actor, in some cases when the name appears in the public discourse it may attribute a normative value to the actions of this organisation.

[20] In section C the resonance of the environmental issue discourse element "E" is divided into twelve sub-categories of types of "environmental issue cultures": "global warming"; "rainforest etc."; "rare fauna"; "nuclear"; "mining"; "car"; "energy"; "industrial waste pollution"; "agricultural waste pollution"; "natural environment"; "green business"; and "green politics". The resonance of these twelve sub-categories of the environmental issue "E" discourse element are compared to draw indicators on the type of environmental problem specification that is mobilised by the campaigns of each organisation.

Industry[21]) actors for environmental problems in a newstext. This discourse element "G" is a component of the news narrative that serves as an indicator for the **delegitimation strategies** (i.e. "blaming") which are used by the environmental organisations against their targeted opponent actors. Indeed it is the Government responsibility issues "G" which construct the Government actors as an opponent of the environmental organisation. Examples include Government negligence for regulatory policies for controling biological substances, Government failure to comply with European legislation, the car industry's unwillingness to introduce environmental critieria into their assessment of the efficiency of new technology. I undertake a content analysis of these Government responsibility issues in Section C to ascertain the targets of the environmental organisations' respective campaigns.[22]

Newstexts make sense as individual units (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983); each article has a "storyline" or narrative about an "event" which serves to raise the environmental contest into public debate. The four discourse elements "O", "A", "E", and "G" are the essential components of a news narrative which is produced by environmental mobilisation. These discourse elements contain the strategic information on the environmental contest which appears empirically in public texts. It is the discursive *contents* of these four components which construct the strategic meaning of news narrative in a text. These four discourse elements constitute the argumentative structure in which a specific environmental claim is embedded into the narrative of a text.

Mobilising environmental claims is a communicative process that involves the selection of environmental topics, self-promotion of the organisation, and the identification of responsible actors. For this public discourse analysis methodology, I consider an environmental claim which appears empirically in the newstext - resulting from an environmental organisation's mobilisation activities - to be constituted by a combination of the three discourse elements which relate the environmental contest, namely: environmental

---

[21] The primary opponent actors of the environmental organisations are the Government. I take the *government responsibility context* to include the actions of industrial actors, since the Government is ultimately responsible for the mechanisms which regulate the actions of Industry.

[22] In section C the resonance of the government responsibility issue discourse element "G" is divided into ten sub-categories of types of "contested fields": **nuclear n; energy (non nuclear) y; agriculture a ; industry i; transport t; business b; party politics p; labour l; government e;** and **sponsorship d.** The resonance of these ten sub-categories of the government responsibility "G" discourse element are compared to draw indicators on the type of specification of contested fields and practices that is mobilised by the campaigns of each organisation.

issues "E", issues relating to the organisation's activities "A", and the responsibility issues of Government "G". The interrelations between these four discourse elements shown in **Figure 3** give a prototype model for the narrative structure of a "news story" on an episode in the environmental contest. In each example of text where environmental mobilisation is present the three component discourse elements "E", "A" and "G" are "packaged" into a news narrative so that the reported episode from the environmental contest is given a "cultural bias".[23]

This dissertation undertakes an analysis of this process whereby acts of environmental mobilisation by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature produce a "cultural bias" that affects political outcomes. How then are these discourse elements retrieved, coded and reconstructed from the individual texts? And how are the individual texts reconstructed into the "cycle" of a policy event?

5. Newstext Coding and Analysis

5.1 Environmental mobilisation sample

All texts contain the discourse element "O", an organisation's name, since they were retrieved from the CD ROM news database by coding this item of data. The three discourse elements "E", "A" and "G" refer to issues which are constitutive of the environmental claims in the news narrative on an event - it is in these three discourse elements that a "cultural bias" is manifest into a news narrative. Those texts which do not contain the three discourse elements "E", "A" and "G" are excluded from the sample for discourse analysis, since this means that they are references where the environmental organisation is simply mentioned "in passing" rather than being an "actor" in the discourse. I refer to these excluded newstexts as "passing references".[24]

---

[23] When actors use culture as a resource for engaging strategically with other actors in a society they make ideological constructs which have a "cultural bias". In short, an ideology is how an actor makes strategic use of culture. The concept of "cultural bias" is drawn from the anthropological work of Mary Douglas (1968) (1975). It has been applied to the analysis of actor networks by M. Thompson (1984) (1988). On the "packaging" of claims into the media discourse, see Gamson (1988) and Eder (1995).

[24] "Passing references" are produced when a journalist refers to an environmental organisations name when reporting on a topic that is not part of the environmental contest resulting from the organisations activities. This type of references to the environmental organisations are indicated in the visual database by the symbol # .

It is an assumption of the thesis for environmental mobilisation that the organisations act in order to have influence over the definition of the environmental contest that appears in public texts. As I require data on how the environmental organisations shape the semantic contents of news on the environmental contest those where the organisation does not appear as an actor in the contest are excluded from the sample.

In fact relatively few examples of the articles referring to Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature were "passing references" (#) where the organisation does not appear as an actor in an episode from the environmental contest. Only ten of the 56 articles mentioning Friends of the Earth, six of the 35 articles mentioning Greenpeace, and one of the 23 articles mentioning the World Wide Fund for Nature can be classified as "passing references". That these three organisations usually appear as "actors" in a news discourse concerning the environmental contest, rather than by chance, itself bears testimony to their claims-making potential.

After removing the "passing references" to the three environmental organisations, the sample for discourse analysis comprised a total of 98 articles: 46 provide data on the environmental mobilisation activities of Friends of the Earth, 29 on those of Greenpeace, and 22 on those of the World Wide Fund for Nature.

5.2 Text contents

To demonstrate the method for content and text analysis I refer to an example from the sample. **Figure 4** gives an example of a newstext that has been retrieved from the CD ROM database on Friends of the Earth. *Not just white but deathly palid* (FoE a), appeared on 26th September, 1990, and is referred to as newstext (FoE a) in the visual database for the Friends of the Earth sample (see below). For each of the 98 newstexts where an environmental organisation appears as an actor in the environmental contest a similar "profile" of text contents was constructed.

Figure 4. A Newstext sample - (FoE a)

TITLE :26-09-90:FEA **Not just white but deathly pallid**
REPORTER :unnamed
PAGE :18

FRIENDS of the Earth summed it up well. Judge yesterday's white paper on the environment by its verbs. This is the policy paper which Chris Patten pledged would nail the lie about Britain being "the dirty man of Europe." This is the programme which he promised the Conservative Party Conference last year would "nail the lie, not by words but by actions".

So what new firm commitments are included in its 350 proposals? Only a tiny number and even these are modest. Whether one turns to the full 300-page £24.50 full version or the shorter 40-page £2.50 summary, one searches in vain for hard pledges introduced by such verbs as implement, establish, enact. Instead on global warming the Government promises to encourage, promote, monitor or press for; on the countryside it pledges itself to endorse, review, consider and consult; and on towns and cities it will encourage and promote. This is not an action programme, but a discussion paper.

Not even the silky words of Chris Patten could mask the threadbare contents of his glossy documents. Take energy: there is no target for the reduction of energy, no minimum standards for the energy efficiency of household appliances such as the US has introduced, no incentives like linking mortgage tax relief to the energy efficiency of dwellings. A new cabinet committee on energy is promised, but there is not even a commitment to restore the cuts made to the existing Energy Efficiency Office. Or take the motor car, which produces four times its own weight in carbon dioxide gas each year: there are no new taxes or hints of new taxes on bigger engines or dirtier fuel and no stricter regulations requiring catalytic converters. There is no commitment to switch more subsidy from roads to public transport. All we get is a commitment to extend the MoT test to improve the tuning of vehicles. Even Los Angeles, a city built for the car, will have tougher controls in the next decade than London.

Mr Patten specifically ruled out new energy taxes, and although a year ago there was excited speculation about the way in which taxes and charges could be used to control pollution, all he was prepared to say yesterday was that the Government would continue to look at ways in which the market could control pollution more effectively. Instead of targets, minimum standards and new regulations, industry is being exhorted to improve itself. Industry will not like this. It will inhibit action.

The market does not allow the individual company to pioneer new cleaner methods if its competitors are to be allowed to continue to use cheaper, easier and dirtier procedures. Industry likes a level playing field where each company has to play to the same rules. What has gone wrong? It looks like a combination of penny-pinching by the Treasury, empire-defending by cabinet colleague, and a Prime Minister whose enthusiasm for protecting the environment has waned as the costs and the necessary regulations have become apparent.

There is no inherent contradiction between conservatism and conservation, but it does pose problems for Mrs Thatcher and her philosophic objections to the three necessary mechanisms: public expenditure, regulation, and a national strategy. And yet "strategy" is included in the subtitle to yesterday's white paper; and there are new regulations (hedgerows, for one), and at least one area where there will be an increase in expenditure (preserving cathedrals). Mr Patten is still in negotiation with the Treasury, but after the huge sums he won for the poll tax subsidies he is not expected to come away with very much for the environment. Of course there are major programmes already in the pipeline, but they mainly reflect EC directives, not ministerial initiatives: the £28 billion programme to improve drinking water and clean up beaches by better sewage disposal was resisted by ministers until privatisation was completed; the £6 billion programme to tackle acid rain followed five years of resistance by ministers. Even now, the UK has reduced by 50 per cent its original commitment to install desulphurisation equipment (because of electricity privatisation); is making the smallest cut of major EC members; and will remain by far the biggest sulphur dioxide polluter in the EC. There is more than just hedgerows and heritage in yesterday's package, but most of it is hype.

There is not much action on the street, let alone in the stratosphere. Round one is lost; but with concerted effort, environmentalists can still ensure that the action starts in round two.

DATE : 26-09-90

5.2.1 actors and events - contents indicators

The **i. environmental mobilisation indicators, ii. contested field indicators** and **iii. media coverage indicators** are initial descriptive indicators for retrieving information on the actors and events who appear in a newstext. The codings for the article (FoE a) are given in **Figure 5.**

Figure 5.

"Profile" of Friends of the Earth Text No.34:

Date: 26/09/90 ref: (FoE a)

Headline: *Not just white but deathly palid*

Size: 790 words Page: 18 Section: Feature

i. environmental mobilisation indicators:

occurence of "staged event":	$	yes
organisation a "source" of text:	s	yes
organisation's information present in text:	i	yes
organisation spokesperson quoted in text:	S	no

ii. contested field indicators:

environmental problem scope:	National	N
actor field scope:	National	N
"type" of contested field:	government internal decision making	e
policy or non policy field:	policy field	o

iii. media coverage indicators:

environmental organisation:	positive	+
environmental organisation's activities:	positive	+
environmental problems:	positive	+
government/industry	negative	-

5.2.1.i. environmental mobilisation indicators

These are an initial coding for the discursive actions of the environmental organisation that appear in the newstext. It codes simply: whether the organisation has "staged an event"

to enhance the possibility of achieving media resonance ($); whether it is an explicit "source" for the production of the text by journalists (*s*); whether information produced by the organisation (e.g. scientific data, reports) appears in the news narrative (i); and whether a spokesperson from the organisation is quoted directly in the text (*S*).[25]

For the case of the newstext (FoE a), the first two sentences, *"Friends of the Earth summed it up well. Judge yesterday's white paper by its verbs."* (FoE a), indicate that the organisation has used the "verb" stunt as a "staged event" ($) to raise this particular article as news. The organisation can also be considered as a "source" actor (*s*) of the semantic text, which is structured around the points raised by the stunt. Thirdly, the organisation's selected and reported information (i) on environmental topics and government responsibilities is the basis of the argumentation on the environmental problematic that appears in the article. However, a Friends of the Earth spokesperson is not explicitly cited.

5.2.1.ii. contested field indicators

These are an initial coding for the "event" from the environmental contest that is reported by the news narrative. The contested field is constructed into the news narrative as an "event" by the environmental organisations' opposition to a Government actor. Four indicators are used for analysing the contested field in the news narrative, namely: the scope of the environmental problem (W world/global, E european, N national, or L local); the scope of the actor field (W world/global, E european, N national, or L local); "type" of contested field (nuclear **n**, energy (non nuclear) **y**, agriculture **a**, industry **i**, transport **t**, business **b**, party politics **p**, labour **l**, government **e**, or sponsorship **d**); and whether or not the contested field was a policy field (**o**) or a non policy field (**x**).

For the case of the newstext (FoE a), environmental problems in the news narrative are discussed primarily in the national context (N), the primary actor field of the contested "event" (Friends of the Earth v. Government) is national (N), and refers to government internal decision making (e) in terms of policy matters (o).

---

[25] The symbols in brackets are the coding elements for the visual database (see below). If these symbols appear in the visual database for an article then an incident of a staged event, or sourcing, or mobilising information, or spokesperson occurs in the news narrative. If the symbol is absent then it did not occur.

5.2.1.iii. media coverage indicators

These are a coding for the evaluations of the actors and topics in the environmental contest that are made by the media actor who "writes" the text. These are the values that the journalist attributes to the characters in a news narrative, i.e. journalistic commentary on the environmental organisation; its activities; the environmental problems; and the Government (or Industry) actor.

In the news text (FoE a) the environmental organisation (+) and its actions (+) are viewed positively - *"Friends of the Earth summed it up well"* (FoE a) - as are the prognoses for environmental problems (+) that it raises. The Government on the other hand is viewed negatively (-). In this case the journalist strays from "objectively" reporting events and opinions, and agrees with the line taken by Friends of the Earth against the Government.

5.2.2 environmental discourse - contents indicators

The **i. environmental news narrative indicators** and **ii. discursive stunts and explicit framing devices** are indicators for the semantic elements which constitute the environmental claims that appear in a news narrative. Its is through these text elements that the strategic orientation of the organisation's claims - the strategic information produced by its activism - is mobilised as a news narrative relating to the environmental contest. These indicators appear at the surface level of text and serve for reconstructing the discursive action strategies of the organisations. In other words, these coded discourse elements are used to reconstruct: firstly, how the organisation "frames" the environmental contest in the news (i); and secondly, how it uses polemics, reasoning devices and references to cultural elements to legitimise its own stance and delegitimise that of its opponent (ii). Together these indicators will be used for reconstructing the claims-making practices of the environmental organisations in the news. The codings for the article (FoE a) are given in "text profile" that is represented in **Figure 6**.

Figure 6.

"Profile" of Friends of the Earth Text No.34:

Date: 26/09/90 ref: (FoE a)

Headline: *Not just white but deathly palid*

Size: 790 words Page: 18 Section: Feature

i. environmental news narrative indicators, discourse elements:

"O" environmental organisation's "name":
simple descriptive usage for naming organisation

"A" issues relating organisation's activities, self-legitimation strategies:
Production of counter document on Government's record. Organisation's use of links to media actors to relay detailed and specific criticisms of Government's White Paper policy document; use of discursive stunt ("judged by its verbs") to highlight inaction of proposed programme

"E" environmental issues, issue legitimation strategies:
global warming threat; energy efficiency; car use/roads/public transport; drinking water quality; conservation of hedgerows; heritage; acid rain threat; use of beaches; sulphur dioxide emissions

"G" government responsibility issues, opponent delegitimation strategies:
Government national policy strategy for environmental protection; use of regulatory controls over industry; policy instruments for effective implementation; role of state intervention/market mechanisms in Conservative policy

ii. discursive stunts and explicit framing devices:

Discursive stunt: *"Friends of the Earth summed it up well. Judge yesterday's white paper on the environment by its verbs ... one searches in vain for hard pledges such as implement, establish, enact. Instead on global warming the Government promises to encourage, promote, monitor or press for; on the countryside it pledges itself to endorse, review, consider and consult; and on towns and cities it will encourage and promote. This is not an action programme but a discussion paper."*

Reference to *"the Dirty man of Europe"*.

5.2.2.i. environmental news narrative indicators[26]

These are the discourse elements which constitute the narrative of newstext, i.e. the organisation's name "O", environmental issues referring to problems "E", issues referring to the organisation's activities "A" and the responsibility issues of Government "G". These are written down in a descriptive shorthand for coding (see **Figure 6** for (FoE a)). This descriptive coding represents the four discourse elements as the components of a news narrative in which the organisations environmental claims are embedded. The environmental claims that are made by an organisation and which bias' a news narrative are constituted by a 'package' of the three elements relating to issues "E", "A" and "G" .

In the newstext (FoE a), the organisation's name "O" "Friends of the Earth" is not used in an elaborate way (e.g. as a metaphor or as a synonym for environmental action) but simply functions to label the organisation as a collective actor.

For the newstext (FoE a) the issues relating to the organisation's activities "A" that appear in the news narrative are the production of a document that criticises the Government's national policy document and the mobilisation this document to opinion leading journalists. This strategy by Friends of the Earth is precipitated by a "staging" of their critical report as an event and by using a discursive stunt "the document should be judged by its verbs" to gain media resonance.

In the case of (FoE a) a multiple number of environmental problems are named as environmental issues "E" in the news narrative. As the news narrative covers the environmental contest as a national strategy for producing an environmental agenda, several environmental problems are raised in the context of the development of a national integrated programme. In articles covering other types of "event" from the environmental contest, e.g. a case of direct action against nuclear weapons testing (Gpc U), a single environmental problem may be elaborated and developed in greater detail than those mention in (FoE a). The narrative in (FoE a) mentions the following environmental problems as issues: global warming threat; energy efficiency; car use/roads/public transport; drinking water quality;

---

[26] These descriptive indicators for the discourse elements "E" and "G" are coded into sub-categories for envirionmental issue cultures and contested fields and are used for comparing the organisations' "public campaign cultures" in Section C. The descriptive indicators for claims in the news narrative - the discourse elements "A", "E", and "G" - are comparatively "weighted" and used for reconstructing the cases of environmental mobilisation in the "cycle" of a political event in Section D.

conservation of hedgerows; heritage; acid rain threat; use of beaches; sulphur dioxide emissions. This selection of environmental issues is part of the "environmental problem specification" function of environmental mobilisation. The environmental topics which the organisation intends to legitimate are raised in relation to the development of a national environmental policy strategy.

Finally, the "G" issues relating to the responsibility of Government (and Industry) concern the development of this integrated national environmental policy strategy. In (FoE a) the news narrative explores the policy instruments that are available for effective environmental control, the existing policy record of the Government and its regulation of industry, and the role of state intervention and market mechanisms in a Conservative policy for the environment.

5.2.2.ii. discursive stunts and explicit framing devices

These are the empirical surface elements of a newstext which are produced as either direct or reported speech in the news narrative and attributed to the environmental organisation. Discursive stunts and explicit framing devices maintain the arguments of the environmental organisation which inhere into the news narrative. Explicit framing devices may be based on moral, aesthetic or factual reasoning devices and are the explicit claims that are attributed to the organisation in a text. Discursive stunts are appeals to cultural elements (e.g. nationalism, anti-authoritarianism, popular culture) that make the organisation's arguments resonate in the media. Both explicit framing devices and discursive stunts are ways that the environmental organisations "package" their claims to achieve media resonance for the environmental contest. This "packaging" adds to the "news value" of the news narrative enabling it to resonate in the public culture. Explicit framing devices and discursive stunts are designed to achieve a cultural resonance. This is how the organisation has the opportunity to assert its "image" and articulate its environmental reasoning devices in the media discourse.[27]

In the case of (FoE a) the discursive stunt from the Friends of the Earth report is that the Government's White Paper should be "judged by its verbs". This 'novel' piece of

[27] A full definition of the distinction between explicit framing devices and discursive stunts is given in the introduction to section E.

amateur discourse analysis is picked up by the journalist and used as the basis for a news narrative which stresses the inaction of the Government. This case of "packaging" by Friends of the Earth makes the usually hidden world of public policy detail visible and easily accessible to the reading public. Reference is also made to the overall discursive stunt for the White Paper, "the Dirty Man of Europe" frame. There are no explicit framing devices in this example, although the argument of the news narrative is taken from the Friends of the Earth circular to journalists criticising the White Paper. Other types of discursive stunts and explicit framing devices are analysed and discussed in detail in Section E.

5.2.3 "Weighting" technique for discourse elements in a newstext

Following on from the coding methodology for newstexts described above, I now turn to the first step that is necessary for reconstructing the coded discourse elements into individual cases of environmental mobilisation. Here I present a method that produces an numerical indicator for the "bias" in the news narrative of a text. The "bias" in a news narrative is indicated by the relative prominence of the four discourse elements "O", "A", "E", and "G" in a text.

The model for the analysis of a newstext (**Figure 3**) identified the four discourse elements "O", "A", "E", and "G" which were descriptively coded as indicators for an environmental narrative, i.e. the strategic information on the environmental contest in a newstext. The following technique gives an indicator for the comparative resonance of these four discourse elements in a news narrative on the environmental contest. This indicator shows the **prominence** of the organisation's name "O", the issue referring to its activities "A", the issues referring to environmental problems "E", and the issues referring to Government responsiblities "G" in the argumentative structure of a news narrative on an episode in the environmental contest. The "weighting" technique is undertaken for each newstext in the sample.

Each newstext in the sample of an organisation is attributed a total resonance of 24 units. This total figure of 24 units of resonance is then divided between the four discourse elements, the organisation's name "O", activity issues "A", environmental issues "E", and

Government responsibilitiy issues "G", for each of the 98 texts using the following method.[28]

Viewing each text as a unit that is made up of the four components that have been coded as discourse elements - "O", "A", "E" and "G" - this gives six possible relations between the four elements which construct the news narrative. These six possible relations are the following (see also **Figure 3**):

"O" - "A" "O" - "E" "E" - "A" "A" - "G" "E" - "G" "G" - "O"

The 24 units of resonance are divided between these six relations, so that each is attributed with 4 units of resonance. Two possible types of relationship are possible between the two discourse elements in each of these six relations:

1) In the news narrative on the environmental contest one discourse element may be a *subtext* of another discourse element. For example the issues relating to environmental problems "E" may be a subtext of the issues relating to Government responsibility "G". In such a case where "E" < "G", one unit of resonance is attributed to the discourse element "E" and three units of resonance to the discourse element "G". This means that "E" is the *subtext* (<) of "G" in the news narrative, or conversely that "G" is the *context* (>) of "E".

2) In the news narrative on the environmental contest one discourse element may be *linked* to another discourse element, so that neither is more prominent in the text. For example, the issues relating to environmental problems "E" may be integrated with the issues relating to the responsibility of Government "G". For example, this may occur when the elaboration of environmental problems is interwoven with the identification of Government responsibilities in the text. In such a case where "E" = "G", two units of resonance are attributed to each of the two discourse elements "E" and "G". In this case "E" is *linked* (=) to "G".

When added together, these "weightings" for the six relationships divide a total of 24 units of resonance between four discourse elements for each text. In a given text each of the four

[28] The coding of these discourse elements for the newstext (FoE a) is given in **Figure 6.** as environmental narrative indicators.

discourse elements "O", "A", "E" and "G" achieves of "weighting" of 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9 units of resonance so that the total of the four elements is 24 units of resonance. This gives a comparative numerical indicator for the prominence of each discourse element in the news narrative of a newstext. Nine units of resonance is the "maximum" indicating that a discourse element is dominant in the news narrative of a text, whereas three units of resonance is the "minimum" indicating that a discourse element is not very prominent in the news narrative of a text.

For example, for the newstext (FoE a) the following weighting was achieved:

	"O" - "A"	"O" - "E"	"E" - "A"	"A" - "G"	"E" - "G"	"G" - "O"
text FoE a	<	<	=	=	=	>
weighting	1 - 3	1 - 3	2 - 2	2 - 2	2 - 2	3 - 1

"O"	1 + 1 + 1	is	3 units of resonance
"A"	3 + 2 + 2	is	7 units of resonance
"E"	3 + 2 + 2	is	7 units of resonance
"G"	2 + 2 + 3	is	7 units of resonance

Total resonance per text is 24 units of resonance.

For the newstext (FoE a) this gives a "weighting" for the discourse elements in the news narrative whereby the organisation's name "O" has 3 units of resonance; the issues relating to the organisation's activities "A" have 7 units of resonance; as do both the environmental issues "E" and the Government responsibility issues "G". This "weighting" is indicative of a text where the organisation's name is not prominent in the news narrative which 'narrates' the environmental contest, but where issues relating to its activities (the mobilisation of a discursive stunt) are integrated with the elaboration of environmental problems and the identification of governmental responsibilities (the environmental policy critique).

The "weighting" technique divides 24 units between the discourse elements "O", "A", "E" and "G". It draws from the qualitative coded contents of a newstext and gives these discourse elements a relative quantitative weighting. In doing so, the method reconstructs the **prominence** of the discourse elements "O", "A", "E", and "G" for the news narrative on the environmental contest in each text. The relative prominence of the four discourse elements in the news narrative is indicative of the "bias" that has been engaged into a text by the mobilisation activities of an environmental organisation. The "weighting" figures for prominence will therefore be used in the reconstruction of the environmental mobilisations from the coded discourse elements that is undertaken in the remainder of the dissertation.

5.4 Visual databases: Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature

Following on from the "weighting" technique described above, **Table B.II** shows the possible types of "weighting" for a discourse element in the news narrative of a text on the environmental contest.

There are seven possible "weightings" that a discourse element can achieve in a single text, namely: three, four, five, six, seven, eight, or nine units of resonance. This scale of units of resonance, where three is the "minimum" and nine is the "maximum", indicates the prominence of a coded discourse element in a news narrative. Subsequently, there are seven levels of prominence for a discourse element in the news narrative of a text, namely: lowest (3), low (4), relatively low (5), medium (6), relatively high (7), high (8), and highest (9). As I mentioned earlier, these "weighted" resonances for the four discourse elements per text

serve as an indicator for the 'bias' in a news narrative. Such a 'bias' in a news narrative is a product of an enviromental organisation's claims-making activities, i.e. its discursive practices.

Table B.II: Possible types of "weighting" for a discourse element in a news narrative

discourse element resonance	discourse element prominence	is *subtext* of	is *linked* to	is *context* of
"9" units	highest	0	0	3
"8" units	high	0	1	2
"7" units	relatively high	1	0	2
		0	2	1
"6" units	medium	0	3	0
		1	1	1
"5" units	relatively low	1	2	0
		2	0	1
"4" units	low	2	1	0
"3" units	lowest	3	0	0

This "weighting" technique was undertaken for the discourse elements for each of the 98 texts in the news sample of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. These are represented along with the coded indicators for **actors and events - contents** in the **Visual databases** below. **Figures Fa** and **Fb** are the visual database for the news sample of Friends of the Earth, **Figures Ga** and **Gb** are the visual database for the news sample of Greenpeace, and **Figure W** is the visual database for the World Wide Fund for Nature.

The visual database functions as a coding scheme for the media resonance that is achieved by an environmental organisation over the three-month sample period. The individual articles are represented in time sequence from left to right across the visual database. Each article is identified by the symbols |A|B|C|..etc., then (if necessary) |a|b|c|..etc., in times series for a each text referring to an organisation and reporting the environmental contest, (or alternatively by the symbol # for a "passing" reference).

The visual databases represent a shorthand coding for the news sample of the three environmental organisations. For each newstext in the sample of an environmental organisation a time series representation of the "weighting" of the four discourse elements

is given from left to right. In addition, the coded environmental mobilisation indicators (I.i) appear at the top, the contested field indicators (I.ii) at the bottom, and the media coverage indicators (I.iii) for each discourse element in the middle, for each article. Furthermore, each visual database is followed by a time-sequence listing of the titles of all the articles that are represented.

One of the problems of content analysis techniques is that the coded material is often not easily accessible to the analyst or the reader. One of the primary advantages of this type of data representation - that is retrieved from the coding of text - is that it maintains the interactive qualities of the different dimensions of the coding within a comparative context. This facilitates the identification of different patterns and types of resonance in relation to the indicators for the actors and events for the production, processing and reception of this resonance (which are "reported" in the text). In this sense the visual database has an advantage, it enables the analyst at an initial stage to test hypotheses concerning the media resonance of environmental organisations in relation to indicators for their production and communication which appear in the text.

On the basis of the comparative prominence of the four discourse elements in each text and related actor and event indicators - which are shown in the visual database - different types of resonance may be identified which represent the different types of environmental discourse that are produced by the mobilisation activities of the environmental organisations. The visual database presents the different types of quantifiable data in an interrelated way for the news samples of each organisation. It provides a 'mixed' qualitative/quantitative representation of the data (an initial quantified reconstruction of the qualitative coded material). This enables the analyst to identify patterns and trends in the data samples for the organisations (over time and by contents) that deserve closer qualitative analysis by more detailed hermeneutic techniques (e.g. frame analysis).

Figure Fa: Friends of the Earth's media resonance *The Guardian* Aug/mid-Sep 1990



Figure Fb: Friends of the Earth's media resonance *The Guardian* mid-Sep/Oct 1990



FRIENDS OF THE EARTH Texts: Headlines

prior to the "news cycle":

August

01	03\08\90	A	Environment pure or poor? Environment Guardian reports on the different ways pressure groups operate in the jungle of overseas development.
02	03\08\90	B	Environment. Money for old hopes. Why do aid programmes go wrong and is there any real chance that the agencies are learning from past mistakes? Environment Guardian reports on the complex problems encountered and the new thinking gaining ground.
03	07\08\90	C	Incinerator churns up worries on milk. ... reports on residents' concern about emissions of smoke near a dairy farm.
04	10\08\90	D	Environment. Village green - A whiff of tourism can divide communities the world over. ... looks at schemes in North Wales and Cyprus.
05	10\08\90	E	Countryside plan of no benefit.
06	10\08\90	F	TV advert "misleading".
07	14\08\90	#	Disparate dream.
08	15\08\90	G	Chimneys, castles and candy floss. Run of the river.
09	17\08\90	H	Scheme to cut farm nitrates "a contemptible exercise".
10	17\08\90	#	Earth First! is a militant US environmental group committed to direct action in support of conservation.
11	17\08\90	I	Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and the threat he poses could do one of two things - encourage energy efficiency or cause further environmental destruction.
12	20\08\90	#	The Pub crawl: revolutionary sign of the green man. In the first in a series on drinking habits ... visits organic bars in the North East.
13	21\08\90	J	TUC wants green stewards at work.
14	22\08\90	K	"Macho cult" of cruelty.

the "prologue" discourse:

15	28\08\90	#	Rhythms of the rainforest.
16	28\08\90	L	Pesticide firms want farm curbs.
17	29\08\90	M	Dramatic rise in N-waste estimates.
18	30\08\90	#	Diary.
19	31\08\90	N	Environment Eco-soundings.

September

20	01\09\90	O	Vaccines buried at drug firm site.
21	04\09\90	P	Swiss headquarters financed through stocks and bonds of companies in rain forest logging, nuclear weapons and pesticides. Investments tarnish green image of WWF.
22	07\09\90	Q	PWR inspector recommended approval on fuel supply and environmental grounds.
23	10\09\90	#	French boycott call on "dirty" BMWs.
24	11\09\90	R	Labour bids for green ground.
25	12\09\90	S	Frank makes his monstrous debut.

26	14\09\90	T	Night plough cuts weeds. Hoe of darkness.

the "news event" discourse:

27	17\09\90	U	The National Children's Home's latest ad campaign launches today eshewing the shock tactics of recent years for a gentler image.
28	18\09\90	V	Surrey bans use of peat as Fisons attacks "one-sided" FoE camp.
29	24\09\90	W	Chickens drop into generation game.
30	24\09\90	#	Activists take on big names over creation of party machine.
31	25\09\90	X	Sparks fly in the great debate. The issue of nuclear power has always been a hot potato.
32	25\09\90	Y	Diary.
33	25\09\90	Z	Struggle at the green machines's wheel. the Greens agree on the problem, but there is less evidence at the Conference of consensus on the way ahead.
34	26\09\90	a	Not just white but deathly palid.
35	26\09\90	b	balancing act civilizes media circus. ... on the unexpectedly restrained press launch of the Patten blueprint yesterday.
36	26\09\90	c	Mixed reaction from the critics.
37	28\09\90	d	Resort digs in to save beach.
38	28\09\90	e	Environment. Toronto's anti-pollution drive. Does Chris patten's blueprint deserve admiration or abuse? ... finds Toronto's planners are more ambitious.
39	29\09\90	#	Zeitgeist.
October			
40	01\10\90	f	Europe "should meet US targets" on cleaning up diesel exhaust.

the "epilogue" discourse:

41	08\10\90	g	Welsh wind farm project "would spoil rural views".
42	09\10\90	#	Thatcher cool on exchange rate euphoria.
43	11\10\90	h	Water watchdog to prosecute five firms.
44	12\10\90	i	Farmers offer deal to avert free market "devastation".
45	12\10\90	j	Plutonium test on volunteer attacked as absurd.
46	16\10\90	k	Tough environment programme falls short of closing Sellafield (and) decision to stop Sizewell B. Labour sets out green policy.
47	16\10\90	l	Leading article. Green in judgement.
48	17\10\90	m	Ministry accused of acting as "poacher and gamekeeper". Doctors condemn pesticide secrecy.
49	20\10\90	n	Property. Reaching for the stars.
50	22\10\90	o	Four in five avoid officially recommended safe route.
51	23\10\90	p	Lucas turns blind eye to green worries on diesel emissions.
52	24\10\90	q	Greenpeace puts company in dock.
53	24\10\90	#	Society.
54	25\10\90	r	Draft prospectus for power sell-off leaked.
55	26\10\90	s	Cuts in farm cash "will cause exodus".
56	29\10\90	t	Is this the dawning of the age of awareness? Katherine Hamnett's campaign for environmentally friendly cotton.

Figure Ga: Greenpeace's media resonance *The Guardian* August & September 1990



Figure Gb: Greenpeace's media resonance in *The Guardian*, October 1990



GREENPEACE Texts: Headlines and News Section

prior to the "news cycle":

August:

01 A 02-08-90:HOM	'Nuclear dream' given the cold shoulder by scientists
02 B 03-08-90:FEA	Environment Pure or poor? Environment Guardian reports on the different ways pressure groups operate in the jungle of overseas development
03 C 13-08-90:HOM	Dounreay promoted as world centre for reprocessing Nuclear plant seeks reactor fuel trade
04 D 16-08-90:HOM	Engineer criticises 'string and sticky tape' repair Safety 'in doubt' as N-power gauges fail
05 # 17-08-90:FEA	Earth First! is a militant US environmental group committed to direct action in support of conservation
06 E 17-08-90:FEA	Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and the threat he poses to vital oil supplies could do one of two things - encourage energy efficiency or cause further environmental damage
07 F 18-08-90:HOM	Trapped gas 'will add to global heat'
08 # 20-08-90:FEA	The Pub Crawl: Revolutionary sign of the green man - In the first of a series on drinking habits Michael Morris visits organic bars in the North East
09 G 23-08-90:HOM	Protesters board nuclear ship
10 # 24-08-90:HOM	Nuclear protesters freed

the "prologue" phase:

September:

11 H 04-09-90:HOM	Swiss headquarters financed through stocks and bonds of companies in rain forest logging, nuclear weapons and pesticides investments tarnish image of WWF
12 # 07-09-90:FEA	Diary
13 I 07-09-90:FEA	Fears for a sea of caesium
14 J 07-09-90:FEA	Testimonies from the atoll
15 K 11-09-90:HOM	Labour bids for green ground
16 L 12-09-90:HOM	Virus risk to blue flag bathers

the "news event" phase:

17 M 18-09-90:HOM	Toxic waste imports boosted by illicit trade
18 N 25-09-90:HOM	Environment Secretary scorns Britain's 'dirty man' tag Greenpeace 'bias' puts Patten in a rage
19 O 25-09-90:FEA	Diary
20 P 25-09-90:FEA	Struggle at the Green machine's wheel The Greens agree on the problem, but there is less evidence at the conference of consensus on the way ahead
21 Q 25-09-90:EG	Sparks fly in the great debate The issue of nuclear power has always been a hot potato
22 R 26-09-90:HOM	Mixed reaction from the critics
23 S 27-09-90:FEA	Andrew Moncur

October:

24 # 06-10-90:WEE ZEITGEIST

the "epilogue" phase:

25	T	09-10-90:HOM	Mersey polluters breached limits 859 times
26	U	09-10-90:FOR	Greenpeace told to leave N-Test site
27	V	11-10-90:FOR	
28	W	12-10-90:FOR	Poland 'used as dumping ground' for toxic waste
29	X	15-10-90:HOM	Greenpeace ship released after discovering 'nuclear test site'
30	Y	16-10-90:HOM	Tough environment programme falls short of closing Sellafield decision to stop Sizewell B Labour sets out green policy
31	Z	19-10-90:HOM	River attack
32	a	24-10-90:HOM	Greenpeace puts company in dock
33	#	24-10-90:FEA	Society
34	b	26-10-90:FEA	The new cold war
35	c	30-10-90:FOR	Moscow resumes Arctic N-tests

Key to News Sections in *The Guardian*:

HOM	Home News
FOR	Foreign News
FEA	Feature
EG	Environment Guardian (special)
WEE	Weekend Supplement

Figure W: WWF's media resonance in *The Guardian* Aug/Sep/Oct 1990



WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE: Headlines and News Section

prior to the "news event"

August:

01	A	01-08-90:FEA	
02	B	03-08-90:FEA	Environment Pure or poor? Environment Guardian reports on the different ways pressure groups operate in the jungle of overseas development
03	C	03-08-90:FEA	Environment Money for old hopes Why do aid progammes go wrong and is there ant real chance that the agencies are learning from past mistakes? Environment Guardian reports on the complex problems encountered and the new thinking gaining ground

the "prologue"

September:

04	D	04-09-90:FEA	Leading article: Blood and the rhino
05	E	04-09-90:HOM	Swiss headquarters financed through stocks and bonds of companies in rainforest logging, nuclear weapons and pesticides Investments tarnish green image of WWF
06	F	04-09-90:HOM	WWF paid for helicopter used to kill poachers
07	G	04-09-90:HOM	Gun law rules in battle to save rhinos and elephants
08	H	05-09-90:HOM	Controversy forces rethink on Fund's investment policy. 'Unethical' firms to be dropped by WWF
09	I	05-09-90:HOM	Tough-talking campaigner in the wildlife fund hot seat Wednesday people
10	J	07-09-90:FEA	Foreign Fields Jan Rocha in Corumba Brazil
11	K	14-09-90:FEA	Eco Soundings
12	L	15-09-90:CIT	Investors beware your money may not be going where you think
13	M	15-09-90:HOM	Roads endanger ancient forests

the "news event"

14	#	24-09-90:FEA	Unfair shares as the flighty come down to earth
15	N	25-09-90:FEA	Diary
16	O	26-09-90:HOM	Mixed reaction from the critics
17	P	27-09-90:FOR	Chinese "flouting rhino ban" Peter Biles in Nairobi
18	Q	28-09-90:FEA	Hugh Synge continues our occasional series on endangered plant species with a report on the Cafe marron, the rarest plant in the world Environment Fencing with extinction

October:

19	R	05-10-90:FEA	Chaos threatens climate conference

the "epilogue"

20	S	19-10-90:FEA	The land of a thousand islands gets another dressing down

21	T	20-10-90:HOM	Antique rhino horn trade halted after thefts from country houses
22	U	20-10-90:WEE	MOTORING Putting the 'car' in caring
23	V	26-10-90:FEA	The new cold war

Key to News Section in *The Guardian*:

HOM	Home News
FOR	Foreign News
FEA	Feature
CIT	City News

Headlines of articles referring to the White Paper: *This Common Inheritance* September 25th 1990

a) prior to the "news cycle"

no references

b) the "prologue" phase

27-08-90:HOM	Tighten farm planning law, ministers told
31-08-90:HOM	World treaty on climate mapped out
31-08-90:FEA	What a waste
07-09-90:HOM	Decision gives cold comfort to nuclear lobby
11-09-90:HOM	Labour bids for green ground
15-09-90:WEE	Home Front: Signs to save power and prosper - The crisis in the Gulf confirms that politics and the environment is a dangerous and therefore combustible mix, writes John Elkington

c) the "news event" phase

i) prelude: the week before

19-09-90:HOM	Labour's green plan for farmers
21-09-90:HOM	Government to oppose EC call to cut carbon dioxide emissions
22-09-90:HOM	Environment proposals no threat to car economy

ii) "news event": The White Paper v. "the dirty man of Europe"

24-09-90:HOM	How tomorrow's Environment White Paper became the victim of inter-departmental crossfire in Whitehall. Patten stars in whodunnit
24-09-90:FEA	Green appeal in recession
25-09-90:HOM	Climate chief challenges US
25-09-90:HOM	Environment Secretary scorns Britain's 'dirty man' tag. Greenpeace bias puts Patten in a rage
25-09-90:HOM	White Paper will not solve ecology crisis, say Greens at Wolverhampton. Patten plan doomed at first hurdle
25-09-90:FEA	Diary
25-09-90:FEA	Struggle at the Green machine's wheel The Greens agree on the problem, but there is less evidence at the Conference of consensus on the way ahead
26-09-90:HOM	Environment plan to make polluters pay
26-09-90:HOM	Chris Patten unveils his comprehensive clean-up programme to counter looming ecological disaster and combat pollution 'from street corner to stratosphere'
26-09-90:HOM	Waging war on dirty rivers with old pop bottles
26-09-90:HOM	Balancing act civilises media circus Michael White on the unexpectedly restrained press launch of the Patten blueprint yesterday
26-09-90:HOM	Mixed reaction from the critics
26-09-90:FEA	Not just white but deathly pallid
27-09-90:FEA	Whitehall's pressurised reactors Commentary Hugo Young
27-09-90:FEA	Andrew Moncur
27-09-90:SPO	Halifax Town 1, Manchester United 3 Leighton is again the fall guy
28-09-90:HOM	Government puts up its green team
28-09-90:FEA	Environment So what can I do? The White Paper's suggestions for the caring citizen
28-09-90:FEA	Does Chris Patten's blueprint deserve admiration or abuse? Fiona Reynolds manages a half cheer Environment: A Patten but no real shape
29-09-90:WEE	Zeitgeist

29-09-90:WEE	SOUND BITES
29-09-90:WEE	SIMON RAE THE WORLD IS TOO MUCH WITH US

iii) postcript: the week after

02-10-90:HOM	Ministers take slow route to cleaner cars as Patten calls for catalytic conversion
04-10-90:FEA	Even the party faithful finds Tory transport policy hard to swallow Free market's road to ruin
05-10-90:FEA	A Country Diary
05-10-90:FEA	
05-10-90:FEA	Building in the problems
05-10-90:FEA	A decade of fumes

d) the "epilogue" phase

09-10-90:HOM	Play fields sold for debts
10-10-90:HOM	Conservative rivals clash over Europe
11-10-90:HOM	Patten pushes case for the environment
16-10-90:HOM	Tough environment programme falls short of closing Sellafield decision to stop Sizewell B Labour sets out green policy
18-10-90:HOM	Hurd and Major top the political popularity list Guardian ICM Poll
19-10-90:FEA	Sinking more quickly into the mire Commentary
25-10-90:HOM	Riviera climate forecast for Britain
25-10-90:FEA	Quote
26-10-90:HOM	NFU protesters say market forces may bring rural dereliction
27-10-90:WEE	Gardening: Green thumb - Some dilemmas in turning organic

Key to News Sections in *The Guardian*:

HOM	Home News
FEA	Feature article
WEE	Weekend supplement
SPO	Sport

5.5 Research strategy

After presenting the visual databases for Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the Worlds Wide Fund for Nature, I now indicate the ways in which the contents of the news discourse are reconstructed in the remainder of the analysis.

In the next section C I analyse the process of "environmental problem specification" that is undertaken by the news campaigns of the three environmental organisations. This involves a reconstruction of the environmental issue cultures of the organisations' campaigns from the discourse element "E", and a reconstruction of the contested fields that the organisations mobilise from the coded discourse element "G". When related together these elements give the "public campaign cultures" of the environmental organisations in the news. In section D I reconstruct the "cycle" of environmental claims that are made by the three environmental organisations over the four time-phases of a political event: "prior to the news cycle"; the "prologue"; the "news event"; and the "epilogue" discourse.

The four discourse elements "O", "A", "E" and "G" construct a news narrative on the environmental contest into a text. The three discourse elements referring to the issues relating to the organisation's activities "A", environmental issues "E", and the Government responsibility issues "G" are the indicators for the environmental claims that are mobilised in the narrative. It is the combination of these three discourse elements into a specific "package" that "biases" the representation of the environmental contest in a newstext.

Each newstext may be considered as a case or an episode in the environmental contest. The "weighting" technique attributes 24 units of resonance to each text. In section D the units of resonance for the three discourse elements for environmental claims - "E", "A" and "G" - are aggregated for each week of news in the three months of the sample. This gives a discourse pattern for each organisation for each newsweek in the "cycle" of the political event covering the Government's launch of the White Paper *This Common Inheritance*. The detailed coded descriptions of the the discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" are then reconstructed within the framework of the "cycle" that is produced by this reconstruction of the "weightings" for each newsweek.

In section E I reconstruct the discursive stunts and explicit framing devices[29] of the

[29] These represent the linguistic structures of a news narrative that appear in the text and are produced by the organisations' acts of mobilisation. I discuss these in detail in the introduction to section E.

three organisations which penetrate the semantic contents of the newstexts. This provides more detailed information on the communication strategies of the organisations in a political event.

Together these three sections can be considered to constitute three types of "frame analysis" of the organisation's environmental mobilisations: an analysis of how the organisations' campaigns "frame" the topics for the British environmental discourse (section C); an analysis of how the organisations strategically "frame" a political event (section D); and an analysis of how the organisations "frame" cultural elements to promote themselves, raise environmental problems, and delegitimise opponents in the British public discourse (section E).

6. Content Analysis - Preliminary Indicators

In this final part of the methodological section I give the findings of the preliminary content analysis (5.2.1 actors and events above) covering 1. environmental mobilisation indicators; 2. contested field indicators; and 3. media coverage indicators. These initial findings are intended to set the agenda for the more detailed analysis of the thesis for environmental mobilisation which appears in the remainder of the dissertation.

6.1 environmental mobilisation indicators

As mentioned above (5.2.1.i), environmental mobilisation indicators are coded from the contents of the news text sample for each organisation and are represented at the top of the visual database. These are an initial coding for the discursive action of the environmental organisation, i.e. whether the organisation has "staged an event" to achieve/enhance the possibility of achieving media resonance ($); whether it is an explicit "source" for the production of the text by journalists (*s*); whether information produced by the organisation (e.g. scientific data, reports) appears in the news narrative (i); and whether a spokesperson from the organisation is quoted directly in the text (*S*).

The coded environmental mobilisation indicators for the news samples of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature are represented in **graph B.1**.

For each of the three organisations the most frequently occuring environmental

mobilisation indicator refers to mobilised information (i), namely when information produced by the organisation (e.g. scientific data, "facts") is used in the news narrative. Cases of mobilised information (i) occurred in more than two thirds of the articles for each organisation. This indicates that Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature are active in producing the information that defines the environmental contest.

Actors from the organisations are directly cited (*S*) in the newstexts in two thirds of the articles in the Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace samples, and in a half of those in the World Wide Fund for Nature's sample. This shows that the activists from the organisations are routinely attributed space in the news narrative for commenting on events. It suggests that the activists have close links with and good access to the journalists who produce the texts.

Regarding the "staging of events" ($) and the explicit "sourcing" (*s*) indicators, these are apparent in more than half of Greenpeace's articles, in just less than half of Friends of the Earth's articles, and about a quarter of the World Wide Fund for Nature's. This indicates that the two more media-oriented organisations, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, are more likely to use communication strategies to gain entry to the news agenda than the World Wide Fund for Nature. Furthermore, it shows that Greenpeace is more likely to "stage events" to achieve coverage and is more keen to appear as an explicit "source" of an article than Friends of the Earth. Conversely, Friends of the Earth rely more on producing information that is reported in the news narrative (in which the organisation is as succesful as Greenpeace). This implies that Greenpeace has a more self-assertive "image" in its discursive practices than Friends of the Earth.

6.2 contested field indicators

The contested fields indicators (see 5.2.1.ii above) are coded for each text from the samples for Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature and appear at the bottom of the visual database for each organisation. These are an initial coding for the "event" from the environmental contest that is reported by the news narrative. The contested field is constructed into the news narrative as an "event" by the environmental organisations' opposition to a Government (or Industry) actor. Four indicators are used for analysing the contested field in the news narrative, namely: the scope of the environmental problem (W world/global, E european, N national, or L local); the scope of the actor field

(W world/global, E european, N national, or L local); "type" of contested field (nuclear n, energy (non nuclear) y, agriculture a, industry i, transport t, business b, party politics p, labour l, government e, or sponsorship d); and whether or not the contested field was a policy field (o) or a non policy field (x).

Here I deal only with the indicators for the scope of the environmental problem (iss scope) and the scope of the actor field (act field) that appears in a news narrative on a contested event.[30] These coded indicators for the contested fields in the news samples of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature are given in graph B.2.

The scope of the actor fields which appear in the Friends of the Earth sample are predominantly national (N), whereas in the Greenpeace sample two thirds of the actor fields are national (N) and one third world/global (W). In the case of the World Wide Fund for Nature two thirds of the actor fields in its news sample are world/global (W) and only one third national (N). This indicates that Friends of the Earth are primarily involved in national events from the environmental contest, whereas Greenpeace are also active in supranational events, and the World Wide Fund for Nature are primarily involved in supra-national environmental events. This gives a preliminary indicator for the scope of the environmental organisations' campaigns in Britain. Friends of the Earth are national actors, Greenpeace are firstly national actors and secondly supra-national actors, and the World Wide Fund for Nature are firstly supra-national actors and secondly national actors.

The scope of the environmental problem(s) (iss scope) which appears in a news narrative is not the same as the scope of the actor field (act field). The propensity for the scope of environmental problems to extend beyond the scope of the actors in the event is a preliminary indicator for the "framing" function of environmental issues. The environmental issues cited in a campaign can extend ("globalise") or shrink ("localise") the notion of the contest that is present in the actor field.

In the case of Greenpeace, two thirds of the actor fields had a national (N) scope and a third a world/global scope (W). In contrast, for the scope of environmental problems this trend is reversed: two thirds of the environmental problem scopes in the Greenpeace sample are world/global (W) or european (E) and one third are national (N). This indicates that the

[30] The other indicators for contested fields are reconstructed in section C below.

environmental problems in the Greenpeace discourse have a tendency to "globalise" the environmental discourse, i.e. refer events to a wider problematic.

For the case of Friends of the Earth's sample, which has a predominantly national (N) scope of actor field, a third of the environmental problems raised have a world/global (W) or european (E) scope, whereas a majority are national (N), and a few local (L). This indicates that the environmental problems that are raised in the Friends of the Earth discourse maintain a national emphasis, but do also refer events to a wider problematic - a "globalising" tendency - and in a few cases to a narrower problematic - a "localising" tendency.

The case of the World Wide Fund for Nature is different from that of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace: the overall scope of the environmental problems in the sample is similar to the overall scope of the actor fields mentioned. As the World Wide Fund for Nature discourse has a tendency for mobilising supra-national events, it is difficult for the environmental problematics raised to further "globalise" the discourse. However the organisation does not show a tendency to "localise" the supra-national actor fields to national environmental problems. This indicates that unlike Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature acts primarily as a supra-national actor in the national news discourse. There is a slight increase in the number of world/global (W) relative to the national (N) indicators for the World Wide Fund for Nature moving from the scope of actors to that of the environmental problems in the news narratives. This shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature does have a tendency for "globalising" the national events that it enters.

6.3 media coverage indicators

The media coverage indicators (see above 5.2.1.iii) are a coding for the evaluations of the actors and topics in the environmental contest that are made by the media actor who "writes" the text. These are the values (positive +, negative -, or neutral =) which the journalist attributes to the characters in a news narrative, i.e. journalistic commentary on the environmental organisation (O); its activities (A); the environmental problems (E); and the Government (or Industry) actor (G). These are coded for each article in the news sample and appear in the middle of the visual databases, next to the discourse element - "O", "A", "E"

or "G" - with which they are closely related. The media coverage indicators for samples of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature are represented in **graph B.3**.

The media coverage indicator shows how the actors and problems reported in a news narrative on the environmental contest are evaluated by the journalist producing the text. In general it seems that the journalists who "write" the newstexts tend to view the actors in the environmental contest neutrally but are more willingly to offer values (usually positive) when elaborating environmental problems.[31]

As an acting organisation (O & A), Friends of the Earth is predominantly attributed with a neutral value (=), i.e. reported 'objectively', in the sample of news. In an eleventh of the news narratives where it appears, Friends of the Earth's activities (A) are reported favourably (+). A fifth of Greenpeace's news narratives report its activities (A) favourably (+). This indicates that Greenpeace is more likely than Friends of the Earth to have favourable reportage on its actions.[32] In contrast, the World Wide Fund for Nature's actions (A) are attributed with negative values (-) in a third of its coverage. This finding is explained by the occurence of a series of "scandals" in the World Wide Fund for Nature's practices during the sample period (see later).

The opponent Government and Industry actors (G) are attributed a negative value in more than half of the Greenpeace sample, more than a third of the Friends of the earth sample and more than a quarter of the World Wide Fund for Nature's sample. This shows that the organisations' environmental mobilisations and blaming strategies have an influence over the journalist's evaluative coverage of their opponents in the environmental contest. Greenpeace seems to have the blaming strategies that are the most prevalent at "shifting" the bias of the reporter.

More than half of the environmental problems (E) raised by Greenpeace are treated

---

[31] The work of Lowe and Morrison (1984) has indicated that in the early eighties journalists were willing to attribute favourable coverage to the topics of environmental organisations. Unlike the present, this was at a time however when environmental claims were not seen to be overtly politically contentious.

[32] This may be due more to the polemical style of Greenpeace news discourse which is designed to achieve sensationalist "new values" than a journalistic preference or favouritism towards Greenpeace. There is less scope for the journalist to offer explicit opinions on the policy-related discourses of Friends of the Earth and the conservation activities of the World Wide Fund for Nature than in the "news events" in which Greenpeace "stages itself" as the key actor. Later I discuss this difference in communication strategies as a division of communicative labour between the environmental organisations (Section D).

favourably (+) by the journalist; as are more than a third of those raised by Friends of the Earth and the World Wide Fund for Nature. This indicates that the organisations have the environmental problems which are raised by their mobilisation activities favourably reported by journalists. The environmental problems raised by Greenpeace are more often reported in an evaluative way that is favourable, but this does not mean that Greenpeace is the most 'successful' environmental mobiliser or that which is most favourably treated by journalists. Such evaluations depend on the type of environmental issue topics and contested fields that are raised, the style and narrative contents of the reports which cover events, and the significance of the "news events" to the establishment of a national political agenda on the environment. It is to these matters which I now turn.

C) 'Public Campaign Cultures' in the Mass Media Discourse: theme mobilisation, target construction and environmental framing patterns

1. Introduction

1.1 "Public campaign cultures"

An issue that has been successfully mobilised for public attention is also by definition "newsworthy". When environmental organisations "make the news" they are exercising and pushing the right to have their arguments heard. The role of a "free press" in a western type liberal democracy is supposed to ensure that opposition voices are heard as a routine but fundamental part of democratic procedure. Actors do not, of course, have equal resources of access to the public sphere.[1] However, it is their ability to remain on the public agenda which makes the environmental organisations' attempts to be heard against the superior power resources of government and industrial actors an interesting case-study. Their continued potential, as news sources and sources of expertise for journalists to draw on, for framing the environmental "contest" indicates that the organisations maintain a special resource for political communication.[2] In this thesis I argue that their ability to exercise discursive power is due to a special potential for strategically mobilising environmental culture as a resource for making political claims in contemporary societies.

Environmental organisations make themselves, their actions and their campaign of information "newsworthy". This is a normal everyday practice for a contemporary environmental organisation. The extreme case is when they "stage events", when protest actions are performed as stunts or in a way that is highly dramatic and visible. According to media analysis folklore, this *novelty* aspect appeals to the media's perception of a "news" story, and particularly for the tabloid press and television news (Greenberg 1985, Anderson 1990; 1993). Furthermore this suggests that the organisations construct their claims into

---

[1] The seminal work of the Glasgow University Media Group (1976) and Hall (1978) has claimed that governments tend to be the 'primary definers' in mass media discourse.

[2] An early study by Sachsman (1976) indicated that environmental organisations seem to have a special capacity for influencing news production by demonstrating that 53% of environmental stories in the San Francisco Bay area were the outcome of public relations efforts.

"news event" formats as a specific strategic dimension of their actions. Achieving media coverage is the intended outcome of the organisations' actions. Their actions mobilise pre-selected and culturally biased information into the media arena of public discourse. In other words, environmental organisations act to "make the news". The prime examples of this media strategy in Britain are Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.

I think this assumption of the media analysis of environmental organisations' activities is correct. However, it is an assumption and not a finding of most existing analyses.[3] It is not sufficient simply to enumerate the quantitative amounts of coverage to reach such conclusions about the nature of the organisation's actions. More qualitative work on the discursive *contents* of mobilisations (and how this affects their reception by journalists and the public) is necessary to substantiate such claims. The environmental organisations do not *control* the media agenda simply by achieving coverage, their mobilisations are always subject to the possibility of unintended outcomes. As public communications their significance and "success", i.e. their resonance in the national political culture, is also dependent on the processing of their messages by journalists and reception by specialist and non-specialist publics.

With the notable exception of a recent analysis of the news coverage of Greenpeace (Hansen 1993), little attempt has been made to systematically analyze the *contents* of the environmental organisations' mobilisations. Indeed the qualitative contents of the organisations' communications are often presumed as an accepted part of "common sense" public knowledge rather than analyzed. Anecdotes about notorious incidents involving the organisations (and usually the most dramatic actor - Greenpeace) have tended to serve as a basis for sweeping claims about the historical significance of their actions, e.g. Cassidy (1992).

If the basis of the environmental organisations' political action does occur through public communication media, i.e. their ability to 'frame the debate' on the environment in Britain, then it is essential to analyze the *range of contents* which they mobilise into the media discourse as a routine part of their actions. This has been a significant empirical deficit in previous work on the environmental organisations and the media. How is it possible to make valid claims about what the organisations do and communicate, and the significance

---

[3] See for example the analyses of Greenberg (1985), Mazur (1990) and Cassidy (1992).

this has for a society, without analysing the resources of information which they use to construct claims and be contentious in the public discourse?

This section undertakes a reconstruction of the *contents* of the environmental organisations' "communication campaigns" from the context where they appeared, namely the news discourse. The *contents* of the public communications made by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature are reconstructed from the three months sample news coverage in August, September and October 1990. As this period covers the publication of the British Government's White Paper policy document, it is a key period for the campaigning activities of the organisations.

One assumption of the analytic model (see section **B**) is that environmental organisations construct "campaigns" into the public communication media by mobilising claims which relate *environmental themes* to *government responsibility contexts*. This constitutes a specific type of political action. Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilise "communication campaigns" that range over distinct sets of *environmental themes* and *government responsibility contexts*. I refer to the *range of contents* of an organisations' "communication campaigns" as a **"public campaign culture"**.[4]

Other public actors - e.g. policy-makers, politicians and business actors - use what the organisations are saying and the topics which they raise as a pre-condition for entering the public discourse on the environment. The organisations' collective "campaign culture" is a *resource* for actors in the public discourse and is therefore a key indicator for the type(s) of environmental discourse that is (are) constructed within a national political culture. In this sense the discursive actions of the environmental organisations serve as a "gatekeeper" for other actors to enter the public debate on the environment.

"Public campaign cultures" are produced and mobilised by the organisations to set the national political agenda on the environment. These communications constitute an *encoded* culture for making environmental claims against the Government. A "public campaign culture" indicates the issues and public policy fields on which the organisations seek to 'frame the debate' in the environmental "contest".

---

[4] Each organisation has a "public campaign culture" which is a resource for making environmental claims that are politically contentious. An organisation's "public campaign culture" is an indicator for its discursive action *repertoire* in the news media. Furthermore the "public campaign cultures" of the three major environmental organisations may be considered to constitute a collective "campaign culture" for mainstream political activism by the British environmental movement.

The methodology for public discourse analysis that is defended here codes sets of text *contents* by relating *source* elements (*environmental themes*) to *target* elements (*government responsibility contexts*) for individual cases of communication. When reconstructed these related *contents* may be used as data for interpreting the strategic intentions of the organisations' communicative actions within the public culture. In this section I analyze the types of environmental issues "E" and types of government responsibility issues "G" that are constructed in the news discourses of each organisation. The reconstruction is undertaken in three steps: Firstly, what type of environmental issue cultures ("E") do the organisations mobilise? Secondly, which type of contested fields for *government responsibility* ("G") do they highlight? And thirdly, how do these two variables relate together in specific cases and construct the contentious 'oppositions' which constitute an organisation's "public campaign culture"?

The reconstructed *contents* of these environmental mobilisations tell us about the environmental topics, opponents and public policy arenas which Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature contest in the public discourse. The contents show the topics and contests with which the organisations 'frame the debate' in Britain. Furthermore it identifies the 'opponent' actors whom the *contents* of this communication aim to critically engage in the British environmental discourse.

1.2 Framing environmental issues and social contests

Environmental issues are social constructions.[5] They are produced within a social context and "framed" by actors as symbolic packages that are communicated in public discourse.[6] This means that the environmental issues that are mobilised by the organisations reflect the context of their production. They construct a claim which is made against a target actor. In most cases the environmental organisations make claims against government and industry actors. This illustrates that environmental claims are based on a social contest

---

[5] On the social construction of nature see the introduction section A and the perspectives of Evernden (1992) and Eder (1986; 1993; 1995).

[6] On social movements, framing and the construction of symbolic packages as a strategic resource, see Snow and Benford et al. (1986), Snow and Benford (1988; 1992) and for a media discourse perspective Gamson (1988; 1995), Gamson and Modigliani (1989).

between actors with opposed interests. Indeed the intended role of environmental claims which are mobilised in the news is to re-construct a social contest between actors. In most cases a re-constructed opposition is made between the "public interest" and "government actions and practices". The "public" tends to be seen as pro-environmental supporter and the government as the actor who is responsible for the poor condition of the environment.

The role of an environmental organisation in the news process is communicative. Environmental organisations are *sources* of news who when they appear in the discourse possess a specific potential to be politically contentious due to the type of information which they produce, "package" and mobilise. Environmental information maintains a propensity for resonance within the national political culture by drawing on the popularity of a cultural tendency that is opposed to the dominant industrial ideology of modern societies. The organisations frame this counter-modernist tendency into specific claims on issue topics and public policy arenas. Indeed the widely perceived opposition between the "public" and the "government" on the environment is an indicator of the "success" which the environmental movement's communication strategies have had in framing the environmental "contest" in Britain over the last decade.[7]

Over the past decade the organisations have used the cultural resource of the popularity of certain environmental themes for "framing" an *emergent* national political agenda on the environment. This constitutes a considerable political achievement at a time when in Britain the Thatcher Governments have exerted a hegemonic influence over national political culture (see e.g. Keat and Abercrombie eds. 1991; Gamble 1990). Government and media actors have followed in the wake of the environmental organisations and entered the environmental agenda at a later date.

Public discourse theory defines the role of the environmental organisations as a *mediator* between on the one hand the cultural resource of the public perception of environmental themes, and on the other the political agenda of government. My hypothesis is that the environmental organisations take on a creative role in this process. By comparison

---

[7] The vast number of opinion polls which show an increase in environmental concern within the hierarchy of public values, relative to full employment, low inflation, or whatever (see for example Eurobarometer surveys), confirm the social significance of environmental issues in contemporary societies. Although the "results" of any public values analysis are of limited utility - since the "public" is not a single actor with a uniform standardised perception of the political world - opinion poll surveys are key indicators for political debate because they are claims that tell the government what it should be doing. Opinion polls are significant because they can frame the debates of key political actors.

the constructive role of the media actors is less creative. Journalists put the contents of the environmental information into "news frames". Their primary role is simply to process the environmental information they receive into the formats of 'structures of news'. Media processing adds "news values" to the content of the communication, it does not control the strategic orientation of the contents and targets of communication.[8] In contrast to the media actors, the organisations' mobilisation of information "frames" the social contest on the environment into distinct political conflicts, based on specific issues, events and actors. It is the environmental organisations rather than the journalists who activate the environmental discourse into a political contest.[9]

The balance of this 'division of labour' between environmental organisations and journalists in producing the politically active *contents* of environmental news may shift over time. As "specialist" environmental posts are created within the journalistic field, the media actors are likely to become less dependent on the organisations for expert knowledge and more able to produce their own environmental argumentations and opinions. Nonetheless the "reporting" function of the media will ensure that the organisations remain a key (though not necessarily the only legitimate) voice in the public discourse. The journalists' reception of their mobilisations may simply become more discriminating. They may require more evidence before believing the environmental organisations' claims.

Nonetheless, it is at present the organisations who "make" the issues that "make" the environmental news agenda. They act strategically, using a cultural resource with the specific aim of changing the existing social structure. In other words, the organisations' mobilisation of biased normative communications into the public discourse makes them an active element of political culture.

This characteristic makes the environmental movement different from the labour movement, and other social movements whose claim for a re-organisation of the social

---

[8] I elaborate on my usage of the concepts of 'structures of news' and "news values" in the concluding section. 'Structures of news' are drawn from van Dijk (1985) (1988), Fowler (1991) gives an overview of the more established concept of "news values".

[9] It is worth noting that analyses that are based on interviews with environmental journalists (Lowe and Morrison 1984) (Anderson 1990; 1993) tend to overstate the importance of the journalist in producing the news contents of environmental discourse because their primary source of data is the media actors' self-perception of their role. Obviously when interviewed, actors define themselves as the reference point for describing changes in the production of environmental news; they may not be aware of changes in the practices of other actors in the process.

structure is based on a redistribution of social structural resources and macro-historical narrative, e.g. the power of the labour force in the capitalist system of production. The resources of the environmental movement are drawn from a specialism in the knowledge and communication of claims in contemporary societies, it is a **cultural power** that is available in the present political culture. This is also why the contemporary environmental organisations are media and public relations based - they are designed to promote widespread access to the environmental knowledge that is gained from scientific research. Communications based organisations such as Friends of the Earth are famously short of structural organisational resources; their power is qualitative, normative, ephemeral and communications based rather than quantitative, structural and systemic. This may constitute a difference between "contemporary" movements and "modern" social movements.[10]

In the following I undertake a content analysis of the agenda-building properties of the organisations' claims that are lodged in the news discourse: environmental issue cultures (2.); government/industry contested fields (3.); the process of environmental issue framing and target construction (4.). These elements are used to reconstruct the "public campaign cultures" of the three organisations.

2. Mobilising environmental themes into news coverage: environmental issue cultures, frames and campaigns

Environmental organisations enlist public legitimacy to mobilise claims against the existing political agenda of Governments. The specific environmental issues that appear in news discourse need to be understood within this ongoing context of a social contest.[11] Each text represents a social relation from the environmental contest. It is of fundamental importance that this social relation is maintained within the analysis of environmental issues, since it is the framework which gives the issues meaning. Environmental issues cannot be understood outside of the social context of their production and communication. They are not

---

[10] I take up this argument on the concluding section F which looks at the environmental organisations as a new type of collective actor.

[11] A primary methodological concern has been to maintain within the analysis the relations between the four discourse elements which constitute a news narrative on the environmental contest: the organisation's name ("O"), environmental issue indicators ("E") and the indicators for the source actors ("A") and target actors ("G") for the social production and communication of the environmental contest.

"objects", but cultural "frames" that offer a biased view of social reality. They are ideological products that are strategically communicated in public discourse to produce social change.[12]

All environmental themes are ultimately related in the same counter-modern cultural tradition that is present and active in contemporary societies (Eder 1992; 1993; 1995). The *globalisation* of the environmental theme has been one of the most significant innovations in the environmental discourse over the last decade. Indeed it is one of the primary characteristics of the current wave of "environmentalism", that Jamison, Eyerman et al. (1990) have identified as a "new environmental consciousness".[13]

The first aim of this section is to compare the *range* of environmental issues ("E") that the organisations mobilise in their campaigns. This is undertaken below, where I use the category of **environmental issue culture** to describe the sets of specific "framed" issues that mobilise *environmental themes* in the campaigns of the organisations.

The globalisation of "the environmental problem" as a contested "event" unifies all the environmental issue cultures, (and environmental campaigns) into a single unified theme, namely a counter-modern cultural tendency. Environmental issues may be specific as "frames" (e.g. "car exhaust emissions" and "global warming" are two issue frames) but they are no longer distinct from one another: they are elements of an issue culture that is mobilised by a specific type of social contest in contemporary societies. Furthermore, this means that specific environmental issues are cultural frames which are embedded in the context of their production, a contest which is just one act or "event" in the ongoing social contest over the environment that occurs between competing actors, e.g. Friends of the Earth v. motor industry, or Friends of the Earth v. car owners, or Greenpeace v. British Government.

---

[12] I do not intend to retrace the steps of the argument regarding the "objectivity" of environmental problems that are identified as issues in conditions of risk and uncertainty. Here it is sufficient to establish the status of their existence as socially constructed partial claims in the public discourse. Environmental issues are constructed and mobilised to communicate the social contest of which they are part. Science-based "objectivity" claims are simply a type of "framing device" that is used by actors for legitimating environmental claims. This works as an appeal to the rationality and symbolic authority of scientific evidence. Apart from the appeal to scientific knowledge there are also other types of "framing devices", such as those which are based on moral or aesthetic appeals for a better "quality of life".

[13] Princen and Finger (1994) and Ruedig (1995) have also noted the global dimension of issues to be characteristic of the contemporary wave of environmentalism.

This constructed "nature" of environmental issues within an issue culture has important consequences for our interpretation of the social significance of the appearance of a specific environmental issue "frame" in the news. The analysis retrieves data from an assumed opposition in text: *environmental theme* to *government responsibility context*. This representation of the social contest produces a standardised text-structure: environmental claims oppose government and industry actions and interests. One actor, the "source" (environmental organisation), is mobilising claims against another, the "target" (a government or industry actor). The type of newstext which is produced by the mobilisation activities of the environmental organisations has a simpler narrative structure than an environmental editorial or feature article. It covers reported "events" between opposed actors rather than making environmental argumentations which are designed to lead public opinion. This indicates that the campaign activities of the organisations tend to produce and work within their own genre of news.[14]

An environmental issue "frame" (e.g. "global warming") is produced and communicated in a contested event. It is necessary to interpret the significance of this issue "frame" as an element which targets a specific field of Government (or Industry) activity as a contested event since this is the context of its production. Indeed it is this contested action of an opponent which 'causes' the mobilisation by an environmental organisation. In other words, specific environmental issue "frames" have meaning in the context of the campaigns in which they are produced, embedded and mobilised. Issue "frames" that appear in the news are key indicators for the organisations' campaign cultures but ought not to be interpreted (or coded) in isolation from the context of their production, namely the contest between

[14] In editorials or features that appear at the journalist's initiative there may be several layers of expressed opinions and environmental argumentations in the same article. This produces a more complex argumentation or narrative structure than simple news reports on "events" where the organisations are active. Nonetheless, my sample does include editorials and features in addition to the "hard" news reports, but only ones which have been produced by and refer to the actions of an environmental organisation. In such editorials and features the *contents* of the argumentations expressed are still drawn from the organisations' mobilised information and so the model remains an adequate analytic framework. In any case, journalists usually only take on the role as opinion-leaders in exceptional circumstances that are directed by external events. In such cases special news formats and *genres* are used to note the exceptional deviance from the normal structure of news, e.g. "editorial columns", "special features" on the day of the Government's publication of its White Paper.

source and target actors.[15]

To take one example of how single issue frames may constitute a unified issue culture that works across and integrates different contested contexts, a famous and long-running Friends of the Earth campaign has been against the use of the "car". When opposing the British Government's de-regulation policy for roads, motorways or public transport, Friends of the Earth may mobilise criticisms against the increasing problems of congestion and pollution brought about by cars in towns. At the time of an international or European Community conference for setting emissions standards, they may mobilise against the health risks to the public from both leaded and unleaded car emissions. When global warming is a topical news issue the organisation may mobilise scientific data on the amount of carbon-dioxide produced by cars and the contribution of this to the problem of global warming. Before a National Budget, Friends of the Earth may support a piecemeal policy proposal for a "car-tax" or reduction in the price of unleaded petrol. In other circumstances the organisation might mobilise information against the motor industry by using environmental cost-benefit analyses to criticise the inefficiency of car technology. Increasing the efficiency of cars would reduce energy consumption and pollution. Improving the quality of the bodywork and durability of the motor would make cars last longer and be more re-cyclable, thus reducing the problem of waste production. At other times Friends of the Earth may choose to criticise the quality of public life where everyone in London spends two hours in a traffic jam every day of the working week. They may appeal to the simple values of a return to the bicycle.

Clearly the communication campaigns of the environmental organisations may produce many different issue "frames" whilst remaining within a broadly defined environmental issue culture. At the same time even these broadly defined environmental issue cultures are interrelated by the universal nature of the environmental "contest" which identifies a fundamental cleavage in contemporary societies. The examples of environmental issues "frames" described above all mobilise problematics relating to the "car" issue culture that are elements of public campaigns by Friends of the Earth. Even so the "car" issue culture

[15] Gamson and Modigliani (1989) just code the issues in their analysis of nuclear power. This has the 'effect' of reifying the issues beyond the social context of their production, namely a contest between actors. The changes in issue "frames" which they identify are interesting, but tell us little about the changes in power relationships in the contest between movements and government institutions that may have brought them about.

itself is only a composite element of the issue culture relating to "global warming", that in turn is only part of the total issue culture of "environmentalism". This illustrates that the cultural resource for environmental meanings that is available to the organisations, namely the potential for mobilising specific issue "frames" from an environmental issue culture, is highly *flexible*. Issues are "frames" that *shift* according to the specific context of the contested "events" between actors which they seek to re-construct.

I refer to this *flexible* property of the issue "frames" across contested contexts as **thematic shift**. The media agenda building activities of the environmental organisations attempt to bias and control the range of the thematic shift of the environmental problematic within public discourse. The organisations intend to prioritise their favoured interpretations of the environmental problematic that appear in the media. In this sense their actions frame the environmental discourse within the national political setting.

Although the communicative property of issue "frames" makes the environmental problematic thematically flexible, the specific environmental issue "frames" which appear in the news construct "real" oppositions of interests between actors. For example, the issue "frames" raising the "car" problematic for Friends of the Earth serve to construct oppositions of interests between sets of actors in different contexts: e.g. actors with vested interests in the Government's de-regulation policies for transport versus the public interests of de-congesting and de-polluting towns and localities; actors with interests in technologies which produce toxic emissions versus the interests of public health concerns; interests of the motor industry in profit versus the interests of public consumers in 'safe' and 'clean' (but affordable) technology; the interests of private car owners versus the collective public interest in the "quality of life" and living environment etc...[16]

In each case a specific "car" issue "frame" reconstructs a "contest" between the

---

[16] Nature and the environment are by definition perceived as a collective common good. Advocates of "environmentalism" are arguing that nature ought not to be at the disposition of individual interests but available to all, namely that it should be a "public good". This is the basis of the conflict between the notion of the common good and the partial vested interests (usually of Government or Industry) that is mobilised by environmental issue frames. Opponent actors may be blamed for their actions which are counter to public interest and "anti-social" (i.e. the stigma of named "polluters"). The constructed nature of environmental discourse makes it possible to identify a wide range of "polluters". A recent development is that business actors are now able to present themselves (through PR activities) as servers of the public interest rather than "polluters". Multi-national chemical companies such as Shell and BP have greater financial resources than environmental organisations for promoting their claims. This means that the organisations have to become cleverer and use new communication strategies to make their claims stick. Such competition for legitimacy has proliferated in the development and mobilisation of environmental issue frames in recent years.

competing actors and the social relations on which their interests are based. None of the single issue "frames" exhaust the possibility for other "frames" from the "car" issue culture. On the contrary they invite re-framings and counter-framings in the public debate. It is this flexible quality that makes specific "frames" contentious but locates them in the time and space of public discourse as a single case or "event" in an ongoing and incommensurable "contest". This shows that the role of the environmental organisations' mobilisation activities is not simply to 'raise the debate' but to 'frame the debate' in public discourse. Their activities shape the range of "contests" that resonate in an environmental issue culture within a time and space of public discourse.

The "car" example shows that environmental issue "frames" are part of an issue culture that is produced by environmental campaigns and contested in the public discourse. Environmental issue "frames" are communicative and their "framing" potential is *flexible* in both the "source" actors and the "target" actors which they may define and the interests and values which such communications may contest. The mobilisation of environmental information is an strategic action. The selection of which specific "framing" will be used for an environmental theme in a campaign is determined by the type of constructed "event" and the target audience to be reached through the news medium. These are strategic decisions that are taken by environmental organisations in their day-to-day routine practices. To be pertinent in public discourse environmental claims must re-construct a real opposition of interests between social actors. Environmental issues do not appear out of thin air, they are "framing devices" that are raised from within a political culture and designed to work in specific social contests.[17]

In this analysis the environmental issues which appear in the sample of news coverage are coded from a set of texts that have been retrieved by using the name of the environmental organisations. This biases the environmental issues in the news sample to those which are produced by the activities of the environmental organisations rather than by other actors. The organisations are the "source" actors, the "mobilisers", for this sample of environmental

---

[17] Sociological analysis has tended to brush aside the debate over the status of environmental issues as social constructions. For example, the concept of environmental issues used by Yearley (1990) reifies the issues into objects that have a natural existence beyond the social relations that produced them. This is not a tenable sociological position. Similarly I criticised Gamson and Modigliani (1989) earlier for analyzing data on environmental communication by coding and comparing issue-frames without taking into account the social contexts which produce the specificity of each mobilised "frame".

news. Clearly the environmental issue frames and issue cultures which appear in the discourse, do so as active elements of the organisations' "public campaign cultures". They do not appear merely by chance, but are framed, produced and mobilised into the public discourse by the organisations' campaigning activities. The organisations' campaigning activities (rather than journalistic initiative or invention) is the context of their production. Furthermore, this means that the environmental issues which appear in this sample are intended to communicate and reconstruct "contests" which shape the national environmental agenda. They are elements of the organisations' campaign activities in the public discourse.

In this section (2.) I reconstruct the environmental issues that were mobilised by each environmental organisation's campaigning activities over the sample period. This serves to give a first indicator for the different *range of contents* in the "public campaign cultures" of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. It raises three questions of interrelated significance: Which environmental issues and issue cultures figure prominently in the organisations' campaign activities? To what extent is there a *division of thematic interest* in the environmental topics on which the organisations campaign? How are the organisations' "public campaign cultures" complementary and competitive in the range of environmental issue cultures which they construct?

In each text an environmental organisation has mobilised information into the argumentative structure of the news. The analytic category for environmental issues "E" codes a description of the "type(s)" of environmental problematic which appear(s) in a specific text (see methodological section B).[18] Here I divide the descriptions of the data collected by the environmental issues "E" category into twelve "types" which are intended to represent different environmental issue cultures.

To compare the discursive activities of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature I use the following twelve categories for the different "types" of environmental issue cultures which are raised by the campaigns:

1) **global warming** comprising references to global warming, the ozone hole, greenhouse effect, carbon dioxide emissions, and CFC emissions;

---

[18] In the analytic model the prominence of the environmental issues "E" is "weighted" relative to the organisation's name "O", the activity issues "A", and government responsibility issues "G" for the argumentative structure of each text. In addition to this the *contents* of the environmental issue "E" category is descriptively coded. Taken together this description and "weighting" gives an indicator for reconstructing the type and prominence of an environmental problematic that is mobilised in the text.

2) **rainforest etc.** referring to exotic flora and habitats, tropical rainforest, and the Antarctic;

3) **rare fauna** referring to rare endangered exotic animal species;

4) **mining** concerning the extraction of natural resources;

5) **nuclear** covering every aspect of the nuclear debate, N-power, N-testing, and radio-active waste;

6) **energy** concerning non-nuclear energy production affairs in the national context and including alternative energy;

7) **industrial waste pollution** covering toxic and chemical waste emissions and sewage processing;

8) **agricultural waste pollution** covering farm slurry, nitrates and pesticide pollution including references to farming techniques designed to alleviate such problems, e.g. organic farming;

9) **natural environment** dealing with all aspects of the destruction of the British natural environment, Greenbelt, landscape and flora and fauna;

10) **car** covering all problems related to transport: shipping, road use, and the use of cars, car technology and emissions;

11) **green business** relating green market affairs, projects, development, and green tourism; and,

12) **green politics** referring to green parliamentary political affairs, "green democracy" and the ethics of environmental pressure group activities.

These categories are described in the keys to the pie charts f, g and w which represent the range of the different types of environmental issue cultures that are mobilised in the news discourses of the three organisations.

The campaigning activity of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature in producing *environmental theme(s)* is reconstructed by combining the "type" of environmental issue culture with its "weighted" resonance for the news discourse of each organisation. The overall "types" of environmental issue cultures which appear in the set of texts are then aggregated for each organisation. This gives a comparative indicator for the range of environmental issue cultures and their relative resonance in the "public campaign cultures" of the organisations. It shows the range of environmental issue cultures that the three organisations mobilise during this key period for the British environmental "contest".

Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature, the three most resonant environmental organisations, mobilise public campaigns that raise environmental issues and issue cultures which relate critically to both national and international *government responsibility context(s)*. The communicative intent of these environmental issues cultures is to frame and highlight specific government responsibility contexts and action arenas.

"Global warming", "rainforest etc.", and "rare fauna" issue cultures refer to *global* problems and are more likely to frame a supra-national context. In contrast "industrial waste pollution", "agricultural waste pollution", "natural environment", "car" , "green business" and "green politics" issue cultures are more likely to frame and concern *domestic* problems and be set in a national context. "Mining" and "energy" environmental issue cultures may communicate concerns relating to either a national or a supra-national context, whereas the "nuclear" issue culture is special in that it may frame either national or supra-national or both contexts simultaneously. These framing characteristics of the different types of environmental issue cultures are tendencies rather than fixed guidelines.

For example, when the "global warming" issue culture is mobilised alone, it refers to a supra-national context. However when it is combined in a frame with other issue cultures, "global warming" may refer primarily to a national rather than a supra-national context. Thus in a specific article "global warming" issues may be combined with "energy" issues in a "blaming" frame which primarily criticises a national *responsibility context*, e.g. a Government policy advocating more "fossil fuels" (carbon dioxide producing) energy production. Indeed this kind of "linkage" between the twelve environmental issue cultures when highlighting *responsibility contexts* is a common feature, partly due to the flexible and shifting nature of environmental themes. Environmental organisations mobilise claims by combining different environmental issues and issue cultures into frames that identify and highlight *responsibility contexts*. I refer to such combinations of environmental issue cultures in specific cases of mobilisation (i.e. individual texts) as **frame clusters** of environmental issue cultures.

The presence of multiple environmental issue cultures in a single text, namely a

"frame cluster", is a common feature of the social construction of environmental claims.[19] This ability to combine different environmental issue cultures in a mobilisation is an indicator for the *discursive framing repertoires* of the environmental organisations in the news.

In section 1.2 I described how the specific environmental issues in news texts are "frames" which represent (and reconstruct) a social contest between the interests of competing actors. Indeed the environmental issue frames which are mobilised by environmental organisations are culturally biased to oppose a target interest, most often that of an opponent government or industrial actor. Environmental issues literally "frame" the environmental contest. They highlight the different social contexts where an environmental problem may be contested. For this reason they are most likely to appear in a text as clusters of specific issue frames. For example the "global warming", "nuclear", and "energy" issue cultures are all represented in the Friends of the Earth text, *Sparks fly in the great debate. The issue of nuclear power has always been a hot potato* (FoE X). This cluster of environmental issue frames enables the focus of this contest to shift and range across local (possible health risks to inhabitants near a nuclear power station), national (prospects of future energy production) and global (apocalypse of an overheated earth) levels of concern. At the same time several interrelated actors are profiled as "contestants", e.g. scientific experts, politicians, government policy actors on nuclear power, the public at risk, and the environmental organisations themselves. The shifting range of the frame cluster of environmental issues draws and ties these actors into a set of contested social relationships.

Environmental issue frames are the elements which construct the contested *environmental themes* of a campaign into a text. The special property of environmental issues gives them a "shifting" quality across the social contexts that represent the environmental contest in the news. They are especially prone to *thematic shift* because they are constructs which "exist" as contested issues, i.e. social constructions for which there is no single "objective" legitimated consensus. Specific environmental issues necessarily imply a broader issue culture and hence a broader action-context for the environmental contest.

Table C.I gives the aggregate amount of resonance that was produced in the news

---

[19] Indeed for this reason more than one environmental issue culture is coded per text. When two or more environmental issue cultures are present the "weighted" resonance of the environmental issues "E" category is divided equally between the number of issue cultures present.

discourse of each organisation for the twelve types of environmental issue culture. It identifies the environmental issue cultures that were raised in the news texts of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature and the combinations of issue frame clusters that were mobilised in specific articles.[20] I now undertake a reconstruction of the environmental issue culture "types" for the three environmental organisations in a comparative context.[21]

[20] For example, article B of Friends of the Earth's news coverage (FoE B) combines "rainforest" and "rare fauna" issue cultures into an environmental issue frame cluster that "works" within a single text.

[21] Hansen's analysis of Greenpeace (1993) is the only other attempt to re-construct the claims-making fora of an environmental organisation from news data. He takes eighteen categories for "Greenpeace-environment issues". In increasing order of significance, they are: green politics/parties; North Sea/Baltic seal deaths; Gulf War pollution; the arts/books; environmentalism/env. movement; Rainbow Warrior affair; government env. politics; ozone layer/global warming; air pollution/acid rain; other; sea/beach pollution; conservation/endangered species; waste disposal/management; exploitation natural resources; and nuclear power/arms/waste. I find this eclectic categorisation to be of limited analytic value. "Waste disposal/management", "exploitation natural resources" and "government env. politics" do not relate to specific environmental claims, but to the government and industry action-contexts which the claims criticise. "Gulf War pollution" and "Rainbow Warrior affair" refer to political "events", whereas "the arts/books" appears to refer to a section of the newspaper. It is difficult to see how a coder may differentiate between non-comparable indicators. For example, "sea/beach pollution" is an environmental issue that can be the result of "waste/disposal management" activities by government/industry. They are different dimensions of communication about a single reported problem. It is to avoid this type of confusion that my analysis maintains a distinction between the environmental issues "E" and the targeted responsibility contexts "G" which they construct into public discourse.

Table C.I: Resonance of different types of environmental issue cultures in news coverage for Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the WWF.

environmental issue culture category	article references*				amount of resonance (units)			
	FoE	Gpc	WWF	total	FoE	Gpc	WWF	total
"global warming"	F I K R X c b a e k l	A E F K N Q b	R V	20	30	23.3	10.7	64
"rainforest etc."	B I K P U l	E G H I J N b	C E H I J K L Q S V	23	18	22	49.5	89.5
"rare fauna"	B	B	A B D F G H I J K P T	13	4	1.5	59.8	65.3
"nuclear"	G J M Q X j k l r	A C D G I J N Q U V Y X c	H	23	30.8	62	3.5	96.3
"mining"	P V d	b	V	5	10	2.7	2.7	15.4
"car"	D I R a c e f k o p	E K R Y	U	15	40.3	9.3	8	57.6
"energy"	I Q R S W X g k n r	A E K Q Y		15	38	12	0	50
"industrial waste pollution"	C J O a q h	M T L W Z a		12	35.8	40.5	0	76.3
"agricultural waste pollution"	H L P T W c h i m s	R		11	56.8	2.3	0	59.1
"natural environment"	D E G K N V a c b d g	L R	M O	15	42.6	6.9	15	64.5
"green business"	D G P I t	H	E I L	9	21.7	4	8.8	34.5
"green politics"	A Y Z	B O P S	N	8	12	14.5	3	29.5

* letters refer to the specific articles (see section B for titles and visual databases) where the environmental issue cultures appear

2.i) Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace

The **pie charts f** and **g** show the environmental issue culture resonance of Friends of the Earth's and Greenpeace's *discursive actions* over the sample period. Both organisations' campaigns register in all twelve categories for environmental issue cultures types. This shows that they are 'active' across the full scope of the British environmental agenda.

Friends of the Earth's environmental issue resonance is more evenly divided between the issue culture categories than Greenpeace. This indicates that Friends of the Earth are the *generalists* in the British environmental discourse, they campaign more evenly across the full range of resonant *environmental themes*. In comparison Greenpeace tend to mobilise a more selective range of environmental issues.

The most resonant environmental issue culture in the Greenpeace discourse is the "nuclear" category which accounts for 31% of the total resonance (**pie chart g**). This is followed by "industrial waste pollution" with 20%, and the "global warming" and "rainforest etc." issue-cultures which comprise 12% and 11%, respectively, of the environmental issues raised by Greenpeace.

The high prominence of the "nuclear" and "industrial waste pollution" issue cultures indicates that these are primary elements in Greenpeace's environmental issue *framing repertoire*. Greenpeace favours campaigns against the nuclear threat and industrial pollution and raises these topics regularly in the public discourse. Nuclear threat is a high prominence issue culture that works at both the national and supra-national levels, whereas industrial pollution tends primarily to be a national issue. Together these two issue cultures comprise over half the environmental issue resonance of the Greenpeace discourse. This indicates that "nuclear" and "industrial" issue frames maintain a strategic importance in defining the thematic orientation of Greenpeace's "public campaign culture". Furthermore the nature of these two environmental issue cultures suggests that Greenpeace's campaigns mobilise an "anti-technology" critique into the public discourse.[22]

Broadly speaking, Greenpeace's campaign ideology appears to be more "anti-technology" than "pro-nature": it tends to raise *environmental themes* relating to the risks of

---

[22] Indeed Greenpeace's popularity rose initially in tandem with the waves of mass demonstrations and popular protests against nuclear weapons and power in the seventies and early eighties that took place in most Western democracies. For descriptions of the organisationsal development of Greenpeace, see Eyerman and Jamison (1989) and Rucht (1995). For the actual figures on the exponential growth in Greenpeace UK membership, see McCormick (1991).

complex modern technologies and dangers of pollution from industry rather than aesthetic or moral issues concerning the beauty of the natural environment.

In their analysis of Greenpeace, Eyerman and Jamison (1989) point out that "anti-technology" critiques tend to be mobilised as piecemeal "blaming" strategies rather than as a fundamental ideological claim with historical significance for society. From this they tend to conclude that the "technological dimension" of what they refer to as Greenpeace's "cognitive praxis" (and by implication that of the movement) is an impoverished and opportunistically motivated version of a potentially radical anti-technological critique.

> "As a movement, environmentalism has never been anti-technological, it has instead singled out and opposed the destructive and negative applications of science and technology.." (p. 112: 1989).

The empirical data presented here on the environmental issue cultures of Greenpeace's campaigns confirms an anti-technological ideological orientation that is latent in the mobilisation of "nuclear" and "industrial waste pollution" issue frames. These environmental topics do single out examples of the destructive and negative applications of science and technology. However that they appear as issue frames that identify and oppose specific "applications of science and technology" does not preclude a 'deeper' societal significance for environmental activism. On the contrary specific issue framing is simply a feature of the organisations' mobilisations activities which keeps the movement 'alive' by activating technological risk themes in the public discourse at times when waves of mass demonstrations or protests may have ended or reached a nadir.

The relatively high prominence of the "global warming" and "rainforest etc." which both account for about an eighth of Greenpeace's environmental issue resonance indicates an orientation in Greenpeace campaigns towards mobilising supra-national *environmental themes*. Indeed the prominence of issues frames for constructing the global warming problematic suggests that Greenpeace's anti-technological critique extends to the global level. Greenpeace raise concerns about scientific competence and technological risk in the public discourse as a routine element of their mobilisation activities. This serves to communicate the focus of their mobilised concerns across local, national and global *responsibility contexts*.

In contrast to the technological risk critiques, the relatively prominent "rainforest"

type issue frames indicate that Greenpeace do also mobilise on the aesthetic concerns regarding endangered exotic habitats. However, Greenpeace's aesthetic concerns with nature tend to be supra-national and focus on beautiful places that are far away from Western civilisation. This may be a part of the mystical/romantic element of Greenpeace ideology. At the same time it shows that Greenpeace "work" with the popular public images of global issues by framing exotic habitats in far away places. This type of global issue is a good PR exercise as images of disappearing exotic habitats have a strong popular appeal in contemporary Western societies. Also this type of issue is more open to the high quality photographic and aesthetic representation which attracts public attention more than the scientific details of global warming. Such concerns make few demands on the attentive public to invest in changing their social activities. The public is granted access to the *environmental theme* as a commodity for cultural consumption, a symbolic form of "armchair tourism" rather than a basis for constructive critique. Greenpeace mobilise more of this type of environmental issue frame than Friends of the Earth.

Friends of the Earth's communication on *environmental themes* is more evenly differentiated between the twelve issue culture categories than Greenpeace. The organisation's make-up of environmental issue frames does not share Greenpeace's "anti-technological" bias. Instead the **pie chart f** shows that the "agricultural waste pollution" is the most resonant environmental theme in the Friends of the Earth discourse. This issue culture maintains 16% of Friends of the Earth's environmental issue resonance, followed by "natural environment" issues with 13%, "car" 12%, "energy" and "industrial waste pollution" 11%, "global warming" and "nuclear" 9%, "green business" 6%, and "rainforest etc." 5%.

The focus on agricultural practices and pollution and the domestic natural environment which together constitute just less than a third of the environmental issue resonance, illustrates that Friends of the Earth place a greater emphasis on themes relating to the countryside in a national context than Greenpeace. Whereas Greenpeace's primary domestic issue relates to pollution caused by industrial emissions, Friends of the Earth lead on the pollution caused by farming techniques. This indicates one example of a *thematic division of interest* in the discourse mobilisation activities of the two most resonant environmental organisations. Greenpeace take industry whereas Friends of the Earth take agriculture.

Nonetheless Friends of the Earth do maintain an interest in mobilising against industry, in particular at the national level. The relatively high resonance of environmental

issue cultures relating to "car", "energy" affairs, and "industrial waste pollution" highlights the *type* of "anti-industrial" critique in Friends of the Earth's environmental issue *framing repertoire*. Whereas Greenpeace specialise on targeting industrial emissions and technological risks, Friends of the Earth generalise across the polluting sectors of British industry. Friends of the Earth raise issues which bring the activities of the productive sectors of industry and agriculture into the public spotlight rather than simply highlighting examples of the potentially risky 'effects' of industrial and nuclear emissions.

In addition, "energy" and "car" are types of issue frames which engage the public as a responsible actor rather than simply "blaming" the government/industrial technological complex. For example, a key "energy" issue frame concerns Friends of the Earth's campaign against the Government's privatisation plans for public utilities and the effects of this on costs to consumers (see later). Friends of the Earth's environmental issue framing confronts the activities of the attentive public more directly than Greenpeace. Like its "car" issue culture, which identifies an industrial product as a realm for public choice on environmental values, Friends of the Earth's "energy" issue culture appeals to the public as actors with divided interests: both as consumers who want cheap power and as the victims of pollution and as potential contributors to global warming. In contrast to Greenpeace, the environmental issue cultures which comprise Friends of the Earth's "public campaign culture" are oriented to the national domestic level and seek to cognitively involve the public into practical responses.

The resonance of the "nuclear" issue culture in Friends of the Earth's *discursive repertoire* is much lower than for Greenpeace. This suggests that the nuclear *environmental theme* has a different strategic role in the campaign communications of the two organisations. From the distribution of environmental issue cultures, it seems plausible that Friends of the Earth's "nuclear" issue frames are more likely to be mobilised as a concern within the national policy context, whereas I indicated above that Greenpeace mobilise the nuclear threat as a universal global concern that is an supra-national 'effect' of technological risk.

Earlier I identified the "natural environment" issue culture mobilising issue frames concerning the national countryside as the second most prominent category in Friends of the Earth's campaign culture. By comparison issue cultures relating to supra-national exotic habitats and animals play a minor role in the Friends of the Earth communication campaigns. The "rainforest etc." category accounts for only 5% of Friends of the Earth's environmental issue resonance, compared to 11% for Greenpeace. This indicates that Friends of the Earth

campaigns rely less on the populist appeals of distant faraway lands and instead focus the environmental debate more concretely on the practical and policy concerns within the national context. The supra-national oriented issue culture which does resonate significantly in Friends of the Earth's discourse is the "global warming" category, which accounts for 9%. This relatively high figure is probably due to importance of global warming as an issue within the national British environmental debate. Global warming has become a framing device that links and integrates other issue cultures at the national and supra-national levels.[23]

A further noteworthy point is that the "green business" category accounts for 6% of Friends of the Earth's environmental issue resonance, but only 2% of Greenpeace's. This illustrates that Friends of the Earth are more active than Greenpeace in the development of green projects, tourism, and market opportunities. Friends of the Earth are more 'openly' active in the market discourse between business enterprise and consumers than Greenpeace. This is an indication of the organisation's greater orientation towards engaging in the practical applications of environmental action and proposing piecemeal "solutions" than Greenpeace, which focuses more on mobilising green rhetoric and morality into the public discourse.

Furthermore Greenpeace's "green politics" issues frames have more resonance than Friends of the Earth's. In addition to its orientation to public rhetoric, this is probably an outcome of Greenpeace's "blaming" strategies which are more directly critical of the Green Party and other environmental organisations activities than Friends of the Earth. Friends of the Earth is less disposed to comment publicly on the activities of other members of the environmental movement. It tends to take a more pragmatic integrationist and less competitive stance than Greenpeace within the environmental movement.

To summarise, what trends does the *division of thematic interest* that has been identified in the "public campaign cultures" of the two organisations indicate about their the discursive action repertoires? Friends of the Earth confront the British public directly with environmental issues that raise topics concerning the major policy sectors of government. Their framings also tend to offer the public a "choice" of a action-contexts as possible responses, whether it be buying unleaded rather than unleaded petrol, using a bicycle rather

---

[23] As I described earlier, "global warming" is now a common currency for making environmental claims, it may be an element of 'internal' national policy debates or other contested fields that principally have a national focus.

than a car, or simply voicing opposition to, rather than consent for, the Government's environmental policy. Greenpeace do not allow their public this "freedom of choice": Greenpeace preserve the responsive action-context as their own territory and the public are simply invited to agree with the Greenpeace line. In this sense, the environmental issue range of Greenpeace's "public campaign culture" is more geared by the demands of its own "public image" needs than that of Friends of the Earth. Greenpeace's environmental issue frames tend to mobilise elite-actor "blaming" strategies that have a "populist" tilt. In contrast Friends of the Earth's "public campaign culture" is eclectic but primarily serves to raise and publicise environmental concerns with the national policy agenda.

2.ii) The World Wide Fund for Nature

The **pie chart w** shows the distribution of the environmental issue resonance between the twelve issue cultures for the World Wide Fund for Nature. Unlike Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace which had full complements, the World Wide Fund for Nature's mobilisations only register issues in nine of the twelve issue cultures. This shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature is not 'active' across the full thematic scope of the British environmental agenda, but maintains a *specialist* concern in a specific sector of the environmental agenda. What *division of thematic interest* is maintained by the organisation's specialist "public campaign culture"? And secondly, what implications may be drawn for the discursive action *repertoire* of the World Wide Fund for Nature from the thematic composition of its campaign culture?

"Rare fauna" and "rainforest etc." categories together account for more than two thirds, 68%, of the World Wide Fund for Nature's environmental issue resonance. This confirms that the World Wide Fund for Nature's *specialist role* within the movement consists in mobilising supra-national themes relating to endangered rare animal species and exotic habitats into the national discourse. It shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature's key public campaign activities focus on exotic habitats in distant lands and highlight the 'real' possibility that such species and places may disappear unless conservationist steps are taken.

The balance between these two supra-national themes slightly favours "rare fauna" (37%) to "rainforest etc." (31%) issue frames. This division indicates a tendency to emphasize issues relating to the possible extinction of specific animals rather than the habitat,

i.e. the whole ecosystem of which the animal is only an element. "Save the Elephant" and "Save the Rhino" campaigns are famous and long-standing pillars of the World Wide Fund for Nature's fundraising and public communication strategies. Indeed a similar campaign, for the Panda, even provides the symbol for the World Wide Fund for Nature's logo. These exotic animals have been the star performers in many natural history television documentaries and are convenient attention "pegs" for the World Wide Fund for Nature to reach the public. They are popular, appeal to children, have educational content, are open to stunning visual representation and may be easily applied to marketable merchandise.[24] Furthermore, this type of supra-national conservation themes tend to be politically benign and are less controversial than technological risk themes in the national policy context.

In contrast to animal campaigns, "rainforest etc." issues tend to appeal to a more discerning and politicised environmental public. "Rainforest" issues open and mobilise a discourse on the "sustainability" of ecosystems in a global context. This not only confronts an attentive public with a grasp of the interrelatedness of environmental problems, but extends the single issue into a broader concern with global sustainability and brings the campaign focus into an emergent supra-national policy arena. In the contemporary world "rainforest etc." issue frames indicate a more politicised campaign repertoire than "rare fauna" concerns.[25]

The resurgence of the World Wide Fund for Nature's activities and membership figures during the most recent wave of environmentalism has been documented (McCormick 1991) (Szersynski, Miles et al. 1995). A key feature of this phase of environmentalism has been the *globalisation* of the environmentalist critique. Without overstating the distinction, it seems plausible that the *global* "rainforest etc" issue frames are a product of the World Wide Fund for Nature's re-newed activity in the wake of the most recent cycle of public attention for the environment. By comparison the "rare fauna" issue frames are more likely to be part of the World Wide Fund for Nature's traditional conservationist campaigning

---

[24] Donati's (1992) analysis of the Italian WWF. noted that the organisation is willing to exploit the marketability of its image and association with nature.

[25] Within the "rainforest" issue culture, single issue attention "pegs" may still be used to reach the public. For example, like the animal campaigns, "Save the Tropical Rainforest" or "Save Tropical Hardwood" campaigns can be packaged as a single unit and marketed for appeal to a broad public. The main difference is that they maintain a latent reference to the ongoing global debate rather than remaining an eclectic set of supra-national single issue campaigns.

strategy. It appears that the *globalisation* of the environmental discourse has revitalised and revolutionised the focus, content and thematic scope of the World Wide Fund for Nature's campaigns. Indeed the traditional "public campaign culture" is encapsulated but extended into a new focus on the "global sustainability" of entire ecosystems. This situation has evolved due to the *globalisation* of the environmental discourse rather than as a result of the organisation's intentions.[26] Nonetheless the World Wide Fund for Nature's environmental thematic concerns now brings the organisation into fields of international regulatory policy negotiation.[27] Contemporary environmental debate makes the World Wide Fund for Nature into an actor with supra-national policy concerns.

In addition to "rainforest etc." and "rare fauna", a further supra-national issue culture "global warming" is the fourth most resonant issue frame. "Global warming" accounts for 7% of the World Wide Fund for Nature's total environmental issue resonance. This means that three quarters of the organisation's issue frames were composed of supra-national orientated concerns relating to "rare fauna", "rainforest etc." and "global warming". The comparatively lower resonance of "global warming" issue frames indicates that the World Wide Fund for Nature tends to focus on the aesthetic issues relating to the destruction of the world's natural environments rather than the scientific disputes about the reasons for or "causes" of this situation in a global context. It is likely that "global warming" issue frames are used in campaigns which relate the organisation's concern for the destruction of natural habitats to the supra-national intergovernmental policy agenda. Policy-makers and Governments require more science-based rational justifications for conserving the world's natural environments than the public. In policy debates scientific information is at a premium for justifying claims. Hence the role of "global warming" frames may be to operate as a frames that combine with "rainforest" frames, thus enabling the World Wide Fund for Nature to extend the claims from their conservation campaigns into supra-national policy concerns.

The "nuclear" and "mining" issue frames both account for a minimal proportion (2%) of the organisation's environmental issue resonance. These types of issue frames may be either national or supra-national, however their low resonance shows that they are most likely

---

[26] The organisation's transformation of its name from the World Wildlife Fund to the World Wide Fund for Nature plus its development of a new mission statement *Mission for the 1990s* were both brought about the attempt of the organisation to 'catch up' with the global concerns of contemporary environmentalism.

[27] See Princen and Finger's (1994) case study of the WWF's role in the ivory trade ban.

to appear as sub-frames of the more resonant campaign themes. Whereas the thematic distribution of Greenpeace's environmental issue cultures indicates that its campaign culture is "anti-technological" rather than "pro-nature", the reverse is true for the World Wide Fund for Nature. The World Wide Fund for Nature campaigns focus on "nature" as an issue in itself, rather than highlighting the deleterious industrial practices which are producing this situation. This feature distinguishes the World Wide Fund for Nature from Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, whose campaigns raise issues that identify the actors and action-contexts who are deemed responsible for the world's environmental problems.

The thematic trends in the World Wide Fund for Nature's supra-national environmental issue cultures are repeated on a smaller scale at the national level. Indeed the third most resonant issue culture in the organisation's discursive action *repertoire* is the "natural environment" with nine per cent. This indicates that the World Wide Fund for Nature retain an active concern in the aesthetic and moral issues relating to the nation's landscape, flora and fauna. In stark contrast the issue cultures relating to the nation's key productive sectors of energy, agriculture and industry did not register at all in resonance of the organisation's campaign culture. These were the prominent national issue cultures in the campaigns of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, which indicates a difference in the *division of thematic interest* between them and the World Wide Fund for Nature in the national arena. Even at the national level the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilises "pro-nature" rather than "anti-technology" environmental issue frames.

Another feature of the World Wide Fund for Nature's distribution of environmental issue resonance at the national level concerns the significant resonance of the "car" and "green business" issue cultures which both account for five per cent. This prominence of "car" and "green business" issue frames indicates that the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilise projects that are designed to contribute market-related solutions to the problems of the British countryside and natural environment. Like Friends of the Earth, at the national level the organisation is prepared to advocate consumer pressure and censure the public about using cars.

To sum up, the *environmental themes* in the campaigns of Friends of the Earth and

Greenpeace maybe considered *anthropocentric*, they relate "man" and "nature"[28] into a formula of "cause and effect". In contrast the World Wide Fund for Nature focus on "nature" rather than "man". However despite this focus on "nature", the World Wide Fund for Nature may not be considered *eco-centrists* even in the most casual sense of the word. The organisation has made a rather late (and strategic) entry into the public discourse on the "value" of nature in the contemporary world. New perceptions of "environmental ethics" have affected its perception as an organisation with an "interest" in nature rather than *vice versa*.[29]

The World Wide Fund for Nature's traditional campaigns have focused on "nature" as a distinct entity that is separate from "man", and failed to make "man" responsible for his actions towards "nature". This orientation is a legacy of the colonial "divide and rule" conservationist policies that overseas development organisations like the World Wide Fund for Nature endorsed in the past. The *globalisation* of environmental discourse has introduced a new perception into overseas development and conservation policies. In the *globalist* elements of the emerging perception, "man" and "nature" are united in "habitat" and "global sustainability" becomes a justification for extending the orientation of campaigns into the policy arenas of national and international intergovernmental institutions. The World Wide Fund for Nature's *globalist* "package" is an emergent perception that has been mobilised as a response to changes in the public values of nature in Western societies, it competes with the traditional colonialist perception of overseas conservation. At the present time elements of both "packages" co-exist in the thematic interests of the World Wide Fund for Nature's campaigns. It is likely that despite the apparent incommensurability of their claims some working compromise between the two "packages" will take the form of a "new" World Wide Fund for Nature conservation campaign strategy.

---

[28] By the "man" in the "man and nature" relation I refer to *mankind* which includes both man and woman. It seems pertinent to retain "man" as the reference point because the dominance of the male attitude to nature rather than the female attitude to nature seems to have been a contributing factor to the ecological crisis that confronts modern societies today.

[29] Indeed in 1990 the World Wide Fund for Nature even commissioned a report from Lancaster University (Grove-White et al 1990) to examine how changes in the perception of environmental ethics might be compatible with the organisation's future policies.

3. Targeting government responsibility contexts in news coverage: environmental campaign targets and contested fields

The sample of texts in this analysis represents a particular dimension of the environmental contest, namely that which is produced by the activities of the environmental organisations when they mobilise environmental issues with the specific intention of contesting government (and industry) actors in the public discourse.[30]

Mobilising environmental claims into news may be seen as two related parts of a communicative process: the selection of environmental topics and the identification of responsible actors. The selection of environmental topics is a key role of the environmental organisations in the public discourse, but so is the ability to identify opponent actors and target the fields of activity for which their opponents are deemed culpable for environmental damage. Both parts of this communicative process occur in the medium of public discourse. This is why the retrieval of data from news that is defended here codes the relation of *environmental themes* and *government responsibility contexts* from each text.

Whereas the last section 2. focused on the type of environmental issues and issue cultures that are mobilised into the news coverage by the organisations, in this section I analyze the types of contested fields which are raised and targeted as "responsibility contexts" by their campaigning activities in the news discourse. Following on from the environmental issue culture analysis (above), this reconstruction gives a second indicator for the *range of contents* of the "public campaign cultures" that are mobilised by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature in the British news discourse. It identifies which contested fields and public responsibilities the organisations construct into the news. After the environmental issue cultures, this is a second element of the discursive action *repertoire* of the environmental organisations.

Two related questions define my inquiry into the process of **target construction** by which the organisations name their opponents in the public discourse: Firstly, which government and industry action contexts do the three organisations' campaign activities "make responsible" in the public discourse? And secondly, how are the organisations' "public campaign cultures" complementary and competitive in the range of contested fields which

---

[30] The sample was retrieved by coding the names of the environmental organisations and represents the specific arenas of news discourse in which they are active.

they construct and the opponents who they target?

News texts make sense as individual units, each article has a "storyline" or narrative about an "event" which serves to raise the environmental contest into public debate. Environmental issue cultures and contested fields which are mobilised by the environmental organisations are contextualised at the surface level of news within a narrative of actors, events and opinions. Reported "events" appear in a narrative structure or "storyline" which is a "peg" or framework for positioning the 'deeper' themes of the environmental contest into prominence in the public discourse. It tends to be the news genre - e.g. a "scandal" - rather than the thematic contents of news - the "environmental contest" - which defines the stylistic way "events" are related in news story or narrative.[31] Nonetheless, appearing in a news story or narrative is an important way for environmental organisations to raise the 'deeper' themes through which they mobilise the environmental contest. It enables them to bring the cultural cleavage of the environmental contest to the surface of public debate.

For the current purposes of analysis it is necessary to look beyond the immediate "events" that appear as "stories" at the surface of news and retrieve the thematic elements of the news contents which are pertinent to the environmental debate. A news story or narrative is a framework which enables the organisations the potential to mobilise the thematic contents - i.e. the specific environmental issue cultures and contested fields of government and industry - which they intend to frame the public debate. In this sense a mobilisation of thematic contents into a news story or narrative serves as a discursive "act" in the ongoing social contest over the definition of environment problems.

The 'success' of the environmental organisations in framing the debate depends on their ability to 'bias' the selection of thematic contents which appear in a news story. This 'bias' might occur in the selection of thematic contents from the environmental debate which are used in a news story and that "work" either *pro* or *contra* the 'real' interests of the competing actors in the environmental contest. The ability to build environmental agendas through news coverage has direct consequences for the future potential of actors who engage in the social contest over the environment. It shapes the resources for them to speak with

---

[31] The surface contents of news stories often appear "trivial" due to the stylistic tendencies of journalists, who are prone to sensationalist - "man bites dog" - rather than objective representations of reality. One way that environmental themes achieve a "news value" is when they may be defined, categorised and related as a public "scandal". This has the effect of producing an endless series of environmental "scandals" in the news.

authority and act with influence in the continuing public discourse on the environmental problematic.[32]

Environmental news stories are important not because they tell the truth or lie about "events", but because their thematic contents influence the potential for the actors who compete in the environmental contest to continue acting in the future debate. News coverage re-constructs the environmental contest by decisively selecting the range of thematic contents which are the key topics for contemporary debate. It constructs 'real' oppositions between the competing actors in the environmental contest by shaping the context of public legitimacy for their future actions. On what basis is this legitimacy contest constructed?

The competition between environmental organisations and the government actors is the key axis of opposition in the environmental contest. It is 'activated' as a legitimacy contest in the public discourse by an opposition of interests between "the public" and "the government" that is mobilised by the campaign activities of the organisations. The field for legitimacy over which environmental organisations and their opponents compete is the notion of serving the "public interest". Serving the "public interest" is a source of legitimacy for the claims that the environmental organisations make in the public discourse. At the same time this act of claims-making constructs a *responsibility context* for government (and industry) actors. It makes the act of opposition to the government 'specific' in time and place by defining a practice in which government activities may be considered negligent by environmental criteria.[33]

The environmental organisations' campaign activities invoke a process of target construction into the public discourse, they specify who are the culprits and which are the harmful activities that are contra to public interest. This gives a shape and structure to the environmental contest by identifying a responsible set of actors and activities for the environmental problems that are named as issues. Moreover it binds the environmental issues

---

[32] The underlying thematic content of environmental disputes which environmental organisations frame into news stories affects the structure of the power relationships between actors in the environmental discourse because it identifies the key themes and responsibility contexts for the contemporary debate. It tells the public which issues they should be thinking about and the government what they might be held accountable for.

[33] Due to the publicising function of the "news" the accountable actor is ultimately always the Government, even though an industrial polluter may be directly blamed and a policy context not explicitly mentioned. If a claim is made that someone is acting against the public interest then the Government are necessarily implicated as a culpable actor, since their role is to serve the interests of the British public.

that are raised into a context of contested social relations, and thereby gives them meaning as an act in the environmental contest.

In each text strategic information has been mobilised into the argumentative structure of the news by an organisation. The environmental organisations use a notion of the "public interest" to mobilise their preferred *environmental themes* and de-legitimise the activities of government which they contest. The latter are the *government responsibility contexts* that appear in texts.[34]

In Section 2. I differentiated the total resonance of environmental issues "**E**" between twelve sub-categories of issue cultures for each organisation. This reconstruction gave an indicator for the range of *environmental theme* that is raised by the campaign activities of an organisation. Here I differentiate the total resonance of government responsibility issues "**G**" into sub-categories of **contested fields** that are targeted by the organisation's news campaigns.

The analytic category for *government responsibility context* "**G**" descriptively codes the contested field which appears in a specific text (see methodology section **B**).[35] Here I divide the total coded resonance of responsibility issues "**G**" for each organisation between five targeted arenas of governmental and industrial activity: **energy**; **production**; **services**; **political relations**; and **government & institutional activities**. Each of these government/industry arenas is further sub-divided into two categories of contested fields. In all this provides ten categories for "types" of contested fields that the environmental organisations' campaign activities mobilise into news texts. Together these ten categories provide the basis for comparing the different "types" of contested fields that are mobilised by the discursive actions of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature:

---

[34] Typically, in a text the organisations frame an environmental issue which highlights the responsibilities of government actors by defining a contested field. In this sense, the organisations may be seen as the "source" and government the "target" actors of the contested claims that appear in the sample of news.

[35] In the analytic model the prominence of the government responsibility issues "**G**" is "weighted" relative to the organisation's name "**O**", issues relating to the activities of the organisations "**A**", and the environmental issues "**E**" for the argumentative structure of each text. In addition the *content* of the government responsibility issues "**G**" is coded descriptively.

1) **Energy** arena:

nuclear contested field **n**,
representing nuclear energy production, nuclear industry and testing

energy (non nuclear) contested field **y**,
representing all non-nuclear energy production, including fossil fuels and renewable sources

2) **Production** arena:

agriculture contested field **a**,
comprising agriculture, farming and fishing activities

industry contested field **i**,
comprising heavy and chemical industrial production and construction (inc. mining and waste)

3) **Services** arena:

transport contested field **t**,
including transport infra structure, shipping and vehicle activities

business contested field **b**,
comprising business concerns, commerce, media and consumer activities (inc. tourism)

4) **Political relations** arena:

party politics contested field **p**,
covering party political "politics" activities

labour contested field **l**,
including labour and trade union activities, social welfare and employment concerns

5) **Government & Institutional activities** arena:

government contested field **e**,
covering the internal discussions, policy making and decision-making of government

sponsorship contested field **d**, the sponsorship, funding, aid, development and research activities undertaken by private and public institutional foundations

In addition to this coding for "type", each contested field is further coded for whether it appears as a "policy" field **o**, or as a "non-policy" related field **x**. This classifies the extent to which the environmental organisations target opponent actors in a policy context.

Whereas a multiple coding strategy per text was employed for the environmental issue cultures (2. above), a single coding strategy is used for the contested field in a text. Only the dominant contested field is coded for each text. There are two reasons for this: Firstly, less contested fields than environmental issue cultures appear in a text because the contested field is embedded in the "event" of the news story or narrative. News stories tend to relate single "events", or at most two related "events" where one is more prominent and contextualises the other. This means that each text is likely to have a dominant contested field that appears in the primary news event. Secondly, unlike environmental issues which are communicative and tend to appear in frame clusters (section 2.), contested fields are more context bound and mutually exclusive.[36]

The ten contested field categories are described again in the keys to graphs **f**, **g** & **w** (see below), which show the distribution of contested fields that are mobilised by the activities of the three organisations. Percentage figures for the distribution of the total resonance of contested fields, and its split between "policy" and "non-policy" contexts are also given. This data appears in **Table C.II** and the codings for each article are represented in time series at the bottom of the visual database for each organisation (section **B**). This data is also represented in the graphs **f**, **g** and **w**.

[36] Sometimes more than one contested field may appear in a single text. For example, the British Government may be criticised over their inadequate implementation of existing regulatory measures for river pollution (which would be coded government contested field **e**) and a chemical company depositing more than its legal quota of waste into the river may also be contested (which would be coded industry contested field **i**). In such cases the contested field which appears in the main "event" of the news story is coded as this is the primary responsibility context that appears in the article.

Table C.II: Resonance of different types of contested fields in news coverage for Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the WWF.

contested field	no. of articles				"policy" framing device resonance o				"non-policy" framing device resonance x				total resonance o & x			
	FoE	Gpc	WWF	sum	FoE	Gpc	WWF	sum	FoE	Gpc	WWF	sum	FoE	Gpc	WWF	sum
n nuclear	4	11	0	15	23	16	0	39	7	62	0	69	30	78	0	108
y energy	5	1	0	6	28	0	0	28	8	8	0	16	36	8	0	44
a agriculture	6	0	0	6	40	0	0	40	5	0	0	5	45	0	0	45
i industry	7	7	3	17	22	39	23	84	25	14	0	39	47	53	23	123
t transport	1	0	2	3	7	0	16	23	0	0	0	0	7	0	16	23
b business	6	1	8	15	7	0	7	14	29	4	44	77	36	4	51	91
p politics	4	3	0	7	33	25	0	58	0	0	0	0	33	25	0	58
l labour	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	15	0	0	15	15	0	0	15
e government	8	6	3	17	55	33	25	113	5	12	0	17	60	45	25	130
d sponsorship	3	0	6	9	0	0	0	0	15	0	35	50	15	0	35	50
total	46	29	22	97	215	113	71	339	109	100	79	288	324	213	150	687

3.i) Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace

Graphs **f** and **g** give the *government responsibility contexts* that are constructed in the news samples of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. They show the resonance of government responsibility issues "G" across the ten "types" of contested fields for the two organisations. In addition each contested field is broken down into those which appear as "policy" contexts **o** and those which appear as "non-policy" contexts **x**.

When comparing graphs **f** and **g** it is evident that Friends of the Earth's campaign activities construct government responsibility contexts in all the ten categories for contested fields, whereas Greenpeace produces only six "types" of contested field. This indicates that Friends of the Earth target opponents from across the full range of national political activity and sectors of production, whereas Greenpeace specialise on targeting specific responsibility contexts of government and industry. From this it is possible to draw the first conclusion regarding the process of target construction by the organisations campaign activities: Friends of the Earth are *generalists*, but Greenpeace are *specialists* who select and target specific contested fields in the public discourse.

The overall division between "policy" **o** and "non policy" **x** related contested fields indicates another general difference between the two organisations. For Friends of the Earth two thirds of contested fields appear as "policy" **o** (66.5%) and a third (33.5%) as "non policy" **x** related. In the case of Greenpeace a half (53%) appear as "policy" **o** and a half (47%) as "non policy" **x** contested fields. This shows that Friends of the Earth are more likely to criticise opponents by referring to policy matters than Greenpeace. It is common for Friends of the Earth to criticise government (and industry) actors by identifying their "policy" obligations in the public discourse. Furthermore, the campaign activities of Friends of the Earth are more strategically oriented towards the national policy agenda than Greenpeace. This gives an indication that Friends of the Earth's mobilisation activities aim to construct policy options in the public discourse and be legitimate within the institutional political framework. Indeed Friends of the Earth's criticism may serve to mobilise the harmful activities of industrial actors through the media into policy debates. Greenpeace on the other hand are more likely to "blame" their opponents without referring to the political

institutions as a possible forum for correcting environmental damage by policy-making.[37]

One of the findings of the previous section 2.i) was that the "nuclear" environmental issue culture is dominant in the Greenpeace discourse accounting for about a third (31%) of the total environmental issues. The "industrial waste pollution" issue culture accounted for a further fifth (20%) of Greenpeace's mobilised environmental issues. Here graph **g** shows that the nuclear contested field **n** which accounts for more than a third (36.5%) of responsibility issues is the most prominent in the Greenpeace discourse, followed by the industry contested field **i** which accounts for a quarter (25%). The high compatibility between environmental issue "types" and targeted contested field "types" shows that Greenpeace's primary mobilisations are streamlined, single issue dominated campaigns. This specialisation for promoting key environmental issues and contested fields as single topics indicates a highly strategic orientation towards the selection of campaign topics. It suggests that Greenpeace mobilise a specific environmental issue to "blame" a specific contested field of responsible actors. By avoiding a complex textual relation of source to target, Greenpeace's communication in the media discourse avoids the possible ambiguities of interpretation that might otherwise arise. Greenpeace mobilises clearly defined issues against easily identified targets whilst remaining on a single campaign topic. That the organisation is able to achieve this "effect" in the media shows that Greenpeace maintains considerable control over the coverage and representation of its campaigns.

The fields of nuclear energy production/testing and heavy and chemical industrial production are the key campaign issues and targets of Greenpeace. After the nuclear **n** and industry **i**, the main contested fields for Greenpeace are government decision-making **e** which constitutes a fifth (21%) of responsibility contexts and party politics **p** with a tenth (11%). Together these two contested fields account for a third of the responsibility contexts constructed by Greenpeace. This shows that although the organisation's campaigns are less policy related than those of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace does nonetheless target the national political field with responsibility. Greenpeace enters national politics to attribute

[37] Here there is a general indication that Friends of the Earth "blaming" strategies are more constructive in producing policy options than Greenpeace's which tend to "blame" the government and industrial actors unconditionally on moral grounds (see later).

blame to opponent actors at opportune times.[38]

When an opportunity presents itself for criticising the actions of the Government and political parties (including the Green Party), Greenpeace is prepared to enter the arena of conventional political activity. The Greenpeace motive is to condemn conventional politics for its inadequacy as a forum for environmental problems. This confirms that Greenpeace's interest in conventional politics is strategic and tied to the promotional function of Greenpeace campaigns rather than a desire to enter the political agenda by constructive policy discourse.

In contrast to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth's campaign activities construct a full complement of contested fields. The primary contested field in the Friends of the Earth discourse is the government **e** category which comprises a fifth (18.5%) of the resonance of responsibility contexts. This is followed by the heavy & chemical industry field **i** (15%) and in descending order of prominence: agricultural production **a** (14%); fossil fuel & renewable energy production **y** (11.5%); business, commercial & media activities **b** (11%); party politics activities **p** (10%); nuclear energy & industry **n** (9%); sponsorship, funding, aid & development **d** and labour, union & welfare activities **l** (both 4.5%); and finally transport and vehicle activities **t** (2%).

Friends of the Earth target a wide range of government and industry contested fields and in particular focus on "internal" government activities and policy decision-making. More than nine tenths of the government **e** contested fields appear as "policy" related **o** contexts in the Friends of the Earth news sample, whereas this proportion drops to three quarters for Greenpeace (15.5% out of 20%). It is not surprising that both organisations have a tendency to refer to policy related contexts when targeting the internal decision-making processes of the Government. However, these figures confirm that Friends of the Earth are more likely to enter the governmental field with policy options and proposals than Greenpeace, who tend instead to find non-policy targets to construct when criticising internal governmental affairs. When contesting Government, Friends of the Earth make environmental claims that articulate

---

[38] The visual database shows that four of the six articles that constructed the government **e** contested fields occurred during the "news event" phase of the White Paper "event" (see **D** later). This shows that Greenpeace involvement in targeting Government and national political affairs is enhanced due to the special circumstances of the White Paper event. Similarly, the Greenpeace party politics **p** target construction occurred in the special circumstances of commenting on the Green Party Conference (Gpc P) and on the Labour Party's opposition environmental policy proposals (Gpc Y). This shows that Greenpeace enter the discourses on national politics strategically, at times that are opportune for mobilising "blame".

problems and identify potential solutions within a policy discourse. Friends of the Earth campaigns use the media for entering into policy discourse with Government whereas Greenpeace targets Government actors with blame. This pattern of target construction identifies Friends of the Earth's aim to be engaged centrally in the production of the British environmental policy agenda.[39]

In section 2.i) I showed that the five most resonant environmental issue cultures in Friends of the Earth's sample are: "agricultural waste pollution"; "natural environment" (national); "energy" (non-nuclear); "car & transport"; and "industrial waste pollution".

From these five "agricultural waste pollution" is the highest prominence issue. Graph f shows that agricultural production a is the third ranked contested field in the Friends of the Earth sample accounting for about a seventh of the responsibility contexts (14%). Furthermore a high proportion of the agricultural production a contested field appears as policy related o contexts (12.5% out of a total 14%). This indicates that Friends of the Earth's mobilisation activities focus on promoting a campaign against agricultural policy. Agriculture and farming practices are a key campaign that Friends of the Earth mobilise and contest as a policy discourse.

Another that is mobilised by Friends of the Earth as a policy discourse against Government is the campaign on energy production (fossil fuels & renewable). "Energy" (non-nuclear) is the third ranking environmental issue culture and energy production y is the fourth ranking contested field. As in the case of the agriculture campaign a high proportion of the energy production y contested field appears as "policy" related o responsibility contexts (9% out of the total 11.5%). This shows that Friends of the Earth's concerns for energy production by fossil fuels and renewable sources constitute a key campaign that is waged against policy actors.

Whereas farming and energy concerns are established campaigns against policy sectors of government (and industry) responsibility, concerns with industry hold a slightly different position in Friends of the Earth's campaign repertoire. Graph f shows that the industrial production (heavy and chemical) contested field i accounts for more than a seventh (15%)

---

[39] The graphic model shows that six of the eight Friends of the Earth articles that are coded as government e contested fields occurred during the "news event" phase of the White Paper event. This shows that like Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth strategically timed the selection of the internal policy actions of Government as a target during the special conditions of the White Paper press launch.

and is the second ranking government responsibility context that is constructed by Friends of the Earth. Section 2.i) showed that "industrial waste pollution" (11%) and "mining" (3%) together account for a seventh of environmental issues mobilised by Friends of the Earth. As in the cases of farming and energy the figures for issues and contested fields tally closely, which indicates that concerns for industrial production constitute another key campaign for Friends of the Earth. However, in contrast to farming and energy, Friends of the Earth's heavy and chemical industry campaign is not mobilised principally against "policy" o responsibility contexts. More than half of the industry i contested field appears as "non policy" related x contexts (8% out of a total 15%). This indicates that Friends of the Earth are more likely to blame industrial actors rather than policy actors for the heavy industrial and chemical practices which they contest.

It is interesting to note that the reverse holds for Greenpeace. The industry i contested field is once more a highly prominent responsibility context but three quarters of it appear as a "policy" o related (18.5% out of 25%). This shows that Greenpeace tends to campaign against policy actors for concerns relating to heavy industrial and chemical practices. Greenpeace focuses more directly on the policy related dimensions of industrial targets than Friends of the Earth. Such a finding is surprising when one considers that the Greenpeace discourse exists at a calculated distance from the national policy discourse. However a closer examination shows that four out of Greenpeace's five industry i contested fields which are "policy" related in fact have a supra-national orientation. *Virus risk to blue flag bathers* (Gpc L) and *Poland 'used as dumping ground' for toxic waste* (Gpc W) are coded with an European, whereas *Toxic waste imports boosted by illicit trade* (Gpc M) and *The new cold war* (Gpc b) have a World/Global issue scope.[40]

The policy related orientation of the industry i responsibility contexts in the Greenpeace sample is produced by issues with a international scope. This indicates that Greenpeace principally perceives "policy" as a target for identifying the supra-national governmental responsibilities for the damage caused by harmful industrial practices. Targeting supra-national policy measures with "blame" is a tool for Greenpeace to condemn the inadequacy of policy instruments and at the same time promote a *globalisation* of the governmental responsibility for environmental damage. International policy contexts rather

[40] See bottom of Friends of the Earth's visual database for the codings of issue scope (iss scope) for each article. Refer also to the contested fields indicators in the methodological section B.

than industrial actors are targeted with "blame" for the damage caused by heavy industrial and chemical practices. Conversely, the national "internal" policy agenda receives sparse critique from Greenpeace for the environmental damage caused by industrial practices.

The composition of Friends of the Earth's industry **i** contested fields is revealing too. Two of Friends of the Earth's three "policy" **o** related industry **i** contested fields concern issues with a National scope (FoE V h), whereas the other has an European issue scope (FoE q). Of the four "non policy" **x** industry **i** contexts (FoE C F O d), two have a National and two a Local issue scope. This shows that in contrast to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth tends to target industry **i** contested fields as a national or sub-national responsibility context. Furthermore, Friends of the Earth are likely to "blame" an industrial practice as a "non policy" context when it is a localised concern, e.g. *Incinerator churns up worries on milk. ... reports on residents' concern about emissions of smoke near a dairy farm* (FoE C), and as a "policy" related context when it is a national concern, e.g. *Water watchdog to prosecute five firms* (FoE h). This confirms that for criticising industrial practices Friends of the Earth is more active in the national policy field than Greenpeace. Indeed the only time an international European policy context is constructed for an industry **i** contested field in Friends of the Earth's sample, is for an article that is mobilised by Greenpeace, *Greenpeace puts company in dock* (FoE q Gpc a).

A comparison between the graphs **f** and **g** highlights another distinction between the campaign cultures of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace this time relating to their targeting of nuclear concerns. The nuclear contested field **n** dominates the responsibility contexts which appear in the Greenpeace sample, accounting for more than a third of the total resonance (36.5%). Four fifths of these appeared as "non policy" **x** related (29% of the total 36.5%) and a fifth as "policy" **o** related contexts. This contrasts with the nuclear **n** contested field for Friends of the Earth which accounts for less than a tenth of responsibility contexts and is composed of a fifth "non policy" **x** and four fifths (7% out of 9%) "policy" **o** related contexts.

This shows that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace oppose nuclear industry, nuclear energy production and testing by targeting the nuclear **n** contested field in different ways. For Friends of the Earth nuclear practices are primarily a contested policy arena, whereas for Greenpeace the nuclear campaign is carried into other spheres of life that are not related to policy. Unlike the heavy and chemical industry **i** which Greenpeace contests as an

international policy responsibility, government and industry actors take the blame for nuclear damage in a "non policy" related x context. It suggests that instead of making a policy context responsible, Greenpeace blames government and industry actors directly and unconditionally for the risks to life which are posed by the nuclear threat.[41] Whereas Greenpeace blame the actors, Friends of the Earth are more likely to criticise nuclear concerns as a "policy" related o discourse.

In the cases of industry i and nuclear n contested fields (Greenpeace's two prominent responsibility contexts) Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace target different aspects of the responsibility contexts with "blame". Their strategies are complementary rather than competitive. This suggests that there is a tacit *division of communicative labour* in the process of target construction between the two organisations.[42] Moreover, Friends of the Earth do not compete for the two key responsibility contexts of Greenpeace campaigns. This indicates that Friends of the Earth take a generalist and integrationist role within the public campaigning activities of British environmental organisations and leave Greenpeace to their 'expert' campaign specialities.

Further evidence of this generalist role is shown by the spread of Friends of the Earth's target construction across the ten contested fields. I have already noted that the Friends of the Earth campaign *repertoire* mobilises "policy" related o responsibilities for the fields of government decision-making, agriculture, energy and nuclear. In the case of criticising heavy and chemical industry i, national policy related responsibilities are also mobilised but not predominantly. Together these four topics are the established pillars of Friends of the Earth's public campaign activities. It is significant that industry, agriculture,

---

[41] It is worth noting that the nuclear issue has been the central crusade in the Greenpeace campaign history, from the initial pioneer voyages into nuclear testing zones to its present activities. For Greenpeace the nuclear issue is linked to man's universal destruction of the world. The nuclear contest may not be resolved as a "policy issue", the perceived fault has a greater cultural depth than such an admission would allow. Greenpeace identify responsibility contexts far and wide for nuclear concerns, from the local to the global domain, e.g. the sufferings of indigenous peoples in exotic places due to the radiation contamination from Western nuclear testing, *Fears for a sea of caesium* and *Testimonies from the atoll* (Gpc I, J). The nuclear debate is a key theme in the radicalism of Greenpeace ideology in that its resolution is unconditional and the potential risk is universal. For Greenpeace this excludes the possibility for the pragmatic "half way solutions" of policy rationality. Like industry i the contest is primarily waged against actors who are defined in a supra-national context (see 4. below).

[42] The hypothesis for the existence of a *division of communicative labour* by the environmental organisations (that is expressed in differences between their strategic mobilisations) is tested in relation to the White Paper event in the next part of this analysis.

energy and nuclear concerns are also the key policy sectors for environmental action by the national Government.

The transport **t** contested field is less well established as a single pillar in the Friends of the Earth campaign repertoire. Although the "car & transport" issue culture accounts for an eighth of environmental issues in the Friends of the Earth sample (section 2.i)), by contrast the transport, shipping & vehicle **t** contested field produces only a fiftieth (2%) of government (and industry) responsibility contexts. This indicates that mobilised "car & transport" issues extend beyond the parameters of contested transport activities (and policies). Indeed "car & transport" issues construct responsibility contexts for opponent actors in the fields of business **b** (FoE D p), energy **y** (FoE I), party politics **p** (FoE R p), and government decision-making **e** (FoE a c e f), but only once in specific reference to a transport policy context (FoE o).[43]

This shows that the "car" is an environmental issue that "works" across and links different government and industry responsibility contexts in Friends of the Earth's campaigns. The "car" campaign produces a different type of target construction than "energy" and "agriculture" which identify single specific policy relevant contexts. The car campaign links and unifies several targeted contested fields. It serves to mobilise and integrate several contested fields against government (and industry) actors.

The "natural environment" is another prominent Friends of the Earth issue that serves this integrating function across different responsibility contexts. Friends of the Earth mobilise environmental issues concerning the destruction of the natural environment in news texts which highlight business **b** (FoE D), government "internal" decision-making **e** (FoE E, N, a, b, c), labour & welfare **l** (FoE G), sponsorship **d** (FoE K), heavy & chemical industry **i** (FoE V, d), and energy **y** (FoE g) contested fields.

The car and nature campaigns show that the property of *thematic shift* of environmental issues is used by Friends of the Earth to target different fields of government and industry in a single instance of mobilisation. These two cases show that unlike those of Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth's public campaigns tend not only to construct a specific

---

[43] **Table C.I** gives the environmental issue frames (and frame clusters) mobilised in each article for the environmental organisations, and the "type" of contested field (in each article) appears at bottom of the organisation's graphic model. Combining the two makes it possible to identify which environmental issue frames constructed which responsibility contexts. Indeed this analytic task is undertaken more systematically and in a comparative context in section 4. below.

contested field per issue, but in some cases "link" their targeting of different fields through one issue.

This tendency indicates that whereas Greenpeace's "blaming" strategies are specialist, one-dimensional and specifically orientated, Friends of the Earth's target construction maintains the *depth* of relating a single environmental issue to several contested fields, i.e. it "spreads the blame". In doing so Friends of the Earth's environmental argumentation engages more practically in identifying the action-contexts where changes in behaviour and potential solutions may be realised. The public campaigns on car and natural environment topics achieve this "effect" for the organisation by promoting a "linkage" between several related responsibility contexts. It integrates the "blaming" against the whole spectrum of government and industry actors who are responsible for environmental damage relating to the topics of nature and cars in Britain. This enables Friends of the Earth to emphasize the interrelatedness of the causes of these environmental problems by identifying a range of related responsible actors.

Such a "spreading of the blame" provides the basis for an appraisal of the complex basis of environmental problems and their potential solutions. It constitutes a more constructive critique of environmental responsibilities than that of Greenpeace. If Friends of the Earth's mobilisations assert that different actors are responsible for nature and car problems, by identifying distinct but related activities that are deleterious to the environment, then an appreciation of the "complex" interrelatedness of environmental problems (and their potential solutions) is made public knowledge. More streamlined campaigns (such as those of Greenpeace or against established policy sectors) are more likely to promote a mono-causal understanding of environmental problems.

To recap: Friends of the Earth construct policy related responsibility contexts by *generalising* across the spectrum of the national environmental agenda, whereas Greenpeace *specialise* on targeting nuclear (as non policy) and industrial (as supra-national policy) contested fields. Government internal decision-making is a prominent target field for both organisations, but more so for Friends of the Earth who are also more likely to focus on the policy activities of Government. Greenpeace's campaign culture is dominated by the streamlined campaigns against the nuclear threat and heavy and chemical industrial production, both of which are oriented supranationally. Friends of the Earth's campaign culture maintains streamlined campaigns against the national policy sectors of agriculture,

(non nuclear) energy and nuclear energy. In addition Friends of the Earth contests heavy and chemical industrial production as a national campaign.

In Friends of the Earth's campaign culture the prominent environmental issue frames relating to the natural environment and cars "link" several contested fields. Such "bridging" campaigns relate a more "complex" appraisal of the interrelatedness of the environmental problematic than the streamlined campaigns of Greenpeace. It is worth noting that the communications of the two primary media oriented organisations do not compete over similar campaign territory. Their campaigns are complementary and distinct, even on campaign topics which overlap. This gives an indication that there is a *division of communicative labour* in the public campaign targeting of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.

3.ii) The World Wide Fund for Nature

Graph w illustrates the responsibility contexts that are constructed in the news sample of the World Wide Fund for Nature. Whereas Friends of the Earth mobilised all contested fields and Greenpeace six, the World Wide Fund for Nature's activities produce only five contested fields. This indicates that the World Wide Fund for Nature's communication is *specialist* rather than *generalist* in the "type" of targets which it selects. Like Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature highlights the responsibilities of opponent actors on specific topics and contested fields in the news.

Half (53%) of the World Wide Fund for Nature's contested fields appear as "policy" related **o** and half (47%) as "non policy" related **x** contexts. This balance between "policy" and "non policy" contested fields is similar to Greenpeace, but shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature is less oriented towards opposing policy related actors than Friends of the Earth.

Unlike either the Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth case, the target construction of the World Wide Fund for Nature produces a neat division between the contested fields which are "policy" **o** related and those which are "non-policy" related **x**. This indicates a dual strategy for mobilising responsibility contexts. On the one hand, the organisation targets the contested fields of government "internal" decision-making **e**, heavy and chemical industry production **i** and transport, shipping and vehicle activities **t** as "policy" related **o** discourses. And on the other, it wages "non policy" **x** related campaigns against business & commerce

b and development & sponsorship **d** contested fields. Hence there are two strategies in the target construction activities of the World Wide Fund for Nature: one for making "policy" actors responsible, and one for making "non policy" actors responsible for their actions.

It is worth noting that World Wide Fund for Nature is itself a key non governmental actor for international conservation, development and research (Princen and Finger 1994). This means that the organisation may construct responsibility contexts where it may be an actual or potential "responsible" actor. The World Wide Fund for Nature's construction of responsibility contexts may serve to highlight the organisation's own activities, serving as a form of self-legitimation, promotion and/or public accountability. Neither Friends of the Earth nor Greenpeace campaign through the media towards this goal of justifying their own practical attempts to alleviate environmental damage.[44] The two media orientated organisations are less involved than the World Wide Fund for Nature in activities which are designed to alleviate the conditions of environmental damage. Instead their campaign activities target other actors with "blame" and make them publicly accountable.

Two distinct campaign strategies are evident in the World Wide Fund for Nature sample: *targeting* which contests government (and industry) actors in specific fields; and *promoting* which informs and legitimises the organisation's own projects in another set of specific fields. Under this categorisation both Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace primarily engage in *targeting* strategies.[45]

This raises the question of which contested fields the World Wide Fund for Nature 'promotes' and which it 'targets'.

Graph **w** shows that the construction of responsibility contexts by the World Wide Fund for Nature is dominated by the business **b** and development **d** contested fields. These

---

[44] One minor exception to this rule is presented by Friends of the Earth's "agritourism" projects which appear in the media as a *promoting* rather than *targeting* campaign strategy. Whether "agritourism" projects constitute a practical attempt to alleviate environmental damage is a disputed point, which is why Friends of the Earth has to justify its actions.

[45] The distinction between *promoting* and *targeting* campaign strategies is analytic; environmental organisation may mobilise communications seeking to achieve both goals. However Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace communicate principally to contest the actions of other actors (usually Government or Industry), whereas the World Wide Fund for Nature communicates about a contested field where it is itself the key actor. The World Wide Fund for Nature's communications construct "responsibilities" for its own action context, it "contests" within its own contested field. This role functionally distinguishes the World Wide Fund for Nature from Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. The World Wide Fund for Nature is a non governmental organisation and its communications strategies are subsequently more likely to "promote" than "blame" the *government responsibility contexts* which it raises in the public discourse.

two contested fields comprise a third (34%) and a quarter (23.5%), respectively, of the responsibility contexts in the organisation's discourse, and include all the fields that appear as "non policy" **x** related. This shows that the contested fields which the World Wide Fund for Nature are most keen to highlight are development and business activities, both of which are defined beyond the aegis of policy actors. It indicates that sponsorship, development, research, marketing and business are the fields which the organisation raises in the news. The motive for mobilising these action contexts is more likely to be 'self-promotional' than for 'blaming' government and industry opponents. The World Wide Fund for Nature are less concerned than Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace with public "blaming" strategies against Government actors. For the World Wide Fund for Nature, publicity serves a different function - one that informs the public about the actions that are being taken in response to the environmental problems. Business **b** and development **d** are the fields for the World Wide Fund for Nature's promotional strategy.

More than two thirds (68%) of the environmental issue resonance mobilised by the World Wide Fund for Nature are "rare fauna" and "rainforest etc." issue frames (see **B) ii** above). This orientation towards global conservation issues implies that the business **b** and development **d** fields which appear in the World Wide Fund for Nature's news sample in fact refer to their own supra-national projects and finance schemes for overseas development programmes. The two dominant contested fields business **b** and development **d** mobilise responsibilities for actors within the organisation's own environmental projects, who may include government actors, supranational governmental bodies, business sponsors or the practical fundraising and conservation actors of the WWF itself. A consequence of this is that the responsibility contexts of the World Wide Fund for Nature are not only less politically contentious than those of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, but serve a different function, that of publicising the organisation's own activities in the field of world conservation.[46]

If politicising the environmental debate is not the primary aim of the organisation's campaign culture, then why does the World Wide Fund for Nature seek publicity for its activities? The answer lies in the organisation's need to legitimise its public image as the key

---

[46] Unfortunately for the World Wide Fund for Nature this publicising function also extends to giving the organisation "bad publicity". This is what happened during the series of "scandals" relating to its fundraising and conservation activities that appear in the sample coverage. In this exceptional period the organisation was effectively using "blaming" strategies against its previous actions and policies to "promote" the idea that it had now rectified its fundraising and conservation activities (see later).

actor in world conservation. Maintaining this public image opens up opportunities for sponsorship and patronage from government and industry actors. Such resources are needed to fund the practical conservation activities of the organisation.

The World Wide Fund for Nature has a fundraising tradition for seeking patronage from individual wealthy benefactors. Prince Philip is one of the most famous British patrons of the organisation. Another example of this patronage is the '1001 club', whereby one-thousand-and-one individual benefactors each contribute $10 000 to the organisation's funds.[47] In addition to such sums more than £25 Million is contributed by the British public annually.[48] It is likely that this donating public includes many patrons among the rich and influential.

Detailed coverage of World Wide Fund for Nature's projects in the *Feature* sections of a quality newspaper, like *The Guardian*, enables the organisation to prime this special public and attributes it with the prestige of a responsible and established public actor. This type of coverage also provides the organisation a public platform for approaching private business for donations. Indeed the World Wide Fund for Nature annually accept substantial financial contributions from industrial, business and government organisations. This shows that the media coverage of environmental issues serves a different function in the World Wide Fund for Nature campaigns than it does for Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Although the World Wide Fund for Nature does not perform as many stunts to achieve attention, media coverage is nonetheless a vital element in the organisation's fundraising, project planning and implementation strategies.[49]

This 'promotional' nature of the World Wide Fund for Nature's public communication strategies tends to preclude references to "policy" o responsibility contexts. Overseas environmental development activities are usually outside the ambit of the immediate policy concerns of Government. More specifically, the low resonance of "policy" o related business

---

[47] Source *The Guardian* 05/09/90.

[48] Source *The Guardian* 03/09/90.

[49] Needless to say the "scandals" were a Public Relations disaster for the World Wide Fund for Nature. They were however "leaked" from internal sources in the organisation who were unhappy with the new policy direction under the Director General Charles de Haes. This shows that the rival faction were able to use their established relations with journalists not only to attack de Haes, but to ensure a measure of damage limitation for the organisation within the coverage of the "scandals".

b and development d fields is due to the fact that they are both contested fields which follow *long term* rather than *short term* paths to "solving" environmental problems. Development programmes and sponsored business activities exist outside the immediate concerns of the world of politics, and the everyday confrontations of the environmental contest in political discourse. The World Wide Fund for Nature primarily use the media to inform and communicate with special sections of the public rather than cause embarrassment to established political actors. Unlike Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature's mobilisations appear in the *Feature* rather than the *Home News* sections of the Paper.[50] Indeed more than half of the articles in the World Wide Fund for Nature sample were *Feature* articles, which shows a tendency for approaching select sections of the public.[51]

Rather than appealing to the public *en masse*, the World Wide Fund for Nature communicate with specialist audiences. The high quality and quantity of coverage provided by *Environmental*, *Development* and *Special Features* shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature has good established contacts with journalists. This facilitates the discursive depth necessary for the organisation to get across the *long term* aims of its conservation and development projects. Such established contacts with the media enable the World Wide Fund for Nature to mobilise the complex "habitat" conservation issues into the public discourse. For example, *Hugh Synge continues our occasional series on endangered plant species with a report on the Cafe marron, the rarest plant in the world. Environment fencing with extinction* (WWF Q), is typical of the formula used by the World Wide Fund for Nature to "package" its claims for these *long term* environmental issues. Another example from the "non-scandal" section of the sample is, *The land of a thousand islands gets another dressing down. Fred Pearce Indonesia.* (WWF S). Long term world conservation issues do not possess the same immediacy and "news value" as the environmental "scandals" that are often

---

[50] The section of each news article is given along with its Headline after the visual databases in the methodological section B.

[51] When the World Wide Fund for Nature did appear in the *Home News* rather than *Feature* articles in this sample it was not because their issue mobilisation activities "made the news", but on the contrary that their business and development activities were reported as "scandals" by the media. Even allowing for distortions in the sample due to the exceptionally high media interest in the WWF's financing and development strategies, the analysis is still able to classify the organisation's contested fields from the media discourse. It is clear that due to special circumstances that the WWF's promotional activities may have resonated more than is normally the case but that does not prevent us from analyzing the contents of the organisation's discourse.

mobilised by Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. The World Wide Fund for Nature relies on maintaining good contacts with environmental journalists to mobilise the specialist knowledge of world conservation issues.[52]

If the business **b** and development **d** contested fields indicate the World Wide Fund for Nature's *promoting* campaign strategy, when does the organisation implement a *targeting* strategy and which actors does it make publicly "responsible"?

Together the three lower ranking contested fields in the World Wide Fund for Nature's campaign culture account for four tenths of its responsibility contexts. Graph w shows that in descending order of resonance these contested fields are: government "internal" decision-making **e** (16.5%); heavy and chemical industry production **i** (15.5%); and transport and vehicle activities **t** (10.5%). These three contested fields are all entirely composed of "policy" **o** related responsibility contexts. The World Wide Fund for Nature's communications only refer to internal governmental matters, heavy industrial and chemical production and transport affairs as policy matters. In other words, the organisation's *targeting* campaign strategies make governments responsible for regulating and sanctioning the actors who cause environmental damage in the field of world conservation. The World Wide Fund for Nature contest the deleterious actions of heavy industrialists and transport concerns by referring to legal regulatory standards. At the same time the organisation campaigns against government actors for improving the standards and enforcing implementation of policies which fall within its conservationist field of interest. In this sense the World Wide Fund for Nature's *targeting* strategies are those of a conventional "pressure group", it enters political debate only to promote concerns that lie within the regulatory policy discourse that is specifically related to its specialist field of interest. The World Wide Fund for Nature does not seek to raise "new" contentious topics.

---

[52] This also means that the WWF tends to appear in a different structure of news (van Dijk 1985 1988) than the more politically contentious organisations. The titles of the two articles (WWF Q, S) illustrate that the journalist takes a prominent and personal relation to the reading public, whilst the exotic habitat issues receive an elaborate narrative description and the World Wide Fund for Nature remain discreetly out of public view. The World Wide Fund for Nature maintain a low profile in the text. Apparently the WWF utilises this low profile and their special contacts with journalists to mobilise their long term issues into the news. Their specialist target audience for this type of issue are the sections of the public who have an interest in exotic places (e.g. as a possible travel destination) and the time to read detailed *Features*.

Unlike Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace which attempt to politicise the environmental contest through the media, the "blaming" strategies of the World Wide Fund for Nature remain within the boundaries of an established policy discourse. The organisation campaigns for better standards of regulation and implementation by Governments and for legal compliance by industrialists. Its strategic *targeting* in the media aims to raise the policy concerns that are implied by its 'promotional' conservation interests. In this sense the World Wide Fund for Nature's *targeting* and *promoting* campaign activities are complementary and constitute different elements of a unified public communication strategy.

The distribution of the World Wide Fund for Nature's *targeting* campaign strategies in time across the White Paper event is further revealing.[53] Four out of the five articles referring to the World Wide Fund for Nature during the "news event" stage of the White Paper appear as "policy" o responsibility contexts. Furthermore all four which appear in the "epilogue" phase are "policy" o contested fields (see visual database). This shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature strategically times its entries into political discourse through the media. In this case its *targeting* mobilisations coincide with the special opportune conditions for environmental policy discourse with the national Government that prevail around the publication of the White Paper policy document.

The special conditions of the White Paper event also facilitate the organisation's collaboration with the more politicised wing of the environmental movement. During the White Paper "news event" phase the World Wide Fund for Nature appears in unison with Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace to contest the national environmental policy agenda on three occasions (WWF N O R). Prior to the White Paper news event the organisation focuses on *promoting* strategies, but in the period of policy reconstruction around the event the World Wide Fund for Nature implements *targeting* strategies against the international regulation of the illegal use of rhino horn by the Chinese pharmaceutical industries (WWF P), and the environmental damage caused by multi-national timber and mining industries (WWF S V). In these cases the World Wide Fund for nature is pressurising the national Government to take an international stance for the implementation of more stringent supra-national policies

[53] For the time series of the different contested fields in the World Wide Fund for Nature sample across the White Paper event refer to the coding at the bottom of the graphic model for each article: contested fields indicators. The analysis of the White Paper "cycle" of communication is undertaken more comprehensively in the next section D.

which affect its global conservation efforts. This shows that the organisation's *targeting* strategies are designed to push its conservation interests in the forum of international politics. The organisation attempts to mobilise change by acting through Government. Hence the entrance of the World Wide Fund for Nature into politics tends to maintain a format that is often not contentious vis-a-vis Government actors.

To recap: It appears that the World Wide Fund for Nature has a dual campaign strategy in the public discourse. The organisation 'promotes' its own conservation activities by mobilising development **d** and business **b** contested fields as "non policy" related responsibilities, and 'targets' "policy" related responsibilities for actors in the contested fields of government decision-making **e**, industry **i** and transport **t**. These two elements of the World Wide Fund for Nature's campaign strategy are complementary. The World Wide Fund for Nature "promotes" its own activities as being worthy of public and private financial support, by utilising good contacts with environmental journalists which ensures a favourable and dense coverage of the special complex nature of the world conservation practices. At the same time the organisation "blames" its opponents in the field of world conservation - heavy industrialists, such as logging or chemical multinationals - by referring to their non compliance with existing international policies, which brings pressure to bear on the British Government to act. In favourable conditions the World Wide Fund for Nature enters the national political arena in allegiance with the more confrontational organisations Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. On such occasions it acts like a conventional "pressure group" pushing for favourable changes in the Government's policy commitments.

4. Environmental framing patterns in news campaigns: environmental issue frames "linking" contested fields

In section 2. I compared the range of *environmental themes* that Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilise into the sample of news coverage. In Section 3. I compared the range of *responsibility contexts* that are constructed into the same sample by the organisations' communications. This analysis involved a reconstruction of the "types" of environmental issue frames and issue cultures (section 2.) and a reconstruction of the "types" of contested fields (section 3.) which appear in the news discourses of the three environmental organisations. Taken together these *source* and *target*

elements of the news discourse are considered to be indicators for the discursive action *repertoires* of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature for public communication. In this section 4. I attempt to analyze the relation between the mobilisation of *environmental themes* and targeting of *government responsibility contexts* that is produced in the set of news texts of each organisation. This will identify the strategic role of specific types of environmental issues cultures in the media campaigns of the organisations.

Much has been made in the ongoing analysis of the potential for environmental issue frames to "shift" across the different types of contested fields which they are active in constructing.[54] Indeed in section 2. the term environmental issue "frame clusters" was coined for the combinations of environmental issue frames that are mobilised together in a single case of a news narrative. Earlier I argued that the propensity for *thematic shift* by environmental issue frames occurs due to their constructed and communicative nature. The "shifting" potential of environmental issue frames (and frame clusters) to communicate meaning by referring to different social contexts serves an important function in the environmental discourse: it integrates the focus of the environmental debate into a unified campaign - the environmental contest.

Following on from this, it is clear that specific environmental issue frames may sustain an integrating or unifying role within the "public campaign culture" of an environmental organisation. Certain environmental issues may be mobilised as "linking" frames, they may refer to several targeted contested fields and thus integrate the focus of the campaigning critique of the organisation against interrelated opponents. This process of mobilising against interrelated targets is an important feature of environmental campaigning, because it mobilises environmentalism into the public discourse as a critique rather than a random collection of one-off protest issues. Furthermore, it is only by mobilising a critique against interrelated opponents that environmental organisations have the possibility to communicate the genuinely 'complex' nature of environmental problems to the public. Communication is not a linear process and neither is the mobilisation of the environmental

---

[54] Even the preliminary content analysis in the graphic model (see methodological section B) - which codes each text for the scope of the environmental issue(s) (`iss scope`) and decision-making actor field (`act field`) - indicates that environmental issues do not simply repeat the spatial context of the actor field. Environmental issue frames can "link" different spatial contexts - from local to national to global and back again! - which is part of their communicative function.

critique. Environmental mobilisation is educational: it raises collective learning processes into the public discourse. The associations that are made by the organisations at the level of text - e.g. which actors and related practices are to "blame"? - serves as a resource for other public actors to reconstruct the environmental contest.

Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature have emerged as the three environmental organisations that have experienced exponential growth (by membership figures - see McCormick 1991; Szesynski, Miles et al. 1995) during the upsurge in popularity of environmental discourse since the early eighties. Analysing their patterns of environmental issue frames (and frame clusters) to identify which environmental issues serve as "linking" frames across several contested fields may provide a clue to the types of environmental issues through which the environmental debate has emerged in recent times. Which environmental issues have served as the "carriers" of the critique that has been mobilised through the campaigns of these three organisations? Through which media campaigns is the "new environmental consciousness" (Jamison Eyerman et al. 1990) emerging in the British public discourse?

In this section 4., the resonance of the twelve "types" of environmental issue cultures (section 2.) is distributed between the ten possible "types" of contested field (section 3.) for each environmental organisation. The graphs for Friends of the Earth **f2**, Greenpeace **g2**, and the World Wide Fund for Nature **w2** indicate the role of the different "types" of environmental issue frames in the process of target construction. The graphs illustrate which environmental issue frames construct which government (and industry) contested fields in the media campaigns of the three organisations.

To clarify the representation of this data, the twelve "types" of environmental issue cultures are split into two: supra-national and national environmental issue frames.[55] The "energy", "mining" and "nuclear" issue cultures which may be the source of frames with either a national or supra-national reference are placed with "global warming", "rainforest

[55] As I explained in section 2., the distinction between national and supra-national environmental issue frames is a tendency which is made for descriptive convenience rather than a clear cut categorisation. To recap briefly on the description of categories in section 2.: "global warming", "rainforest", and "rare fauna" issue cultures usually frame supra-national contexts because they refer to *global* problems. "Industrial waste pollution", "agricultural waste pollution", "natural environment", "car", "green business" and "green politics" concern *domestic* problems and usually frame national contexts. "Mining" and "energy" issue cultures are equally likely to frame either national or supra-national frames, whereas the "nuclear" issue culture may frame either supra-national or national or both contexts simultaneously.

etc." and "rare fauna" issue cultures which are usually the source for supra-national frames. These six environmental issue cultures appear in the upper graph for each organisation which is labelled "**supra-national environmental issue framing patterns**". The remaining six issue cultures, namely "industrial waste pollution", "agricultural waste pollution", "natural environment", "car", "green business" and "green politics" appear in the lower graph as "**national environmental issue framing patterns**".

The communicative properties of environmental issue frames include the potentiality to "link" the different social contexts of actors in the environmental contest. This is part of the construction of the environmental contest and occurs in public discourse. The social contexts of the actors who are targeted by environmental mobilisations may differ either spatially (being either local, national or global etc.) or by "type" (being either industrialists or policy actors etc.). In this section 4. an attempt is made to analyze the environmental issue framing patterns that are mobilised in the news discourses of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. Particular attention is given to the "linking" properties of specific environmental issue cultures across targeted "types" of contested field. This is referred to as the propensity of specific environmental issue frames for "linking" targeted contested fields. It is an indicator for the "dynamics" of the campaign critiques which the organisations mobilise into the news discourse.

4.i) Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace

Environmental issue frames are mobilised either as frames of a single "type" of issue culture or as "frame clusters", i.e. multiple or combined "types" of issue frames. Here I analyze the "environmental issue framing patterns" that are produced by the overall environmental issue framing and target construction properties of the organisations' media campaigns. An attempt is made to reconstruct the 'role' of specific "types" of environmental issue cultures in communicating the environmental contest as part of an organisation's campaign strategy.

Graphs **f2** and **g2** show the **environmental issue framing patterns** of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, respectively. For each organisation this is the distribution of the twelve "types" of environmental issue cultures across the specific "types" of government/industry contested field which they construct in the news discourse. The graphs

give an overall pattern for the relation between environmental issue framing and target construction that is produced by the media campaigns of the two organisations. This shows how the environmental organisations mobilise *environmental themes* to target *government responsibility contexts* in their media campaigns. It is an indicator for the strategic orientation of their respective "public campaign cultures".

An initial comparison of graphs **f2** and **g2** shows that Friends of the Earth's environmental issue cultures are more differentiated across the ten "types" of contested fields than those of Greenpeace. This indicates that Friends of the Earth's campaigns are more likely to be composed of environmental issue frame "clusters" than Greenpeace's. Environmental issue frame "clusters" interrelate more than one environmental issue culture when targeting a contested field. Hence this may also indicate that Friends of the Earth's campaigns mobilise a more complex critique of the causes of environmental problems than Greenpeace. Greenpeace has a more streamlined environmental issue framing pattern that is dominated by single issue campaigns, and in particular, the nuclear campaign at the supra-national and the industrial campaign at the national level. Furthermore, Greenpeace's campaigns are more oriented towards the supra-national level, whereas Friends of the Earth's environmental issue framing pattern is more concentrated at the national rather than the supra-national level.[56]

These general impressions confirm the findings of sections 2. and 3.. Detail will now be added to these general statements by looking at the role of specific "types" of environmental issue cultures in the structure of the organisations' communication campaigns. This will be done by first comparing **i.a)** the "supra-national environmental issue framing patterns" and then **ii.b)** the "national environmental issue framing patterns" of the campaigns which are mobilised by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace in the public discourse.

4.i.a) supra-national environmental issue framing patterns

The "global warming" issue culture raises issue frames relating to global warming, the ozone hole, the greenhouse effect, and the production and emission of carbon dioxide and CFCs into the atmosphere. When mobilised this "type" of issue culture gives a supra-national

[56] This confirms the earlier finding from the preliminary indicators in the methodological section **B**.

frame of reference to the environmental contest. By necessity it constructs the notion of a *global society*. The upper graphs **f2** and **g2** show that "global warming" issue frames "link" six contested fields in the news discourse of Friends of the Earth and five in that of Greenpeace. This means that "global warming" issue frames are 'active' in the construction of more different "types" of contested field than any other supra-national environmental issue. "Global warming" issues are used in Friends of the Earth's campaigns to highlight the following contested fields, in ranked order (highest resonance first): government "internal" decision-making **e**, party "politics" **p**, heavy & chemical industrial production **i**, sponsorship & research **d**, nuclear matters **n** and energy (non-nuclear) production **y**. In the case of Greenpeace "global warming" frames do not target sponsorship & research **d** field and the hierarchy of the other five issue frames is different: government decision-making **e** is again the most resonant, followed by Greenpeace's two primary targeted campaign fields, namely nuclear production **n** and heavy & chemical industry production **i**, and finally by party "politics" **p** and energy production **y**.

For both Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, "global warming" is the issue culture which is most frequently mobilised as a "frame cluster", combining with other issue cultures. This means that it is the most communicative "type" of issue culture across different "types" of social contexts. The potentiality for "global warming" issue frames to "link" several contested fields makes this issue culture a 'special' element of the environmental critique. Although it is not the most resonant environmental issue culture in the news discourse of either Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace (section 2.), "global warming" frames nonetheless constitute a key strategic element of the organisation's communication campaigns. Why is this the case? What special communicative 'effect' do they mobilise?

"Global warming" is a supra-national issue frame which exhibits a high propensity for "linking" across several targeted contested fields. This is important because it enables the organisations to integrate the environmental contest by unifying the diverse elements of their protests into a societal critique. It is by reference to the "global warming" issue culture that the organisations' campaigns achieve the dynamism of constructing an 'interrelated' societal critique rather than being a set of single issue one-off protest campaigns. This holds for the cases of both Friends of the Earth's and Greenpeace's "public campaign cultures".

For both Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, government decision-making **e** is the

most prominent contested field referred to by "global warming" issue frames.[57] This implies that the role of "global warming" issue frames which are mobilised in the campaign critiques of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace is to "interrelate" several contested fields in the public discourse as a unified policy target. Stated simply, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace raise "global warming" issues to bring other contested fields into public communication as policy matters. In effect this unifies diverse elements of the environmental contest and places them under public scrutiny as a policy field of government.

In the case of Greenpeace two primary campaigns, the nuclear and industrial contests, are "linked" to government policy making by "global warming" frames. Mobilising "global warming" frames is a way for Greenpeace to "link" their two primary campaign targets (against the nuclear threat and industrial & chemical pollution) and a non policy target (non-nuclear energy) to the notion of government responsibility for policy making. It gives the "blaming" thrust of their key campaigns an added dimension by adding the culpability of the government to that of the polluters.

For Friends of the Earth "global warming" frames "integrate" their distinct campaigns which construct and define the problem (targeting industry, promoting research, and balancing the pros and cons of nuclear and non-nuclear energy) as a general policy concern of government. "Global warming" frames are a way for Friends of the Earth to define an environmental problem and at the same time critically enter the energy policy field by mobilising "alternative" action strategies to the existing policies of government. This communication strategy "links" a complex appreciation of an environmental problem to the responsibility of the government's policies.

Referring to endangered exotic habitats and in particular to the tropical rainforest, "rainforest etc." is another environmental issue culture which automatically gives a supra-national frame of reference to the environmental contest. Graphs **f2** and **g2** show that the "rainforest etc." issue culture "links" several "types" of targeted contested fields when mobilised in the public campaigns of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. "Rainforest etc." issue frames target five contested fields in the Greenpeace discourse and four in that of Friends of the Earth.

In Greenpeace's media campaigns "rainforest etc." issue frames "link" five "types"

---

[57] I noted in section 2. that government decision-making contested fields e are predominantly a "policy" related target.

of contested fields, in ranked order: nuclear **n**, business & marketing **b**, heavy industrial & chemical production **i**, government decision-making **e** and energy (non nuclear) production **y**. "Rainforest etc." issue frames most commonly target the nuclear **n** contested field in the Greenpeace news discourse. This indicates that Greenpeace mobilises "rainforest" frames as part of its nuclear campaign. By mobilising "rainforest etc." frames, the other contested fields (business, heavy industry, government policy, and energy) are integrated as 'related targets' into Greenpeace's nuclear critique.[58] Articles such as *Fears for a sea of caesium* (Gpc I) and *Testimonies from the atoll* (Gpc J) are examples of how Greenpeace mobilise issues of endangered exotic habitats to criticise the testing of nuclear weapons in remote parts of the world. Greenpeace use the "rainforest etc." issue culture to "link" the activities of the following actors in their targeting critique: WWF, business, heavy industrial actors (loggers and multi-nationals), government policy makers and the non-nuclear energy production.

For Friends of the Earth "rainforest etc." frames "link" a different set of contested fields, namely: sponsorship & development **d**, business **b**, party "politics" **p** and energy (non nuclear) **y**. From these four "types" of contested field, "rainforest etc." issue frames are most likely to target the development **d** and business **b** fields. This indicates that "rainforest etc." issue frames have a different role in the campaigns of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Rather than serving a *targeting* role as a communicative element of the nuclear campaign, "rainforest etc." issue frames constitute a *promoting* role in Friends of the Earth's campaign strategy. Friends of the Earth's "rainforest etc." frames highlight development and business activities in the news discourse. Matters of party politics and non-nuclear energy are raised within a campaign discourse that focuses on development and business actors. In fact "rainforest" issues are not a prominent element in Friends of the Earth campaigns (section 2.). Friends of the Earth mobilise "rainforest etc." issues to enter the debate on strategies for supra-national conservation. This suggests that mobilising "rainforest etc." issue frames is part of Friends of the Earth's strategy for promoting its integrationist role in the environmental movement. It enables the organisation to comment publicly on the promotional, financial and development activities of (other) conservation organisations to alleviate environmental damage in exotic regions. In the case of this news sample Friends

[58] This framing pattern also indicates that Greenpeace mobilises issues concerning endangered exotic habitats primarily as a protest against the damage to ecosystems that is caused by activities which produce nuclear radiation.

of the Earth mobilised "rainforest" frames to 'spread the blame' for the WWF scandal (see later).

After "global warming" and "rainforest etc.", a third issue culture which gives a supra-national frame of reference to the environmental contest is "rare fauna". This issue culture refers to endangered rare exotic animal species. However unlike the other two issue cultures, "rare fauna" issue frames do not "link" the different targets of the organisations but mobilise only a single "type" of contested field in each case. "Rare fauna" issue frames have a low resonance and minimal significance in the campaigns of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.

The "nuclear" issue culture relating to the damage and potential danger of nuclear radiation contamination may give either a supra-national or national or both frame(s) of reference to the environmental contest. "Nuclear" issue frames "link" four contested fields in the campaign discourse of Friends of the Earth and three in that of Greenpeace. This indicates that "nuclear" issue frames have a communicative role in the public campaigns of both organisations.

For Greenpeace "nuclear" is by far the most resonant issue frame (section 2.). "Nuclear" issue frames predominantly target the nuclear **n** contested field, though they also "link" with party "politics" **p** and government decision-making **e** fields. This indicates that Greenpeace mobilises "nuclear" issues as a streamlined one issue protest campaign against nuclear energy production and testing. Greenpeace's opposition to the nuclear industry is a prominent element in its public campaign strategy. However, the nuclear issue frames also "link" to party politics and government decision-making which indicates that Greenpeace's nuclear campaigns relate to policy matters in addition to their primary role of targeting nuclear opponents with "blame".

In Friends of the Earth's campaign culture, "nuclear" issue frames target four contested fields: nuclear **n**, labour **l**, party politics **p**, and energy **y**. As in the case of Greenpeace the primary target is against nuclear production and testing. This indicates that the nuclear contest is a key element of Friends of the Earth's public campaign strategy. In contrast to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth's "nuclear" issue frames "link" more contested fields and have a more evenly distributed resonance. This shows that "nuclear" issue frames have a different role in the public campaigns of the two organisations. Friends of the Earth do not tend simply to contest nuclear power as a single target. "Nuclear" issue frames

'interrelate' the opponents of the government's nuclear policy (trade unions, opposition party and fossil fuel/renewable energy producers) into a campaign critique against the nuclear industry. This indicates that Friends of the Earth contest nuclear power with a critique that raises alternative policies and "solutions". Friends of the Earth's campaign strategy sees the nuclear contest as a possibility for raising an energy "package" into the public discourse as an alternative to the government's policy rather than simply as a way of "blaming" the nuclear industry for the damage to life that is caused by radiation.[59]

The "mining" issue culture relating to the extraction and depletion of natural resources can give either a supra-national or national frame of reference to the environmental contest. However, in the campaigns of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace "mining" issue frames have a low resonance and minimal significance. For Greenpeace "mining" frames target only the heavy industry **i** contested field, whereas heavy industry **i** and business **b** are "linked" in the case of Friends of the Earth. This indicates that the organisations mobilise "mining" issues to contest heavy industrial practices; however this contest is not a key element in their public campaign cultures.

"Energy" referring to problems of energy production (non-nuclear) is another issue culture which can give the environmental contest either a supra-national or national frame of reference. The upper graphs in **f2** and **g2** indicate that "energy" issue frames "link" four contested fields in Friends of the Earth's campaigns but only three in Greenpeace's. Section **B)** showed that the "energy" issue culture is more resonant in Friends of the Earth's campaigns than Greenpeace's. Indeed "energy" is Friends of the Earth's most resonant issue frame in the upper graph in **f2**. This implies that "energy" issues have a more prominent and significant role in Friends of the Earth's public campaigns than those of Greenpeace.

For Friends of the Earth "energy" issue frames target the following contested fields, in order of rank: fossil fuel/renewable energy production **y**, business **b**, nuclear **n** and party "politics" **p**. This confirms that the energy contest is an important and strategic element in

---

[59] This difference is further illustrated by the composition of the two organisations' nuclear **n** contested fields. Friends of the Earth's is produced by "global warming", "nuclear" and "energy" issues frames, whereas Greenpeace's nuclear **n** contested field also mobilises "rainforest" frames. That Greenpeace's nuclear contest is mobilised by frames relating to exotic nature indicates that it has a tendency to be supra-national in scope. I have already noted that Greenpeace's nuclear campaign contests the destruction of distant exotic native communities by the Western military-industrial complex (section 2.). In contrast, Friends of the Earth's nuclear contest mobilising "energy" and "global warming" frames (in addition to "nuclear") is more likely to be a campaign with a national focus. For Greenpeace the nuclear campaign is more likely to *globalise* the focus of its environmental critique than for Friends of the Earth.

Friends of the Earth's communication campaigns. In addition to contesting the practices of the energy industry, Friends of the Earth mobilises "energy" frames to promote renewable energy initiatives, oppose the nuclear industry and identify with the opposition political party. Friends of the Earth's energy campaign appears in the public discourse as an integral critique which identifies 'causes' and possible 'solutions' to the energy problems.

Greenpeace's "energy" frames target (in ranked order) nuclear industry **n**, party "politics" **p** and fossil fuels/renewable energy production **y** fields. That "energy" issue frames are mobilised against the nuclear industry rather than the energy industry indicates that the energy contest has a different strategic role in Greenpeace's public campaigns than Friends of the Earth's. Greenpeace primarily mobilise "energy" issue frames as an element in their nuclear campaign or as an indication of their allegiance with the opposition party's policy. Energy problems tend to appear in Greenpeace's campaigns for raising nuclear problems in the public discourse.[60]

"Energy" issues are a prominent "linking" element of Friends of the Earth's campaigns, whereas for Greenpeace they are less important and serve primarily as an element in other communication campaign strategies. Friends of the Earth's campaigns highlight energy production alternatives and policy options to existing practices of energy production and open this discourse to public scrutiny. By comparison, Greenpeace use energy issues to campaign *against* the nuclear industry.

4.i.b) national environmental issue framing patterns

The six "types" of environmental issue culture which appear in the lower graphs **f2** and **g2** give a national frame of reference to the environmental contest. The greater concentration of Friends of the Earth's issue frames in the lower graph in **f2** indicates that the organisation tends to focus campaigns on national contested fields. The reverse holds for Greenpeace whose issue cultures resonate more in the upper graph in **g2**. This confirms that

[60] In Greenpeace's energy **y** contested field, "energy" issue frames resonate less than the "rainforest" and "global warming" frames, whereas the reverse holds for Friends of the Earth (upper graphs **f2** and **g2**). This means that two supra-national issue frames ("global warming" and "rainforest") are more active than "energy" frames in targeting Greenpeace's **y** energy field, whereas they are less active in the case of Friends of the Earth. This implies that Greenpeace's energy contest is supra-nationally oriented whereas Friends of the Earth's is more likely to have a national focus.

Greenpeace's public campaigns tend to be oriented towards supra-national contested fields.

Friends of the Earth's national contested fields tend also to be targeted by more different "types" of environmental issue frames than those of Greenpeace. This indicates that Friends of the Earth's public campaigning has a higher propensity for "linking" contested fields into a national critique than that of Greenpeace. By comparison Greenpeace's public campaigning in the national arena is dominated by a single contest against heavy industrial and chemical plants. I now add detail to this general statement.

The "industrial waste pollution" issue culture refers to problems concerning the harmful by-products of industrial activity such as waste emissions, effluent, toxic pollutants, sewage and chemicals. "Industrial waste" issue frames "link" three contested fields in the campaign discourse of Friends of the Earth but mobilise only one contested field for Greenpeace. In both cases "industrial waste" frames primarily target the heavy (and chemical) industry **i** contested field. This indicates that the public campaigns of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have "blaming" strategies for routinely targeting industrial actors. Friends of the Earth's "industrial waste" issue frames also raise labour **l** and government decision-making **e** contested fields. In contrast to Greenpeace's streamlined industrial protest campaign, Friends of the Earth refer also to the workplace and government policy making as action contexts where responses to the industrial problem may be employed. This confirms that Friends of the Earth's industrial "blaming" strategies are more constructive than those of Greenpeace.

"Agricultural waste pollution" issue frames refer to the environmental problems that occur as a result of farming practices. These include agricultural waste emissions and farmyard slurry, use of pesticides and nitrate fertilizers, and farming techniques.

Section 2. showed that "agricultural waste" is single most resonant issue frame in Friends of the Earth's campaign culture. The lower graph in **f2** shows that "agricultural waste" frames "link" five contested fields for Friends of the Earth, in order of rank: agricultural production **a**, energy (non-nuclear) **y**, heavy and chemical industry **i**, business **b**, and government decision making **e**. "Agricultural waste" issues predominantly target the agricultural production **a** contested field. This confirms that the agricultural contest against farmers is an important element in Friends of the Earth's public campaigning strategy. Furthermore, "agricultural waste" issue frames serve to relate this key campaign to the energy and industry contests and government policy field. Although it is a streamlined

campaign, Friends of the Earth's criticisms of the farming lobby refer also to other culpable actors (such as pesticide manufacturers and government policy makers) who "share the blame" for this type of environmental problem. Section 3. showed that Friends of the Earth primarily targets the agriculture a contested field as a policy matter. This implies that the organisation's agriculture contest is a well established campaign that constructs policy options against the powerful sectoral interests of the farming lobby.[61]

For Greenpeace "agricultural waste" frames have little resonance and target only the government decision-making e field. This means that Greenpeace does not campaign against the farming lobby in Britain. Greenpeace leaves the agriculture contest to Friends of the Earth.

The "natural environment" issue culture refers to environmental problems that result from the destruction of the natural environment in Britain, covering aesthetic issues of landscape, flora and fauna and the "Greenbelt". Section 2. showed that "natural environment" issue frames are the second most resonant "type" of issue culture in Friends of the Earth's discourse, whereas for Greenpeace they are one of the least resonant. The lower graphs in **f2** and **g2** indicate that "natural environment" issue frames "link" six of Friends of the Earth's contested fields but only two of Greenpeace's. This makes the "natural environment" issue culture the source of Friends of the Earth's most communicative issue frames across different "types" of contested field. Mobilising issues that refer to nature is a key element of Friends of the Earth's public campaigns, it serves to integrate their contests into a broader national critique. This is not the case for Greenpeace.

In order of rank, the six contested fields that are "linked" by "natural environment" issue frames for Friends of the Earth are: government decision-making **e**, heavy and chemical industry **i**, (non-nuclear) energy production **y**, business **b**, sponsorship and development **d**, and labour and welfare **l**. This indicates that Friends of the Earth primarily mobilise "natural environment" issues to target and contest the actions of government policy makers. Aesthetic and factual claims about the destruction of Britain's natural environment constitute an effective way for Friends of the Earth to mobilise their challenge to the Government's policy

---

[61] The farming lobby in Britain is an long-standing and established opponent of the environmental movement and has its interests well preserved by the Ministry of Agriculture. See e.g. Cox, Lowe et al. (1984) on how the Country and Wildlife Act 1981 was shaped by policy actors to serve the interests of the farming and forestry lobbies.

agenda into the public discourse. After "blaming" government policy in general, Friends of the Earth's "natural environment" issue frames target heavy industrialists and the fossil fuel energy industry with "blame". This relates the responsibility of the industrial culprits for the destruction of the natural environment to the government responsibility for policy making. In this way "natural environment" issue frames enable Friends of the Earth to integrate their criticisms of industrial practices (e.g. excavation, erection of electricity pylons in the country) with the campaign against the Government's policy on nature conservation.

Further to this role for interrelating the target actors, "natural environment" issue frames also mobilise matters relating to business activities, sponsorship and development, and labour and welfare. This indicates the constructive side of Friends of the Earth's campaigns where sponsorship and promotional schemes for using the natural environment (e.g. agritourism, greening the workplace) are mobilised into the public discourse. Friends of the Earth is involved in joint ventures with business in some of these projects. By mobilising this notion of using the natural environment in a 'better' way, Friends of the Earth's campaigns promote greater public access to nature.[62]

When Friends of the Earth mobilises "natural environment" issue frames, it is able to 'target' actors and 'promote' actors. "Natural environment" issue frames "link" a targeted action context with a promoted action context. This indicates that the "natural environment" issue culture identifies the 'cause' and sponsors a 'solution' for this environmental problem. For Friends of the Earth, mobilising 'natural environment' issue frames is a way to interrelate the *targeting* and *promoting* roles of their campaigns into an integrated critique which covers several key contested fields.

"Natural environment" issue frames resonate little in the public campaigns of Greenpeace and "link" only the heavy (and chemical) industry i and government decision-making e fields. This implies that Greenpeace mobilises "natural environment" issue frames primarily in the communicative process of "blaming" industrial actors. References to the natural environment are an element in Greenpeace's industrial campaign, its primary national target, which links the responsibility of industrial actors to government policy makers.

---

[62] Friends of the Earth's sponsorship and promotional activities for creating public access to the natural environment is contested in some cases by other environmental organisations (Council for the Protection of Rural England) because the public and new enterprises in the countryside can also be defined as the 'cause' of the problem.

"Car" issue frames identify environmental problems which occur due to the use and production of cars, such as consumerist behaviour resulting from the "car culture", exhaust emissions, car technology, traffic, roads and the regulation of transport (including shipping). Section 2. showed that this "type" of environmental issue culture is far more resonant in Friends of the Earth's campaigns than Greenpeace's. "Car" issue frames "link" five of Friends of the Earth's contested fields but only three of Greenpeace's.

For Friends of the Earth "car" issue frames "link" the following contested fields: government decision-making **e**, business **b**, transport **t**, party politics **p**, and (non-nuclear) energy **y**. This hierarchy of contested fields indicates that Friends of the Earth primarily mobilise "car" issue frames to target government policy actors with responsiblity for this type of environmental problem. It is probable that "car" issues raise questions relating to the Government's standards of regulation for the use of cars into the public discourse (e.g. tax concessions for lead-free petrol, speed limits). Friends of the Earth uses "car" issue frames for criticising the environmental standards of existing Government policies. Furthermore, "car" issue frames "link" this targeting of governmental policy to the responsibility of the following actors: manufacturers for technological innovation to improve efficiency and reduce emissions; the transport sector for road congestion; the opposition party for policies with higher environmental standards; and the energy sector for improving fuel efficiency. This indicates that "car" issue frames have an important role for integrating the diverse but related factors of this environmental problem into a unified campaign critique against the standards set by Government policies.

"Car" issues are less significant in Greenpeace's public campaigns. These issue frames target the party politics **p**, government decision-making **e**, and energy (non-nuclear) **y** contested fields. This shows that when Greenpeace's campaigns mobilise "car" issue frames, they serve primarily to communicate alternative policy options. However, Greenpeace are only likely to mobilise "car" issue frames as an sub-element of a different targeting campaign. For example, "car" issues may add another element of contention to a Greenpeace "blaming" strategy against the Government's environmental standards or the polluting practices of an oil multi-national.

"Green business" issue frames are the culture of "market solutions" to environmental problems. They include commercial and market activities that are justified by environmental criteria (e.g. ethical investment, agritourism, green development projects) and are the basis

of endless disputes within the environmental movement. Section **B)** showed that "green business" issues are not a primary concern of either Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace, but they resonate more for Friends of the Earth whose campaigns have a need to justify the organisation's promotional activities.

The lower graphs in **f2** and **g2** show that "green business" issue frames target only the business **b** contested field in Greenpeace's public campaigns, whereas they "link" business **b** with party politics **p** and labour **l** in Friends of the Earth's. This indicates that "green business" frames are used by Greenpeace in their communication which targets business actors. It is likely that they are part of Greenpeace's "blaming" strategies against business actors who make green claims for their products. For Friends of the Earth "green business" issue frames play a more *promoting* role, which reflects the organisation's more pragmatic approach to the environmental benefits of market activity. In Friends of the Earth's campaigns "green business" frames are elements of both "blaming" and "supporting" strategies vis-a-vis business actors. However, perhaps more importantly "green business" frames serve to "link" the green claims of the opposition party's and trade unions' policies to the emergent environmental projects of business.

"Green politics" issue frames are the culture of "political solutions" to environmental problems. They include political activities that are justified by environmental criteria (e.g. a political party's green policy statement, the "green ethics" of an environmental organisation's practices, the question of green democracy) and form claims which are often disputed by other actors. Section 2. showed that "green politics" issue frames resonate more in the Greenpeace discourse than in that of Friends of the Earth. Greenpeace are more confrontational than Friends of the Earth in the market for political claims. Graph **g2** shows that "green politics" issue frames are used by Greenpeace for targeting government decision-making **e** and party politics **p** contested fields. This confirms that they are an element of Greenpeace's "blaming" strategies against the policy actors of the political establishment. Graph **f2** indicates that "green politics" issue frames perform a similar role for Friends of the Earth, but in addition to targeting the official and opposition policy makers they also relate to the development **d** contested field. Friends of the Earth mobilised "green politics" issue frames as a *promoting* campaign strategy to intervene in the "scandal" surrounding the ethics of the World Wide Fund for Nature's development projects.

4.ii) The World Wide Fund for Nature

Here I analyze the "environmental issue framing pattern" that is produced by the overall environmental issue framing and target construction properties of the World Wide Fund for Nature's media campaign. As in the earlier cases of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, an attempt is made to reconstruct the 'role' that is played by specific "types" of environmental issue cultures in communicating the environmental contest as part of the World Wide Fund for Nature's campaign strategy.

Graph **w2** shows the **environmental issue framing pattern** of the World Wide Fund for Nature. This is a distribution of the twelve "types" of environmental issue cultures across the specific "types" of government/industry contested field which the organisation may construct in the news discourse. Graph **w2** gives an overall pattern for the relation between environmental issue framing and target construction that is produced by the World Wide Fund for Nature's public campaigns. It shows how the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilises *environmental themes* to target *government responsibility contexts* in the news. This is an indicator for the strategic orientation of the organisation's "public campaign culture".

A preliminary viewing of the graphs in **w2** indicates that the World Wide Fund for Nature's environmental issue cultures construct fewer "types" of contested field than those of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.[63] Furthermore, the organisation's environmental issue cultures tend to be less differentiated in the contested fields which they target than those in the campaign cultures of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. This confirms the earlier findings (2. and 3. above) that in comparison to the two media-oriented organisations, the World Wide Fund for Nature has a more limited range of campaign targets and a less diverse range of communication strategies for mobilising the environmental contest.

Graph **w2** shows that like Greenpeace the organisation's campaigns are more oriented towards the supra-national level. However, apart from the two dominant issue cultures "rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" there is little evidence that the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilises campaigns which "link" different "types" of contest fields. This implies that the organisation's campaigns mobilise a simpler relation of environmental issue framing to

---

[63] The World Wide Fund for Nature targets only four contested fields in the upper "supra-national environmental issue framing pattern" graph in **w2**, whereas Friends of the Earth's target eight and Greenpeace six in the upper graphs in **f2** and **g2** respectively.

target construction into the public discourse than the other two organisations. The World Wide Fund for Nature's campaigns have a less 'complex' overall environmental framing pattern than Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Indeed it is only the organisation's "rainforest" and "rare fauna" campaigns which tend to 'integrate' the environmental contest into a societal critique rather than leave it as an unrelated set of single issue protest campaigns.

In short, the initial overview shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature has established 'routine' communication strategies for mobilising the environmental contest within its specialised campaign field of world conservation. This general impression confirms the findings of sections 2. and 3.. Detail will now be added by looking at the 'role' of specific "types" of environmental issue cultures in the structure of the World Wide Fund for Nature's communication campaigns. As in the earlier cases, this will be done by first comparing **i.a)** the "supra-national environmental issue framing patterns" and then **ii.b)** the "national environmental issue framing patterns" of the campaigns which the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilise into the public discourse.

4.ii.a) supra-national environmental issue framing patterns

Section 3. indicated that the World Wide Fund for Nature has a 'dual' strategy for raising contested fields in the public discourse - the organisation's communication campaigns are composed of *targeting* and *promoting* elements. The World Wide Fund for Nature enters the public discourse to 'target' government, heavy industrialist and transport actors with "policy" responsibilities, and to 'promote' business and development actors as a "non-policy" field for environmental responsibility. This 'promotional' campaigning is self-referential, the World Wide Fund for Nature has communication strategies for legitimating its own conservation activities in the public discourse.

The "global warming" issue culture gives a supra-national frame of reference to the environmental contest. Mobilising environmental problems which identify a threat to the existence of the earth as a global eco-system, "global warming" issue frames are the following: global warming, the ozone hole, climatic change, and the increasing production and emission of carbon dioxide and CFCs into the atmosphere. Section 4.i) showed that "global warming" are the most communicative issue frames in the supra-national

environmental issue framing patterns of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.[64] However, for the World Wide Fund for Nature "global warming" issue frames construct only two "types" of contested field, namely government decision-making **e** and heavy (& chemical) industry **i**.

Graph **w** shows that "global warming" issue frames mobilise government decision-making **e** and heavy (& chemical) industry **i** contested fields in the World Wide fund for Nature's public campaigns. This indicates that "global warming" issue frames serve to communicate the organisation's *targeting* strategies which "blame" government and heavy industrialist actors for "policy" defined responsibilities. This is a more specific and less general 'role' than Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace whose "global warming" issue frames serve to integrate their other campaigns into a policy related societal critique. It is indicative of a more 'streamlined' campaign strategy. For the World Wide Fund for Nature "global warming" issue frames are a policy related "blaming" strategy. Referring to "global warming" is a way for the organisation to "blame" governments for the inadequacy of existing policy measures for protecting nature in the world eco-system, and "blame" heavy industrialists (e.g. logging, minerals extraction) for contravening such policies. The World Wide Fund for Nature is an international 'pressure group' which lobbies governments for international treaties and the implementation of supra-national regulation for protecting the balance of nature in the world ecosystem. That "global warming" issue frames mobilise this type of *targeting* strategy is indicated by the titles of the two articles which refer to this type of environmental problem: *Chaos threatens climate conference* (WWF R), and *The new cold war* (WWF V).

"Rainforest etc." issue frames refer to endangered exotic habitats and in particular the tropical rainforest. The "rainforest etc." issue culture identifies problems such as the possible extinction of rare exotic plant species, but also includes the dangers to the world's eco-system that may be caused by the de-forestation and desertification of habitats in Third World nations. The "rare fauna" issue culture highlights environmental problems such as the threat of extinction to rare exotic animal species. Both the "rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" issue cultures attribute a supra-national frame of reference to the environmental contest.

Section 2. showed that "rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" issue cultures are the source

---

[64] "Global warming" issue frames "link" six contested fields in the news discourse for Friends of the Earth and five for Greenpeace.

for more than two thirds of the issue frames that are mobilised by the World Wide Fund for Nature. Furthermore, I indicated that the two issue cultures are related: "rainforest etc." issue frames give a more radical version of the threat of extinction to exotic habitats because they define the problem in relation to the "sustainability" of the global ecosystem; whereas "rare fauna" issue frames mobilise only the problem of a single species (e.g. "Save the Elephant").

The upper graph in **w2** shows that "rainforest" and "rare fauna" issue frames "link" three contested fields in the World Wide Fund for Nature's public campaigns. This makes "rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" more communicative across the different "types" of contested fields than any other issue cultures for the organisation. "Rainforest" and "rare fauna" issue frames are not only the most prominent elements in the World Wide Fund for Nature's campaigns but they are also the most 'dynamic' across types of social context.

By referring to problems of "rainforest" and "rare fauna" the organisation is able to 'integrate' the *targeting* and *promoting* elements of its campaign strategy into a unified critique. In other words, the World Wide Fund for Nature's "rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" issue frames mobilise an 'integral' contest into the public discourse. Lacking the thematic diversity of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the organisation's public campaigns mobilise a 'specialist' supra-national critique of the environmental problematic which focuses specifically on presenting the case for the conservation of the world's resources of nature.[65] This raises two related questions: Firstly, how are the *targeting* and *promoting* elements of the organisation's communication strategies 'integrated' by this dominant thematic focus? And secondly, how do the "rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" issue frames combine to produce this communicative 'effect'?

"Rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" issue frames "link" the same three contested fields in the World Wide Fund for Nature's public campaigns, namely development **d**, business **b** and heavy (& chemical) industry **i**. This confirms that there is a high association between the

---

[65] In section 2.ii) I described how the "rare fauna" and "rainforest" are different elements of the same theme. They are both issues that refer to the preservation of natural environments in the context of overseas development projects. The difference is one of emphasis. "Rare fauna" frames mobilise the more traditional conservation issues concerning the preservation of specific exotic species, whereas the "rainforest" frames mobilise a more contemporary concern with the preservation of exotic *habitats* as a vital element in the global eco-system. Indeed I also suggested that the *habitat* "package" is the more radically *globalising* and a possible historical successor to the *species* "package". At the present time, however, it is clear that both these elements combine to produce the single dominant issue theme in the World Wide Fund for Nature's public campaigns.

"rare fauna" and "rainforest etc." elements in the World Wide Fund for Nature's campaigns. Graph w shows that for "rainforest" frames the hierarchy of the contested fields is the following: development **d**, business **b** and heavy (& chemical) industry **i**. In the case of "rare fauna" issue frames the rank of business **b** and development **d** is reversed, whilst heavy (& chemical) industry **i** remains the lowest.[66] This implies a difference between the communicative 'roles' of "rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" issue frames. "Rainforest etc." issue frames 'integrate' the discourse on the marketing and financial activities of the organisation and policy related criticisms of heavy industrial actors within a 'promotional' critique on its practical development and conservation activities. "Rare fauna" issue frames 'integrate' the development activities of the World Wide Fund for Nature and policy related criticisms of heavy industrial actors within a critique of its own marketing and financial activities. In short, "rare fauna" issue frames tend to communicate the business side, whereas "rainforest" communicate the development side of the organisation's 'promotional' activities.

"Rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" issue cultures are primarily *promoting* elements in the organisation's campaign strategy. Nonetheless both "types" of issue frame also communicate about the environmental problem in a way that mobilises a secondary *targeting* element against heavy industrial actors. This indicates that "rainforest" and "rare fauna" issue frames constitute a streamlined campaign to mobilise a *conservation interests versus industrial interests* contest into the public discourse. The activities of the culprits are "blamed", but only within the context of an overall prognosis that identifies the organisation's own practical actions as a potential remedy to the problems of supra-national species and habitat conservation.

"Rainforest etc." issue frames "link" five contested fields for Greenpeace and four for Friends of the Earth, but only three for the World Wide Fund for Nature. This indicates that although "rainforest" issue frames resonate in higher absolute and proportionate amounts for the World Wide Fund for Nature, this resonance is a less 'dynamic' element of the organisation's communication strategy than it is for Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. The World Wide Fund for Nature's "rainforest etc." issue frames serve a different

---

[66] In section 3.ii) I showed that the references to development and business activities are often self-references in the World Wide Fund for Nature's campaigns, whereas references to heavy industrial actors tend to be policy-related targets. This indicates that business and development activities tend to be constructed as a *promoting*, and heavy industry as a *targeting* element of the organisation's communication strategy.

communicative 'role': they mobilise a compact critique which promotes a specific kind of environmental practice rather than a dynamic critique which targets an interrelated set of opponent actors. In contrast to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the argumentations of the World Wide Fund for Nature have a streamlined campaign orientation. This finding reinforces the claim that the World Wide Fund for Nature's public campaigns primarily serve a 'promotional' rather than a 'targeting' role.

Section 4.i) showed that unlike "rainforest etc." issue frames, "rare fauna" are not a "linking" element in Friends of the Earth's and Greenpeace's campaigns. "Rainforest" frames tend to be more communicative than "rare fauna" frames. An explanation for this is that "rainforest etc." frames constitute a *globalising* element for the environmental discourse, a dynamism for spreading the focus of the critique across different social contexts which is prominent in the most recent wave of the "new environmental consciousness" (Jamison Eyerman et al. 1990). Concern with *habitat* as a part of the global eco-system rather than an object of beauty (a *species*) has become a radicalizing element in the contemporary environmental discourse. It seems plausible that this radical notion of a "global nature" (i.e. "rainforest" frames) was initially pushed by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace and that this has altered the context of the World Wide Fund for Nature's preservation interests and actions. The *globalisation* of environmental discourse has engaged the World Wide Fund for Nature's campaigns into the contemporary environmental discourse. Now, as a supra-national conservationist, the organisation has to partake in the public debates concerning global "sustainability". The campaign perspective has been radicalised by the environmental discourse rather than *vice versa*.

The "linking" properties of "rare fauna" issue frames are exclusive to the World Wide Fund for Nature's campaigns. This indicates that the organisation's traditional campaigns for the preservation of animal species in exotic places are now part of a strategic campaign critique rather than one-off "single issue" campaigns. According to graph w, "rare fauna" issue frames 'integrate' the development activities of the World Wide Fund for Nature and policy related criticisms of heavy industrial actors within a critique of its own marketing and financial activities. The focus on the World Wide Fund for Nature's own marketing activities shows that "rare fauna" issue frames mobilise a campaign critique that is *self-targeting*. "Rare fauna" issue frames mobilise a critique which "blames" business actors (and the organisation's own collaborations with business) whilst highlighting the actions of

development projects and problems which they face from non-regulated industrial production. This indicates that the organisation's mobilisation of "rare fauna" frames introduces a "self-targeting" strategy whereby the organisation cleanses itself of damaging associations with ethical investment "scandals". It is part of a strategy for a public reformation of the organisation's environmental credentials (see later).

To recap: the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilises campaigns that are less thematically diverse and target fewer opponents than Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. The dynamism of the organisation's communication strategy is carried by the "rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" issue frames which mobilise a critique on the problems of conservation projects and the lack of adequate regulation of heavy industrial production. Furthermore, "global warming" frames "link" this 'integral' compact critique to the responsibilities of governments for the supra-national implementation of policies and regulation of damage to natural habitats. The environmental issue framing pattern of the World Wide Fund for Nature identifies the organisation's role as a supra-national pressure group which promotes conservation interests and criticises the lack of policy regulation of heavy industrialists.

4.ii.b) national environmental issue framing patterns

The lower graph in w2 exhibits a low issue resonance. This indicates that the World Wide Fund for Nature's public campaigns tend not to target national contested fields. As I have established above, the organisation is an actor which campaigns on supra-national themes in the environmental contest.

Four "types" of environmental issue frames target national contested fields in the World Wide Fund for Nature's campaigns: "natural environment", "car", "green business", and "green politics". Of these only "natural environment" issue frames "link" two contested fields. This low amount of issue frame "linking" across different "types" of contested fields indicates that the World Wide Fund for Nature use one-off single issue campaigns to target national contested fields. The organisation makes little attempt to mobilise a national critique of the environmental problematic. Indeed its entrance into the national debate in this sample is a response to the special opportunity that is presented by the British Government's publication of its environmental policy agenda (see later).

"Natural environment" issue frames "link" the transport t and government decision-making e contested fields for the World Wide Fund for Nature. Section 3.ii) showed that these are both policy related fields. This indicates that the organisation contests the destruction of Britain's natural environment as a policy responsibility for Government actors. This is indicated by the titles of the two articles: *Roads endanger ancient forests* (WWF M); and *Mixed reaction from the critics*[67] (WWF O). "Car" issue frames also contest transport policy in *Putting the 'car' in caring* (WWF U). Contrary to Friends of the Earth's car campaign, the World Wide Fund for Nature's appears as single issue contests against Government policy. There is little critique of the 'interrelatedness' of pollution, damage to the countryside and the use of cars. The World Wide Fund for Nature tends to leave national environmental contest to the other environmental organisations and instead focuses on promoting its supra-national conservation interests.

5. The Public Campaigns of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the Worlde Wide Fund for Nature: globalising, personalising and moralising the environmental discourse

The content analysis has provided empirical data on the *contents* that are mobilised into the news by the public campaign activities of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. By comparing the different types of environmental issues and contested fields that appear in the three samples, I have reconstructed the specific ways that the three environmental organisations "frame" the environmental contest in the British public discourse. This data has been interpreted as an indicator for the strategic orientation of the communication campaigns that are waged individually by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature against their opponents. To conclude this part of the analysis, I now look briefly at the overall mobilisation of environmental issues and targeting of contested fields by the three organisations.

Graphs **fgw.1** and **fgw.2** show the total resonance of the different "types" of environmental issues and contested fields, respectively, that were mobilised in the three months news sample of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. Taken together graphs **fgw.1** and **fgw.2** show that the "public campaign cultures"

---

[67] This refers to the reception of the Government's White Paper document.

of three environmental organisations mobilise a widely diverse range of environmental issues and related social contexts into the public discourse. The period of the so-called rise of the "new environmental consciousness" (Jamison Eyerman et al. 1990) has witnessed the emergence of an environmental critique in the British public discourse.[68] The dynamic rise of these three organisations in the late eighties has been documented for the British case (McCormick 1991). Furthermore, these are the three organisations which are most commonly mentioned in the British news (Hansen 1993). Following on from this, the graphs **fgw.1** and **fgw.2** may be considered to represent the collective "public campaign culture" of the media-oriented sector of the British environmental movement. This body of communication may be seen as the 'cutting edge' of the public agenda building activities of the environmental movement in Britain at the time of the Government's publication of the White Paper on the environment in 1990.

Graph **fgw.1** shows that the media-oriented movement sector's campaigns promote "nuclear" environmental issues more than any other "types" of issue culture. However unlike Hansen's (1993) analysis - which focuses only on Greenpeace - the graph indicates that a wide range of other "types" of environmental issue cultures are mobilised into the British public discourse. The second most prominent environmental issue in the media sector's campaigns is "rainforest etc.", followed by "industrial waste", and then "rare fauna", "global warming" and "natural environment" which have similar prominence, and "car" and "agricultural waste" issues have a similar but lower prominence.

"Nuclear" issue frames may refer to a supra-national or national (or both) contexts and "rainforest etc." and "global warming" issue frames give a supra-national definition to the environmental contest. In the earlier parts of this section 4.i) and 4.ii), I analyzed the environmental issue framing patterns that are produced by the campaigns of the organisations. The "linking" of an environmental issue across different "types" of contested field is taken as an indication that campaigns are waged as a societal critique rather than as one-off-mono-causal problems. "Nuclear", "rainforest etc." and "global warming" issues

---

[68] I have analyzed the longitudinal changes in the British public discourse on "environmentalism" from 1987-1991 elsewhere (Statham 1994a 1994b). One of the key findings of the overview of the British environmental discourse has been that in the years 1987-91 the environmental discourse changed from two distinct discourses (on nuclear protest conflicts and nature conservation) to a unified discourse on environmental problems as "risks". The emergent "risk" version of the environmental discourse in British news relates to local and global social contexts and addresses the "life world" of the reader. On the basis of such findings one can make the claim that risk communication has made the environmental contest more 'reflexive' in British society.

were seen to be frames with a high propensity for "linking" several social contexts. This shows that three of the most resonant environmental issue cultures in the organisations' campaigns also have a tendency for integrating the environmental contest as a societal critique. "Nuclear", "rainforest etc." and "global warming" are all "types" of issue frames which are communicative across different "types" of social contexts and also have a tendency to *extend* the spatial notion of the environmental contest beyond a national concern.

The process whereby the spatial notion of the environmental contest is extended may be referred to as the *globalisation* of the environmental discourse. "Nuclear", "rainforest etc." and "global warming" environmental issue frames *globalise* the reference to spatial context of the environmental contest. They are also highly prominent in the organisations' media campaigns. It seems plausible therefore that the campaign activities of the organisations may seek to introduce this dynamic process of *globalisation* into the British public discourse on "environmentalism". How might the prominence which the organisations' campaigns give to this "type" of environmental issue have contributed to the development of the environmental discourse into a societal critique?

The reasoning devices[69] which carry environmental communication may be based on either factual, moral or aesthetic claims. Policy discourses are based on the scientific rationality of "hard" facts (Eder 1995), whereas non policy related discourses may be based on other types of rationalities, such as moral claims or an appeal to aesthetic values. The de-differentiation of scientific knowledge into the public discourse has been deemed an important feature of contemporary "risk societies" (Beck 1992) and more specifically environmental discourse (Eder 1993). The delegitimation of the authority of scientific "experts" has opened the public debate over how society should regulate environmental "problems" to other actors, and other types of reasoning devices. Policy actors are no longer simply able to apply scientific-based rationalities to identified problems, but when challenged in the public discourse must justify their actions on the basis of other cultural rationalities.[70] This process may be regarded as the increasing *moralisation* of the environmental discourse and the mobilisation activities of the organisations have been a key factor in bringing this situation

---

[69] Gamson (1988) and Gamson & Modigliani (1989) use the concept of reasoning devices as cognitive categories in the analysis of public discourse. In reference to the environmental discourse, Eder (1994) defines three types of cognitive "frames": empirical, moral and aesthetic.

[70] I discuss this point in detail in the conclusion section F.

about.

The comparative analysis (above) has shown that "nuclear" issue frames are used to mobilise both policy related and non policy related contested fields (Friends of the Earth's campaigns usually do the former and Greenpeace's the latter). Policy discourse is based on scientific facts. The organisations' "nuclear" issue frames are able to communicate both science-based reasoning devices and moral or aesthetic reasoning devices. This indicates that they aim to appeal to both policy actors and the public. Furthermore, it implies that the organisations' campaigns have been active in promoting the *moralisation* of the environmental discourse.

A feature of the *moralisation* of the environmental discourse is that the environmental contest is made pertinent to all members of a society. The process whereby the notion of the environmental contest penetrates into the moral concerns of everyday life and experience may be referred to as the *personalisation* of the environmental discourse. "Nuclear" issue frames *personalise* the environmental discourse because they are perceived as a danger to life and a threat to existence. Nuclear risks are not empirically quantifiable and the 'effects' of exposure to radiation unknown but a source for much public speculation.[71] They are issues that are contested in the public discourse.

"Nuclear" issue frames have a key structural role in environmental communication because they de-differentiate the boundaries of "expert" and lay knowledge. Not only has it facilitated the notion of the spatial extension of the environmental contest, but the nuclear contest has also facilitated a de-differentiation of the different types of cognitive reasoning devices that are available to actors for defining the environmental problematic. This is important because it means that the knowledge on which environmental claims are based is no longer simply a specialist field for "experts" - e.g. scientists giving empirical facts to policy actors - but is opened up in the public discourse as a resource for other actors to legitimate their own environmental claims on moral or aesthetic grounds. In short, the nuclear contest has made it easy for lay actors to communicate and legitimate environmental claims and has been a dynamic factor in the *globalisation* and *personalisation* of the environmental discourse.

---

[71] For a case study on public communication about nuclear risks in British culture, see the analysis on the Chernobyl "news story" as a social metaphor 1987-1991 (Statham 1993). For the Swedish case see Nohrstedt (1990).

The analysis in the earlier sections showed that "global warming" issue frames tend to mobilise a policy related discourse. This indicates that the environmental organisations raise "global warming" issues as a science-based reasoning device to open policy agendas for legitimation in the public discourse. "Rainforest" issue frames, on the other hand, tend to mobilise a discourse on the preservation of nature that is not policy related. This indicates that the organisations use "rainforest etc." issues as a moral or aesthetic reasoning device for appealing to the "life" values of the public and moralising the public discourse. At the same time both "types" of issue frame make the organisations' identified opponents responsible for the global environmental problematic.

Regarding the organisations' national environmental issue frames, section 4. indicated that "car" and "natural environment" issue frames have a high propensity for "linking" different "types" of social contexts. This means that these issue frames are also a contributing factor to the mobilisation of the environmental contest as a societal critique. "Car" and "natural environment" issue frames are mobilised by the organisations to construct policy and non policy related contested fields. This indicates that they are used by the organisations for communicating science-based reasoning devices for opening up the policy field to the public discourse and for communicating moral and aesthetic reasoning devices for the public to relate these environmental problems to personal experience. In other words, "car" and "natural environment" issues *personalise* the environmental discourse. They both relate the environmental contest in a way that ties an "expert" policy field (transport and environment) to the public's first hand experiences. People use cars or have an appreciation of the countryside or their gardens in everyday life. By mobilising "car" and "natural environment" issue frames the organisations are engaging in the de-differentiation of "expert" knowledge (technology and natural science) and public culture (cars and parks).[72] When mobilised by an organisation, this "type" of environmental issue frame not only popularises interest in policy debates but also provides a cue for the public to be aware of the impact of their own apparently innocuous everyday activities in producing environmental damage.

My data indicates that the communicative actions of the media-oriented organisations has been factor in popularising the *global* and *personal* perspective on the environmental contest. By mobilising these environmental themes the organisations have extended the

---

[72] On cultural de-differentiation and the mixing of elements of expert and popular cultures, see Featherstone (1989).

boundaries of-self-reference for the British public discourse on "environmentalism". The organisations define the environmental contest in a way that promotes a notion of the *global society* and refers to the *personal life world* for an actor. This has the effect of making environmental protest into a reflexive critique for society.

When the public discourse on "environmentalism" begins to refer to the 'world' and the 'life world' instead of the 'nation' the stakes for environmental responsibilities are raised and subsequently the case for change becomes more compelling. Britain is no longer an island where some people are conservationists and some people protest against nuclear power, but now must bear a national responsibility for making an interrelated world - from private life to global citizen - into a "sustainable" environment.

Graph **fgw.2** indicates that government decision-making **e**, heavy (& chemical) industry **i** and nuclear industry **n** were the most targeted contested fields by the environmental organisations' campaigns. This means simply that the environmental organisations target government policy matters, heavy industrial, chemical and nuclear actors with "blame" for environmental damage. It is evidence that the media-oriented sector of the movement has been "active" in placing this burden of responsibility the shoulders of Government and Industry actors by mobilising the environmental contest as a societal critique. Such a finding is not surprising when one considers that the news sample covers a period of enhanced mobilisation that the organisations' designed to coincide with the publication of the Government's first major policy statement on the environment (see next part).

The increasing acceptance of an environmentalist creed in the public discourse has made it imperative for Governments to intervene (or be seen to intervene) in the environmental contest over the last decade. Similarly, the pressure of public discourse has meant that heavy industrial actors, such as the chemical, petroleum and nuclear industries, now also have to justify their activities in ways that refer to environmental values.[73]

On the basis of these findings, the following claim is plausible: *The campaigns of the media-oriented sector of the movement have played a prominent role in the radicalisation of the environmental contest from a set of distinct public protests into a reflexive societal*

---

[73] For example, witness the relentless public relations campaigns of British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. who have attempted to turn the Sellafield reactor into a theme park.

critique in Britain.

This would mean that by introducing the environmental contest into the public discourse, the media-oriented organisations have made "environmentalism" accessible to British society as a "collective learning process".[74] In other words, British people now possess the cultural tools (Swidler 1986) to be able to define their own actions and relate to the actions of others by referring to environmental criteria. This does not mean that the British have become environmentalists, but that they are able to view society through a filter of environmental values, if required to do so. Of course, they may choose not to, or even to oppose the possible courses of action, strategies or policy options that have been raised by environmentalists. However, as even one of the most famously intransigent of Prime Ministers, Margaret Thatcher, felt the need to take a "U-turn" and propose environmental strategies in 1988 (see later), it has become increasingly difficult for the British to choose not to engage in the politics of environmental discourse.

The national policy "event" may be seen as a result of the "pressure" on the Government to conform with the standards set by an increasingly popular usage of environmental critique in the public discourse.[75] When their actions are made accountable by the popularity of environmental critique, Government and Industrial actors are forced into learning how to use environmental norms to justify what they do. As I shall show in the next part, the Thatcher Government's establishment of a policy agenda in September 1990 was not 'successful' as an attempt to achieve legitimation for the Government as an "environmental actor". This outcome was due in part to the mobilisation activities of the environmental organisations. The role of the organisations' environmental mobilisations has been to keep up this "normative pressure" on Government and Industry to change their policies and practices by continually 'tightening the rules' of what constitutes sound environmental practice in the public discourse. After analysing the contents of the

---

[74] For a theoretical perspective on the importance of collective learning processes in social action see Eder and Miller (1986). I discuss the initiation of learning processes as part of the agenda-building activities of environmental organisations in the concluding section F.

[75] My empirical work on the British environmental discourse 1987-91 (1994) indicates that the *personalisation* of the language in the British public discourse on "environmentalism" is a trend that has occurred parallel over time to the *politicisation* of argumentations (e.g. the use of references to nature to construct norms). This implies that the environmental critique in Britain has become common usage and constructs political arguments. In short, environmental claims have become both more popular and more political.

organisations' media campaigns, in the next part of the thesis I analyze the "cycle" of news coverage into which their strategic mobilisations where "packaged" to achieve specific policy outcomes.

D) 'Telling Tales' - Environmental organisations and communication strategies in an emergent policy agenda: claim packaging in the news cycle of the Dirty Man of Europe event

1. Introduction: discourse patterns, mobilisation and "news events"

In the last section **C)** I compared a dimension of the communication properties of the environmental organisations as sources in the news, namely their "public campaign cultures". In this section **D)** the organisations' communication properties as sources are contextualised and analysed within the news coverage of a political event. The methodology for news text analysis that is employed here aims to clarify the following: To what extent is it possible to identify a *division of communicative labour* in the organisations' mobilisation activities during the different phases of a political event? On what bases are the organisations able to combine their public communication strategies, and what factors regulate the potential for their communicative actions to have political "effects"? The specific *contents* of the organisations' "public campaign cultures" are reconstructed into cases of communicative action over the dynamic "cycle" of a political event.

The distribution of articles referring to Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature is given in **graph D.I** overleaf. **Graph D.II** shows the quantitative distribution of article references to environmental organisations in relation to the overall coverage of the specific "news events". This serves for identifying the British Government's launch of the White Paper policy document *This Common Inheritance* on the week commencing 24th September 1990 as the dominant "news event" in the three months sample.

I divide the sample of media discourse on the White Paper event into four phases: that "prior to the news cycle"; the "prologue"; the "news event", and the "epilogue". The rationale for the "news event" phase is the following: the "news event" occurs when there are more articles on the White Paper than those mentioning any single environmental organisation. The phase "prior to the news cycle" occurs before there is any coverage on the White Paper event. The "prologue" phase occurs before the "news event", when any single environmental organisation receives the same or more coverage than the White Paper. Conversely, the "epilogue" phase occurs after the "news event", when any single

organisation receives the same or more coverage than the White Paper. Hence the chronological order of the White Paper "news cycle" phases is: "prior to the news cycle"; the "prologue"; the "news event"; and the "epilogue".

Following these definitions, **graph D.II** shows that the phase prior to the White Paper "news cycle" occurs before the week commencing 27th August. Similarly, the "prologue" discourse takes place from the week commencing 27th August until that commencing 10th September. As a peak "news event" the White Paper story lasts three weeks, from that commencing 17th September until the end of that commencing 1st October. Finally the "epilogue" to the White Paper "event" starts on the week commencing 8th October and continues until the end of the survey sample.[1]

A further "news event", the World Wide Fund for Nature scandal, augmented the number of references to environmental organisations at two specific times in the sample. The WWF scandal initially "broke" in the week commencing 1st August, then re-appeared and "peaked" as a "news event" during the week commencing 3rd September, lasting for two weeks (see **graph D.II**).

In the methodology section (B) above), I noted that "A" issues refer to the activities of the organisation and are indicators for the self-legitimation strategies of environmental organisations, "E" issues refer to environmental themes and are indicators for the environmental problems which they seek to legitimise, and "G" issues refer to government responsibility contexts and are indicators for the delegitimation strategies which they use against opponents. Here I focus on these three discourse elements: the organisation's activity issues "A"; the environmental issues "E"; and the government responsibility issues "G".[2] I analyze their relative amounts of resonance in the news cycle on the White Paper policy document in order to reconstruct the time series of environmental claims and contested "events". What discourse patterns are produced by the organisations' mobilisations during the different phases of the environmental news sample?

---

[1] These four phases in the news cycle are also represented in the visual databases for each organisation (see section B)).

[2] The analysis of the relative *prominence* of the four discourse elements in the environmental organisation's discourses that appears in the visual databases (above), shows that the organisation's "name" "O" is an element that is highly *subtextualised* by the other three elements in the discourse. This finding is not surprising as the other three discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" are issues which construct the environmental contest. They possess a much higher potential for discursive *elaboration* than the organisation's "name", which in most cases is simply *objectified* element in texts.

The quantitative distribution of references to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace shows that in both cases their amount of coverage has a *relative autonomy* from peak "news events". In other words, the two most media-oriented environmental organisations receive coverage even when there are no obvious or imminent environmental "events" to be reported on the news agenda. This implies that much of the coverage of environmental organisations is "invented" by the organisations themselves and "tuned" to the demands of news production and media processing.[3]

In the following, I comparatively analyze the discourses of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. These were the three most resonant organisations in the sample (section B)). These organisations have also been cited as the emergent transnational movement sector that is carrying environmental politics into a new era by linking local and global policy concerns (Princen and Finger 1994). It seems therefore pertinent to analyse the different ways in which they operate as collective actors in the national political culture, and to see to what extent discursive action forms a part of their different political strategies.[4]

As I have noted earlier, contemporary environmental organisations make themselves, their actions and the information on which their campaigns are based "newsworthy". The extreme case is when they "stage events", when protest actions are performed as stunts or in a way that is highly dramatic and visible. This 'novelty' aspect is deemed to appeal to the media's perception of a "news" story, and particularly for the tabloid press and television news (Greenberg 1985, Anderson 1991). This suggests that the organisations construct their claims into "news event" formats as a specific strategic dimension of their actions. The achievement of media coverage is the intended outcome of the organisations' actions. Their actions mobilise selected information into the media arena of public discourse. stated simply, environmental organisations act to "make the news". The prime examples of such a media

---

[3] Kielbowicz and Scherer (1986) note the ways in which social movements may "frame" their protest actions to coincide specifically with the news values, presentation styles, news cycles and reporting techniques of journalists and editors.

[4] I discuss this further in the conclusion where I consider the role of discursive strategies as part of the action repertoire for these environmental organisations to influence policy decisions. I agree with the assertion of the Princen and Finger (1994) model that these three organisations are constructive of the basis of the future of environmental campaigning, but criticise their overemphasis on the transnational rather than national level as the key arena for policy decisions and their omission of the role of the media and political communciation in the environmental agenda-building process.

strategy are Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.[5]

Unlike Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the activities of the World Wide Fund for Nature are not primarily oriented towards achieving media attention. A consequence of this is that the World Wide Fund for Nature's coverage has less *autonomy* from the environmental "news events" on the media agenda. The organisation's public profile allows less scope for staging "news events".

The World Wide Fund for Nature is a supra-national organisation that operates from Britain and raises funds for campaigning on world conservation issues (McCormick 1991; Szerzynski, Miles et al. 1995). The organisation is a charity and runs its own overseas development and conservation projects. In 1990 the World Wide Fund for Nature had a membership of 3.7 million in 28 national organisations and an annual income in excess of one hundred million pounds sterling. It is the largest environmental organisation in the world and co-ordinates projects in more than 70 countries.[6] In 1988 the World Wide Fund for Nature UK distributed 5.1 million pounds to conservation projects, a third going to domestic and two-thirds to overseas projects.[7]

Partly due to its origins as a conservation organisation the World Wide Fund for Nature's activities are less media oriented and more hidden from the public eye. Nonetheless the organisation expends a considerable amount of effort and resources on fund-raising activities, this amounted to 1.9 million for the World Wide Fund for Nature UK compared to a total conservation budget of 5.1 million pounds sterling in 1988. Indeed the World Wide Fund for Nature courts patronage from the influential, wealthy and respectable, whether they are individuals - such as the President of the WWF President Prince Philip - or corporate

---

[5] I think this assumption of the media analysis of environmental organisations' activities is correct. However, it is an assumption and not a finding of most existing analyses, e.g. Greenberg's (1985), Mazur's (1987; 1990), Cassidy's (1992). It is not sufficient simply to enumerate the quantitative amounts of coverage to reach such conclusions. More qualitative work on the discursive content of mobilisations and their reception by journalists and the public is necessary to substantiate such claims. The environmental organisations do not *control* the media agenda simply by achieving coverage, their mobilisations are always subject to the possibility of unintended outcomes. As public communications their significance and "political success" is dependent on the "processing" function of journalists and how they are received by specialist and non-specialist audiences.

[6] *The Guardian* 04/09/90.

[7] *The Guardian* 26/04/88.

companies[8], rather than appealing directly to the public *en masse*. This means that the World Wide Fund for Nature are less involved in staging "news events" than the media oriented organisations Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.

The World Wide Fund for Nature case provides an example for the media resonance of a more conventional environmental organisation during the White Paper "news event".[9] At the same time it shows how media attention for the environment has radicalised the public activities of such organisations beyond single issue environmental concerns into campaign strategies which are specialist and diversified. The following analysis will show how the politicisation of the environment has brought these conventional organisations into an active role within the public discourse. In addition the World Wide Fund for Nature became the subject of its own "news event" during the sample, when its financial activities and conservation policies were criticised by a television documentary and became a public scandal. The case will show how the environmental organisations shape the news when their activities are "bad news" rather than an "event" highlighting an issue, blaming other actors or forming the 'novel' basis for a news story.

The sample is divided into four distinct periods of environmental "news": that prior to the White Paper "news cycle"; the "prologue"; the "news event"; and the "epilogue" to the White Paper "event". This division represents the different phases in the "cycle" of the dominant "news event". For each phase I compare the discourse mobilisation patterns of the environmental organisations, i.e. the resonance that is produced by the combinations of the three constructive discourse elements "A", "E" and "G". I refer to the visual database, the titles, and the texts in order to specify the possible *causes* of the combinations of elements in particular cases of discourse patterns. This involves reconstructing the different types of *communication strategies* that the environmental organisations used within the different phases of the White Paper "news cycle". How does the *timing* combine with the *contents* to produce the strategic dimension of their discourse mobilisations? What factors determine the organisations potential for "packaging" contentious environmental claims into a mainstream

---

[8] In 1988 individual private donations 'heavily outweighed' income from companies, according to *The Guardian* 26/04/88.

[9] As the analysis in Section C) (above) shows, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace tend to promote the range of issues that are contested in the public sphere and concern technology - the latest wave of environmental mobilisation - whereas the World Wide Fund for Nature promotes issues that tend to be less contentious relating to conservation and preservation of species.

structure of public communication? How do the discursive framing repertoires of the three organisations vary in relation to events in the "cycle" of news coverage? Is there a *division of communicative labour* between the organisations, and if so, on what basis does it occur?

1.i Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace

The comparative distribution of the organisation's activity issues "A", environmental issues "E", and government responsibility issues "G" over time is shown in **graph f** for Friends of the Earth and **graph g** for Greenpeace. These graphs represent the *relative significance* of the three discourse elements which construct the environmental contest over the sample period. They illustrate the "peaks" and "troughs" of issue resonance that are produced by the organisations' mobilisation activities.

The resonance peaks and troughs of the two organisations follow similar general patterns. This indicates a coincidence on their part with the same "news events". However, a closer examination of the discourse patterns shows that Friends of the Earth's resonance is more continuous and regular over the sample than Greenpeace's, which tends instead to occur in specific intense "pulses". This pattern may be produced by differences in the *content* and the *timing* of the communication strategies of the two organisations. In other words, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace are active in the same discourse arenas, but their acts of mobilisation "work" differently in the news discourse. Their communications occur at similar times, but produce different discursive "effects". What may these general differences indicate for the discursive action repertoires of the two organisations?

Greenpeace's discontinuous "pulses" of resonance may indicate an attempt to regulate the specific timing of their coverage more than Friends of the Earth. "Timing" may be an important component of the Greenpeace communication strategies whereas Friends of the Earth may prefer a more constant and open access to reporters.

The strategic aim of both organisations' communicative actions is undoubtedly to achieve public attention. However, the difference in their discourse patterns implies the following hypothesis: whereas the strategic dimension of the Greenpeace communication "packages" consists in their *timing*, the strategic dimension of Friends of the Earth's communication is more likely to be maintained in the *content* of its "package", i.e. in the

combination of elements in the environmental claim.[10]

In other words, Greenpeace's mobilisation strategies may be geared more to the timing of media "news events" and the content of their communication more reliant on the occurrence of single specific "events" in the news. By contrast it appears that the actual semantic *content* of the mobilised message may be a more strategic element in the Friends of the Earth's communications. This may constitute the primary means by which Friends of the Earth target decision-makers through the public discourse. Greenpeace on the other hand may rely more on the timing of their mobilisations for targeting the decision-makers and communicating with the public.

The thesis regarding such a *division of communicative labour* between the organisations may be tested by comparing the two discourse patterns during the phases of the White Paper "news cycle".[11] The remainder of this section will be concerned with such an comparative analysis of the organisations' discourses.

1.ii World Wide Fund for Nature

The comparative distribution of issues relating to an organisation's activities "A", environmental issues "E", and government responsibility issues "G" over time is shown in **graph w** for the World Wide Fund for Nature. This graph gives the *relative significance* of the three discourse elements over the sample period. It gives the "peaks" and "troughs" of issue resonance produced by the organisation's activities.

The World Wide Fund for Nature's general pattern of the resonance over the sample is different from that of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. This shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature resonates differently with the "news events" in the media agenda than

---

[10] Here I consider an environmental claim to be a combination of the three elements environmental issues "E", issues relating to the organisation's activities "A" and government/industry responsibility issues "G" into a specific "package" with a cultural bias. It appears in the discourse at the surface level of the newstext. On the mobilisation of symbolic packages and reasoning devices in the media see Gamson (1988), for a critique see Eder (1992). See M. Thompson (1984; 1988; 1991) and Thompson and Wildavsky (1982) for an analytic application of Mary Douglas' concept of 'cultural bias'.

[11] The initial level of comparative analysis of the discourse patterns is provided by the distribution of the resonance of the three discourse elements in a news week. This research strategy facilitates both a closer analysis of individual texts during specific newsweeks of interest, and a generalisation of the newsweeks into the phases of the news cycle on the policy event.

the two higher profile organisations. It is active within a different sector of the agenda for public communication on the environment.

The World Wide Fund for Nature's resonance pattern occurs in a series of discontinuous peaks and troughs. This suggests that like Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature tends to make the news in instances that are related to specific "news events". Cycles of peak coverage are followed by troughs where the organisation receives no coverage. The World Wide Fund for Nature coverage is less continuous than that of Greenpeace over the sample period. This shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature fades in and out of the news, whereas Greenpeace constitutes a more permanent feature. It may indicate that the World Wide Fund for Nature are brought into the news by specific "events", whereas Greenpeace have relatively more control over the timing of the specific "news events" by which they achieve media prominence.

This is simply another way of stating that the activities of Greenpeace are more oriented towards reaching the media agenda than those of the World Wide Fund for Nature. Nonetheless, the World Wide Fund for Nature case will establish the significance of the media agenda for a different sector of the environmental movement, a supra-national conservation organisation. How do the *timing* and *contents* combine in a more conventional organisation's communication strategies? When and how does this type of organisation enter the media agenda on the environment, and what type of communication strategies are mobilised in the resultant discourse?

The thesis for a *division of communicative labour* in the different sectors of the environmental movement may be further tested by adding the analysis of the discourse patterns of the World Wide Fund for Nature as a case to the comparison of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.

a) Prior to the "news cycle": business as usual

During the phase of resonance before the media's "prologue" discourse on the White Paper, it is likely that the environmental organisations' communication strategies were relatively less determined by the White Paper "event". Although the mobilisation of information may have been enhanced in this phase due to the imminent "event", the organisations are likely to retain their 'normal' formats for communication rather than

referring directly to the White Paper. In theory at least, the news discourse from the week commencing August 1st until that commencing 20th August, inclusive, should be a *business as usual* period for the environmental organisations' communication strategies.

a.i) Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace

The visual database shows that the discourse prior to the "news cycle" covers eleven *active references* to Friends of the Earth (FoE A to K inc.) and seven to Greenpeace (Gpc A to G inc.).

The *business as usual* phase of Friends of the Earth news discourse is characterised by an hierarchical differentiation of the three constructive discourse elements. **Graph f.a** shows that with the exception of the first week, an hierarchical discourse structure is maintained by Friends of the Earth for the remaining newsweeks, when the resonance of the three elements is as follows: the environmental issues "E" are most prominent, followed by the government responsibility issues "G", and finally the organisation's activity issues "A" which are significantly less prominent than the other two. This discourse pattern coincides with the general trend of Friends of the Earth's discourse structure, where environmental issues tend to be more prominent than government responsibility issues, and the issues relating to the organisation's activities are a *subtext* of both.[12] This similarity with the general pattern indicates that Friends of the Earth's communication serves a *business as usual* function in this phase. But what is *business as usual* for Friends of the Earth?

The most resonant environmental themes in this phase concern in the first instance, toxic emissions from waste processing plants and related health risks (FoE C); and in the second, the ethics of "agro-tourism" projects, the town/country divide, destruction of landscape, and traffic pollution of countryside (FoE D). Other high prominence environmental themes concern the use of nitrates in agricultural practices and the pollution of drinking water (FoE H), pollution and quality of life themes related to regional urban decay (FoE G), and the future of energy conservation strategies in the wake of probable rise in world oil prices due to the Gulf War (FoE I). This shows the wide range of environmental themes covered by Friends of the Earth in the course of their *business as usual* mobilisation.

---

[12] See the visual database and discussion in section B).

C) and the world energy conservation debate arising from the imminent Gulf oil price rise (Gpc E) produce a combination of equally high prominence environmental issues "E" and government responsibility issues "G". This confirms that Greenpeace mobilise environmental themes in a way that they are firmly embedded within a government/industry responsibility context. Also the type of environmental themes and responsibility contexts raised in this *business as usual* phase gives a preliminary indication that Greenpeace's campaign strategies are more oriented towards the supra-national level than Friends of the Earth's.[14]

For the peak resonance newsweek commencing 13th August, the Greenpeace activity issues "A" are a *subtext* of the high resonance issues "E" and "G", which is similar to their role in the Friends of the Earth discourse. On the newsweek commencing 20th August, however, the issues relating to the activities of the organisation "A" return once more as the most prominent element in the Greenpeace discourse. This resonance is not produced by an external "news event" like the WWF scandal, but is the result of the production of "news event" by the organisation's own direct protest actions. The article *Protesters board nuclear ship* (Gpc G) describes the direct action of six Greenpeace activists who boarded a British Nuclear Fuels ship and chained themselves to machinery. The protest action occurs as part of the campaign against the British Government sponsored shipping trade in spent nuclear fuel. The action appears as a sequel to the mobilisation of this same issue the week before (Gpc C).[15]

This shows that Greenpeace are keen media strategists: they mobilise a specific environmental theme in the discourse one week, thus setting the media agenda for the reception of their direct action a week later. The journalists were primed, informed and able to apply the Greenpeace version of the contested theme without prompting when the protest "event" occurred. This is an example of an environmental organisation constructing a "news event" by a protest action that is designed specifically to gain public attention in the media. It also suggests that the Greenpeace's "activist" image is more readily translated into targeting strategies than that of Friends of the Earth.

---

[14] This is also a finding of the preliminary indicators from the content analyses in section **B.6**.

[15] This finding suggests that there are two different types of activity issues "A" in the Greenpeace news discourse: that similar to Friends of the Earth which function as a *subtext* to the more prominent "E" and "G" issues; and those which are produced when Greenpeace's direct action is itself the prominent subject of the discourse.

This use of "blaming" strategies shows that when Greenpeace mobilise an environmental theme, they take a more controversial and actor-orientated oppositional stance than Friends of the Earth. Friends of the Earth are more likely to let the themes 'speak for themselves'. Overall, however, the *business as usual* news discourses of the two organisations follow patterns that are broadly similar. This confirms that the difference between their discourses consists in a different emphasis of contents rather than in a different location on the news agenda. The primary exception to *business as usual* for the two organisations occurs in the first week, when their discourse patterns are influenced by the special circumstances surrounding the World Wide Fund for Nature scandal "news event".

a.ii) World Wide Fund for Nature

The visual database shows that the discourse prior to the "news cycle" covers three *active references* to the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF A to C inc.).

The discussion of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace (above **a.i**)), shows that their discourse mobilisation patterns were influenced in the week commencing August 1st, by the World Wide Fund for Nature scandal "news event". This had the effect of mobilising a discourse where themes relating to the activities of the environmental movement are more prominent than either the environmental themes or government/industry responsibility contexts. It distorts the *business as usual* communication of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Due to the special circumstances of the scandal, this phase prior to the White Paper "news cycle" does not constitute a *business as usual* period of communication for the World Wide Fund for Nature.

Graph w.a shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature received a peak coverage on the week of the scandal and then received no further coverage in this phase. Indeed for this scandal newsweek August 1st, the World Wide Fund for Nature achieves a resonance that is higher than both Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. This is due to the exceptional circumstances of the scandal which make the World Wide Fund for Nature's activities into a "news event" in its own right.

For the scandal newsweek the World Wide Fund for Nature's discourse has a hierarchical structure, where the organisation's activity issues "A" are the most prominent element, followed by the environmental issues "E" and the government responsibility issues

Not surprisingly considering their topics, the latter two of these articles also mobilised high prominence government responsibility issues "G" (FoE G I). Otherwise the most resonant government responsibility issues "G" in this phase concern the national conservation policy field, where the Government are reported to be discussing plans for restructuring the Nature Conservancy Council quango (FoE E).

This pattern of discourse mobilisation shows that Friends of the Earth's communication strategies primarily serve to give a *voice* to the environmental themes, whereas the government/industry responsibility context is a secondary, but associated factor. The activities of the organisation itself remain a *subtext* within this discourse on environmental themes in responsibility contexts.[13] This is indeed the case for the three weeks of the *business as usual* phase from the week commencing 6th August onwards, when the only time that themes relating to the organisation's activities achieve a relatively high prominence is to relate Friends of the Earth's involvement in an "agro-tourism" project restoring cottages in Cyprus (FoE D).

The exception to this pattern of *business as usual* communication occurs on the first week of the sample (**graph f.a**) and can be attributed to the influence of the "news event" scandal involving the World Wide Fund for Nature. Inevitably the scandal concerning the fund-raising practices, policies and lack of campaign "success" of the World Wide Fund for Nature draws comparisons with and comments from other environmental organisations.

Graph f.a shows that for Friends of the Earth this merely inverts the 'normal' trend between the issues relating to the organisation's activities "A", and the problematic and target constructing issues "E" and "G". The hierarchy of environmental issues over government responsibility issues is maintained, but these are the *subtext* of the debate over the organisation's activities concerning the internal structure, policies, and co-operation ethics, aid redistribution, fund-raising, merchandising and financial investment practices of environmental organisations (FoE A B).

This exceptional pattern in the first week due to the WWF scandal "news event" is repeated in the Greenpeace discourse (**graph g.a**). On the week commencing 1st August, Greenpeace's activity issues "A" are the most resonant, but unlike Friends of the Earth the

---

[13] Friends of the Earth's activity issues "A" are primarily a vehicle for mobilising the more prominent environment and government/industry thematic dimensions of claims. Self-publicity is a less prominent theme of the organisation's claims.

government responsibility issues "G" are more prominent than the environmental issues "E". In fact the WWF scandal accounts for only half of the total resonance in this newsweek. In addition to the WWF "news event" article (Gpc B), Greenpeace mobilise an article which targets Britain's nuclear energy policy as a false solution to the problem of global warming on August 2nd (Gpc A). The high prominence of activity issues "A" and government responsibility issues "G" in these two articles gives an indication that Greenpeace discourse is more based on the actors - who must be made responsible for issues - than the actual environmental issues "E" themselves. In contrast to Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace's is more of an "actor" discourse.

Graph g.a shows that Greenpeace, like Friends of the Earth, has a peak of resonance at the week commencing 13th August. However, this peak resonance appears as a pulse of communication that is more exceptional to the general pattern than that of Friends of the Earth. This indicates that the Greenpeace discourse pattern is more volatile, changeable and instantaneously determined than Friends of the Earth's. It suggests that the Greenpeace discourse is determined more by its co-ordination with specific "news events", whether these are mobilised by the organisation itself or produced by the media's own agenda for news.

Whereas environmental issues "E" maintained a hierarchy of prominence over the government responsibility issues "G" for Friends of the Earth's discourse, the two elements are highly integrated in Greenpeace's. This is shown by the close proximity of the lines "E" and "G" from the 6th August onwards in **graph g.a**. The relative lack of differentiation between the elements "E" and "G" indicates that Greenpeace's mobilisations tend to "frame" environmental themes by referring to an equally prominent government responsibility context. This shows that targeting the government and industry actors with "blame" is a key element of the Greenpeace communication strategies. In other words, "blaming" is *business as usual* for Greenpeace.

The themes that are mobilised into the Greenpeace discourse by highly prominent environmental "E" and government responsibility issues "G" concern the following: global warming and climate change (Gpc F) where the environmental issues are prominent; and the risk of accidents at nuclear power stations due to an alleged lack of safety reviews by the Nuclear Industry and the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (Gpc D), where the government responsibility issues are more prominent. In addition to this, articles concerning the British nuclear industry's aim to trade in reprocessing spent reactor fuel from other countries (Gpc

"G" (**graph w.a**). This indicates that the discourse is dominated and *contextualised* by the issues relating to the activities of the organisation "A".

Two articles relate details of the organisation's activities that have received public criticism[16], one with a highest (WWF B) and one with relatively high prominence activity issues (WWF C). It is interesting to note that both of these articles occur in the specialist *Environment* feature section of the newspaper. After the "bad" publicity received from a critical television documentary, the organisation ensures a damage limitation of its public image, by entrusting the public scrutiny of its affairs to the specialist environmental journalist. This is itself a type of communication strategy. Rather than simply criticising the World Wide Fund for Nature's activities, the environmental journalist is able to relate them thematically to the environmental themes and government/industry responsibility contexts of which they are part.

It appears that the World Wide Fund for Nature used its contacts with the environmental journalist to ensure a constructive criticism of its activities, one that contextualises the organisation's activities with its 'special' problems and dilemmas and the possible future directions it may take. In this case the thematic link between the environment and government/industry responsibility context serves as a contextual background for elaborating the problems of the organisation and the choices it must make to reform its activities. The special conditions of the scandal "news event" produce a type of communication that is not present in either the Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace discourses. In this phase of the sample the communication strategies of the World Wide Fund for Nature are geared towards the "damage limitation" of its public image.

The third article (WWF A) occurred prior to those about the scandal. It appears in a media gossip section of the news and relates a joke about the World Wide Fund for Nature's annoyance with the media for referring to the panda as a "panda bear". Apparently the creature is a member of the racoon and not the bear family. Released two days prior to the scandal discourse, this serves as a timely reminder to the media and the public that the

---

[16] Central Television's "The Cook Report" criticised the organisation for bad management and lack of success in key campaigns using information from a critical internal report that was "leaked" by members of the organisation dissatisfied with the direction of its policies under the Director Charles de Haes. These policies included the acceptance of large sums of money from industrial, business and government organisations, and the investment of funds in multi-national companies engaged in logging in the Third World and with nuclear interests.

World Wide Fund for Nature's conservation campaigns are a vital and longstanding element of British culture. The organisation's famous flagship campaigns, "Save the Panda" and "Save the Elephant", come in for special criticism in the scandal discourse. This short communication is aimed at reminding the journalists and public alike of the organisation's longstanding commitment and beneficial activities for conservation issues. It should therefore also be seen as part of the World Wide Fund for Nature's image "damage limitation" communication strategy.

After its peak scandal "news event" resonance the World Wide Fund for Nature disappears from the media agenda (**graph w.a**). This shows that in contrast to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature enters and leaves the media agenda in relation to "news events" that are constructed by the reporting activities of journalists rather than by the actions of the organisation. However, on entering the media agenda the World Wide Fund for Nature is able to exert some influence over the way its activities are reported and in particular by providing specialist information to sympathetic journalists. This holds even when it is necessary that the organisation's activities are opened to public criticism.

As I stated earlier the World Wide Fund for Nature's fund-raising strategies target specialist wealthy business, industry and government sources rather than the general public. Subsequently the organisation has less need for permanent mass media attention than Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.[17] This may explain its absence from the media agenda after the scandal "event". It is plausible however, that the nature of the scandal dictated that the World Wide Fund for Nature should keep a low media profile whilst the consequences of the "bad" publicity were gauged, and its future policies, strategies and structure reformulated.

b) The "Prologue": themes 'speaking for themselves'

The "prologue" phase of the discourse on the White Paper is the three newsweeks from the 27th August until that commencing 10th September. During this period Friends of

[17] However "bad" media publicity may be extremely damaging, as industrial sponsors who have paid to use the logo and public image of the WWF are likely to disassociate themselves immediately from the organisation. On the role of environmental "image politics" and the relations between environmental organisations and industry in Italy, see Donati (1992).

the Earth and Greenpeace receive more coverage than the imminent White Paper. It constitutes a phase in the White Paper "news cycle" when the environmental organisations are more likely to mobilise claims that are intended to set the agenda for the reception of the policy document. This is the organisations' attempt to influence the criteria which journalists and the public, as well as opposition politicians, will use to evaluate the forthcoming White Paper.

b.i) Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace

The visual database shows that the "prologue" discourse covers nine *active references* to Friends of the Earth (FoE L to T inc.) and five to Greenpeace (Gpc H to L inc.).

Graph f.b shows that Friends of the Earth's "prologue" peak occurs during the first week, that commencing the 27th August. During this week there is a constant flow of articles which mobilise the differentiated hierarchical resonance pattern, that I have suggested is typical of Friends of the Earth's communication strategies. Environmental issues "E" are the most prominent, followed by government/industry responsibility issues "G", and then organisation's activity issues "A". The prominence of environmental themes in this sector of the "prologue" discourse is shown by the wide gap between the discourse elements "E" and "G" on the week commencing 27th August **(graph f.b)**.

This pattern indicates that Friends of the Earth's strategies for pre-setting the agenda on the White Paper focus on highlighting the *content* of specific environmental issues "E" by an intense period of communication. At this phase Friends of the Earth did not frame claims specifically in terms of government responsibility, it sufficed to let the environmental theme 'speak for itself' and inform the public and the media. In other words, the first week of the "prologue" constitutes an accentuated period of *business as usual communication* for Friends of the Earth.

The four articles in this week all mobilised environmental issues "E" of the highest text-prominence (FoE L M N O). The specific themes are: the misuse of pesticides in agriculture and resulting health risks (FoE L); the disposal of nuclear waste and the future of nuclear energy in Britain (FoE M); the protection of a 150 years old Chestnut tree in St Paul's as a part of London's heritage (FoE N); and the public health risks arising from the disposal of biologically produced hazards/viruses by a multi-national drug company (FoE O).

The titles of three of the articles indicate the mobilising tone of Friends of the Earth's "prologue" campaign agenda: *Pesticide firms want farm curbs* (FoE L); *Dramatic Rise in N-waste estimates* (FoE M); and *Vaccines buried at drug firm site* (FoE O). Each headline announces the environmental issue "E" in a claim "package" that gives an affirmation of the line taken by Friends of the Earth and expressed in the text. This ability to disturb the "balanced reporting" function of journalists and reproduce its own version of the story in the news headline may itself be seen as testimony to the communication skills and definitional power of Friends of the Earth.[18]

The fourth article is an example of a direct protest action by a Friends of the Earth local group (FoE N). The Friends of the Earth protest action involved people climbing into the branches of a 150 years old Chestnut tree to prevent it being cut down by order of a Court injunction. In contrast to the Greenpeace protest action mentioned above (Gpc A), the report of this action mobilises environmental issues "E" concerning the rights of nature and the value of heritage. It thus serves to raise an environmental theme based on aesthetic and moral claims, rather than discredit and "blame" guilty government and industry actors. This shows that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have different types of target communication in mind when they stage "news events". They have different direct approaches to the public in the "prologue" to the White Paper agenda. Friends of the Earth's "news event" was produced by the action initiative of a local group, whereas Greenpeace's was an organised, centrally controlled and strategic action.

For the newsweek commencing 3rd September, Friends of the Earth's discourse pattern is adjusted: although environmental issues "E" remain the most prominent, the organisation's activity issues "A" achieve a higher resonance than the government/industry responsibility issues (**graph f.b**). The *cause* of this shift in the discourse is an external factor, the recurrence of the WWF scandal "news event" (FoE P) (see **graph D.II**). The WWF scandal discourse is external to the "prologue" campaigning strategies of Friends of the Earth

---

[18] Van Dijk's (1985) (1991) discourse analysis emphasises the importance of the "headline" for producing meaning in the structure of the news. This seems a rather obvious point as the social function of a news headline is to "frame" the meaning of the text. However, van Dijk's linguistic based analysis claims that ideological bias of a news text occurs in a disruption of the balance of the "objective" reporting function of journalists. In this case it appears that Friends of the Earth have successfully mobilised their preferred ideological bias into the news headline. They have exerted a degree of definitional power over the journalistic practice and influenced the news representation of social events.

but raises a debate on the ethics of environmental organisations' investment policies.[19] During the same week Friends of the Earth makes a statement that is highly critical of the Government's sanctioning of a pressurised water nuclear reactor, Hinkley C (FoE Q). This gives a first shift within the "prologue" discourse towards a more policy oriented type of "framing" for Friends of the Earth's claims.

The trend towards a more integrated discourse pattern is maintained in the last week of the Friends of the Earth "prologue" discourse. The **graph f.b** shows that the discourse elements become less hierarchically differentiated and that environmental issues "E" and government responsibility issues "G" become integrated at an equally high level of resonance. In other words, the government responsibility issues "G" become a more prominent element in the discourse. Also the role of Friends of the Earth as an "actor" in the news discourse is enhanced which is shown by the relatively high resonance of activity issues "A". This indicates that there is a clear shift in Friends of the Earth's mobilisation strategies within the "prologue" phase. The environmental themes are no longer allowed to 'speak for themselves' but are neatly "framed" in a policy context. Their relevance to the imminent White Paper may not be easily overlooked by journalists, the public and politicians.

By the late "prologue", Friends of the Earth's communication strategies have changed towards targeting specific environmental policy contexts. Direct pressure is placed on the Government policy-makers to give more attention to the organisation's claims. In *Labour bids for green ground* (FoE R), Friends of the Earth holds discussions with the Labour Opposition Leader, Neil Kinnock, over the Labour Party's production of an alternative policy document to the White Paper. This is followed the next day by a direct attack on the Government's privatisation policy for the electricity industry and the environmental problems that may result from such a deregulation (FoE S). Both of these articles produce a resonance in which the government responsibility issues "G" are more prominent than the environmental issues "E". In addition they are targeted towards specialist audiences of decision-makers: the former appearing in *The Guardian's* Political Section and the latter in the City News section. This shows that Friends of the Earth maintains a *flexibility* in its communication strategies

[19] The WWF scandal raised a news discourse highlighting the activities of the different organisations and sectors of the environmental movement. This of course has the effect of raising the discourse element relating to the activities of an organisation "A", above its 'normal' prominence relative to "E" and "G" within the text structure.

whereby it may target specific 'influential' audiences at opportune times rather than simply mobilising information with the aim of making it resonate with the general public. It is also worth noting that the organisation's "blaming" of the Government remains thematically and contextually constructive, rather than simply appealing to the anti-government sentiments within elements of British popular culture.

In the article on electricity privatisation Friends of the Earth take a direct and 'controversial' stance against the Government. This illustrates that the organisation is prepared to use explicit "blaming" tactics in opportune and strategically favourable circumstances. They nonetheless combine such direct communication tactics with less confrontational ones. Indeed the final article in the "prologue" phase discusses the possibility of ecologically balanced farming practices as an alternative to the use of pesticides (FoE T). This debate is outside the context of current political affairs. The article *Night plough cuts weeds Hoe of darkness* (FoE T) informs and popularises the idea of a 'solution' to the problem of pesticide use in farming, but at the same time the policy "frame" is conspicuously absent. It may be that Friends of the Earth is concerned that the immediate relevance of proposals for regulatory policy measures is not allowed to obscure the *longer term* aspects of the problem of pesticide use in the public mind. Indeed the survival of the organisation is dependent on the public's ability to conceptualise environmental problems as long term issues. This may explain why the organisation's activity issues "A" achieve a relatively high prominence for long term "framings" of environmental themes (FoE T).[20] These mobilisations serve to associate Friends of the Earth's actions with the *long term* future of the environment. By mobilising campaign themes as long term affairs Friends of the Earth are in part attempting to secure their own survival as legitimate actors in the environmental discourse in the future. Friends of the Earth cannot allow the public to think that short term "policy solutions" are "real solutions" despite the dominance of the imminent White Paper over their current mobilisations. In this instance Friends of the Earth are attempting to mobilise a public with long term environmental concerns.

In the "prologue" phase Friends of the Earth's communication strategies exhibit a

---

[20] The graphic model shows that the article (FoE T) combines highest prominence environmental issues "E" with relatively high prominence issues relating to the organisations activities "A" and relatively low prominence government responsibility issues "G". This combination indicates that the text focusses on the the environmental theme and the organisation's actions rather than the responsibilities of Government and Industry actors.

pragmatic flexibility in the selection of themes, target audiences and strategic timing of mobilisations. This is reflected by the *content* of their claims which is "formatted" in the news text in relation to specific reported "events". The organisation combines more than one type of strategy from its communication repertoire at a time. This indicates that a different combination of aims constitute the competing factors which produce the *content* and "timing" of their mobilisations, which serve as indicators for their communication strategies.

In contrast to Friends of the Earth which "peaks" in the first week of the "prologue" phase, Greenpeace does not achieve any coverage in the week commencing 27th August (**graph g.b**). This indicates the different timing strategies of the two organisations. Instead Greenpeace's "prologue" peak occurs one week later, on the newsweek 3rd September. Here Greenpeace's discourse pattern exhibits an hierarchical differentiation of high resonance environmental issues "E" from the government responsibility issues "G", a pattern that I have suggested is more characteristic of Friends of the Earth than Greenpeace. It is probable that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace worked together and deliberately orchestrated their peak mobilisations of environmental claims in this phase to occur in successive weeks. Avoiding competition for coverage would be beneficial to the aims of both organisations at this phase of the "prologue" discourse. They can both have their campaign issues 'aired' without competing for the limited news space allocated per week to environmental issues.[21]

I noted earlier that when Friends of the Earth allow the environmental issue elements "E" to 'speak for themselves' they do so across a set of themes designed to pre-set the national agenda for the White Paper, namely: use of pesticides; nuclear waste processing; the risks of biological engineering (FoE L M O). In contrast to this approach, Greenpeace's highly resonant environmental issues "E" concern a supra-national theme: the severe side-effects suffered by the Polynesian peoples due to the radio-active contamination of the Pacific Islands which has resulted from nuclear testing. *Fears for a sea of caesium* (Gpc I) and *Testimonies from the atoll* (Gpc J) appear as feature articles rather than news items. These articles confirm that Greenpeace's criteria for mobilising environmental claims are less determined at this stage by imminent national policy events than Friends of the Earth.

In addition the articles show that when Greenpeace let environmental themes 'speak for themselves', they do so by invoking a universal sense of injustice rather than identifying

---

[21] On the competition for news space by actors in the agenda-setting and agenda-building process, see Hilgartner and Bosk (1988).

specific national problems. The identification with the sufferings of the Polynesian people combines romanticism with a universal sense of injustice. It serves to mobilise the Greenpeace "public image" that is based on the promotion of an ideology which advocates an indignant and mystically based sense of injustice in the world.[22] This suggests that Greenpeace mobilise the theme of nuclear testing in such a format to remind the public that the moral high ground in the environmental discourse belongs to the Greenpeace ideals. The public and journalists need to know that Greenpeace serves the universal good of mankind. The campaign is designed to pre-set the agenda for Greenpeace to be defined as the "goodies" when they may be drawn into direct "controversies" with government and industry. When Greenpeace are not "blaming" specific actors, they are informing people so that they know how to react when they do "blame".

This example of the mobilisation of environmental issues "E" indicates another dimension of the Greenpeace public communication strategy. Greenpeace environmental themes draw on an romantic appeal to the exotic, which has achieved a resonance in contemporary culture due to the popularisation of the ideas of deep ecology.[23] This indciates that Greenpeace elaborates environmental issues "E" by working with contemporary public meanings and popularised elements of environmental counter-culture rather than public policy-related or practical logics.

A further point of note from **graph g.b** is that Greenpeace's working procedure issues "W" are more resonant than government responsibility issues "G" during the newsweek of the 3rd September. In addition to the lower government responsibility resonance resulting from the emphasis on exotic environments and de-emphasis of explicit "blaming" strategies, this trend is produced by the influence of the WWF scandal (Gpc H), which re-emerges on the week commencing 3rd September. In the scandal discourse the financial actions of Greenpeace are compared favourably to the World Wide Fund for Nature's. The WWF scandal "news event" has a similar effect to that which it had on Friends of the Earth's

---

[22] In North American Indian mythology "Greenpeace" is the name of a tribe that returns to restore a world despoiled by man, hence "Rainbow Warriors" etc.. For a discussion of Greenpeace myths, see Pearce (1991).

[23] On the "dreams of deep ecology" see Devall and Sessions (1985), Luke (1988). The popularization of the ideas of deep ecology has been a significant development in contemporary British culture. No longer reserved for the sect, the dreams of deep ecology are available and marketable to all: witness James Lovelock's (1979; 1989) *Gaia hypothesis* on the supermarket bookshelves and for that matter anything on the counters of the Bodyshop Ltd.

"prologue" discourse, it raises a discourse on the legitimacy and ethics of environmental organisations' practical activities. This raises the organisation's activity issues "A" in the discourse of both organisations for the week commencing 3rd September (compare **graphs f.b** and **g.b**). Unlike Friends of the Earth, however, Greenpeace engages explicitly in criticising the activities of the World Wide Fund for Nature. Not only does this highlight Greenpeace's orientation towards actor "blaming" strategies, but indicates that the organisation is prepared to turn these onto organisations in other sectors of the environmental movement.

This example illustrates that Greenpeace have a high degree of autonomy from other organisations in the environmental movement, and that in favourable circumstances they are prepared to criticise the activities of other environmental organisations as a means for reinforcing the legitimacy of their own actions in the public sphere. It shows that Greenpeace see the arena of public communication as a competitive environment for "image" marketing. At the same time the example indicates that the news agenda serves as a medium for organisations to mobilise claims that regulate the internal agenda of the environmental movement. Greenpeace use public communication to ethically regulate the activities of other environmental organisations. As Tom Burke from the Green Alliance relates:

> "Greenpeace doing it their way .. keep us all honest."[24]

During the final week of the "prologue" Greenpeace's discourse pattern is similar to that of Friends of the Earth (**graphs f.b** and **g.b**). The environmental issues "E" and the government responsibility issues "G" achieve the same high level of resonance whereas the activity issues "A" are a *subtext* of these. This marks a return to "blaming" tactics for Greenpeace. Like Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace's late "prologue" discourse "frames" environmental claims in a way that is directly pertinent to the imminent policy event. Greenpeace takes the unusual step - for them - of publicly joining Friends of the Earth to meet the Opposition leader and discuss the forthcoming Labour Party environmental policy document (Gpc K). For Greenpeace this 'exceptional' venture into the conventional party

---

[24] Interview for *EUI Project No. 42*, 5/12/90. This interview was undertaken by Bron Szersynski in 1990 as was that with Chris Rose (see later). They are used as a source of data with the permission of the project Director Klaus Eder.

politics arena is a strategic attempt to de-legitimise the Government's policy consultation process, and in particular its public liaison with interest groups. The joint action makes it clear that both Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth consider their consultations with the Government policy-makers to have been fruitless and that they wish their distance from the Government's position to be made public.

Whereas Friends of the Earth chooses to attack the Government on the privatisation and deregulation of the electricity industry (FoE S), Greenpeace criticises the Government's record of not complying with the European Community bathing water directives (Gpc L). *Virus risk to blue flag bathers* describes the risks to public health of bathing at one of the supposedly 'clean' blue flag beaches. It compares the British Government's record for implementing EC directives on dumping raw sewage and on beach cleanliness unfavourably with the rest of Europe.[25]

These two campaign themes, electricity privatisation and sea pollution, are selected by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace for the last week of the "prologue" discourse. They constitute a specific type of thematic "blaming". Both issues are "framed" to define a concept of "public interest" that is critical of the Government's policies. The public may relate their first hand "sea-side" experiences to the possible risks of gastroenteritis, meningitis and hepatitis: their health has been put at risk unknown to them - the Government is to blame. Similarly, the privatisation of the electricity industry followed in the long line of profitable state industries that the Government "sold" cheaply to private investors; the public 'experienced' this first hand.[26] Now the Government is to blame for displacing the public control over the regulation of the detrimental environmental effects of these industries into private hands.

Both of these themes deal with publicly known 'events', but reveal previously unknown side-effects for which the Government policies are to be held accountable. They serve to make the Government publicly accountable. This shows that at the end of the

---

[25] Both Friends of the Earth's and Greenpeace's environmental claims are a prompt for their communications in the 'Dirty Man of Europe v. White Paper' event (see below).

[26] Indeed a series of popular television advertisements had invited the 'ordinary' members of the public to become first time investors and shareholders. The infamous "tell Sid.." commercials popularised the sale of British Gas, whereas for the electricity industry the slogan became "tell Frank..". These advertisements made the de-regulation of profitable national industries a "public event" where the small first-time investor could make a quick "no risk" profit. Even those who remained opposed to or unaware of privatisation were subsequently made aware of its consequences by the sharp rise in the costs of public utilities.

"prologue" phase the Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace "blaming" strategies take a stance that retains an oppositional but thematically constructive orientation within the environmental policy agenda. Nonetheless, both organisations are highly critical of the Government and their mobilisations aim to engage the "first hand" interests and experiences of the reading public into a direct involvement with the environmental policy discourse. Bearing in mind the strong relations between Government offices and journalists and the importance of Government sources for the news[27], this ranks as a considerable mobilisation achievement prior to the start of the White Paper "news event" discourse.

A final point worth noting is that the **graphs f.b** and **g.b** illustrate that the quantitative resonance and discourse coverage of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace rises and falls at different weeks during the prologue phase. This may in part be attributed to differences in the two organisations' responses to environmental "news events" such as the WWF scandal. However, it is more likely to be an indication that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace are co-ordinating their communication strategies on either an informal or formal basis, so that they do not compete for the limited space available for environmental news in the crucial phase running up to the main "event".

b.ii) World Wide Fund for Nature

The visual database shows that the "prologue" discourse covers ten *active references* to the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF D to M inc.). This makes the "prologue" the most resonant phase in the sample for the World Wide Fund for Nature.

Graph w.b shows that on the first week of the "prologue", commencing the 27th August, the World Wide Fund for Nature does not receive any coverage. This represents a continuation of the trend from the phase prior to the "news cycle". Earlier I suggested that this lack of resonance was due to a combination of two factors: firstly, the World Wide Fund for Nature tend to enter the media discourse only in relation to specific "news events"; and secondly, the organisation are keeping a low media profile after receiving "bad" publicity from the scandal "news event" relating to their own financial activities and policies (see above **a.ii)**).

---

[27] On this see e.g. Hall et al. (1978), Kiebolwiecz and Scherer (1986), Einseidel (1993).

In stark contrast **graph w.b** shows that on the following newsweek, commencing the 3rd September, the World Wide Fund for Nature achieves its peak resonance, not only for the "prologue" phase but for the whole sample period. Indeed the organisation receives more coverage than the combined totals of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. What factors are responsible for this exceptionally high resonance?

On the week commencing 3rd September, the World Wide Fund for Nature scandal "news event" re-emerged and peaked.[28] Indeed six of the seven articles referring to the World Wide Fund for Nature on this week cover the scandal "news event" (WWF D E F G H I). This shows once more that the media coverage of the World Wide Fund for Nature is more tied to the reporting of specific "news events" than that of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. In the mainstream news the World Wide Fund for Nature tends to be a news item rather than a news-maker, and when the organisation does act as a *source*, this tends to be in relation to specific "news events".

In the phase prior to the "news cycle", the WWF scandal was covered in the specialist *Environment* section of the newspaper. It appeared on the media agenda as item of interest for environmental readerships; as news it was formatted as a matter of internal concern for the environmental movement (section a)). The scandal remained within the confines of the *specialist* environmental news discourse. By contrast, on its second peak commencing 4th September, the WWF scandal becomes a headline "news event" for mainstream news. At its re-emergence on the agenda the scandal became a mainstream public issue rather than an issue of specialist environmental concern. For what reasons do the World Wide Fund for Nature enter the main media agenda, and how does this unusual situation affect their discourse pattern, communication strategies and media representation?

Graph w.b shows that this high peak of resonance has a similar discourse pattern to that when the scandal occurred in the earlier phase. For both peaks of the scandal "news event" the issues relating to the organisation's activities "A" are the most prominent discourse element, followed by the environmental issues "E", whilst the least resonant element is the government responsibility issues "G" (**graph w.b**). This illustrates that when an environmental organisation is subject to public "blame", the government/industry responsibility context is relegated to a *subtext* of the discourse. Not surprisingly the

[28] Refer to **graph D.II** on article references and environmental "news events" (**introduction** to this section).

contextualising theme of the discourse concerns the organisation's activities.

On the 4th September 1990, the WWF scandal hit the news. Four articles appear on the "news event" including the front page headline article, *WWF paid for helicopter used to kill poachers* (WWF F), and the main editorial leader, *Leading article: Blood and the rhino* (WWF D). To appear in such high profile news structures constitutes an exceptional resonance even for the media oriented organisations Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, and is highly exceptional for a conservation organisation like the World Wide Fund for Nature.[29]

The titles of the headline and leading articles indicate that when the WWF scandal emerges as a major mainstream "news event", it appears as an ethical theme concerning the organisation's conservation activities, and more specifically, its sponsorship of African Governments that operate a shoot-to-kill policy for poachers in their National Parks. The "event" is *headline news* because the 'public interest' has been damaged. Or at least the public intentions and "good will" indicated by individual donations to the organisation have been seriously misled. For the public discourse it becomes a "scandal" that donations to a charitable organisation have been used to pursue conservation policies that seemingly value the conservation of rare species more than the taking of human life. In this example, an ethical theme - concerning the value of human life - achieves media attention without being intentionally mobilised by an organisation. Instead the organisation's actions themselves fulfil criteria of "news value" for a different reason: they are ethically contentious and constitute a public scandal. This enables the journalists to make the World Wide Fund for Nature into a *headline news* story.[30]

In addition to the front page article and editorial leader (WWF F D), the WWF scandal is also covered in two mainstream *Home news* articles on the 4th September. *Gun law rules in battle to save rhinos and elephants* (WWF G) continues to reveal further "events" from the scandal on the front page. By contrast, *Swiss headquarters financed*

---

[29] On the significance of linguistic structures in the news and the prominence of headlines that are produced by journalistic practices, see van Dijk (1985) (1991).

[30] It is worth noting that both Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace use a notion of the 'public interest' in their "blaming" strategies v. the Government. They "frame" existing Government actions and policies so that they are seen to be against the 'public interest' (see b.i) above). In this case the 'public interest' is the notion that is used by journalists for criticising the activities of the World Wide Fund for Nature. This shows that defining the 'public interest' is an important element for mobilising "blaming" strategies against other actors in the public discourse.

through stocks and bonds of companies in rain forest logging, nuclear weapons and pesticides Investments tarnish green image of WWF (WWF E), opens the scandal "events" into a broader discourse on the ethical context of the World Wide Fund for Nature's financial and conservation policies. The focus for public debate is whether the organisation's activities are ethical. Journalists raise questions concerning the ethical criteria for the activities of environmental organisations. In this instance the public discourse assumes a role for regulating the ethical boundaries of environmental organisations' activities. This shows that although organisations act specifically to define the legitimate ethical boundaries for sound environmental practices, their own activities are subject to the same process of legitimation in the public discourse. The example illustrates that when used as a strategic resource, public communication is a weapon that may possess a 'double-edged' blade.[31]

It is significant that the WWF scandal was launched in the daily newspaper with the strongest tradition for quality reporting on the environment in Britain, namely *The Guardian* (Lowe and Morrison 1984) (Elkington, Burke et al. 1988) (Statham 1993). I noted earlier that in contrast to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature has a specialist public among the wealthy, rich and influential. The "bad" publicity of a scandal might potentially destroy the interest-basis of such a public. The media reporting and processing of the issues relating to the scandal "events" is of vital importance for the World Wide Fund for Nature. It appears that *The Guardian* treats the scandal in a way that will cause minimum rather than maximum damage to the organisation's credibility. This suggests that the World Wide Fund for Nature have favourable working relations with the quality press.

The September 4th front page article (WWF F) plus the article extending the scope of the scandal into an ethical question about the ethics of the World Wide Fund for Nature's investment policies (WWF E) are both written by Paul Brown, *The Guardian*'s Environment correspondent. Brown also covered the first scandal which was confined to the *Environment*

---

[31] Like their targeted opponents the government and industry actors, the environmental organisations have the ethical boundaries of their activities subject to regulation by the public discourse. Despite the enhanced *autonomy* for the environmental organisations to communicate relative to other public actors, that has occurred due to their role as knowledge *specialists* in a field that has recently become a "topical" fixture on the media agenda, their communicative actions are still subject to the constraints as well as the freedoms of public discourse. This shows that the environmental organisations' claims do not have a monopoly over environmental truths in the public discourse. There is more than one version of environmental truth seeking cultural legitimation.

section (a.ii) above). In both cases the criticisms of the World Wide Fund for Nature's activities are embedded in an elaborate description of the problems faced by conservationists operating in Third World countries. Indeed the articles contain detailed information from internal reports on the organisation's activities that has been "leaked" to *The Guardian*. In addition a selection of self-critical quotes from activists within the organisation are included in the reports. This indicates that the organisations are also supplying information for the scandal from within.

On the next day September 5th, a further two articles appear on the WWF scandal in the *Home news* section (WWF H I). In one Paul Brown is again the named reporter (WWF H). Whereas on the previous day he extends the scandal concerning the organisation's ethical stance in specific conservation policies to a discourse on its financial activities and internal problems (WWF E F), today Brown reports that World Wide Fund for Nature has decided to sell its share portfolios in multi-national companies and re-invest in companies that meet the guidelines to be set out by a new ethical committee in the organisation. After exposing and opinion-leading on the scandal "news event", Paul Brown now breaks the news of the organisation's ethical re-formation. With Brown's compliance, *Controversy forces rethink on Fund's investment policy. 'Unethical' firms to be dropped by WWF* (WWF H) serves as a vehicle for reconstructing the organisation's image. This time the "news event" is that the organisation is making its practices comply with environmental ethics, the World Wide Fund for Nature is re-legitimising its activities.[32] After the "bad" publicity on Tuesday, the "good" publicity returns on Wednesday. The journalist's "blaming" strategies relent, but must first explain the deviance in the World Wide Fund for Nature's scandalous behaviour. Who was responsible for making the organisation's activities unethical? What was the *cause*? The answer to these questions comes in the other article on the same day (WWF I).

Tough-talking campaigner in the wildlife fund hot seat. Wednesday People (WWF I), profiles Charles de Haes the director general of the World Wide Fund for Nature. De Haes is presented as the man responsible for transforming the World Wide Fund for Nature from

---

[32] By other critieria even the World Wide Fund for Nature's reformed investment practices might be considered *unethical* because they involve working within the system of international finance capital. The global system of finance capitalism is defined by more idealist environmentalists as the *cause* of global environmental problems and in particular those of underdeveloped nations. Clearly the World Wide Fund for Nature work by a more pragmatic definition for the ethical basis of their environmental practices.

an organisation with an annual income of less than two million to one of more than a hundred million pounds sterling per annum. Nonetheless, the article is unsympathetic to these achievements, and de Haes is blamed for pursuing single-minded policies that have split the organisation and resulted in the public scandals concerning its activities. In short, de Haes is "blamed" personally for the scandals. The article concludes:

> "De Haes worked for the Rothmans cigarette group of South African industrialist Anton Rupert, a backer and trustee of the WWF, before taking the top staff job at the fund, initially on a secondment from Rothmans. Some colleagues say that Mr de Haes may still feel more at home in the world of money than in the world of idealism." (WWF I)

In the first sentence de Haes' personal qualities are placed in doubt by his association with two elements that have a unethical stigma attached to them in British culture: smoking and South African business. The second sentence not only "blames" de Haes for placing priority on the World Wide Fund for Nature's financial rather than ethical stance, but also indicates that the re-emergence of the WWF "news event" was initiated by a faction within the organisation who opposed the policies that were being pursued under de Haes' directorship. In this sense the WWF scandal is staged as a "news event" from within the organisation. A faction of the organisation worked in co-operation with a leading environmental journalist by "leaking" confidential information and providing quotes that were critical of the organisation's recent activities.[33] This set the agenda for a reception of the news scandal that would not
do the World Wide Fund for Nature permanent damage, whilst giving a front page exclusive to *The Guardian*'s environmental correspondent.

In this instance the public discourse was used by a faction within an environmental organisation for regulating the boundaries of the contentious ethical issues of its own

---

[33] The graphic model shows that of the six articles covering the WWF scandal for the newsweek commencing 3rd September (WWF D E F G H I), all six reported information i produced by the organisation, five included citations *s* from WWF members, three were "news events" staged $ by the organisation - i.e. the faction opposed to the leadership, and the organisation was the stated source *s* in two (see preliminary content analysis for environmental mobilisation indicators in **B.6** above). This indicates that the organisation was not a passive observer but on the contrary a highly active in producing the news which reported its own scandal.

activities. An internal conflict over the competing interests of fund-raising and campaign strategies appears in the mass media discourse. The dissatisfied campaign activists are utilising their contacts and resources for media communication in order to settle an internal dispute. In effect the WWF scandal "news event" is mobilised from within the organisation itself. By using this strategy public criticism of the organisation's activities could not only be limited, but controlled and directed against the financial priorities of the current leadership.[34] The seventh article in this exceptional week of coverage for the World Wide Fund for Nature occurs on the 7th September. *Foreign Fields. Jan Rocha in Corumba Brazil* (WWF J), is feature article that describes the difficult plight of the Brazilian Forest police who attempt to prevent the poaching of caiman in the Panatal, one of South America's ecological sanctuaries. The World Wide Fund for Nature's reported activities are twofold: firstly, financing research for estimating the current caiman population and evaluating the importance of the species in the food chain of the area; and secondly, attempting to set guidelines for hunting, commercialisation and conservation, in association with CITES, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora. This combines themes relating the the case for ecology and preservation with supra-national policy interests. However, the organisation's own activities "A" appear only as a *subtext* to the prominent issues of conservation and species preservation "E" and the responsibilities of indigenous and foreign Governments for restricting illegal trade "G". The organisation maintains a low profile within the narrative structure of the text.[35] This article signifies a *business as usual* communication in the news agenda for the World Wide Fund for Nature. After the over-exposure of the World Wide Fund for Nature's dubious activities during the scandals, the article serves to re-legitimise the organisation's conservation strategies and highlight the special problems that are faced in pursuing conservation projects in Third World

---

[34] The internal resolution to the problem, namely the establishment of an ethical committee to decide on policies and the withdrawal of funds from multi-nationals, obviously took place prior to releasing the scandal "news event" as front page news to *The Guardian*. This "outcome" was probably settled in the aftermath of the first WWF scandal that occurred due to the investigative journalism of a television documentary programme (without a special environmental brief). Clearly, the "exclusive" information was released to a trusted and reputable environmental journalist to ensure that de Haes' directorship rather than the organisation itself took the brunt of the public criticism and de-legitimation.

[35] The visual database indicates that the article WWF J has a high prominence environmental issues "E" and government/industry responsibility issues "G", but that those concerning the organisations activities "A" achieve only a relatively low prominence.

nations.[36]

On the newsweek commencing 10th September, after the peak of the scandal "event", three articles cover the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF K L M). The **graph w.b** shows that from being the *context* of the World Wide Fund for Nature's discourse during the scandal peak, the issues concerning the organisation's activities "A" become the *subtext*, whilst the prominence of environmental issues "E" over government responsibility issues "G" is maintained. This shows the there is a shift in emphasis in the World Wide Fund for Nature's discourse pattern during the last week of the "prologue". The issues relating to the organisation's activities now take on a low profile.[37]

I have suggested that the World Wide Fund for Nature enter the media agenda in relation to specific "news events". What changing conditions in the media agenda produce this transition in the World Wide Fund for Nature's discourse, whereby for the week commencing 10th September, environmental issues "E" are the most prominent element in the World Wide Fund for Nature's discourse pattern, followed by government responsibility issues "G", and finally "A" issues relating the organisation's activities are a *subtext*?

The low resonance of issues concerning the organisation's activities is produced by the 'normalisation' of the World Wide Fund for Nature's discourse after the exceptional scandal "news event". This 'normalisation' process not only means a continuation of the *business as usual* discourse like the article on the preservation of the caiman (WWF J), but includes a reconstruction of the World Wide Fund for Nature's public image and a re-legitimation of the conservation strategies which it promotes. For example *Investors beware your money may not be going where you think* (WWF L), appears in the *City news* section and covers the ethical reconstruction of the organisation's financial investment policy as the *subtext* for describing the current options that are available to the 'ethical investor'. Considering the World Wide Fund for Nature's dependence on individual contributions from

---

[36] The campaign activities of the World Wide Fund for Nature for international conservation is well documented. For example, see the case study on the ivory trade ban by Princen (1994).

[37] This transition in the World Wide Fund for Nature discourse pattern is also visible in the graphic model. From the text (WWF J) onwards there is a marked drop in the prominence of the discourse element "W" which refers to the organisation's activities. For the discourse element which refers to the government responsibility issues "G", the reverse is holds: they become more prominent in texts after (WWF J). In contrast the environmental issues "E" maintain a constant and prominent resonance over the sample. This indicates that after the scandals the government and industry actors tend to replace the those of the organisation as the "blamed" actors, whereas the environmental issues are a stable element regardless of which actor is held responsible.

the wealthy, this article is significant in that it tells a specialist public that the organisation is once more an ethically legitimate conservation actor.

A further article *Eco Soundings. Marco solo* (WWF K), performs the same purpose for the World Wide Fund for Nature but with its general environmental public. It appears in the 'environmental gossip' section and describes how *The Guardian* have scorned approaches from the Italian Federation of Hunting who wanted to pay for information that could be used to damage the image of the World Wide Fund for Nature in Italy. The message is clear, whatever its recent problems the World Wide Fund for Nature is still a more legitimate actor than the Italian Federation of Hunting and has the support of *The Guardian*. Indeed both of these articles (WWF K L) confirm that the World Wide Fund for Nature has contacts with journalists in the quality press who are well disposed to giving the organisation favourable coverage.

Earlier I showed that during the late "prologue" phase Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace pursue "blaming" strategies that are oppositional but thematically constructive towards the Government policy agenda (**b.i**) above). The final article in the World Wide Fund for Nature's "prologue" *Roads endanger ancient forests* (WWF M), also comes into this category. It describes a report to be published jointly by the World Wide Fund for Nature and the Royal Society for Nature Conservation which criticises the threat to 1500 wildlife sites by the British Government's road building programme.[38] This is the first article which is oriented towards setting the agenda for the White Paper "news event". It is the first occasion that the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilise a national conservation issue, and like Friends of the Earth's and Greenpeace's articles it is critical of the Government within a policy context. This example also shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature stages "events" for the media by releasing information directly to journalists rather than using strategies of direct action like Greenpeace, and to a lesser extent Friends of the Earth.

The World Wide Fund for Nature's "prologue" phase shows that even in times of adverse publicity, environmental organisations pursue strategies that enable them to influence the coverage of their activities on the media agenda. In this case the World Wide Fund for Nature's communication strategies were limited to setting the media agenda for their own

---

[38] The WWF's entrance into national conservation disputes is a recent feature of its development (Szersynski, Miles et al. 1995).

public scandal. In fact I have shown that the World Wide Fund for Nature were able to exert considerable "definitional power" in the scandal discourse and co-operated with journalists to set the agenda for re-legitimising the organisation's public image. Indeed the journalist's sympathetic coverage of the World Wide Fund for Nature during the scandals indicates that the organisation has established contacts with specific journalists rather than seeking general access to the media agenda like Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.

By using their special contacts with an environmental journalist the World Wide Fund for Nature was able to ensure an informed, reasoned and sympathetic coverage of the problems and internal disputes within the organisation. Indeed the public discourse was used as a self-cleansing process by the organisation. The environmental issues constituting conservation themes were themselves kept above public criticism. Not only did the scandal "event" serve for "blaming" the organisation, but also to raise a discourse on the problems of preserving rare exotic species - black rhino and elephant - in underdeveloped countries. The special difficulties for conservation projects in Third World nations were used by journalists as an explanation for the ethical blunders of the World Wide Fund for Nature. Indeed graph w.b shows that the environmental issues "E" achieve a high resonance at the peak of the scandal. In this sense the World Wide Fund for Nature's primary environmental themes were even made to 'speak for themselves' through the scandal during the "prologue" phase. The World Wide Fund for Nature's campaign themes were in this sense promoted by its own scandal. No article questions the validity of supra-national conservation projects *per se*.

The environmental problems on which the World Wide Fund for Nature campaign require little validation in the public discourse relative to those of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Similarly, journalists require less convincing, either by scientific information or otherwise, about the legitimacy of moral claims for the preservation of species and habitat. The *content* of the World Wide Fund for Nature's environmental issues is less contentious than that of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Subsequently, the World Wide Fund for Nature's key campaigns may achieve access to specialist enclaves of the environmental media without the need for the organisation to overtly stage "news events". This is one reason why the World Wide Fund for Nature enters and leaves the media agenda in relation to the timing of specific environmental "news events".

Towards the end of the "prologue" phase the World Wide Fund for Nature recovered

sufficiently from the scandal to start mobilising environmental themes for the forthcoming White Paper "news event". At this time the *content* of its mobilisations shifted from a supra-national to a domestic orientation: conserving the national countryside rather than preserving rare species in exotic habitats becomes the new focus. Like Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the *content* of the organisation's discourse becomes critical of the British Government's current environmental record within a national policy context. The mobilisation of national conservation themes was most likely co-ordinated, either formally or informally, with those by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace on other aspects of the environmental policy agenda. This example provides further evidence that there is a thematic *division of communicative labour* among the major environmental organisations, at least in relation to special "news events" on the environmental agenda.

c) The "News Event": blaming the Government

Graph D.II shows that the peak resonance of media attention for the White Paper "event" occurs in the three weeks commencing the 17th September (**section introduction D.1**). For each of these three weeks there are more articles on the White Paper than the combined total number of articles referring to the two media-oriented organisations Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace.[39] This phase is the "news event" peak of the White Paper "news cycle". The Government's policy document *This Common Inheritance* was published and launched at a press conference on 25th September, 1990.

The "news event" phase of the "news cycle" presents the opportunity for environmental organisations to perform as legitimators or de-legitimators for the policy proposals put forward by the Government. Indeed it is a special period of environmental discourse because the journalists and editors will actively seek the opinions of the organisations to evaluate the substantive contents of the Government's policy proposals. This means that the media agenda will be unusually accessible to communications by the environmental organisations, without the organisations necessarily having to expend all their

[39] The total for articles on the White Paper includes those that do not refer to any environmental organisations. The White Paper sample was collected using *CD-Rom* facilities and the titles, dates and news section of these articles are given in an **appendix** after the visual databases (section **B**). It is worth noting that they are concentrated within the "news event" phase. This indicates the short attention span for "events" on the main news agenda, immediate "events" being the substance of news.

energies on media agenda-setting activities and inventing "news events". It is normal media practice for journalists to seek the opinions of interested parties when a political "event" occurs, and particularly an "event" for which they may lack specialist knowledge resources.[40]

The White Paper "news event" covers the emergent public policy agenda on the environment in Britain and dominates this phase of the news sample. As a "news event" it lasts three weeks. In order to retain a sense of chronology within the large number of articles in this phase, I divide the sample coverage into three sub-phases: 1. Prelude: the week before; 2. News event: The White Paper v. "the Dirty Man of Europe"; 3. Postscript: the week after. Each of these sub-phases covers a newsweek.

c.i) Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace

The visual database shows that the "news event" discourse covers twelve *active references* to Friends of the Earth (FoE U to f inc.) and seven to Greenpeace (Gpc M to S inc.). **Graphs f.c** and **g.c** show that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have similar patterns of discourse mobilisation during the "news event" phase. Their discourse patterns are characterised by a trough of coverage on the week prior to the actual "event", a highest peak coverage for the week of the 25th September, followed by a further trough of coverage for the newsweek after the "event" which is even lower than that preceding it.

c.i.1) Prelude: the week before

The troughs of coverage on the week commencing 17th September (**graphs f.c** and **g.c**), indicates a strategy by both organisations for leaving the Government uncertain as to what form their (de-)legitimising tactics might take during the White Paper's press release. In other words, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace are playing a "waiting game" with the

---

[40] In fact *The Guardian* did have a weekly Environment Section at this time and has traditionally provided a higher quality and quantity of specialist and general environmental coverage than other daily British newspapers (Lowe and Morrison 1984) (Statham 1993; 1994a; 1994b). Nonetheless environmental journalists were a recent phenomenon, most newspapers in Britain establishing the post c. 1988 (Anderson 1990, 1993). This factor combined with the "event" being the first systematic policy statement by a British Government meant that most journalists - and certainly all editors - relied on the organisations for specialist information and opinions.

Government, saving their mobilisation potential to achieve maximum impact during the following "news event" week. As the movement's media specialists, it is likely that this communication strategy was co-ordinated by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace and with the other environmental organisations.

On the week commencing 17th September, Friends of the Earth's discourse pattern has a total resonance level that is lower than that at any time during the "prologue" phase (graph **f.b**), which is indicative of the organisation's low key approach during the first week of the "news event". In this week Friends of the Earth refrain from "blaming" strategies that highlight current Government policies and instead mobilise one of their long running campaigns against the peat cutting industry (FoE V). Industry rather than Government actors are the "blamed" targets. The unusually high resonance of the organisations' activity issues "A" is not produced by the organisation staging an "event", but by an article reviewing the advertising tactics of charitable organisations' campaigns. Here Friends of the Earth's activities are a prominent theme because a journalist makes their public relations, campaigning and fund-raising strategies a focus for public attention (FoE U).[41]

Graph g.c shows that Greenpeace has a low total resonance in the prelude to the "news event": the organisation also takes a low key approach. However, in contrast to Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace takes a direct campaigning strategy even in this 'low profile' week. The organisation mobilises an article which takes a highly critical stance of the British Government's support for the international trade in industrial toxic waste. *Toxic waste imports boosted by illicit trade* (Gpc M) has the same format as the earlier nuclear re-processing (Gpc C G) and sea/beach health risks (Gpc L) articles, it makes a direct and critical comparison between the British Government's record of policy implementation and those of other European and Western states. This confirms that when entering the discourse on public policy, Greenpeace have a tendency for criticising national policies within an international context.[42] The "prologue" phase (**b.i**) above) showed that Friends of the Earth's policy-related communication strategies tend to work against the Government from within a national perspective. This example shows that in contrast Greenpeace continue their

---

[41] The discourse has a pattern that is unusual for Friends of the Earth whereby the activity issues "A" are the most prominent, followed by the environmental issues "E" and then the government responsibility issues "G" (**graph f.c**).

[42] See findings of section C above.

strategy from the late "prologue" phase, but on a lower key scale: they use explicit policy-related "blaming" strategies against the Government.

c.i.2) News Event: The White Paper versus "the Dirty Man of Europe"

c.i.2.1) newsweek: an overview

Both Friends of the Earth's and Greenpeace's discourse peak for the sample occurs at the week of the White Paper press release, commencing the 24th September (**graph D.II**). For this week Friends of the Earth has the following discourse pattern: government responsibility issues "G" are the most prominently mobilised, followed by the environmental issues "E" and the organisation's activity issues "A" which are equally resonant (**graph f.c**). Greenpeace's discourse pattern is similar to Friends of the Earth's, but with minor qualifications. The elements in the Friends of the Earth discourse structure are more integrated than that of Greenpeace. For Greenpeace the government responsibility issues "G" are a more dominant element in the discourse, and the activity issues "A" are more prominent than the environmental issues "E" (**graph g.c**).

The high resonance of government responsibility issues "G" in both cases indicates that the discourses most likely consist of "blaming" frames directed against Government and Industry actors. Similarly, the higher prominence of government responsibility relative to the other two issues in the Greenpeace discourse indicates that Greenpeace target and "blame" these actors more explicitly than Friends of the Earth. In addition the issues concerning the organisation's activities "A" achieve a higher resonance than the environmental issues "E" for Greenpeace. This indicates that the Greenpeace discourse is based on actors, i.e. Government and Greenpeace, at the expense of raising the environmental themes.

I shall show that this discourse pattern represents Greenpeace's prime "blaming" strategies, where they place themselves in direct confrontation with their targeted opponent actor in the public discourse. These Greenpeace "blaming" strategies reduce the environmental discourse to Greenpeace versus Government, a clash of actors with clear personalities: the "goodies" versus the "baddies". By comparison the environmental themes are a more integral part of Friends of the Earth's discourse (**graph f.c**), which shows that they remain a prominent semantic element within the discourse structure even when Friends

of the Earth are "blaming" the Government.

The "news event" phase is an exceptional occurrence, at no other time during the previous two phases of either organisation's resonance do government responsibility issues "G" *contextualise* the discourse. This shows that the *content* of the two organisations' discourse patterns is shaped by the special circumstances and pre-requisites of the White Paper. The exceptionally high total resonance of government responsibility issues and predominance of Government actor "blaming" frames, shows that the two environmental organisations strategically "timed" this pattern of discourse mobilisation to coincide with the White Paper. In this phase of the news discourse Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace appear in their role as de-legitimisers of the Government actors in the White Paper "news event". But how do their communications differ and combine in performing this role? To what extent are their strategies co-ordinated, and in relation to which common or individual aims and objectives do they act?

There are nine references to Friends of the Earth (FoE W to e) and six references to Greenpeace (Gpc N to S) in the week of the White Paper "event". Four articles produce active references to both organisations (FoE X/Gpc Q; FoE Y/Gpc O; FoE Z/Gpc P; FoE c/Gpc R). This high number of combined references to the two organisations confirms that their communication strategies are co-ordinated to work in unison for this special "event". In addition, the close association of their patterns of discourse mobilisation at the peak of the "event" shows that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace "work" as different limbs in the same *sector* of the British environmental movement, that based on action in the news media. The two organisations communicate - together and apart - in the same discourse field and are linked by journalistic associations to the same environmental "news events". This supports the thesis that for the British case, it is legitimate to talk of a *division of communicative labour* both by and within the different *sectors* of a single "environmental movement".

I discuss the White Paper newsweek for Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace in two parts: *headline news* and *news reports*.[43]

c.i.2.2) Headline news: leading opinions

[43] This division of the newsweek is chronological and by *news genre*, but by neither strictly. Indeed combining these two factors the distinction is more by types of discourse *narrative content* or in van Dijkian (1985) (1991) terminology "thematic macro-structure" of news.

Friends of the Earth open the week's communication on *The Guardian's* front page. *Chickens drop into generation game* (FoE W), concerns the Department of Energy's selection of renewable energy projects. The article links the environmental theme of renewable energy sources - wind, wave, solar, and methane - with problems of nitrate river pollution and the ethics of "battery hen" food production. This unusual combination of diverse energy and agriculture themes in a single "package" enables Friends of the Earth to re-mobilise two of their two prime campaign fields from the "pre-event" phases (FoE H L S T). The mobilisation of a multi-issue "package" serves to highlight the organisation's key campaign themes in a single prominent communication. The high prominence of these environmental themes sets the public agenda for the reception of the White Paper proposals.[44] If their significance merits front page exposure, then what new proposals will the Government's White Paper provide in these fields?

Here the environmental themes 'speak for themselves' but in a news structure that is more prominent and open to a wider audience than Friends of the Earth's normal coverage. To reach the front page of an opinion-leading newspaper with key themes on the day before the White Paper marks a considerable campaign achievement. It is similarly significant that Friends of the Earth "frame" a direct criticism of the Government's de-regulation policy for the electricity industry - in terms of its low insistence on renewable sources - as a sub-text within the renewable energy theme. The organisation thereby re-mobilises one of the government/industry responsibility contexts with a high prominence in its campaign repertoire, namely the environmental consequences of the Government's de-regulation of the electricity industry (FoE S).

I have shown earlier (**b.i**)) that electricity privatisation is one of Friends of the Earth's key policy-related target fields. Although the government responsibility issues "G" achieve only a relatively low prominence, the text's position on the front page means that it has a high accessibility to the readership. It is improbable that an Editor would allow front page exposure to a more prominent target field directly criticising the Government, unless it might be reported as a specific scandalous "event" and the newspaper had independently legitimated the news sources. The front page coverage indicates that on the day prior to the White Paper

---

[44] The text-structure of the article gives a highest prominence to the environmental issues "E", a relatively high prominence to the activity issues "A" and a relatively low prominence to the government responsibility issues "G" (visual database).

launch environmental information has a higher "news value" than usual.[45]

Environmental organisations are normally confined to their own sections of the newspaper and have their own "news structures". To reach front page *headline news* the article has to emphasize the 'novelty' of chicken excrement becoming a Government sanctioned source of energy production. By making this association Friends of the Earth adds to the "news value" of the topic. Friends of the Earth uses the media curiosity about this "event" as an opening for mobilising a strategically timed reminder of its own favoured environmental policy options to a public that is wider than the Government actors. Clearly Friends of the Earth's priority is to brief specialist and general publics alike for receiving the Government document. At this stage it is too late to influence the contents of the White Paper and environmental organisations had been pursuing strategies for that task for well over a year.[46] This piece of *headline news* is the only reference to either Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace on the day prior to the White Paper. It ranks as a successful communication by subtly engaging *The Guardian* to give high reader accessibility to Friends of the Earth's pre-set environmental agenda and targeted policy fields, whilst appearing seemingly at the initiative of the newspaper journalists rather than the organisation.[47]

Greenpeace makes *headline news* on the actual day of the White Paper "news event", the 25th September, 1990. *Environment Secretary scorns Britain's 'dirty man' tag - Greenpeace 'bias' puts Patten in rage* (Gpc N), appears on page two of *The Guardian*, a prominent position in the "news structure". Whereas Friends of the Earth uses the 'novelty' of the themes to raise the "news value", Greenpeace's communication strategy makes the White Paper into a scandal "news event". Greenpeace literally 'hit the headlines', the

---

[45] In media analysis "news values" are regarded as the intersubjectively constructed categories to which the producers and readers refer for determining the significance of "events" in relation to their "news structure". For an overview see Fowler (1991).

[46] This is confirmed by interview data with the activists in the environmental movement for the EUI Project: No.42.

[47] As a quality newspaper *The Guardian* also has agenda-setting/agenda-building interests that may be served by authoritatively entering the environmental debate. Communications such as this example of *headline news* may be produced by a combination of different and competing interests between the source, media and target actors. In this case *The Guardian* may have been giving high prominence to the environmental agenda to compete with *The Times* which had actively decided to lead against the Government over The White Paper. This also shows that the news accessibility structure for environmental organisations is determined by factors beyond their control. Their specific communication strategies work within the limits of the access to the public discourse which may be available to them at any one time.

organisation appears in the title of the article.[48] It is worth noting that the headline of the article reproduces an opposition between two actors: the Environment Secretary Chris Patten versus Greenpeace. This finding confirms that of the overview (**c.i.2.1**) above), where the discourse pattern at the "news event" peak indicated that Greenpeace's news *content* is based on the actors - the Government and Greenpeace - rather than the environmental themes. Indeed the headline indicates that the contest which is re-constructed in the article between Patten and Greenpeace concerns the value of the White Paper. "The Dirty Man of Europe" is the name of Greenpeace's "report" on the British environmental policy record, that was launched the day before the White Paper and subsequently reported on the actual day of the White Paper's release. The 'dirty man' refers to Greenpeace's version of Britain's environmental record under the present Government. The environmental policy agenda in Britain is not the outcome of a contest between two actors, Greenpeace versus the Government. Even among the environmental organisations, Greenpeace is less involved in the national policy agenda than Friends of the Earth. Why then is the launch of the first environmental policy agenda in Britain reported as a personal confrontation between Greenpeace and the Environment Secretary?

Interpretation of The White Paper v. "The Dirty Man of Europe" episode requires reference to background contextual information. The prominence of Greenpeace at this stage of the debate is explained by the overall strategy that was co-ordinated by the British environmental organisations towards the White Paper. Greenpeace are able to act as the public figurehead for the environmental movement at its launch, enhancing its prestige and public image, whilst other organisations which in the long term seek constructive gains within the environmental policy field take a less directly critical stance against the Government. The "event" is a special case of a public policy agenda-setting strategy that was co-ordinated by the environmental organisations.

> "(T)he decision we took about the White Paper was .. we couldn't influence what went into it, but we could influence the climate of opinion into which it was received, and to make sure that was pretty hostile, very critical and well informed...It was sort of agreed that Greenpeace would act like .. shock-

[48] On the semantic role of headlines in the structures of news see van Dijk (1985) (1991).

> troops, so that the others would be able to .. do their thing. And we decided that the basic thing to do was to take the attention of the press back before the White Paper was launched to the unsolved environmental problems that the country still had .. So then the way that we decided to do that was to use this thing "The Dirty Man of Europe", this idea."[49]

Greenpeace commissioned a "report" from the environmental media relations organisation Media Natura that listed seventeen reasons "Why Britain remains the Dirty Man of Europe" (Greenpeace UK 1990). This report was published on the 24th September, but only after selected political journalists had been primed with "pre-publication" copies of a second report that the organisation did not launch publicly. The purpose of the unlaunched report was to frame the political debate of the environmental policy agenda with the Greenpeace version. Political journalists were given opinions and preconceptions that they need not attribute directly to Greenpeace when reporting the White Paper "event".

> "(W)hen they were asked to respond by their desk, critically, they would use our phrases, our ideas..If you launch something, they'd have to report the news as the launch, the event that was happening. Because it wasn't launched, they didn't have to report it like that."[50]

This strategy for 'subterfuge' of leading opinion in the news discourse was complemented by the "The Dirty Man of Europe" report which was launched for reporting as the 'official' Greenpeace line: this is Greenpeace's staged *headline* "news event" for the White Paper.

Achieving media attention was the prime strategy behind commissioning these "reports". The reports are factually accurate, but were never meant simply to be a translation of scientific findings into public information, the usual criteria for an environmental "report".

---

[49] Chris Rose interview *EUI Project No. 42*, December 1990 (Interviews conducted by Bron Szerzynski and used with permission by Project Director Klaus Eder). Rose is a key actor in the 'dirty man' affair. His organisation Media Natura Ltd produced the publications for the Greenpeace "reports". Material is taken from his own in depth study on the pollution problems facing Britain published in 1990. Perhaps not surprisingly this polemic is entitled *The Dirty Man of Europe: the Great British pollution scandal* (1990). This nonetheless shows that the 'dirty man' "package" was researched and mobilised as a cultural frame from within the environmental movement.

[50] Chris Rose interview *EUI Project No. 42* , December 1990.

The criteria for launching the reports was not simply informative, but prejudicial. 'Dirty man' is a cultural frame that Greenpeace mobilised to prejudice the perceptions of those whose task is to assess and lead opinion on the value of the White Paper.[51] The Greenpeace label calling Britain the "Dirty Man of Europe" invokes a cultural frame that attaches a stigma of shame to the nation. It is perhaps one of the best examples of how environmental organisations use culture as a resource for strategically framing political debate. The "reports" served as a vehicle for covertly mobilising a "symbolic package" that other key actors might use simply for de-legitimising the White Paper. In effect Greenpeace were legitimising their own 'culturally biased' version of the White Paper in the public discourse.[52]

The Thatcher Governments had been adept at using their own version of the national image as a moral justification for monetary based policies - e.g. the appeal for a return to Victorian values in "Enterprise Culture" (Keat and Abercrombie eds. 1991) (Corner and Harvey eds. 1991). By referring to Britain as a 'dirty man', Greenpeace are able to use the national image against the Government. Greenpeace make Britain "The Dirty Man of Europe" and challenge the Government to extend their nationalist convictions into the field of environmental practice.

"Britain: the Dirty Man of Europe" makes environmental values an essential element for the vitality of the nation. For years the Government had attributed the same prestige to economic values within national culture. The Greenpeace label cleverly reverses the priorities of the Government's image of a national culture based on 'market individualism' by claiming that the Government's unsound environmental practices has brought "shame" on the nation. The 'dirty man' example shows how environmental organisations mobilise and "frame" elements of a national culture for strategic political aims in the public discourse. In this case an organisation uses the popularity of environmental themes in Britain as a cultural resource for playing off environmental values against economic values.

The main contention of the organisations' campaigns had been that policies for market

---

[51] On the significance of "dirt" as a threat to the "purity" of the symbolic order of societies, see Douglas (1966) (1975) which I discussed in detail earlier in section A.

[52] On social movements and the mobilisation of "symbolic packages", see Snow, Benford et al. (1988), Gamson (1988) and for a critical overview Eder (1992; 1995), and Johnston (1992). On 'cultural bias' see Douglas (1975) and for an analytic application to actors in a policy field, see M. Thompson (1988).

regulation were unsuitable remedies for environmental "problems".[53] In this instance 'state intervention' is re-legitimised as a policy option by making the nation's "shame" a moral claim of higher authority than the Government's monetary policy priorities. Furthermore this 'effect' is achieved in the news discourse without directly raising the environmental themes, but by stating polemical and one-sided culturally biased 'truths' about the condition of the environment. The critical "frames" mobilised by Greenpeace and their consequences for the White Paper became the real "news event". The White Paper launch was made into the revelation of a national scandal over the condition of the environment in Britain. This shows that not only were the environmental organisations acting to set the media agenda, but were effectively using the "event" to shape the national public discourse on the environment. The organisations were shifting the emphasis of the policy debate to the condition of the environment to establish this as a vital element within the national political culture. This shifted political debate to a basis on which the organisations are longstanding "experts" and the Government relative "newcomers".

The headlining dispute between Greenpeace and the Government is a staged "event" that environmental organisations had designed with the intent of totally de-legitimising the Government's White Paper. The *headline news* "makes" the Government's environmental record into a "scandal" (Gpc N). Despite the emphasis on the White Paper v. "The Dirty Man of Europe" scandal, the article mobilises environmental themes relating the British imports of nuclear and toxic waste, carbon dioxide emissions and global warming, sea-dumping of industrial and nuclear waste, mineral prospecting in the Antarctic, and sulphur dioxide and acid rain emissions. As in the case of Friends of the Earth's *headline news* (FoE W), this serves to repeat Greenpeace's pre-"event" agenda for environmental claims (Gpc A C F I J M). Similarly, Greenpeace's norm for single-issue specific mobilisations is broken to meet the communication priorities of the White Paper "event". Unlike the Friends of the Earth case however, the environmental thematic *content* is a secondary element to Greenpeace's "blaming" strategies in the *headline news* communication. The example also indicates that Greenpeace tend to frame issues within a supra-national/global rather than a national context. Even Greenpeace's criticisms of the national policy record is maintained

---

[53] The internal Governmental reasons for the "failure" of the White Paper proposals were reported as the inability of the Environment Minister to convince his Cabinet colleagues to prioritise environmental concerns at the expense of monetary policies for economic growth. *The Guardian* 30/04/90.

within the broader context of a comparison with other European nations, *sic* "The Dirty Man of Europe".

Whereas Friends of the Earth's *headline news* the day before focuses on the environmental issues "E" (FoE W), Greenpeace's invention of a "scandal" made it possible to mobilise government responsibility issues "G" at a high prominence in the news structure on the actual day of the "event". The staggered "timing" and range of *contents* that appears in these two examples of *headline news* confirms that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace were combining their communication strategies to achieve maximum impact on the national policy agenda. They were controlling the supply of environmental information to the news agenda and shaping the perceptions of journalists, the public and Government actors, whilst at the same time prioritising their own cultural bias of the "policy event" in the public discourse.

The Government's "new" environmental policy agenda had been effectively de-legitimised in the public discourse before the day of its actual launch, i.e. prior to any reports or public discourse evaluating the document's contents. This had been the strategically co-ordinated intention of the environmental organisations. Rather than slipping into the journalistic habit of overstating the importance of single "events" - and particularly those associated with Greenpeace - the *headline news* 'dirty man' "news event" should rightly be seen in the context of the agenda-building activities that had been pursued by the environmental organisations for over a year. It was only the final *coup de grace* in a de-legitimation process of the policy document that had been co-ordinated by the environmental organisations. Public agenda-building had already pre-set the tone for the White Paper, but the scandal re-sharpened the critical focus of the discourse.

> "People did not sit down with wide open minds on the Tuesday Morning to listen to what Mr Patten had to say. They sat down with a bunch of preconceptions ... It was a much more alert and informed and awake audience than is normally the case. And that made it harder for the DoE[54] to get away with things that it might otherwise have got away with...(T)here was a great deal of context setting that went on. There was a lot of briefing that went on.

[54] Department of the Environment.

> The NGOs appreciated the importance of the White Paper, and communicated the importance of the White Paper, very very effectively - to lots of different audiences, including the media. They also communicated the fact that they expected it was going to fail to live up to its expectations... That's context setting .. the NGOs played a large part in the context setting. There was nobody else doing it. The opposition wasn't doing it .. the newspapers weren't doing it. Their job was to report, not to challenge or criticise."[55]

The media agenda had been pre-set and pre-informed by the covert activities of the environmental organisations. Journalists were able to provide better questions than the White Paper could provide answers without even needing to inform themselves on the actual details of the new policy agenda. The "Dirty Man" rhetoric became the legitimate version and journalists evaluated the White Paper using symbolic frames taken directly from the Greenpeace "reports".

c.i.2.3) News reports: balancing views

In conjunction with the *headline news*, the peak of the "news event" achieves an additional type of coverage, the *news reports* that evaluate the White Paper's proposals. This media discourse provides another opportunity for the environmental organisations to mobilise opinions and stage events that de-legitimise the Government's environmental policy proposals.

Greenpeace's "Dirty Man of Europe" *headline news* mobilisation is combined with a further press report on the same day, the 25th September. The media-gossip column *Diary* reports the Environment Secretary's anger at Greenpeace's 'dirty man' claims, and then describes how other environmental organisations including the World Wide Fund for Nature, Friends of the Earth and the Green Alliance have been invited to breakfast talks with the Minister whereas Greenpeace have been omitted (Gpc O, FoE Y).

This orchestrated combination of *headline news* and "media gossip column" by Greenpeace, illustrates the organisation's desire to target political decision-makers and

---

[55] Tom Burke interview *EUI Project No. 42* , December 1990.

opinion-leading journalists in different *genres* of news. It further underlines the media orientation of Greenpeace's 'dirty man' communication strategy. At the same time the organisation's opposition to the Government is "framed" in a way that promotes the Greenpeace image as an uncompromising, cavalier and stylish public actor.[56] It constitutes a successful public relations exercise for the Greenpeace. The "media gossip" article on the "Dirty Man" scandal (Gpc O, FoE Y) depicts Greenpeace being excluded from talks with the Environment Minister, whereas Friends of the Earth are included along with the Green Alliance and the World Wide Fund for Nature. This presentation suits the image of both organisations and the needs of the different *movement sectors*. Whereas Greenpeace's *headline news* attack on the Government had effectively destroyed the possibility of a successful White Paper press launch, Friends of the Earth and the other organisations maintain direct communication links for making claims with the leading policy actors. The different strategic priorities of the organisations are served in one mobilisation of news.[57]

Greenpeace preserve their image for challenging powerful Government actors and "bearing testimony" only to the destruction of the world[58], whilst Friends of the Earth and the other environmental organisations deal with the more pragmatic task of re-constituting a policy agenda for the 'immediate' environmental problems in British politics. This example illustrates a co-ordinated *division of communicative labour* within the environmental movement. The special opportunity presented by the White Paper had made such planning and co-operation a prerequisite of activities by the environmental organisations.

"(T)he NGOs had run a fairly consistent campaign in a rather subtle way over

---

[56] See the founder David McTaggart's (1978) own book or other Greenpeace publicity, e.g. *The Greenpeace Story* (1988), which document the organisation's direct actions in similar picture-book 'adventure' style narratives. I develop the discussion on the Greenpeace use of "public image" in the analysis of explicit framing devices and discursive stunts which appears in the next section E).

[57] The 'visible' public appearance of the organisations' actions in the news structure - in which Greenpeace are divided from the other organisations - is different from the strategic dimension of their actions which were 'collective' in the sense that they were intentionally, if only temporarily, co-ordinated for the short-term event. This example shows that the organisations use the news structure as a field for mobilising claims that have a 'collective' as well as 'individual' strategic basis in the environmental contest between them and the Government.

[58] This is an example of the "David and Goliath" narrative which is a key element in the Greenpeace image and often also makes a "story" with a high "news value" content. Of course no one remembers what David and Goliath fought about, only who won. In the same way "winning" the public legitimation contest against Governments is of prime importance for Greenpeace image.

> a year, to focus on the White Paper, and to come up with at least some sort of understanding of the politics of it before eleven o'clock on the morning of the publication. So that's why you didn't get a whole bunch of NGOs saying different things."[59]

Two further joint references to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace are made in articles on the 25th September, the day of the White Paper launch.

Sparks fly in the great debate - The issue of nuclear power has always been a hot potato (FoE X, Gpc Q) appears in the Environmental section of *The Guardian*. It is a journalist's reconstruction of the public discourse on nuclear power with "for" argumentations attributed to British Nuclear Fuels plc and the Atomic Energy Authority and "against" argumentations to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. This article simply restates the "pros" and "cons" of nuclear power from a neutral position. Indeed the article has a "news structure" that is typical of those initiated by journalists where the author remains neutral and opposed opinions are balanced according to the criteria of 'objective reporting'. The text was most likely prepared in advance by the environmental journalist and released to coincide directly with the White Paper launch, when the editorial demand for environmental news is higher than usual.

The analysis of the agenda-building activities of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth has shown that the nuclear power 'yes or no' debate is not a key national target. Despite occasional general references to the national nuclear energy theme (Gpc A D), the organisations tend instead to format their anti-nuclear claims as specific contexts of radiation "risk" problems that result from the Government's inadequate actions. For example, in the national arena, six articles refer to the poor regulation/implementation standards of Government policy for nuclear dumping and re-processing (Gpc C G #3 N; FoE M Q). This shows that the organisations campaign on specialised dimensions of the nuclear debate related to specific 'events'.

The 'nuclear yes or no' debate is an old fashioned contest in the British environmental discourse. It dates from the public inquiry at Windscale and the Greenham Common protests over a decade ago. Public opposition and mass demonstrations against the building of nuclear

---

[59] Tom Burke, Interview for *EUI Project No.42*, December 1990.

power stations and sites for nuclear weapons made the nuclear issue the first highly politicised and contentious environmental issue in Britain.[60] The opposed lines of argument and boundaries of this debate are well known, it is neither difficult nor controversial for a journalist to reconstruct them. As a contentious national 'event', public opposition to 'the nuclear' *per se* is no longer news. Instead environmental organisations today tend to raise specific regulatory aspects of "risk" technology or the global dimension of the nuclear question as contentious political issues (see earlier content analyses in section C). That the journalist chooses an unimaginative and pre-established dimension of the nuclear debate - "nuclear power: yes or no" - shows that it is the organisations rather than journalists who are more likely to serve as 'primary definers'[61] in the selection, "packaging" and framing of environmental themes for the news discourse. Indeed the "news value" of this article occurs in the specialism of the environmental journalist rather than the newsworthiness of a contentious political claim. The article appears courtesy of the editorial requirement for environmental news on a day of specific strategic importance for the environmental agenda in Britain.[62] This article nonetheless confirms that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace are legitimate actors whose opinions are 'routinely' reported in environmental news, even if their own immediate initiatives focus elsewhere. In addition, it shows that their former primary campaign topics are now common knowledge and an established element of Britiah public culture.

Another combined reference to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace occurs during the coverage of the Green Party's Conference which took place on the same week as the White Paper "event" (FoE Z, Gpc P). Although unrelated to the White Paper "event", this article is also produced by journalistic 'reporting' criteria. It contrasts the scale of activities and depth of resources of the two organisations to the impotence and amateurism of the

---

[60] On the anti-nuclear movement in Britain, see Ruedig (1992) Murphy (1984). For a detailed case study on the Windscale public inquiry, see Wynne (1982).

[61] On the concept of a 'primary definer' in news discourse see the work of Hall et al. (1978). For a critique that extends the notion to discuss the strategies of source actors, see Schlesinger (1990). Anderson (1993) applies this perspective to the case of environmental news.

[62] *The Guardian*'s environmental journalists are well briefed. The decision not to lead on an theme that is contentious in the political discourse on the environment may indicate an editorial decision to remain 'neutral' and objective rather than an ignorance of contemporary environmental debate. The journalist's interest is served by retaining working contacts with Government as well as organisation news *sources*.

British Greens. This indicates that the British media considers the environmental organisations to be more legitimate actors in the environmental discourse than the Green Party. Not only do the media take the organisations' opinions seriously, but Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have established contacts and are well disposed to coverage in the press. The British media even appear to find the staged events and repeated stunts of the organisations endlessly interesting, and a permanent source of news. In contrast the British Green Party is seldom treated with respect, and usually with ridicule, even in instances where its activities may be as 'novel' as the organisations' stunts.

The last of the four articles which mentions both Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace appears on the 26th September, the day after the White Paper release. As the title *Mixed reaction from the critics* (FoE c, Gpc R) suggests, this is the environmental correspondent's report on the reception of the White Paper. The *news report* serves to 'balance the views' of the Government and interested parties concerning the White Paper, namely the organisations. In this case the organisations act as "pressure groups", legitimate actors in the environmental discourse whose specialist interest makes them authoritative commentators. The news reports their opinions as a 'balance' to the Government position. In fact the organisations had pre-determined a strategy for uniting their different views in opposition to the White Paper. The special opportunity of the White Paper served to unite the diverse organisations into a single *voice* and is an important episode in establishing the contemporary British environmental movement.

> "Even though they all said different things and all preserved their separate identities, they all said things that added up to the same point. That's because they'd all been talking to each other the previous year, specifically about how they would handle that. Now that was also unusual in NGO terms - the first time I can recall that happening. So you're dealing with a very untypical thing. It may not be untypical of the future, but it's certainly untypical of the past."[63]

In this article (FoE c, Gpc R) the different *sectors* of the movement once more criticise the

---

[63] Tom Burke, Interview for *EUI Project No.42*, December 1990.

policy document in unison, with each organisation focusing on its specialist campaign field. Whilst the Friends of the Earth spokesperson highlights the deficiencies of regulatory policy targets for fuel and vehicle efficiency, Greenpeace's Lord Melchett damns the inadequacy of the whole Government environmental policy agenda.[64] For the movement's two prime media-oriented actors, this again confirms a *division of communicative labour* between the more pragmatic, incremental and policy-related Friends of the Earth strategies and the indignant Greenpeace 'actor targeted' confrontations. In this instance the other *sectors* of the environmental movement also share in co-ordinating the public discourse's 'official' opposition to the Government.

During the remainder of this newsweek Greenpeace appear in only one further article. Two days after the White Paper "event" a media-oriented Greenpeace stunt re-mobilises the "Dirty Man of Europe" scandal. The actual stunt involved smuggling toilet rolls into bathrooms at the Department of the Environment offices and the Institute of Directors. Each piece of paper was printed with seventeen points detailing why Britain is "the Dirty Man of Europe". Clearly such a 'novel' "event" was newsworthy but this time Greenpeace did not seek a *headline news* genre. As in the article documenting Greenpeace's exclusion from the 'internal' Government discussions (Gpc O), the target audience for this mobilisation is the 'media gossip' readership.[65] The Greenpeace staged event explicitly "blames" the Government's inaction in the policy field. However, this delegitimation strategy works through the media agenda, it makes the whole White Paper discourse into a 'joke' by exposing the official policy community to public ridicule. There is no articulation of any substantive themes, relating to either the White Paper or the environment. The British Government policy-makers are ridiculed by Greenpeace who at the same time boost their own public image. These shock tactics are designed to resonate shortly and sweetly, and prolong the Greenpeace victory of the 'dirty man' "news event" on the media agenda.

In this mobilisation, Greenpeace return to a strategy of discourse subterfuge. The organisation wants people to talk about their 'dirty man' success. Its target audience is not

---

[64] Not surprisingly government responsibility issues "G" have the highest prominence for both organisations in this text (FoE c, Gpc R) (visual databases). See also the discussion of the explicit framing devices in the next section E.

[65] The article raises high prominence government responsibility "G" and organisation activity issues "A" simultaneously (Gpc S) (visual database), which provides a further example of the actor-based 'Greenpeace v. Government' narrative structure of Greenpeace mobilisations.

simply the general public, but the opinion-leaders. The hope is that this media 'event' might filter through into everyday talk of decision-makers. The example shows that Greenpeace have a wider repertoire of strategies and employ more resources than other environmental organisations for setting the media agenda. Their primary target is the media rather than the policy agenda for the environmental discourse.

> "(O)ne of the people in the Institute of Directors found it and phoned up the *Guardian Diary*, you see. So it sort of goes like a virus, that filters out. The only object was to get people in the, sort of, gossiping classes to talk about 'The Dirty Man of Europe'...to get the phrase into a sort of common parlance, but with a specific group of people, who are the friends, relatives, husbands, wives of the image-builders of the political parties, so that they would begin to think "we have a problem with this thing, 'The Dirty Man of Europe'."[66]

This added salt to the Department of the Environment's wounds that had already been opened by Greenpeace's direct confrontational stance. They had been surprised and totally outflanked by Greenpeace, who exerted a knowledgeable and controlled use of the media beyond that of the policy-makers. As Greenpeace vanished from the scene their deconstruction of the White Paper to "the Dirty Man of Europe" was the media's favourite version and common public knowledge.

As the Environment Minister and Department of the Environment returned to the drawing board in the wake of a humiliating public relations defeat, the media agenda was set for other environmental organisations to mobilise constructive policy proposals. After a lower key profile than Greenpeace at the press launch, Friends of the Earth's mobilisation campaign picks up towards the end of the week. Friends of the Earth re-enters the discourse at the start of the reconstruction phase of policy options in *news reports*. This indicates that Friends of the Earth take a more disciplined engagement in the media agenda on environmental policy than Greenpeace. In the remainder of the week four references appear to Friends of the Earth (FoE a b c d), including the one already discussed which occurs with Greenpeace (FoE c,

---

[66] Chris Rose, Interview *EUI Project No.42*, December 1990.

Gpc R).

Balancing act civilises media circus - Michael White on the unexpectedly restrained press launch of the Patten blueprint yesterday (FoE b), appears on the 26th September, it is the political correspondent's review of the previous day's White Paper "event". This article discusses the 'failure' of the Environment Minister's Bill in the political personalities genre which is typical of reporting on policy "events" and ministerial actors. Like the environmental affairs on the nuclear issue (FoE c), this specialist political affairs coverage is initiated due to the high "news value" of the White Paper "event". The political correspondent enters the environmental discourse solely to cover the political implications of the "event". The environmental organisations appear as "pressure groups", the correspondent's lack of a briefing on the environment permits little else. However, Friends of the Earth's presence in this political affairs news discourse confirms their status as a legitimate spokesperson on the national environmental policy agenda. The organisation is cited disclaiming the suggestion that it acted to discredit the White Paper before its launch. This public dissociation from Greenpeace is a 'half-truth' which indicates Friends of the Earth's intention to remain in contact with the policy-makers and its aspiration to an 'internal' role in the national policy discourse.

Not just white but deathly pallid (FoE a), Friends of the Earth's own critical assessment of the policy document is also mobilised on the 26th September. Like Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth stage a discursive stunt which aims to frame the opinion-leading evaluation of the White Paper. Instead of 'dirty man' scandalmongering, Friends of the Earth mobilises a discursive framing device which relates the Government's lack of definitive commitments to action in the White Paper. The organisation's peak "blaming" strategies take a more constructive form than the Greenpeace criticisms.[67] Friends of the Earth's discursive strategy involves undertaking a public content-analysis of the Paper. The framing device is that the White Paper should be judged by its verbs:

"(O)ne searches in vain for hard pledges introduced by such verbs as

[67] This article integrates the environmental "E", government responsibility "G" and organisation activity "A" issues at the same relatively high text-prominence level (FoE a) (visual database). This is indicative of a text-structure that is more 'balanced' between "actor contests" and environmental issues than Greenpeace's mobilisations.

> implement, establish, enact. Instead on global warming the Government promises to encourage, promote, monitor or press for; on the countryside it pledges itself to endorse, review, consider and consult; and on towns and cities it will encourage and promote. This is not an action programme it is a discussion paper." (FoE a)

The environmental themes mobilised by this article concern: global warming, energy, cars/lack of public transport, low quality of water, pollution tax proposals, conservation of hedgerows, beach pollution, and acid rain/sulphur dioxide pollution. These themes repeat earlier campaigns and reproduce them within a policy-related national scope. The criticisms levelled at the Government relate to its lack of policy implementation and formation rather than its choice of proposed fields for the environmental policy agenda. This shows that Friends of the Earth is keen to mobilise its environmental claims within a constructive context for government responsibility issues.

Friends of the Earth explicitly name three elements that are absent from the Government's commitment to an environmental agenda: public expenditure; regulation; and a national strategy (FoE a). Interestingly these three elements reconstruct the potentiality for an 'interventionist' environmental agenda. After Greenpeace's 'dirty man' label has culturally de-legitimised the Government's free market philosophy at the "event", Friends of the Earth expose and play-off the same contradiction between economic and environmental values in this reconstruction of a potential role for Government as a 'legitimate environmental actor'. The message is clear: to become a legitimate environmental actor the Government must renounce market economics as a solution to environmental "problems". On this the two highest profile "experts" on environmental action in the public discourse, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, are unanimous.

The timing and *content* of the Friends of the Earth critique confirms that the organisation has less antipathy for the potential of Government as an environmental actor than Greenpeace. Whereas Greenpeace's cultural populism targets the Government as the enemy, Friends of the Earth take a pragmatic realist stance to the possible benefits of a Governmental environmental agenda. Friends of the Earth's criticisms of Government are subsequently framed in policy contexts. Unlike Greenpeace, the organisation is not opposed to the principle of Government action. Friends of the Earth is more likely to mobilise an

alternative range of policy options.

> "An unfettered market cannot deal with pollution. Long-term planning, domestic and international regulations and agreements, as well as financial incentives such as taxes, subsidies, incentives, grants and permits, are all essential if the Planet is to get the protection it requires. Mrs Thatcher is now struggling to adapt to these new political imperatives of environmentalism, which are in stark contrast to the deregulation and individualism that she has promoted during the 1980s. This is why we have had two years of discordance between her green words and actions - a green credibility gap which is separating the public from the politicians.
>
> A major chance to close this gap was missed. The 1990 White Paper, *This Common Inheritance*, which Environment Minister Chris Patten has said would 'define the orientation of our environmental policies into the next century', was mainly a disappointing reiteration of current policies. More optimistically, we note that the exercise may have sown the seeds for greening of the government machine. The Cabinet-level committee established to co-ordinate the production of the White Paper will remain."[68]

In fact both Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace knew in advance that the content of the Government's policy proposals would fall short of the Minister's much vaunted promises. Indeed they had made considerable efforts to 'talk up' expectations for the White Paper to make its 'failure' appear more devastating.[69] The organisations combined the different *contents* of their mobilisations with specific timing strategies, so that each communication would have maximum critical impact on the Government. Greenpeace's task had been to destroy the Government's credibility on the day of the 'event', now Friends of the Earth starts re-constructing the options for a better policy agenda. The boundaries for

---

[68] David Gee, Director, Friends of the Earth, October 1990 (Friends of the Earth 1990).

[69] The Minister for the Environment Chris Patten had promised a revolutionary package at the previous Conservative Party Conference, 1989, hoisted largely by Mrs Thatcher's *petard*. For a detailed review of the events from 1988 to the White Paper, see Lowe and Flynn (1989), Rose (1990), Flynn and Lowe (1992). On the environmental policy agenda in Britain, see O'Riordan (1988) for prior to, and Grove-White (1993) for after the White Paper.

environmental policy options were being re-drawn to coincide more closely with the interests of the organisations. The "shift" from a de-construction to a policy re-construction strategy started within the newsweek of the "event". Whereas Greenpeace staged the 'toilet roll' event to re-mobilise their White Paper disclaimers (Gpc S), Friends of the Earth's special communication needs require a more subtle strategy.

Toronto's anti-pollution drive - Does Chris Patten's blueprint deserve admiration or abuse? Stephen Cook finds that Toronto's planners are more ambitious (FoE e), is a *feature* article that appears later in the week. Here the Canadian Friends of the Earth organisation are described chairing the Toronto City Council's Advisory Committee on the Environment. Toronto City Council have started to implement radical and integrated environmental policies and Friends of the Earth have a direct 'internal' role in the decision making. Behind the comparison with the Government's White Paper lies the suggestion the British decision-makers could follow the same strategy.

This example shows that in contrast to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth's "blaming" strategies criticise through the semantic *content* of the constructed themes - environmental and policy - rather than de-legitimising the Government's credibility as an "actor" in the environmental field by public ridicule. Both organisations accuse the Government of "inaction" on the policy front, but they mobilise their criticisms as "blaming frames" in different ways.

The final Friends of the Earth reference this week is not linked to the White Paper "event". It concerns a local group campaign against sea gravel dredging by marine prospectors which is damaging the beach at Filey (FoE d). This reference was probably co-ordinated rather than initiated by the Friends of the Earth central office. As in the pre-"event" phases, industrial rather than Government actors are targeted as the responsible culprits.

c.i.3) Postscript: the week after

The **graphs f.c** and **g.c** show that the last week of the "news event" cycle produced very little resonance. Indeed Friends of the Earth appears in one article and Greenpeace in none **(graph D.II)**. After leading and balancing opinion on the White Paper during the peak newsweek, the organisations are allowing journalists and editors to write about the policy

future of the environment.

The Friends of the Earth article mobilises environmental themes relating to the health risks of diesel exhaust emissions and nitrogen oxide and acid rain pollution (FoE f).[70] The government/industry responsibility context concerns the new regulatory standards of the European Community and diesel engine technology, both are deemed inadequate. In this re-mobilisation of its proposals for a policy agenda, Friends of the Earth relinquishes the possibility of directly attacking the national policy context. The EC and the motor industry are the targets whilst the Department of the Environment licks its wounds and re-assesses the consequences of a public relations defeat. The article repeats the organisation's low profile mobilisation pattern where environmental themes are allowed to "speak for themselves", but adds a policy twist.

c.ii) World Wide Fund for Nature

The visual database shows that the "news event" discourse covers five *active references* to the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF N to R inc.). **Graph w.c** shows that like Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature's discourse pattern is characterised by a peak coverage on the week of the White Paper press launch, 25th September. In contrast to the discourse patterns of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, this does not constitute the peak coverage during the White Paper "news cycle" for the World Wide Fund for Nature. The World Wide Fund for Nature's peak coverage occurs during the "prologue" phase due to the exceptional circumstances of the WWF scandal "news event" (**b.ii**) above).

c.ii.1) Prelude: the week before

On the week prior to the White Paper "news event" the World Wide Fund for Nature does not receive any coverage (**graph w.c**). Three interrelated factors may account for the low public profile of the organisation during this week.

Firstly, the World Wide Fund for Nature needs to promote its activities with caution

[70] These environmental issues "E" are highest prominence which indicates that they *contextualise* the other discourse elements in the text (FoE f) (visual database).

following the "bad publicity" received during the newsweeks of the scandal. The organisation is still in the process of re-legitimising the public image of its activities. Secondly, the World Wide Fund for Nature's media coverage tends to coincide with specific "news events" that are reported by the media. In a week prior to the White Paper launch journalists are not likely to attribute a high "news value" to "events" relating to supra-national conservation, which are seen as a specialist environmental concern rather than a general concern of national interest. Thirdly, it is plausible that the World Wide Fund for Nature's absence from the media agenda is co-ordinated with the low profile communication strategies of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Earlier, I showed that prior to the "event" the different organisations tacitly co-ordinated their strategies for de-legitimising the Government's environmental agenda. The World Wide Fund for Nature's interest and the united interests of the movement are served by co-operating with the two media-oriented organisations for the White Paper "event".[71]

c.ii.2) News Event: The White Paper versus "the Dirty Man of Europe"

In the White Paper "news event" week government responsibility issues "G" are the most prominent element in the World Wide Fund for Nature's discourse pattern (**graph w.c**). As in the cases of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, this confirms that the organisation's White Paper "news event" discourse highlights the responsibilities of Government. What types of communication does the World Wide Fund for Nature produce in the White Paper "news event"?

Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace both "peak" on the week of the White Paper "event". For this newsweek the World Wide Fund for Nature's resonance is high, but lower than its peak resonance which occurs during the scandal "news event" (**b.ii**) above). This indicates that the World Wide Fund for Nature are less involved in the immediate news discourse of the White Paper launch than the two media-oriented organisations. The organisation has less propensity to enter the media discourse in relation to specific political "news events". A further difference is that issues relating to the World Wide Fund for

[71] Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace keep an unusually low profile in the prelude newsweek. This ensures that their specialist communication strategies maintain a 'surprise element' for the discursive attack on the Government in the White Paper "event".

Nature's activities "W" are a less prominent element of the discourse than for Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace in the White Paper newsweek.[72] The World Wide Fund for Nature's own activities are not a prominent element in the discourse. In comparison to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature keeps a low profile as an "actor" in the White Paper "event". The organisation does not stage "events" which are designed to shape the immediate "news value" of the political "event". Unless compelled to do so by the pre-requisites of an internal crisis the World Wide Fund for Nature does not actively seek media coverage in relation to specific peak "news events". It does not attempt to make *headline news*. Given this less active role in "making the news" than Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, how does the World Wide Fund for Nature communicate at the peak of the White Paper "news event"?

Four articles cover the World Wide Fund for Nature on the White Paper newsweek (WWF N O P Q). These occur in successive days from the day of the White Paper launch on the 25th September.

In the first two articles the World Wide Fund for Nature appears with both Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. The articles *Diary* (WWF N FoE Y Gpc O) and *Mixed reaction from the critics* (WWF O FoE c Gpc R) are specialist news reports on the 'White Paper v. Dirty Man of Europe' "event". In the first case the reported "news event" is Greenpeace's 'dirty man' scandal-mongering actions and in the second it is the Government's White Paper press launch. They are written by *The Guardian*'s gossip columnist and environmental correspondent respectively. Earlier I showed that this *news report* format serves to report "events" by 'balancing the views' of the Government against their legitimate critics (see **c.i.2.3)**). In the 'media gossip' article the organisation is invited with Friends of the Earth and the Green Alliance to attend internal talks with the Environment Minister on the morning of the press launch. The 'news value' of the piece is that Greenpeace has been excluded: the Minister no longer considers Greenpeace a legitimate "pressure group".[73]

In the environmental report on the 'dirty man' launch a World Wide Fund for Nature

---

[72] The **graph w.c** shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature has a hierarchical discourse pattern for the week commencing 24th September. The government responsibility issues "G" are more prominent than environmental issues "E", whereas the issues relating to the organisation's activities "A" are a *subtext* of the discourse.

[73] As I mentioned earlier, this division suits both those organisations which aspire to 'interest group' status in the environmental policy field and Greenpeace which does not.

spokesperson is cited criticising the White Paper for the lack of policy measures for protecting national wildlife habitats. The organisation's opinions are reported as part of the journalist's evaluation of the 'success/failure' of the public reception of the Government's launch. Here the organisation's specialist voice rings in tune with those of the other movement sectors by critically opposing the White Paper policy proposals. I showed earlier that this united opposition was co-ordinated by the organisations for the "news event". It is also worth noting that the World Wide Fund for Nature's criticism focuses on a national policy field. This confirms that the organisation's communication is shaped by the White Paper "event".

In both cases the World Wide Fund for Nature is represented as a "pressure group" in British politics which acts within the bounds of interest group practices. In the second case it uses this status to "blame" the Government for the inadequacy of its policy proposals in the organisation's specialist field.

Chinese 'flouting rhino ban' (WWF P) and *Hugh Synge continues our occasional series on endangered plant species with a report on the Cafe marron, the rarest plant in the world. Fencing with extinction* (WWF Q) appear later in the "event" newsweek. Neither article mentions the White Paper. After the unusual policy claims-making opportunities in the national agenda, the World Wide Fund for Nature returns to a more familiar supra-national campaign field. The first article claims that Chinese pharmaceutical industries are contravening the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) by selling medicines containing rhino horn to South East Asian countries (WWF P). This extends the theme of rhino preservation into a supra-national policy context. The second tells of the plight of a World Wide Fund for Nature botanist in attempting to preserve the Cafe marron from extinction in the remote island of Rodrigues, east of Madagascar (WWF Q).

This shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature combines the role of acting as a national "pressure group" with promoting its specialist supranational environmental concerns in the "news event" week. Just as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace re-mobilise their campaign agendas in the aftermath of the White Paper v. 'Dirty man' "event", the World Wide Fund for Nature shows similar concern that the focus of environmental news does not preclude its 'normal' supranational campaigns.

The environmental theme of the preservation of rare species is a highly prominent

element in the discourse patterns of the two articles.[74] This shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature raises claims about the responsibilities of Government in the media discourse through the semantic *content* of environmental themes rather than by actor-based "contests", such as the 'WWF versus Government' format. The organisation identifies government and industry responsibility contexts by elaborating the environmental themes. Avoiding controversy is made easier by species preservation not being a nationally contested environmental theme.[75] Rather than "blaming" Government "actors" the World Wide Fund for Nature raises the preservation theme in relation to a supra-national policy field.[76] The World Wide Fund for Nature mobilises its key environmental theme in a way that highlights an opportunity for Government to support its actions by applying pressure at the supra-national governmental level. This subtle communication strategy sets the public agenda by identifying a hidden possibility for the Government to act. In effect the organisation is inviting the Government to contribute to and assist its actions as a supranational "pressure group".

At the same time the organisation uses this phase of high media concern to further re-legitimise its return to *business as usual* communication. The articles re-legitimise the World Wide Fund for Nature as a key national and supra-national actor in its specialist environmental field. In addition the preservation theme is mobilised as a legitimate action context for both the organisation and the Government. It enables the World Wide Fund for Nature to aspire to the status of a supra-national level "pressure group", whilst highlighting an as yet underdeveloped policy field where the Government may purposefully intervene at both the nation and supra-national levels. Whereas Greenpeace "blames" the Government actors and Friends of the Earth criticises by constructing an alternative policy agenda, the World Wide Fund for Nature defines an arena for possible future co-operation between themselves and the Government at a supra-national level.

---

[74] The visual database shows that environmental issues "E" are high prominence in article (WWF P) and highest prominence in (WWF Q).

[75] Unlike 'risk' themes, such as radiation or toxic waste pollution, which are based on scientific uncertainty at the by-products of technological production, a claim referring to the extinction of a species is less disputable and controversial.

[76] The creation of new political spaces at the supranational level is a key activity of the World Wide Fund for Nature (Princen and Finger 1994).

c.ii.3) Postscript: the week after

Like Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature has less coverage in the week following the White Paper "news event" (**graph w.c**). Earlier I stated that this partial withdrawal from the media agenda was orchestrated by the movement to enable the journalists to evaluate the White Paper "news event". In this week a further article refers to the World Wide Fund for Nature.

Chaos threatens climate conference (WWF R), deals with the supra-national intergovernmental attempts to regulate the preservation of forests, and reduction of carbon dioxide and CFC emissions, within the environmental theme of global warming. A World Wide Fund for Nature spokesperson is cited commenting on the negotiating problems faced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in building an agenda for a global warming convention. This article continues the trend in the World Wide Fund for Nature's discourse pattern from the end of the "event" newsweek. In this case, however, the preservation issue only appears as an element of the global warming theme. In effect the subordination of preservation to the global warming theme extends the World Wide Fund for Nature's discourse. Global warming makes preservation a "contested" and policy relevant environmental theme. Accordingly the World Wide Fund for Nature enters into constructive criticism on the supra-national governmental level.[77] This example shows the World Wide Fund for Nature acting as a "pressure group" at the supra-national level. The organisation is staking a claim for a role in the emergent supra-national regulation of environmental problems.

d) The "Epilogue": signs for the future?

The "epilogue" phase of the White Paper "news cycle" occurs from the week commencing 8th October, until the end of the survey sample (**graph D.II**). This discourse constitutes a special phase in the agenda-setting/agenda-building activities of the environmental organisations. After discrediting the Government's White Paper proposals the organisations start mobilising the environmental themes and government/industry

[77] The article has a combination of high prominence environmental issues "E" and government responsibility issues "G" (visual database).

responsibility contexts which re-define the future policy options for the British environmental agenda.

The mass media concern for the environmental concerns generated by the White Paper "event" decreases as the topic's peak "news value" status declines. Nonetheless specific sections of the media take a more specialised interest in environmental affairs. They start evaluating the consequences of the new changes for each specific interest field and public policy arena.

The "epilogue" phase is the last chance for environmental organisations to re-mobilise "packages" for their own favoured policy agenda before environmental affairs return to *business as usual* status. The news agenda in this phase is constituted by news reports which evaluate the longer term 'effects' of the White Paper. It presents an opportunity for mobilising specialised environmental claims as policy-related "packages"[78] that may be picked up and used by the journalists who have to report on the 'future consequences' of the White Paper on a specific field. At the same time this reconstructed policy "package" may filter through to the next generation of decision-makers by becoming the informed and authoritative version for advancements in environmental policy.

d.i) Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace

The visual database shows that the "epilogue" discourse covers fourteen *active references* to Friends of the Earth (FoE g to t inc.) and ten to Greenpeace (Gpc T to c inc.). **Graphs f.d** and **g.d** illustrate the "epilogue" phases of the Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace discourses. Whereas Friends of the Earth rises to a peak in the third week of the "epilogue", Greenpeace's discourse pattern has a general tendency to decrease steadily during the last phase of the "news cycle". This indicates that the "epilogue" discourse has a different 'news value' for the two organisations. It provides a different structure of access to the news and a different context for communication possibilities. For Friends of the Earth the "epilogue" is an important phase for mobilising environmental claims. In contrast

[78] To recap: an environmental claim is a specific "package" that combines the elements of environmental issues "E", government responsibility issues "G", and issues relating to the activities of the organisations "A". It is not simply an environmental issue but has a social context of production - namely the environmental contest between actors - which shapes the boundaries and significance of its semantic meaning.

Greenpeace's decline in resonance indicates that the organisation returns to *business as usual* more quickly than Friends of the Earth. In the "epilogue" phase there are no prime environmental "news events" for Greenpeace to target, the organisation returns to staging its own "events".

As the "epilogue" is primarily an arena for specialist policy-related claims, this difference confirms Friends of the Earth's closer affinity to national environmental policy affairs than Greenpeace. In addition it shows that Greenpeace's coverage is regulated more by the immediacy of the actual "news events", whereas Friends of the Earth seeks media attention with the longer term aim of entering the decision-makers' discourse on environmental affairs.

The "news event" peak (**c.i**) above) has shown that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have different communication strategies for influencing the environmental policy agenda through the media. Indeed the development of a national policy agenda appears to be a secondary concern to Greenpeace but a primary focus of concern for Friends of the Earth. This *division of labour* is evident in a distinction in timing between their communications for the White Paper: when the Greenpeace "scandal-mongers" depart from the environmental news agenda, it is time for the Friends of the Earth "diplomats" to take up the reins.

This distinction is produced by the different *contents* of the organisations' mobilisations, namely their respective 'public appearances', rather than the strategic intentions of their communicative actions which were similar and well co-ordinated for the immediate policy event. The two media-orientated organisations 'hide' the direct links of their communications activities from the public discourse during the White Paper "event". It is strategically important for them to appear distinct. Nonetheless, it is clear that Friends of the Earth's and Greenpeace's communication strategies are not only compatible but that they are specifically co-ordinated to be complementary to the respective and the common goals of the movement.

During the first newsweek of the "epilogue", commencing 8th October, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace achieve similar patterns of resonance (**graphs f.d** and **g.d**). Relative to the last newsweek of the "news event" phase the two organisations achieve a high resonance. In both cases environmental issues "E" are the most prominent discourse element. This discourse pattern constitutes a 'shift' from the "news event" peaks, where the government responsibility issues "G" are the most dominant element. It shows that on

entering the "epilogue" phase both organisations revert to a strategy for making the environmental themes 'speak for themselves' rather than using explicit "blaming" strategies against the Government. The organisations' campaigns start to employ more constructive environmental claims vis-à-vis the Government actors in comparison to the "news event" peak. This indicates a return to more moderate communication strategies against the Government actors.[79]

The first newsweek of the "epilogue" phase is the peak for Greenpeace (**graph g.d**). Four articles are mobilised (Gpc T U V W).[80] This produces a discourse pattern that is similar to Greenpeace's *business as usual* peak on the week commencing 13th August (**graph g.a**). However, at the "epilogue" peak the three discourse elements are more closely integrated than they were in the earlier campaign. In the *business as usual* phase the issues relating to the activities of the organisation "W" were only a *subtext* and not an integral element in the discourse. Relative to the *business as usual* phase, this shows that Greenpeace's "epilogue" communication maintains the activities of the organisation as a prominent discourse element. Rather than returning directly to *business as usual* communication, it appears that Greenpeace's claims continue to promote itself as an environmental "actor" into the "epilogue" phase. Even after the "news event" peak Greenpeace's role as an "actor" is emphasised in the discourse, but how does the representation of Greenpeace's 'public image' shift in the "epilogue" phase?

Mersey polluters breached limits 859 times (Gpc T) and *Poland 'used as dumping ground' for toxic waste* (Gpc W) are texts which exhibit the same structure and "weighted" combination of discourse elements (visual database). The environmental issues "E" and government responsibility issues "G" have a high prominence, and the organisation's activity issues "A" a relatively low prominence. In contrast, *Greenpeace told to leave N-Test site* (Gpc U) and its untitled sequel (Gpc V) both make the issues relating to the organisation's activities "A" the most prominent discourse element. Here the analysis of the texts (visual database) indicates that there are two types of Greenpeace communication in this newsweek.

---

[79] The 'shift' in the emphasis of the discourse is a continuation of a trend that is identifiable at its genesis in the later stages of the "news event" phase.

[80] For the week of 8th October, Greenpeace's environmental issues "E" are more prominent than the government responsibility issues "G", and both are more prominent in the discourse than issues relating to the organisation's activities "A" (**graph g.d**).

It shows that two different Greenpeace mobilisation strategies are employed simultaneously in the news discourse in the first "epilogue" week. In the first case, the actions of Greenpeace are less prominent.[81] The articles criticise the discharge of industrial effluent into Britain's rivers (Gpc T) and exports of toxic waste by Western European nations to the former Eastern Europe for dumping (Gpc W). Environmental themes are discussed in a policy context, but the British Government are not the explicit targets for these "blaming" strategies. Indeed for the national river pollution case, the "blamed" actors are multi-national chemical companies ICI, Pilkington, Laporte, and Shell. For the European toxic waste theme Western companies again take the "blame", whilst the European Community is urged to act. This marks a return to "blaming" strategies which do not simply discredit the British Government as an "environmental actor". In the second case, the actions of Greenpeace are more prominent.[82] Two Greenpeace protest stunts "make the news". A Greenpeace ship confronts the Soviet Navy over nuclear testing in the Arctic (Gpc U), and Greenpeace activists stage a "suffragette" style direct action by chaining themselves to the Soviet Embassy in Berlin to protest about the same issue two days later (Gpc V). In contrast to the "news event" phase, these protest stunts are world rather than national "events". Indeed they mark a return to the famous traditional Greenpeace direct actions that first brought attention to the organisation on the global stage.[83]

Together these two Greenpeace strategies re-mobilise campaign themes that were prominent prior to the "news event" phase (Gpc C I J). In addition, Greenpeace not only refrains from explicit criticism of the British Government but it shifts the "blame" to multi-national industries and the level of supra-national governmental regulation. After the exceptional "news event" weeks had tied its activities to the national context, Greenpeace

---

[81] Here Greenpeace's activity issues "A" are a *subtext* of the more prominent environmental issues "E" and government responsibility issues "G".

[82] For these articles Greenpeace's activity issues "A" are the *context* for the less (or equally) prominent environmental issues "E" and less prominent government responsibility issues "G" (Gpc U V).

[83] This type of direct protest action is a key element of the Greenpeace public image. Greenpeace has used this global "David v Goliath" narrative since its origin, inviting the public to participate in a 'real' adventure story. The organisation intentionally promotes this invitation for the masses to become pioneers in 'real adventures' by documenting its actions in adventure story-book narratives. See for example *Greenpeace III: Journey to the Bomb* (McTaggart & Hunter 1978), or *Rainbow Warrior: The French attempt to sink Greenpeace* (Morgan & Whittaker 1986).

needs to re-assert its "global" orientation.[84] At the same time it is important for Greenpeace not to become too closely identified with the national policy discourse which has dominated its recent "news events". Greenpeace must be seen to 'bear witness to the world', not the British environmental policy field. In effect Greenpeace is 'normalising' its public image by a dual communication strategy. It is also worth noting that both types of Greenpeace communication are "actor versus actor" narratives that are pinned onto "news events". At the "news event" peak it was "Greenpeace v Environment Minister", now this becomes "Greenpeace v multi-national industries" or "Greenpeace v Soviet Government". In the latter cases the "blaming" strategies focus on themes in the environmental discourse rather than ridiculing the character traits of a Government personality. Nonetheless, this confirms that Greenpeace's "blaming" strategies rely on "oppositional actor" narratives which are embedded in a newsworthy "event".[85]

Rather than mobilising a reasoned argumentation of the environmental problematic, Greenpeace communications tend instead to promote a high public profile for the organisation, as a newsworthy "actor". In other words, Greenpeace campaigns through its own public image - the themes of environmental problematic are raised as an element of the organisation's own culture. Indeed the close semantic relation in Greenpeace's news discourse between the organisation's image and 'the environmental contest' - environmental problematics appear through a filter of the narrative about organisation's activities - indicates that its mobilisation strategies have an inbuilt populist orientation.[86]

As it aims to appeal to a general audience, Greenpeace retains the diversity to represent itself as more than one type of "actor" in the news. The organisation's image must be able to speak with more than one "public voice" so that it may appeal to diverse elements of a general audience. These examples from the "epilogue" illustrate that Greenpeace's public image is an important element in its communication campaigns. The river pollution and toxic waste themes show Greenpeace acting as a 'responsible' environmental organisation. They

---

[84] Like the World Wide Fund for Nature, Greenpeace is a key actor in the emerging supranational level of environmental regulation (Princen and Finger 1994).

[85] I develop this point further in the next section E) on explicit framing devices.

[86] That the environmental problematic is lodged as an element of the organisation's image in the Greenpeace "package", limits the discursive depth and range of environmental issues in Greenpeace's news discourse. Subsequently, the organisation's communications are 'populist', they tend to target a general rather than an expert or informed audience.

offer journalists and decision-makers a news story that highlights a problem area in the environmental policy field. The world-wide protest against nuclear testing is a traditional Greenpeace campaign, it is long running and without an imminent policy solution. As a news story, it serves to promote the Greenpeace tradition and the organisation's longstanding role in popular culture as "daring pioneers".

The cases show that Greenpeace plays the fool and the legitimate "environmental actor" at the same time. These diverse roles require two different types of news story that run parallel to each other. This confirms both the high dependency of Greenpeace mobilisations on their "news value", and the high compatibility between the different Greenpeace "packages" and a specific *genre* of news story. It appears that Greenpeace's mobilisation "packages" are specifically designed to make news stories about confrontations between actors. In addition, Greenpeace's flexibility in tuning its image to specific communication priorities indicates that it exerts a considerable degree of "definitional power" over the way that its activities are reported by the media as news. This shows that Greenpeace primarily acts so that its "packages" of claims are deliberately tuned to the values of news formats. It is perhaps more successful than any other environmental organisation at shaping its own news coverage.

> "(T)here are only a small number of stories, so you repeat them with endless variations .. I don't know whether Greenpeace ever sit down and analyse this, I bet they do .. I mean they are really good at the media .. (T)he more you can position your argument, the more you can position your issue in terms of a story, the more you are likely to get into the media. I mean, you need stories, that's what it sells .. it doesn't sell truth, that's all .. vanity. They sell stories and they sell opinions. But .. only a small number of newspapers sell opinions. They mainly market stories and the environment's a wonderful supplier of stories.."[87]

Greenpeace's "packages" maintain a high "news value" rather than a high quality of

[87] Tom Burke, Interview *EUI Project No. 42*, December 1990.

environmental information. Nonetheless, Greenpeace may be the *primary definer*[88] of its own news discourse.

Playing the fool and being a legitimate actor in the environmental discourse may become contradictory roles. If Greenpeace continues to place priority on the "news value" of a "package" relative to the quality of environmental information, then the organisation may exclude itself from the environmental agenda in favour of simply making the news agenda. The advent of 'the environment' as a news specialism may shift the criteria of "news values" away from Greenpeace's actor-based news stories.[89] Instead the quality of environmental information may become a more prominent criteria of environmental news. The *Daily Telegraph*'s first environmental correspondent, Charles Clover, describes how Greenpeace's mobilisation tactics may devalue the organisation's long term credibility as an environmental news source:

> "Far too often some of the pressure groups rely on questionable science, rather than commissioning their own independent research or getting to know the appropriate independent scientist. Greenpeace, just now, are the worst offenders. I am not alone in being heartily sick of yet another press release from Greenpeace - e.g. a recent one on 'Acid rain and human health' - based on the findings of some unheard-of American scientist whose credentials are impossible to check out. Reporting scare stories unchecked just gets environmentalists, and environmental correspondents, a bad name."[90]

Similarly, *The Independent*'s Richard North claims that he no longer reads the material which Greenpeace sends him:

---

[88] The organisation initiates, produces and "packages" the information which is processed into news formats by journalists. The Greenpeace case is prime example of "definitional power" by a *source* actor in the news, an aspect of the communication process that has often been overlooked by media analysis (Schlesinger 1990). Indeed both Anderson (1991) and Schlesinger (1990) sharpen the concept of *primary definer* to focus on the role of sources as actors who construct the *content* of news.

[89] In fact as the case of the *Brent Spar* oil platform in 1995 indicates, Greenpeace's stunts continue to achieve a high media profile simultaneously across Europe.

[90] Clover C. (1988), *Interesting but is it News?*, in Elkington, Burke, Hailes (eds.).

"In the end I stopped reading it altogether because I thought .. while a bit of it will be right and it will all be for the greater good of mankind, substantially it will be wrong in its science or its evidence or its balance."[91]

This suggests that there may be a historical time limit on the "news value" of Greenpeace's existing communication "packages". As journalists become better informed and more discerning, their reception of information from environmental organisations is likely to be more selective. In the citation above, Clover and North demand a more rigorous scientific validation for the organisations' environmental claims. For policy actors 'valid' scientific claims are the most legitimate basis for making arguments. Environmental "problems" are not only raised but must be founded in authoritative scientific knowledge. The emergence of environmental journalism as a specialist field may simply indicate that the environmental discourse is becoming established on the political agenda. Nonetheless, such a change is likely in the long term to promote the "news value" of the type of organisations, like Friends of the Earth, with aspirations to be environmental policy actors. Indeed the "epilogue" phase of the White Paper serves as a 'trial run' for such organisations to legitimate their policy-making credentials.

From the perspective that it is highly skilled at appealing to "news values", Greenpeace may be deemed the most subversive of the media-oriented environmental organisations. Whether its campaign "packages" contribute as much as Friends of the Earth's to raising the environmental discourse, in the sense of 'environmental consciousness', is less clear.[92] However, the emergence of a specialist environmental news field may force Greenpeace to re-dress or diversify the *content* of its mobilisations. Greenpeace specialises in news innovation. If it is unable to fulfil the specialist requirements of environmental journalists and become a full time legitimate news source, it seems likely that the organisation will be pushed to a non-specialist arena of news. Indeed Greenpeace's "story-making" credentials make their mobilisations a perfect fit to the populist "news values" of the tabloids. Rather than existing at the margins of the specialist news field, it is more likely

---

[91] Interview 15/03/89 cited Anderson (1991).

[92] By 'environmental consciousness' I mean the cognitive praxis of the movement (Jamison, Eyerman et al 1990).

that Greenpeace will extend their repertoire to the mainstream popular press.[93]

As in the case of Greenpeace, the "epilogue" phase enables Friends of the Earth to experiment in the special potential of a policy-orientated news discourse - a discourse that is more specialised than the 'normal' environmental coverage.

Friends of the Earth's first week in the "epilogue" phase has similar characteristics to that of Greenpeace (**graph f.d**). Like Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth appears in four articles (FoE g h i j). Once more the high prominence of environmental issues "E" shows that the organisation's communication strategies aim to re-mobilise those issues that may have been obscured in the actor-based discourse of the "news event" phase.[94]

On the week commencing 8th October, Friends of the Earth mobilises environmental themes concerning: renewable energy (wind) and landscape aesthetics (FoE g); river pollution by agriculture and industry (FoE h); farming techniques and the use of agrochemicals (FoE i); and risks to public health from Nuclear plant radiation (FoE j). These articles raise a set of environmental themes that were prominent in the Friends of the Earth pre-"news event" discourse. In a literal sense, they serve the function of a public reminder. Earlier, I identified this public reminder function as a feature of Greenpeace's early "epilogue". However, there is a difference in the rationale of the two organisations' mobilisation strategies. In contrast to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth were more constructive than Greenpeace in their "blaming" criticisms of the Government during the White Paper "event". The organisation did not simply subject Government policy actors to public ridicule. As a consequence, Friends of the Earth do not need to re-legitimise their status as authoritative "actors" in the national policy agenda. Instead of attempting to re-establish its image with journalists as a "political actor", Friends of the Earth's early "epilogue" has a different purpose. It sets the tone for the specific policy criticisms that will be mobilised during the next two weeks of the "epilogue" phase.

In the second and third weeks of the "epilogue" the government responsibility issues "G" are the dominant element in the Friends of the Earth discourse (**graph f.d**). On the

---

[93] The tabloid press in Britain has already started to realize the potential of "environmental stories". For example, the *Braer* oil tanker disaster 1993 ran for two days on the front page of *The Sun* as a "story" about polluted birds. The *Daily Mail*'s "Save Our Seals" campaign in 1988 is one of the first examples of the popular press leading with environmental news. (Love 1990) (Anderson 1993).

[94] This trend towards re-constructing the elements for an environmental agenda is also evident in the last week of Friends of the Earth's "news event" phase.

newsweek commencing 15th October, Friends of the Earth's government responsibility issues "G" displace the environmental issues "E" as the most prominent discourse element. In the third week of the "epilogue", these government responsibility issues "G" rise to a peak resonance and become the *context* of Friends of the Earth's discourse.[95] **Graph f.d** shows that this shift in emphasis occurs during the two weeks of the "epilogue" when Greenpeace fades away from prominence on the news agenda. The discourse patterns show that the "epilogue" is of greater strategic importance to Friends of the Earth than Greenpeace. Whereas Greenpeace simply attempts to remain on the general news agenda, Friends of the Earth presents its constructive policy-related criticisms in the 'specialist' environmental news agenda. The exceptionally high resonance of government responsibility issues "G" indicates that Friends of the Earth's discourse is composed of targeted "blaming" strategies during the "epilogue". But what form does this emphasis on government/industry responsibility contexts take? Who do Friends of the Earth "blame" for what, and how?

In these two weeks of the "epilogue" the information mobilised by Friends of the Earth takes a systematic critical approach to the environmental policy agenda in Britain. Two articles on the second week, describe Friends of the Earth participating in the Labour Party's launch of "An Earthly Chance" - the Opposition document on environmental policy (FoE k l). Friends of the Earth add legitimacy to the Opposition's policies by their active presence at the press launch. Indeed this activity establishes Friends of the Earth's credentials as a potential environmental policy "actor".[96] The articles refer primarily to domestic environmental themes: the future of nuclear power; roads and traffic; carbon dioxide emissions; energy conservation; river pollution and water quality; and food standards (FoE k l). Friends of the Earth's favoured regulatory policy options are outlined for controlling emissions, water quality, energy labelling, "green" mortgages, recycling, car-taxes, and the

---

[95] On the week commencing 22nd October, the government responsibility issues "G" are exceptionally prominent in the Friends of the Earth discourse. They are more resonant than any other discourse element at any time during the "news cycle" (except for "news event" peak). The government responsibility issues "G" are also considerably more prominent than the environmental issues "E" which indicates they are a type of "blaming" frame.

[96] This repeats a story from the "prologue" phase where Friends of the Earth are reported to be in negotiations with Labour leaders over environmental policy options (FoE R, section **b.i**)). Here the reported Opposition policy agenda includes proposals on Friends of the Earth's key campaign issues. This indicates that Friends of the Earth used the White Paper "event" as a way of establishing contacts and negotiating with the Opposition.

building of new nuclear power stations. The organisation's options are attributed a high profile and their participation is seen as a valued contribution to the policy-making process.

Friends of the Earth's support for Labour's environmental agenda gives it the opportunity to demonstrate its "interest group" credentials and embarrass the Government's environmental policy-makers over their lack of consultation during preparation of the White Paper. The news discourse allows Friends of the Earth to experiment with the image of a legitimate environmental policy "actor". At the same time, Friends of the Earth are able to apply a constructive "blaming" strategy to the Government's new policy agenda. The organisation defines a set of potential contexts for Government regulatory action, by highlighting environmental policy options that are different to those of the Government that have been de-legitimated by the White Paper "event".[97] This indicates an attempt to 'court' the influential decision-makers who will decide on any future policy directions that may be taken by the Government. Rather than simply binding its policy options to the alternative agenda of the Opposition, Friends of the Earth are in fact attempting to reconstruct a new notion for an environmental policy agenda. The organisation is setting the boundaries of the discourse for a future policy agenda in British politics. Its "blaming" is critical but highly constructive.

For example, *Draft prospectus for power sell-off leaked* (FoE r) and *Cuts in farm cash "will cause exodus"* (FoE s) appear at Friends of the Earth's "epilogue" peak.[98] In the first case, Friends of the Earth launch "secret" drafts of the Government's plans for energy privatisation as an "event" for mobilising criticisms relating to the possible environmental consequences of the de-regulation proposals. In the second, the policy debate over the Government's agricultural subsidises is used as an "event" for Friends of the Earth to criticise the use of agrochemicals and farming practices. In both cases Friends of the Earth use "policy events" as an opportunity for mobilising environmental claims. Each time the environmental claim contests the Government's regulation by market forces and offers 'interventionist' alternatives. The organisation is able to shift the context of the debate to a focus on two of its key policy campaigns, namely energy production and agricultural

---

[97] This process of 'alternative specification' by interest groups for policy communities is an important aspect of the policy agenda-building process (Kingdon 1984).

[98] These two articles have highest prominence government responsibility issues "G" (FoE r s) (see visual database).

practices. At the same time environmental claims become a basis for defining the role of Government as a legitimate regulatory policy actor. Framing devices are mobilised which de-legitimise the Government's claim that the market and environmental regulation are compatible programmes. In effect the policy debates are re-orientated to a discussion about Friends of the Earth's favoured policy options and specialised interest topics. The spectre of an 'interventionist' state environmental policy is re-mobilised.

Lucas turns blind eye to worries on diesel emissions (FoE p) and *Greenpeace puts company in dock* (FoE q Gpc a) appear on the same week. These articles combine high prominence environmental issues "E" with high prominence government responsibility issues "G".[99] In the first article, Friends of the Earth "blames" the motor industry for not developing technological innovations that comply with environmental standards. Policy targets for cutting emissions appear as a critical sub-discourse to the main "blaming" strategy. In the second article, Albright & Wilson, a multi-national chemical company are "blamed" for illegally discharging waste into the sea and the implementation of European regulatory emissions standards appears as a critical sub-discourse. In this case Greenpeace stage an "event" to "blame" the Industrial actor, whereas Friends of the Earth relate the environmental theme to the national policy context.[100] Once more Friends of the Earth shifts the discourse to a policy context where the organisation has a policy alternative. Industrial rather than Government actors are explicitly "blamed", but in a way that highlights a 'potentiality' for the Government to regulate industry's environmentally harmful activities through the policy formation and implementation process.

This shows a difference between the "blaming" strategies of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. Greenpeace "blames" the Government "actors" at the "news event" peak, whereas Friends of the Earth's "blaming" strategies operate principally in the aftermath of the "news event". Friends of the Earth's "blaming" strategies are policy constructive. Indeed the organisation employs *reason* rather than *ridicule* in its "blaming" strategies. This

---

[99] In contrast to the articles (FoE r s), these two only have high rather than highest prominence government responsibility issues "G" (FoE p q) (visual database). This indicates that for (FoE p q) the government responsibility issues "G" are highly prominent but are more integrated with other discourse elements in the text than (FoE r s). In other words, the environmental issues "E" are more prominent than in the policy debate.

[100] It is reported that Friends of the Earth have referred the Government to the European Commission because the cadium discharges from the chemical works exceed the limits of an European directive (FoE q, Gpc a).

complies with the need for Friends of the Earth to establish itself as a potential actor in the policy field. Whereas Greenpeace led the environmental movement through the brief moment of media glory at the White Paper "event", Friends of the Earth are more influential in setting a critical but rational tone for re-evaluation of the future policy options.

Friends of the Earth's "epilogue" reconstructs an alternative policy agenda to the White Paper in the public discourse. Information is mobilised relating alternative proposals for the following "problem" areas: river pollution (FoE h m q), agricultural practices and pesticide use (FoE i m s), domestic energy consumption (FoE n), transportation of toxic substances (FoE o), car emissions (FoE p), energy production (FoE r). This shows that Friends of the Earth are able to raise their key national campaign fields in the "epilogue" phase. It confirms that the organisation's strategies are adept at entering and guiding the policy-related phase of the news discourse.[101]

In addition the organisation is able to flex its 'interest group' aspirations by collaborating with the Labour Party's production of an alternative environmental policy agenda. This provides another news forum for Friends of the Earth's key campaign themes and favoured policy options. As the "cycle" of high resonance draws to a close in the final week, the "epilogue" discourse has provided a forum for Friends of the Earth to strategically mobilise its favoured policy options.

Is this the dawning of the age of awareness? Judith Watt reports on Katherine Hamnett's campaign for environmentally friendly cotton (FoE t), is the final article in the Friends of the Earth "epilogue" discourse. Here Friends of the Earth adds vocal support to an initiative from the fashion industry and the Pesticides Trust, *Green Cotton 2000*, for promoting cotton that has been grown and treated by methods which limit the damage to the environment by pesticides and chemicals. Friends of the Earth are willing to give public consent to environmental initiatives that are made by industry. This indicates a further dimension of the organisation's 'interest group' aspirations. Establishing bargaining roles with industrial actors will be a feature of any future possibility that Friends of the Earth may have to act as an environmental 'interest group' or be part of a policy community. In contrast

---

[101] For Friends of the Earth's national campaign fields and favoured policy options, see the organisation's report, *How Green is Britain? The Government's Environmental Record* (Friends of the Earth 1990). The publication appeared soon after the White Paper, actually in the "epilogue" phase. At the end of each chapter a list of policy proposals appears for each campaign field. This report is further evidence of Friends of the Earth's strategy for framing the debate for a reconstruction of the national environmental policy agenda.

Greenpeace only appears to criticise industrial actors in the public discourse.

Graph g.d shows that Greenpeace's resonance decreases over the two weeks of the "epilogue", when Friends of the Earth's constructive "blaming" strategies are highly prominent. In contrast to Friends of the Earth, this phase of the White Paper "news cycle" presents fewer opportunities for Greenpeace. Greenpeace's aims have less affinity with the pragmatic steps of establishing an alternative set of national policy-options. Greenpeace only enters the discourse when "news events" coincide with one of their key campaign themes, or when they themselves make a "news event". For example, they enter the news on the Labour Party's alternative environmental agenda to "blame" the Labour leaders for going back on promises they had made regarding the Sellafield Nuclear plant (Gpc Y). Similarly, *River attack* (Gpc Z) reports a Greenpeace direct action as the prelude to a further staged "news event", namely Greenpeace's legal action against the illegal discharges of chemical waste by the multi-national Albright and Wilson (Gpc a FoE q).[102]

Even when government responsibility issues "G" become a more dominant element of the Greenpeace discourse in that last week of the sample **(graph g.d)**, this does not indicate a constructive appeal to the national policy agenda. Instead the articles concern the global themes of mineral extraction in the Antarctic (Gpc b; WWF V) and Nuclear testing (Gpc c) within a supra-national rather than national policy context. In other words, Greenpeace maintain their *business as usual* communication strategies that are characterised by direct actions, stunts and "blaming" Government and industry actors. As far as Greenpeace is concerned, the national environmental policy agenda merits little elaboration, unless there is good "Public Relations" image-capital to be made.

d.ii) World Wide Fund for Nature

The visual database shows that the "epilogue" discourse covers four references to the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF S to V inc.). On the first week of the "epilogue" phase the World Wide Fund for Nature is absent from the media agenda. The organisation's

---

[102] The article *Greenpeace puts company in dock* (Gpc a, FoE q) illustrates the *division of communicative labour* between Greenpeace and Friends of Earth in the "epilogue" phase. Greenpeace make the "news event" and directly blame the Industry "actor", whereas Friends of the Earth introduce a national regulatory policy context to the discourse.

coverage is concentrated in the second and third newsweeks of the "epilogue" before it disappears once more from the news agenda in the final week **(graph w.d)**.

The distribution of resonance indicates that the World Wide Fund for Nature 'targets' its environmental claims to peak at the second week of the "epilogue". Earlier I showed that Friends of the Earth's claims for reconstructing the national policy agenda peak in the third week of the "epilogue" **(d.i)** above). This indicates that the organisations with primary interests in the national and international dimensions of the Government's policy agenda focus their claims on different newsweeks. It is plausible that Friends of the Earth and the World Wide Fund for Nature co-ordinated the timing of their peak communications so that their claims do not compete for coverage. Which dimensions of the environmental policy agenda do the World Wide Fund for Nature's claims reconstruct during the "epilogue" phase?

On the week commencing 15th October the World Wide Fund for Nature appears in three articles (WWF S T U), followed by another on the next week (WWF V). At the peak resonance on the second newsweek the organisation's discourse pattern is similar to that in the last week of the "prologue" when it is attempting to advance claims for the forthcoming "event" and 'normalise' its discourse after the scandal "event" **(b.ii)** above).[103] This implies that in the "epilogue" the World Wide Fund for Nature is mobilising a concentrated series of "packages" that make *business as usual* claims.

In contrast to Friends of the Earth, environmental issues "E" are more prominent than government responsibility issues "G" in the World Wide Fund for Nature's "epilogue" peak (compare **graphs f.d** and **w.d**). In the "epilogue" Friends of the Earth's claims construct a context for Government or Industry actors to change their ineffective or harmful activities **(d.i)** above). Instead the World Wide Fund for Nature's discourse pattern indicates that it attempts to reconstruct elements of the policy agenda by raising environmental themes which 'speak for themselves'. This confirms that in contrast to Friends of the Earth, the World Wide Fund for Nature's constructive criticisms of policy fields are carried by elaborating the specific environmental theme. Friends of the Earth's criticisms communicate by constructing an action-context for implementing alternative policy options. This difference indicates that

---

[103] In both cases the environmental issues "E" are the most prominent discourse element, with government responsibility issues "G" less prominent and the issues relating to the organisation's activities "A" a *subtext* of the discourse (graphs **w.b** and **w.d**).

Friends of the Earth's communications are more oppositional to the activities of Government and Industry, whereas the World Wide Fund for Nature dispute the environmental thematic priorities of the existing policy agenda rather than the proposed mechanisms for environmental regulation.

The land of a thousand islands gets another dressing down. Fred Pearce Indonesia (WWF S) raises the preservation of mangrove forests in Indonesia. As in the latter stages of the "news event" phase (**c.ii**) above) the World Wide Fund for Nature raises the preservation theme in association with the potential for supra-national intergovernmental regulation. Earlier forest preservation was mobilised as an element of the "global warming" theme to relate the possibility for a supra-national regulation of climate change (WWF R). In this case forest preservation is mobilised as an element of "sustainable development" which similarly shifts the focus of the theme onto a context for the supra-national regulation of timber logging. The World Wide Fund for Nature continues to make public its aspirations to be a leading "pressure group" actor in the emergent supra-national agenda.

On the following day the World Wide Fund for Nature re-enters the national environmental agenda appearing in two articles (WWF T U). *Antique rhino horn trade halted after thefts from country houses* (WWF T) raises the theme of illegal international trade in rare species by relating how the Department of the Environment has banned the buying and selling of rhino horn. This re-mobilises a supra-national theme from the "news event" phase (WWF P) and at the same time puts the World Wide Fund for Nature and the Department of the Environment in a co-operative role at the national level. The implication is that this co-operation may be purposefully extended to the supra-national level of regulation. It is also worth noting that article is written by *The Guardian*'s environmental correspondent Paul Brown. This confirms the existence of a regular channel of communication between Brown and the World Wide Fund for Nature and the utility of this contact as a resource for the organisation to enter the media agenda.

Putting the 'car' in caring (WWF U) appears in the *Motoring* section of *The Guardian*. The World Wide Fund for Nature gives support to a business initiative called the Environmental Transport Association which promotes less use of the car and campaigns against Government transport policies but at the same time provides services to motorists. This example illustrates that like Friends of the Earth, the World Wide Fund for Nature is prepared to enter into environmental initiatives with business actors. In addition this

sponsorship of the Environmental Transport Association enables the World Wide Fund for Nature to re-mobilise a key national campaign theme - road building as a threat to habitats - from the "prologue" phase (WWF M).

The final article covering the World Wide Fund for Nature appears in the third week and is once more written by the environmental correspondent Paul Brown. *The new cold war* (WWF V Gpc b) raises the preservation of Antarctica as a theme which previews the forthcoming Antarctic Treaty Conference in Chile. It is the only article which explicitly mentions the White Paper in the World Wide Fund for Nature's "epilogue" phase. The World Wide Fund for Nature are depicted in a national lobbying alliance with Greenpeace against the Government. The British Government's pro-mining stance is shown to be odds with nations such as Australia, France, Italy, Belgium and New Zealand and reference is even made to Britain as the 'Dirty Man of Europe'. Here the World Wide Fund for Nature "blames" the Government, but does so under cover of the association with Greenpeace and the critical authorship of the environmental correspondent. This shows that the organisation are less likely than either Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace to directly "blame" or scandalise the Government actions in the public discourse. At the same time the World Wide Fund for Nature's claims serve once more to construct a supra-national policy agenda. The claims push for specific measures and a role for the organisation within the emergent supra-national policy agenda.

E) 'Speaking in Tongues' - Image Politics: Accessing and Biasing the News by Cultural Critique

1. Introduction: from collective identity to "public image"

One of the assumptions of this analysis is that the contemporary environmental movement is characterised by the activities of a professionalised sector of organisations which acts strategically in the public culture to achieve political objectives. Historically, this phase of development has replaced the earlier phases of mass mobilisation which were characteristic of the dynamic emergence of the environmental movement in the political mainstream in the mid eighties.[1] The analysis has shown that Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature are organisations which have distinct identities as collective actors who appear in the public discourse. Each of the three organisations uses different types of framing strategies to construct the environmental contest. According to theories on social movement organisations[2] one of the key functions of an organisational structure is that it provides an institutional resource which maintains a future capacity for strategy that is not dependent on the spontaneity of mass mobilisation. Moreover, the organisation's formation of a collective identity constitutes part of this institutional resource.[3] For the case of the established environmental organisations, we may extend this notion of the utility of a

---

[1] See the discussion in the introduction section A. The historical development of the environmental movement which becomes characterised by the increasing dominance of a few professionalised multi-national organisations at the expense of the more spontaneous earlier phases of mobilisation is well documented, see e.g. Eyerman and Jamison (1989), Jamison, Eyerman et al. (1990), Szersynski, Miles et al. (1995) and Rucht (1995).

[2] This perspective initially comes from the resource mobilisation approach which focuses on an organisation's utility of internal resources, e.g (McCarthy and Zald 1977), but is also present in the later political process approaches, e.g. (McAdam 1983), (Kriesi 1991), (Tarrow 1989), which acknowledge the importance of the political opportunities that are available for collective action.

[3] Pizzorno's (1978) essay on collective identity and political exchange cites the example of the trade unions' organisations, which are able to draw on embedded institutional resources to find a basis for political negotiation and bargaining with their opponents even at times when the labour movement is at a low ebb. This implies that an established collective identity serves as a residual resource. Melucci (1980; 1988; 1989) advocates such a position, he states that when identity is produced as part of a more institutionalised form of social action, it may crystallise into a an organisational form, system of rules or leadership pattern. This implies that at a later stage of a movement's development, a collective identity is no longer simply a basis for shaping expectations and calculating the costs and benefits of action, but it becomes routinised into an instrumental resource for negotiating objectives with other collective actors.

collective identity as an institutional resource, and refer to the way that the "**public image**" of an organisation works in the public discourse. The thesis is that environmental organisations use their "public images" to achieve legitimacy for themselves as collective actors, for framing the environmental agenda, and to achieve their political objectives.[4]

The last section **D** dealt with the environmental organisations' public agenda-building mobilisations through the news during a specific set of related key events in the environmental contest. The diachronic analysis of the organisations' communication strategies over the 'Dirty Man of Europe' "news cycle" has provided a detailed account of the *discursive repertoires* of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature in the public discourse. When added to the content analyses of the organisations' "public campaign cultures" in section **C**, such findings have contributed to a new understanding of the role of the environmental organisations as a news source. It appears that by using communication strategies the environmental organisations are able to exert a 'relative' influence over the production side of environmental news. For the special case of environmental news, this constitutes a change in the conventional relationship between the media institutions and their sources in the production of news[5]. Furthermore, it indicates that the environmental organisations are a 'type' of 'collective actor' which is able to exert influence over the media's ability to attribute meaning to events. The environmental organisations' acts of mobilisation into political culture, constitute a type of discursive practice that affects the production of public texts. This intervention into the process whereby events acquire meaning in the public discourse may be referred to as a "framing" potential.[6]

---

[4] One attempt to take account of "public image" as a factor in the development of social movement organisations is the study by Walsh and Cable (1989) on the management dilemmas of movement actvists in attempting to co-ordinate mobilisation after the Three Mile Island accident.

[5] For a critical review of the literature on source-media relations, see Schlesinger (1990). Specifically Schlesinger argues that most media research is too 'media-centric' and that it ought to focus more on the role of news "sources" in the process of the production of the ideological contents of news. This perspective on source strategies has been taken successfully up for analyses of environmental news, see e.g. Anderson (1991; 1993), and on the communication of risk by scientists on climatic change Mormont and Dasnoy (1995).

[6] This notion of a framing potential for environmental organisations arising from a privileged access to specialist knowledge and information resources - resources of factual or moral claims about the environment - replaces the notion of mobilisation potential in the conventional conception of a social movement (e.g. McAdam 1983, Tarrow 1989). The discussion on an extension of the notion of consensus mobilisation in the introduction (section **A**) is pertinent here. The concept of "framing" is widely used as the analytic category for the ideological constructs that are mobilised by social movements to contest opponents, e.g. Snow and Benford et al. (1986), Snow and Benford (1988;1992), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Gitlin (1980), and Eder (1995).

The reconstructions of the environmental communications that are made by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature from the sample on the 'Dirty Man' event (sections C and D), have shown that the organisations construct the elements of their "public images" as a resource for legitimating their interests against other actors in the environmental contest. This finding gives a fresh impetus to the phrase "image politics" for the special case of the environmental organisations. It indicates that a condition for the environmental organisations' ability to engage in political action is that they sustain a permanent presence in the system of public communication. This permanent presence in the system of public communication constitutes the symbolic form of a "public image".[7]

When a "public image" appears in the news, actors are able to recognise and relate the organisations' activities to their social relationships by referring to existing knowledge about them as collective actors. Everyone knows what the organisations stand for in a general sense and so the particular details are easily encompassed within a prior notion of an organisation's "public image". According to theories on the collective identity of social movements, the "visibility" of a social movement in the public sphere serves as a symbolic means or "sign" for building a constituency during periods of mobilisation. For example, Melucci (1988; 1989) articulates such a perspective when he discusses the latency and visibility of social movements: namely, the need to sustain the identity of a movement in submerged actor networks during periods of non-mobilisation and in the public sphere during phases of mobilisation when collective actors confront public policies. The "public image" of a movement organisation that I wish to advocate here, extends this notion for the case of an established movement organisation which has a permanent presence in the public sphere rather than existing through alternating phases or "cycles" of "visible" mass mobilisations and periods of submerged "latency". When an organisation becomes a permanent "sign" in the media discourse - as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature have over the last decade - its potential and strategies for political communication become more sophisticated too. A "public image" constitutes the *institutionalisation* of the identity of a collective actor as an element of the public culture. As such it can be used by

[7] This notion of the "public image" of an organisation requires that the mobilisation of meaning, i.e. "symbolic packaging", is considered to form the basis of collective action. The term "symbolic packaging" is taken from Gamson (1988; 1992; 1995) and Gamson and Modigliani (1989) but is attributed a more central role to the construction of action than it achieves in his work.

an organisation as a strategic resource for negotiating demands with other actors.

The three environmental organisations that I discuss here, constitute the units of an established social movement. These movement organisations all engage in *critiques* of specific policy decisions in the public discourse rather than simply representing a public "sign" of *protest* and opposition to Government.[8] As a form of political action in contemporary societies, environmental protest has shifted from mass confrontations and demonstrations at nuclear sites to the specialised production of normative critiques for the system of public communication. Nowadays, it is by legitimation in the system of public communication rather than by direct action or pressure group negotiation that environmental protest impacts upon the policy decision-making processes of Government in Britain. Accordingly it is the "visibility" of the environmental organisations on the public agenda rather than the mass mobilisation activities of their respective constituencies which is the key factor that determines whether the actions of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature maintain the potential to exert influence over the Government's policy agenda or not. The formation and sustenance of a "public image" is a vital resource for contemporary movements to engage in political confrontations. As far as environmental protest is concerned the 'age of the masses' and mass demonstrations has been surpassed by the 'age of communication' and the "image politics" of a small number of well organised professional activists.

Professional movement intellectuals (Jamison, Eyerman et al. 1990) draw on specialist information resources - "expert" environmental critiques, such as the factual findings of alternative science or the moral claims of deep ecology - and utilise their personal links with the media (and Public Relations) institutions to mobilise critiques against specific Government policy decisions. This process of mediating the environmental critique from the discourses of "experts" to the public discourse of the mass media involves the construction of environmental claims into a political strategy.[9] As elements of a political strategy, the

---

[8] In the introduction (section A) I drew the distinction between the collective actions of the environmental organisations and the less organised and more spontaneous protests such as that against the exportation of live animals in Britain. These constitute two different types of mobilisation that may or may not be complementary.

[9] This also indicates that the communicative actions of environmental organisations may be seen as a link in the process whereby expert and public knowledge resources for environmental concern becomes de-differentiated. Such a process of the de-differentiation of expert and public cultures has been cited as a feature of "postmodernism" (Featherstone 1989).

environmental claims which are mobilised by the organisations must fulfil two requirements: firstly, they have to resonate in the public culture; and secondly, they have to counter and delegitimate the cultural authority of the rationality of Government policy making. The "expertise" of the professional activists of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature lies in their capacity for mediating environmental claims from the obscurity of expert discourses - science and deep ecology - into specific critiques that are pertinent to the public policy decisions that affect everyday lives of the British citizens. This dissertation has undertaken an analysis of this process whereby environmental claims are mediated into the public discourse, a process that I have labelled "environmental mobilisation".

2. Discursive Practices in Public Texts: explicit framing devices and discursive stunts

In section **C** the overall structural contents of the environmental contest that is mobilised into the news by the campaigns of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature were compared. In section **D** a diachronic comparative analysis of the organisations' *discursive framing repertoires* was operationalised over the "cycle" of the Dirty Man event. I now analyse a third dimension of the organisations' environmental agenda-building activities. I look at specific examples of their discursive practices that appear in public texts to identify how the "image politics" of the environmental organisations enables them to exert a "**definitional power**"[10] in the mainstream news coverage. This involves identifying the "framing" strategies of the organisations and the normative constructions which they produce in news narratives. I analyse examples where Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature use discursive practices which directly

[10] Hansen (1993) introduces the concept of "definitional power" in his analysis of how Greenpeace mobilise the environmental contest into the news. However, his analytic use of the term in that research omits the notion of the opponents against whom the environmental contest is waged. Power is based in social relations, and without an adequate concept of the targets of communication strategies - the supporters and opponents in the social contest - it is unclear in relation to who or what "definitional power" is realised. If Hansen's (1993) implication is that "definitional power" is realised relative to journalists rather than opponent actors, then this contradicts his earlier seminal work on the 'complex' social construction of the environmental contest in the news (1991), which rightly rejects the linear model of communication and stresses the inadequacy of the 'media-centredness' of many discourse analytic approaches on agenda-setting/agenda-building. What is required is a notion of "definitional power" that relates the process of the production of public texts to the power relations that are at stake in the social contest over environmental problems.

penetrate the semantic structure of the news narratives of public texts. I refer to such discursive practices as **explicit framing devices** and **discursive stunts**. These are the techniques which are used by environmental activists for "packaging" cultural information into discursive "frames" (such as e.g. direct quotations, comments, use of social metaphors, "catchphrases") which are reproduced "empirically" in the semantic contents of news narratives by journalists when they report the news.[11]

In this section E I use the explicit framing devices and discursive stunts as units of analysis for the discursive practices of Friends of the Earth Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature which appear in the news. The elements of a news narrative that I refer to as explicit framing devices and discursive stunts are linguistic products of a source actor that are used in the make up of a newstext. Explicit framing devices occur when a reporter directly cites the opinion of an activist from an environmental organisation and appear in the form of attributed direct quotations and commentaries. Discursive stunts are metaphors or "catchphrases" that are used by a source actor for interpreting events, and which are then used by the journalist in a non-attributed way. Explicit framing devices and discursive stunts cover a continuum of techniques for environmental activists to make space within a news narrative for lodging "cultural bias".[12]

Explicit framing devices are the direct quotes and citations and discursive stunts the "catchphrases" and metaphors that are "produced" in news narratives by the source strategies of environmental activists. These were coded for each organisation and each article in the analysis (see methodology section B). The examples of explicit framing devices and discursive stunts are cited directly from the texts and provide units of analysis for comparing the "public images" by which the organisations aim to achieve self-legitimation, and the de-legitimation of opponents when they make environmental claims in relation to specific "news

---

[11] Gamson's (1988; 1992) use of the concept of "framing devices" is not always explicit as to whether the identified "frames" are those which are empirically mobilised into public texts by actors or his own interpretation of what in fact the actors are trying to mobilise into the public discourse. I refer to **explicit framing devices** and **discursive stunts** as the former, the semantic parts of a news narrative which may be attributed either directly or indirectly to the statements of a source actor. They are an indicator for how an collective actor presents itself to achieve legitimacy for itself and its arguments in the public discourse - how its visible "public image" constructs contentious political meaning into the language of the public discourse.

[12] An ideology is culturally biased information. On "cultural bias" see the discussion of Mary Douglas (1966; 1975) in the introduction (section A). Thompson (1984) has applied the concept to the cultures of sets of actors who operate with a specific rationality - policy actors and scientists.

events".

Explicit framing devices and discursive stunts are contextualised within the agenda-building contents of a text (that have already been analysed in Section D above by comparing the relative prominence of the three types of issues "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek). They constitute the self-mobilisation of identity by a collective actor in the public discourse. It is by this process of "public image" construction that the organisations' agenda-building activities translate into political strategies.[13] Explicit framing devices and discursive stunts add an extra flavour or character to the mobilisation of the environmental contest because they are linguistic structures with a polemical orientation which make the agenda-building properties of a text's contents into an easily digestible moral contest between actors. In short, the function of explicit framing devices and discursive stunts is to 'gel' the deeper structural agenda-building contents of an environmental mobilisation into a narrative structure of news that may be easily and unreflectively digested by a reader. By comparing the explicit framing devices and discursive stunts of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature it is possible to establish the different types of "definitional power" which the three environmental organisations seek to exert by "image politics" in the public culture.

"Britain - the Dirty Man of Europe" may be seen as an example of both an explicit framing device and discursive stunt that was initiated by Greenpeace (with the consent of the other environmental organisations) and which became the public "catchphrase" for damning the British Government's proposed environmental policy agenda. This example has been discussed at length in section D.[14] Explicit framing devices and discursive stunts are also

---

[13] Benford and Hunt (1988) have highlighted the dramaturgical dimension of social movement action as a potential for challenging power. They identify four analytic dimensions of this type of communicative actions: scripting; staging; performing and interpreting. In my perspective the collective identity of an organisation has become routinised through mass media coverage into a "public image". This achievement of a "public image" then becomes renewed and used by the movement intellectuals as a resource for constructing claims into the media discourse that relate to contemporary political events. In this way the organisations' media resonance as a "public image" constitutes a resource for communicating to a mass constituency and at the same time a resource for challenging the authority of political opponents.

[14] In the terms used by Snow and Benford (1988; 1992) the "Dirty Man" frame would be the "master frame" for the environmental movement's opposition to the Government's policy proposal. Snow and Benfords' approach rightly identifies the collective identity of a social movement organisation as a resource which is used for strategic purposes but tends to refer to "frames" and "master frames" in a generalised rather than an empirical case specific way. This detracts from the potential of "frame" as an analytic concept. Gerhards and Rucht's (1991) empirical case study has shown the role of "masterframes" in enabling different organisations to combine their activities in a protest campaign. In this study the "Dirty Man" masterframe enables the organisations to collaborate against the Government's proposed environmental policy agenda. The "Dirty Man"

mobilised by the organisations in more routine examples of political communication. They may be seen as the cultural "tools" (Swidler 1986) or mechanism by which organisations bind the agenda-setting properties of their mobilisations into a moral narrative that resonates in the public culture of a society. Existing empirically in the texts as polemical linguistic structures, these moral narratives constitute the cultural "pegs" on which the organisations are able to lodge the deeper structural agenda-building contents of their claims (e.g. sets of biased information - scientific "facts", moral and aesthetic appeals) within the structures of news. Explicit framing devices and discursive stunts are symbolically "packaged" (Gamson 1988) to enter the language of the public discourse and to resonate as elements of the public culture. Not only do they add the cultural appeal of "novelty" to the "news value"[15] of environmental policy as a topic, but explicit framing devices and discursive stunts are designed to "stick" in the public culture, so that people begin to use these biased "catchphrases" and polemics for referring to the Government's actions. When they are successful, explicit framing devices and discursive stunts produce the dual effect of bringing previously hidden aspects of environmental policy into mainstream public view and biasing the way in which people evaluate the Government's record on policy. Explicit framing devices and discursive stunts indicate how an organisation utilises the resource of its "visibility" as a collective actor, its "public image", in the public sphere. This process whereby an organisation uses its identity as a strategic resource constitutes a form of "image politics".

The environmental organisations engage in "image politics" by constructing normative oppositions between actors in the texts of public discourse. Here I analyse the "public images" which constitute their identities on the public stage and which they use as a resource for constructing social oppositions to other actors in the environmental contest. Building on the analyses of news contents of the organisations' agenda-building properties (sections C and D above), I compare the explicit framing devices and discursive stunts of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. This comparative analysis will

---

masterframe provides a collective identity for the organised movement sector's campaign and it is within this masterframe that the distinct identities of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature are built and operate for this event. In section D I referred to this as a *division of communicative labour* in the communication activities of the three environmental organisations over the cycle of the policy event.

[15] For a review of the concept of "news values" see Fowler (1991).

show how the organisations use their "public images" in empirical cases where they mobilise political claims. To whom and on what bases do the organisations' "public images" appeal in the news? And how do they use their "public image" to embed normative claims (and political bias) into the public culture?

2.i) Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace

The analysis of the "news cycle" of the Dirty Man event has shown that the environmental organisations have different communication strategies for penetrating and constructing the semantic contents of public texts. In contrast to the World Wide Fund for Nature, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace consistently produce and "package" news contents in all four phases of the "cycle" of the event (see above section **D**). On account of this, the two most media-oriented actors may be considered to be the primary "source" mobilisers in the Dirty Man "news cycle". What are the characteristics of the "public images" that are produced by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace when they mobilise the environmental contest against Government opponents?

The Greenpeace news discourse is based on "actors" and "events" (see section **D**). This indicates that the organisation's communication strategies have a general tendency for "packaging" the environmental contest into news stories which have a high "news value". One cultural techniques that Greenpeace uses for gaining access to the public communication structure is the tactic of direct actions. These incidents of protest actions are deliberately staged as 'novel' stunts to raise the "news value" and profile of coverage (Greenberg 1984; Rucht 1995). There are several examples of this communication strategy in the news sample, including reports on Greenpeace ships sailing into military exclusion zones, protesters chaining themselves to a Foreign embassy, boarding ships transporting radioactive waste, smuggling toilet rolls into the Department of the Environment, and so on (Gpc G S U V X Z). This type of communication strategy reproduces "actor oppositions" (Greenpeace v. an Opponent) as the basis for news stories and "packages" them with a high "news value". That the technique of direct action stunts produces news narratives with a high profile "actor opposition" is illustrated by the Headlines of such examples, e.g. *Protesters Board Nuclear Ship* (Gpc G); *Greenpeace Told to Leave N-Test Site* (Gpc U); and *Greenpeace Ship Released After Discovering 'Nuclear Test Site'* (Gpc X).

Direct action protests tend to be reported in a *news genre* that simply describes the actors and the event, i.e. what happened and who did it. This type of news narrative gives Greenpeace and its targeted opponent a high public profile and highlights the conflictual basis of the relationship between the actors as part of the environmental contest. Such a communication strategy is useful for raising the profile of the environmental contest as a conflict in the public discourse but provides only a limited scope for elaborating environmental problems. It may therefore be seen as a strategy for entering the public agenda.[16]

Since Greenpeace's current ambitions extend beyond entering the public agenda, i.e. constituency building, and towards building a public agenda for environmental problems, i.e. political objectives, the organisation needs other communication strategies for placing its brand of environmental concerns in the public sphere. When direct protest actions are not the basis for the Greenpeace news coverage, the organisation still has a routine practice for constructing "actor oppositions" into "news stories" - it uses the technique of discursive stunts. In cases of discursive stunts an organisation uses a cultural construct (e.g. a social metaphor, caricature, or catchphrase etc.) as a mechanism for penetrating the linguistic structure and semantic contents of a public text. This communication technique uses an appeal to a resonant element of British culture (e.g. the appeal of the drama or 'novelty' of an event told as an adventure story, or the humour of an irreverent criticism of a famous politician, or a reference to a well known cultural element such as the "Frankenstein" story - see below) to construct a social opposition between actors in the contest. Discursive stunts are a mechanism for mobilising a normative critique or 'cultural bias' (Douglas 1975; Thompson 1984) into the representation of the environmental contest in the news.[17] Discursive stunts are important because they enable Greenpeace to penetrate mainstream *news genres* that do not simply report protest events but which provide space for evaluating their consequences and discussing the environmental problematic in more elaborate detail. As part

---

[16] Historically the technique of direct actions was the initial strategy that was used by environmental organisations for breaking into the news discourse, see e.g. Greenberg (1985), Jamison and Eyerman (1989), and Rucht (1995). Judged by the four dimensions of dramaturgical social movement action (Benford and Hunt 1988), direct actions are discursive practices which mobilise 'scripting', 'staging' and 'perfoming' dimensions, but are less able to mobilise the 'interpretative' dimensions of the protest. In contrast explicit framing devices and discursive stunts also mobilise 'interpretative' dimensions of protest into the news discourse.

[17] Discursive stunts thus belong to a phase of mobilisation when an organisation has established itself as a "public image" on the public agenda.

of a communication strategy, discursive stunts mobilise a news narrative that has a greater potential for environmental agenda-building and contesting public policy actors than direct actions.

The distinction between direct action stunts and discursive stunts relates to the historical phase of environmental mobilisation. In the initial or early phases of environmental mobilisation, protest action stunts served as a means for an organisation to enter the public agenda. Now that they are established public actors and environmental problems common knowledge, the organisations exist in a phase of environmental mobilisation when the public discourse provides an opportunity structure that is open to more qualitative environmental claims and policy oppositions. In this sense discursive stunts have succeeded direct action stunts as the basis for a communication strategy. Protest has become more discursive and now aims to enter the language of the public discourse. For collective action incidents of symbolic actions have been replaced by the mobilisation of symbols, i.e. "frames", in the public discourse.

A feature of discursive stunts is the production of "catchphrases" which serve as a cultural shorthand for the Greenpeace polemic. The "Dirty Man of Europe" is an obvious example of such a "catchphrase". In cases of discursive stunts, the "news story" becomes more than a reported event about an incident of antagonism between conflicting actors, i.e. Greenpeace v. British Government, the news narrative itself evaluates the environmental contest. The two actors are attributed value-laden roles as opposed "characters" in a narrative that relates a social contest. Once more this is evident from the Headline: *Environment Secretary scorns Britain's 'Dirty Man' Tag. Greenpeace 'bias' puts Patten in a Rage* (Gpc N).

The discursive stunt technique produces oppositions between "actors" whose *narrative roles* in the text are attributed with values that have been pre-defined in the information that is given to journalists by Greenpeace. Discursive stunts and explicit framing devices are often combined in a news narrative. Discursive stunts make the news space for environmental organisations to make the direct claims that appear in explicit framing devices. In this way an organisation is constructive in the production of a news narrative which promotes its "public image" and delegitimates that of its opponents.

In the case of Greenpeace, explicit framing devices are used to re-enforce "actor oppositions" as the narrative basis through which the reader is intended to view

environmental problems. For example, when commenting on the 'Dirty Man' event and the British Government's proposed environmental policy agenda, Lord Melchett, executive director of Greenpeace, is attributed with the following explicit framing devices:

> *"There is nothing in Britain's future plans that will rid us of that tag (Dirty Man of Europe)"* (Gpc N)

> *"We are a non-party organisation but the environment is a political matter and we comment upon it. Chris Patten must forget about words and start taking action to protect, defend and heal the environment."* (Gpc N)

The first explicit framing device constitutes the organisation's opponent delegitimation strategy: Greenpeace delegitimates the British Government as an environmental policy actor by re-affirming the 'Dirty Man' catchphrase. The second constitutes a self-legitimation strategy: Greenpeace asserts itself as a collective actor. Here Greenpeace asserts a right for itself as an actor in environmental politics whilst engaging in direct conflict with the Environment Minister's policy record. The environmental problematic itself remains submerged beneath the actor conflict. This is characteristic of Greenpeace's "public image". Repetition of explicit framing devices is another technique that Greenpeace uses in order to make them stick in the public culture. To maintain the 'Dirty Man' polemic, Greenpeace (again in the persona of Lord Melchett) uses an explicit framing device to reassert the "actor opposition" in a later article.

> *"The Government has dodged the important issues by reiterating existing inadequate policies and has avoided making any new commitments which would protect the environment."* (Gpc R)

Greenpeace's 'Dirty Man' explicit framing devices confirm the importance of constructing clear "actor oppositions" for the organisation's communication strategies. "Actor oppositions" are constructed into the news narrative of texts. This is a key element in the organisation's mobilisation of its own "public image" and engagement in "image politics". Moreover, this communication strategy is not just tied to the exceptional case of the 'Dirty

Man' event, but examples of the discursive stunts and explicit framing devices that construct "actor oppositions" also occur in more routine cases of Greenpeace coverage. Further examples of constructed "actor oppositions" include "Greenpeace v. British Nuclear Fuels Ltd." on the international transportation and dumping of radioactive waste (Gpc C G W), and "Greenpeace v. Global Nuclear Military Complex" on nuclear testing in the natural environments of the Pacific Islands (Gpc I) and the Arctic (Gpc c). In the first case, Greenpeace campaigners are attributed with the following explicit framing devices which construct the contest against BNFL:

> *"If these shipments are banned in America on safety grounds, then they should be banned from the UK. We must not become the world's nuclear dustbin"* (Gpc C)

> *"BNFL (British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.) is turning the UK into the nuclear dustbin of the world. This ship poses a serious risk to coastal communities and the ecosystem of the Irish Sea."* (Gpc G)

In the first explicit framing device the British record as a policy actor is compared unfavourably to that of the United States, and in the second, a similar opponent delegitimation strategy is used to introduce an environmental problem as a risk to society. As in the 'Dirty Man' event, these explicit framing devices against the British Nuclear Industry's policy for the importing radioactive waste also use a discursive stunt, a "catchphrase" - "Britain the Nuclear Dustbin of the World" - on which to pin the polemic.

Greenpeace not only contests the activities of obvious opponents, such as Government, Military and Nuclear Industry actors, but also opposes other environmental organisations when their activities conflict with Greenpeace interests or movement ideals. On two occasions during the WWF scandal "actor oppositions" were constructed by Greenpeace against another environmental organisation, namely "Greenpeace v. the World Wide Fund for Nature" (Gpc B H). This indicates that Greenpeace is a competitive actor in the market for "public image". For the World Wide Fund for Nature scandal, the Greenpeace Press Officer is attributed with the following explicit framing device:

"The role of pressure groups is not to see the other persons point of view. Greenpeace research issues (and) come to conclusions about what needs to be done to solve problems. It is not a matter on which there can be compromise. Negotiating with Governments neutralises pressure groups by forcing them into compromises." (Gpc B)

This example indicates that self-legitimation and opponent de-legitimation strategies are prominent and combined elements in Greenpeace's mobilisations. "Blaming" strategies directed against other actors are an almost permanent feature of Greenpeace's public communication (see secition D). Greenpeace constructs the environmental contest into a conflict between themselves and other actors. Opposing actors are placed into competition in "news events". How do these "actor opposition" narratives which are mobilised by Greenpeace work as a basis for making environmental claims in the public sphere?

A key narrative *genre* that is produced by Greenpeace mobilisations is a news "scandal". Direct actions and discursive stunts are designed to make obscure "events" appear "scandalous", which raises their "news value" and makes them visible on the public agenda. Furthermore, the organisation attempts to make its polemics and "catchphrases" stick and then circulate in the public culture by reinforcing them with explicit framing devices. For this reason Greenpeace messages are simple and repetitive. Greenpeace uses its "public image" to achieve cultural resonance. It assumes public legitimacy as a collective actor as an *a priori* element of this constructed "public image". An outcome of this communication technique is that the "news story" which is offered for public legitimation concerns "who are the good actors?" and not "on what basis is an actor good or bad?".

The organisation pre-determines the identities or "public images" of the characters in a "news story" by releasing information that is culturally biased. This biased information may be based on sets of "expert" data. For example, "scientific facts" may be released from reports relating the possible risks and dangers to the British public health as in the cases of the polluted beaches (Gpc L) and rivers (Gpc T) and safety of nuclear installations (Gpc D). Otherwise the biased information may be based on an aesthetic or moral appeal that has a resonance in British culture, for example an appeal to the "paradise lost" of unspoilt peoples

(Gpc I J) and places (Gpc b c).[18]

Greenpeace does not open the partiality of its claims for legitimation in the public discourse. Instead the information - laden with 'cultural bias' - appears as a contextual background for the "news story" narrative relating how "actors" contest "events". This indicates that Greenpeace symbolically "package" the legitimating basis for their environmental claims into the narrative structure rather than the thematic content of news.[19] It is the values that are attributed to the competing actors (Greenpeace v. an opponent) in the narrative structure of the "news story" and not the actual agenda-building contents of the data (e.g. the truth of scientific facts or moral and aesthetic appeals) which carry the environmental claim that is made. In the Greenpeace news discourse, environmental information is used to construct the morality of the "characters" of the competing actors. The success of Greenpeace's projection of its own "public image" is thus an important factor for determining the organisation's potential for making communication strategies for the public sphere.

Relative to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth's mobilisations are more compatible with the news structures (van Dijk 1988) which report political "events" and in particular those covering national policy "events". This means that Friends of the Earth's access to the structure of public communication is more dependent than Greenpeace on the topicality of environmental affairs on the public agenda, i.e. their "news value". At the same time the organisation's own actions contribute to this "news value" of environmental affairs by mobilising contentious claims. Friends of the Earth maintains the "public image" of a "pressure group" in the news coverage. As environmental policy is an emergent and not an established part of the national policy agenda, this "public image" of a "pressure group" is itself a construction. Friends of the Earth does not yet enjoy the insider status and institutional contacts of an established pressure group in the policy making process (Grove-White and Burke 1989) (Grove-White 1989) (McCormick 1991). The organisation is acting in the public sphere to promote such an arrangement. This indicates that Friends of the

---

[18] The notion of "paradise lost" is the countercultural opponent to the dominant code that has been engendered in modernity and is a common element of environmentalist frames of reference (Eder 1990; 1995). Greenpeace mobilisations that appeal to this notion are likely to resonate in British culture.

[19] Van Dijk's analysis (1985, 1991) distinguishes between structures and thematic contents in news discourse. On the symbolic "packaging" of claims-makers, see Gamson (1988; 1995).

Earth's potential for source mobilisation is linked to the emergence of the environment as a policy issue into British public affairs. Friends of the Earth aims to gain access to those "news events" which constitute an emergent institutional agenda on the environment, i.e. the news *genres* of mainstream politics and specialised public affairs.

As an aspirant "pressure group", Friends of the Earth mobilises claims into the news coverage on environmental policy discourse.[20] This type of news coverage on the national policy discourse tends to report the competing claims which are made by actors, and other interested parties, in relation to specific current events. Thus Government Ministers, civil servants and regulatory bodies (FoE E H Q S a b c e h o r), Opposition spokespersons (FoE R k), sponsored scientific bodies (FoE O T j m), farmers (FoE L i s), business and industrial representatives (FoE L O V p), trade unions (FoE J), non-governmental organisations (FoE U), other environmental organisations (FoE A B I t) and consumers (FoE n) all appear in the news coverage of Friends of the Earth. Typically the arguments which are presented in such news reports are based on "expertise" that derives from the actor's specialist role in the policy process. When actors disagree or contest the interpretation of specific incidents or policy events, two sets of competing factual claims (e.g. scientific facts[21]) appear in the news report, each sponsored by a respective actor. For example, in the cases of policy discourses relating to the Government's regulatory standards for nuclear power installations (FoE Q j) or the purity of water (FoE h), collective actors may dispute the findings of the available scientific evidence. Friends of the Earth attempts to bias and "package" its own preferred interpretation as the legitimate version among these reported competing environmental claims. The organisation's source strategies open the competing set of claims by the actors for public legitimation or delegitimation, by penetrating the narrative structure of the news reports on specific instances, occasions, and episodes from the environmental "contest". How do the cultural techniques of explicit framing devices and discursive stunts work within Friends of the Earth's communication strategies?

The first point to make is that Friends of the Earth is able to use quantitatively more explicit framing devices than Greenpeace as the organisation is routinely sought by journalists

---

[20] This type of environmental news coverage has emerged and increased in Britain from 1988 onwards (Anderson 1991), (Statham 1994a).

[21] Scientific facts are the usual basis for claims in policy discourses (Eder 1995).

as a specialist to comment on mainstream environmental and policy related events. Being less tied to making claims that construct "news values" into the news narrative about the event, i.e. producing a "news story", Friends of the Earth is less "image" assertive than Greenpeace. Being tied principally to the mainstream coverage of environmental "news events", the organisation's claims have a more stable and constant "news value".[22] Subsequently the organisation appears more regularly over the different phases of the news "cycle" than Greenpeace (see Section D).

Over the duration of the Dirty Man "news cycle" Friends of the Earth uses the tactic of direct actions - i.e. "staging events" - to achieve media coverage less frequently than Greenpeace. Indeed on the two occasions when direct action strategies are used to achieve national media coverage, it is by a local rather than the national Friends of the Earth organisations (FoE N d). I have indicated that "staging events" by direct actions tends to be a strategy for entering rather than building the public agenda. In the two cited cases (FoE N d), local Friends of the Earth organisations use the tactic of "staging events" to bring a localised environmental problem to national attention. This shows that staging direct action events is not a regular technique for the national Friends of the Earth organisation to enter the structure of public communication.

Like Greenpeace, however, Friends of the Earth does produce discursive stunts. Discursive stunts allow environmental organisations the news space to make claims through the semantic structure of the news narrative. How do the discursive stunts that are used by Friends of the Earth contrast with those of Greenpeace? An example of a discursive stunt by Friends of the Earth occurs in an article which covers the news topic of the Government's policy for privatisation and deregulation of the electricity industry (FoE S). When the Government advertises the privatisation of the electricity distribution companies with the slogan "tell Frank", Friends of the Earth contests the slogan by replacing it with the catchphrase "Frankenstein". This catchphrase is combined with an explicit framing device: this communication strategy enables Friends of the Earth to penetrate the claims which are embedded within the news narrative, and state that the environmental cost of pollution produced by a privatisation policy will (like Shelley's Frankenstein) be *"uncouth and distorted in its proportions"*.(FoE S).

---

[22] This is particularly the case since the emergence of environmental discourse on the mainstream news agenda, which for the British case is usually dated from 1988 onwards, see Anderson (1991), Love (1990).

The "Frankenstein" example shows that Friends of the Earth is able to use discursive stunts as a technique for embedding political claims into the structure of news narratives. As the headline *Frank Makes his Monstrous Debut* (FoE S) indicates, in contrast to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth does not make itself the leading "actor" in a news narrative relating an "actor opposition". Instead it draws on an existing cultural myth as the basis for constructing an explicit framing device which opposes a specific policy measure. The organisation's discursive stunt produces a framing device that refers to a countercultural theme - the "Frankenstein" myth - which is deeply rooted in the identity of modernity and is resonant in British culture.[23]

Friends of the Earth uses the symbolic resonance of this myth in British culture as a mechanism for constructing 'novelty' into the reporting of an environmental policy event. This raises the "news value" of the topic and presents Friends of the Earth as an actor who is involved in the conflict. Furthermore, it enables the organisation to achieve a relative 'control' or exert a degree of "definitional power" (Hansen 1993) over the media's representation of the claims which are made by the actors in this policy event. Friends of the Earth applies a 'cultural bias' to the structure of the news narrative where the competing claims of the opposed policy actors (including those of the organisation itself) are contextualised. This communication strategy successfully achieves a resonance which delegitimises the Government's privatisation policy measures. By achieving media resonance, Friends of the Earth's political communication becomes an 'act', a discursive practice, which intervenes into and reconstitutes the legitimating basis of the relationships between actors in the environmental contest. It is by maintaining a degree of "definitional power" over the process whereby claims are legitimated in news narratives, that the organisation is able to intervene in the mediation of the environmental contest in the public discourse to the relationships of the social actors who are in conflict. In its own news coverage, Friends of the Earth exerts a 'relative control' over the way that the environmental problematic is

---

[23] Originally entitled *Frankenstein; or, the Modern Prometheus* (1818), Mary Shelley's novel provides a metaphor, the 'monster', which signifies the self-created *risk* to life that is posed by mankind's emerging scientific domination of nature. The Frankenstein myth provides a potent social metaphor which has been used as a cultural resource by actors for criticising the dominance of the scientific method as the rational basis for modern society. The "Frankenstein/monster" metaphor is a key signifier for the countercultural tradition which has opposed the culture of modernity from the outset. On this dualistic cultural coding of modernity, see Eder (1990, 1995). As the discussion of Mary Douglas (1966, 1975) in the introduction (section A) showed, contemporary societies are as likely as primitive societies to use symbolic exchanges for communicating about social problems.

presented and viewed as a contested public policy matter in Britain.

In contrast to Greenpeace which constructs its "public image" into a mythical character as part of a strategy for raising "news values" and achieving coverage by 'novelty' appeal, Friends of the Earth maintains a "public image" as a "pressure group" in news narratives. Friends of the Earth appears as a real and serious actor rather than a mythical and fantastic character. Instead of constructing fictional content into events and producing novel "news stories", Friends of the Earth achieves the 'novelty' to resonate in the public discourse by drawing on the cultural power of a myth that appeals to a countercultural tradition in British culture. Not only does Friends of the Earth have a less contentious "public image" than Greenpeace in the public sphere, but the organisation's discursive stunts are designed to provide news space for embedding political claims in mainstream public affairs news genres rather than being tied like those of Greenpeace to the "scandal" news genre. This is indicative of a general difference in the discursive actions of the two organisations: namely that Greenpeace constructs itself as a conflicting "actor" in the news, whereas Friends of the Earth is more likely to have its opinion sought by journalists within the routine practices for covering environmental affairs. As a collective actor, Friends of the Earth is considered a legitimate spokesperson or "voice" by journalists for commenting on environmental public policy affairs. Furthermore, the organisation's mobilisations impact upon a thematic structure of news[24] which is more likely to exert a cultural pressure on the actors in a policy discourse than the populist "news stories" of Greenpeace. Friends of the Earth aims to communicate through the media to specialist policy communities and the 'attentive public' of environmental sympathisers, it must therefore maintain a "public image" that has legitimacy with both audiences.

The technique of discursive stunts is less prominent in Friends of the Earth's campaign repertoire than that of Greenpeace. It would be counterproductive for the organisation's aspirations as a policy actor simply to court populist appeal like Greenpeace.[25] A corollary to this is that the organisation's "public image" as a "pressure

---

[24] By thematic structure of news, I mean the semantic form which the ideological contents take on in a news narrative. This is akin to what van Dijk (1988) terms the "thematic macro-structure of news". Different types of structures of news are referred to as *genres* in everyday parlance.

[25] Friends of the Earth does not wish to compete with the "public image" of Greenpeace. Earlier, I discussed this functional differentiation but at the same time compatibility of the two organisations' communication strategies over the news "cycle" in terms of a *division of communicative labour* (Section D).

group" accords it with more scope in the structure of news for using explicit framing devices. Since it has more direct channels of access to the mainstream news and an interest in preserving its "public image" as a spokesperson on environmental policy matters, Friends of the Earth uses the tactic of discursive stunts more sparingly than Greenpeace. In the case of Friends of the Earth, the tactic of discursive stunts is preserved for highlighting key policy oppositions when the organisation has a special need for entering the news agenda, e.g. in the key campaign against the Government's privatisation of public utilities.

Although it attributes an identity to the whole environmental movement's "cycle" of criticism on the White Paper, the 'Dirty Man' "scandal" is principally a Greenpeace stunt. (Section D). However, Friends of the Earth participate in the delegitimation of the White Paper by contributing further 'ad hoc' discursive stunts to revitalise the Dirty Man event.

In the first case, Friends of the Earth uses a discursive stunt to contest the Government's policy record the day after the White Paper is published (FoE a). To immediately capitalise on the high "news value" for environmental affairs that is produced by Greenpeace's Dirty Man "scandal" and the Government's own publicity for the *This Common Inheritance* document, Friends of the Earth's discursive stunt contends that the intent of the policy document should be judged by the verbs that it uses "endorse, review, consider, and consult" rather than "implement, establish and enact" (FoE a). This is an attempt to bias the reception of the White Paper by drawing the readership into a text analysis of the document. It indicates that Friends of the Earth's discursive stunts are oriented towards biasing how actors interpret, view and 'read' the environmental agenda in relation to policy events, rather than making high profile novel "news stories" and achieving coverage. Friends of the Earth has a communication strategy for environmental policy agenda-building rather than opponent delegitimation by actor "blaming strategies".

Whereas discursive stunts are used in exceptional circumstances, explicit framing devices are a more common technique for Friends of the Earth to bind the deeper structural agenda-building contents of their mobilisations into news narratives. An example of a high profile Friends of the Earth explicit framing device is supplied for the Dirty Man event, when David Gee the Director of Friends of the Earth is cited in a news report:

> *"The Paper gives no firm targets and timetables for fuel efficiency and vehicle efficiency measures. There were vague promises and little action."* (FoE c)

In this case (FoE c), Friends of the Earth criticises the Government for the inadequacy of its commitment to policy instruments for regulating fuel consumption, technology and the use of private transport. In contrast to Greenpeace's explicit framing devices, claims are made on the basis of the policy measures being "inefficient" rather than against the Government as an "actor". Friends of the Earth's explicit framing device extends the concept of "efficiency" from an economic calculation to an environmental standard for policy strategies. By using the term "efficiency", Friends of the Earth introduces environmental criteria into the notion of a legitimate form of environmental policy practice. The organisation mobilises a criticism that is strategically pragmatic in relation to the Government policy record and which at the same time promotes an extended notion of the concept of "technological efficiency".

Another case of a discursive stunt relating to the Dirty Man event that is combined with explicit framing devices occurs in an article where the Government's White Paper policy strategy is compared unfavourably to that of the City of Toronto (FoE e) - a city where Friends of the Earth are routinely consulted in the town planning process. In this example the discursive stunt gives Friends of the Earth the opportunity to mobilise several explicit framing devices in the context of the Dirty Man policy event. In one of the explicit framing devices, a Friends of the Earth spokesperson is cited as follows:

> *"Traffic jam? They still think the answer is a wider road. They don't think how they might cut dependence on the car and they make no linkage between transportation and environmental pollution."* (FoE e)

This explicit framing device is directed against the specific policy field of private transportation and emphasises how environmental concerns cut across the conventional boundaries of policy sectors. The criticism is that existing policy makers lack the vision and 'thinking' to take an integrated policy approach to environmental protection. Once more environmental criteria are introduced as a better and more legitimate basis for policy strategies than the conventional policy approaches of Government.

These examples show that in contrast to the polemical approach of Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth's explicit framing devices constitute a communication strategy for using reasoned arguments as a critique of specific features of existing policy measures. It is on the

basis of such "reasoning devices" (Gamson 1988) rather than dramatic "effects" that Friends of the Earth attempts to "stick" its claims in the public culture. Compared to those of Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth's explicit framing devices *reason* rather than *rhyme* in the narratives of public discourse.

In the instances cited above, Friends of the Earth is building an alternative environmental policy agenda which competes with that of the Government in the White Paper. For most types of established public policy this role of "alternative specification" whereby choices and options are narrowed takes place away from the public agenda, when specialists co-operate with policy actors (Kingdon 1984). Here Friends of the Earth is using the news space which it achieves from its "specialist" status as an environmental "pressure group" to mobilise reasoning devices which construct an alternative policy agenda in the public sphere. Furthermore, it is challenging the rationality of conventional policy norms by extending notions such as "efficiency" from simple economic value criteria (e.g. cost/benefit analysis) to environmental value criteria (environmental cost/benefit analysis). This type of discursive action constitutes a dual communication strategy: in the short term it legitimates what Friends of the Earth considers to be a sound environmental practice as the basis for policy standards (introducing environmental costs); and in the longer term it promotes an integrated "thinking" towards the development of an environmental policy programme. Excluded from influencing the process of consultation in the "policy stream" where the Government prefers to benefit from the knowledge of economists and scientists[26], Friends of the Earth carries its own knowledge specialism on environmental practice to the Government through the public sphere. In effect, the reasoning devices which Friends of the Earth mobilises into the public sphere may be seen to constitute the formation of an environmental policy "counterdiscourse".[27]

In this instance Friends of the Earth are introducing environmental value critieria into the norms of established policy discourse. It is the "expertise" which the organisation has in

---

[26] In 1990 the Conservative Government's "thinking" on environmental policy was influenced in particular by the policy proposal documents of the economist David Pearce who favours "market" and non-state-interventionist policy solutions to environmental problems (Pearce 1989) (Rose 1990). The notion that the market can effectively regulate polluting practices and bring environmental benefits without state intervention is a contentious position that the environmental movement have steadfastly opposed.

[27] Terdiman (1985: 13) defines a "counterdiscourse" as one which mobilises "an alternative, liberating *newness* against the absorptive capacity of those established discourses".

introducing environmental value criteria to policy norms that is the basis on which it draws and exerts "definitional power" in the public discourse, and which it uses as a collective actor to oppose Government policy strategies. Friends of the Earth utilises its "public image" - the fact that it is already a legitimate environmental actor in the public discourse - to make claims as a "specialist" against actors whose environmental credentials are less legitimate (e.g. Governments and the scientists and economists who advise them on policy-making).

The earlier analysis of the strategic agenda building contents of the news coverage showed that Friends of the Earth campaigns on a wider range of policy based environmental topics than Greenpeace (see Section C above). This feature is also reflected in the range of reasoning devices which comprise Friends of the Earth's discursive repertoire. Indeed there are several examples where Friends of the Earth mobilises explicit framing devices that contest different policy sectors. Friends of the Earth's countryside campaigner Robin Maynard is attributed with the following explicit framing device that advocates policies that will make farmers introduce the assessment of environmental costs into their farming practices:

> *"We have been calling for farmers to get off the treadmill of over-intensive agriculture for over 10 years. If they wish to avoid being thrown onto the free market, they will have to prove they can deliver farming systems that conserve rather than damage the resources of soil and water."* (FoE i)

For the campaign on energy policy, Friends of the Earth campaigners mobilise an explicit framing device which aims to discredit the notion of market price as a legitimate basis for regulating the use of energy resources in a way that is environmentally beneficial:

> *"Oil does not pay its way. It produces carbon dioxide and the greenhouse effect, urban smog, benzine pollution and many other hazards. None of this is reflected in the prices, so alternative cleaner fuels such as wind, wave and solar power are at a disadvantage... (S)hort sharp increases don't tend to lead to energy conservation"... "Price changes will not make people alter their behaviour if they are tied to particular fuels."* (FoE E)

Energy policy field is also related to the domestic home, when Friends of the Earth uses an explicit framing device to relate the rights of the individual consumers to the Government's record and responsibility for energy policy:

> *"House buyers have as much right to know whether their prospective home is hopelessly energy inefficient as they do if it is collapsing with dry rot. What is needed is some firm direction from the Government and we are disappointed this is obviously not forthcoming."* (FoE n)

The examples cited above show that Friends of the Earth intends to construct an environmental agenda that extends the notion of policy practice beyond the use of free market regulatory mechanisms. Indeed the organisation extends the economic rationale to take account of environmental costs and builds this notion into a new language for policy making based on environmental values. The explicit framing devices show that Friends of the Earth mobilises a "public image" of itself as 'specialist' commentator on environmental policy. The organisation legitimates itself as a "pressure group" in the general field of environmental policy and engages in "alternative policy specification". However, as the environment is an emergent and not an established policy field in Britain, Friends of the Earth's discursive practices may still be considered as a component of what is principally an public agenda building strategy. Specifying alternatives whilst the Government is attempting to form its first national environmental policy agenda constitutes a strategy for delegitimating the Government's authority as an actor who is fit to make policy proposals.

The explicit framing devices indicate that Friends of the Earth has a communication strategy for opposing the Government's preference for market based policy solutions to environmental problems. In each case the technique involves introducing environmental criteria to an economic rationale as the basis for a policy measure. The organisation presnts itself as a pressure group acting in the public interest. Friends of the Earth is able to draw on its authority as a well known and long standing specialist campaigner on the environment to advocate such measures. This "public image" not only serves for constructing policy critiques against the Government, but for introducing environmental policy matters in digestible formats to the reading public. In the example on home efficiency (FoE n), the concerns of the public - as "consumers" and "homeowners" - are integrated within the wider

schema of an environmental policy. This shows that the reasoning devices that are used by Friends of the Earth are designed so that members of the public can relate the normally hidden world of policy matters to their own lives, interests and actions. The organisation acts in the public discourse not only to shift the cognitive boundaries of environmental policies, but to make environmental reasoning itself an accessible cognitive element of the public culture. In this way Friends of the Earth's discursive actions popularise environmental policy concerns and engage a degree of social 'reflexivity' into the public agenda building process for environmental policy.

I have shown that Friends of the Earth mobilises environmental policy critiques rather than "actor oppositions" into the public discourse. This feature of the organisation's "public image" extends to its role within the environmental movement, which is illustrated by the two explicit framing devices that are mobilised during the WWF scandal (FoE A B):

> *"The environmental movement is always in debate between the absolutists and the pragmatists. There is a role for both and I do not think that the debate should go away, if anything it should get more intense"* (FoE A)

> *"What's coming out clearly now is that the learning curve really is being climbed very rapidly indeed. Development organisations are realising that development simply cannot work unless it's rooted in sound environmental practice. By and large they know now that they need to listen to the voices of the indigenous peoples"* (FoE B)

In the first case, Friends of the Earth defends the heterogeneity and diversity of the environmental movement as a sign of its health, and in the second it defends the World Wide Fund for Nature's dubious actions by emphasising the WWF's learning and expertise in bringing sound environmental practice to underdeveloped regions. This indicates that Friends of the Earth is less prepared than Greenpeace to make "image" capital at the expense of other environmental organisations and takes a more pragmatic and integrationist role within the movement.

Environmental claims tend only to appear in Greenpeace's news coverage as a subordinate element to the organisation's own "public image" as a collective actor. On the

basis of this finding one can make the general statement that Greenpeace does not enter the public agenda by the "news value" of the quality of its environmental claims - e.g. by "sound scientific research" - but by *dramatising* the environmental contest into an ongoing and compelling "event" with a high "news value". Greenpeace pre-defines the cultural biases of the opposed actors who appear in a news text. This is achieved by packaging the "news events" as a narrative model that gives simple moral lessons to the reading public: "the goodies" v. "the baddies"; "David v. Goliath"; "the winners" and "the losers". Such narrative models are highly compatible with the types of news structures which report "events" with populist appeal and mainstream human interest values. They have a 'novelty' element - *man bites dog* - which raises the "news value" by giving a populist twist to a reported "event" in the social contest. Greenpeace invariably appear as "the goodies", the noble and daring underdog fighting at insuperable odds against more powerful opponents "the baddies", e.g. a Government Military nuclear complex or a multi-national exploiter or polluter. In the same way that interpreting the "David v. Goliath" narrative requires knowledge only about the outcome - "who won?" - and not the contested issue over which they fought, Greenpeace require public comprehension only as the "winners", "the goodies", the morally justified.

It is not environmental claims but the "news stories" of Greenpeace which invoke a 'reflexivity' into the public discourse. People are not engaged into the environmental contest but into following the narrative of a drama that is played out between "good" and "bad" actors. This drama serves as a social metaphor for indicating who one should support in the environmental contest. It is by using social metaphor to construct a moral narrative that Greenpeace enables readers to identify the social relationships which are at stake in the environmental contest. Furthermore, it is on this simplistic but highly effective basis that Greenpeace appeal to the public and seek legitimacy as a collective actor through mainstream news. This communication strategy implies that Greenpeace engages in "image politics" to court mass favour in the public discourse rather than to gain activists for the cause.[28]

As a visible environmental actor, Greenpeace's own "public image" has a higher

---

[28] The 'open' unabashed populism of Greenpeace's mass environmental campaigns is in stark contrast to the 'closed' hierarchical structure of its organisation and the inaccessibility which this has to the base of environmental activism. This has led to criticisms of the 'opportunism' of Greenpeace tactics from within the movement and academics who believe that as a political ideology environmentalism ought to sustain the notion of 'base democracy' (Eyerman and Jamison 1989) (Rucht 1995).

"news value" than the scientific, normative or aesthetic basis of claims which it "packages" onto the public agenda. This is why the organisation's environmental claims appear as polemical self-evident truths, they are not intended to be open for discussion or legitimation by others, including the reading public. Another outcome of this proclamatory and self-affirmatory nature of Greenpeace's communications is that opponent actors attempt to de-legitimise Greenpeace by claiming that it is not a *serious* actor.[29] The Greenpeace discourse remains impervious to such disclaimers, however, as the organisation does not enter the structure of public communication to engage in *dialogue* with Government and Industry actors. Greenpeace aims primarily to popularise and heighten the public perception of the flaws in their opponents' activities on specific environmental topics. Furthermore, the organisation aims to raise its own prestige by fixing its own "image" in the public discourse as "the winners" and "the morally righteous".

Despite the repetitive and tautological basis of the "news stories" which it produces, Greenpeace's claims-making nonetheless retains an apparently permanent "news value" in the structure of public communication. By constructing dramatised "news events" the organisation gains the liberty to repeat the same polemics continuously without becoing "boring" and subsequently being excluded from the mainstream news agenda. This indicates that the strategic dimension of Greenpeace's mobilisation activities occurs in the *dramatisation* of "events" and embedding of claims in public fictions, i.e. biased narrative representations of reality. Greenpeace makes itself appealing as a collective actor by constructing narratives in the public sphere which serve as a social metaphor for interpreting the environmental contest by relating to the actors. Greenpeace tends to make the environmental contest into a children's nursery rhyme or adventure story, where the moral lessons for the public are clearly embedded in the qualities of the "characters" who act out the contest in a news narrative.

Two good examples of this embedding of political claims into public fictions were noted earlier. In addition to defining the British Government's policy agenda as the "Britain the Dirty Man of Europe" event, Greenpeace contested British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.'s international transportation of radioactive waste with the catchphrase "Britain the world's nuclear dustbin". Such slogans are not intended to arouse reflective thinking by the public

[29] For example, this was the claim of the Environment Minister Chris Patten after the Dirty Man event.

about the environmental problematic, on the contrary they serve as cultural shorthand for making the political claims of Greenpeace immediately accessible to the language of public life. This does not necessarily mean that Greenpeace's political claims are trivial, it merely indicates that the organisation uses its "definitional power" for constructing narratives in the news which educate people towards Greenpeace's way of "thinking". In the same way that nursery rhymes are intended to give moral guidance to the behaviour of children, Greenpeace invite the British public into a "collective learning" process[30] about the environmental contest by indicating who they should support.

In this sense Greenpeace's communication strategies have a populist orientation. The organisation works at the cutting edge of public culture by mixing the cultural appeal of environmental claims with anti-authoritarian caricatures and "novelty" stories that have mainstream cultural appeal. This does not mean, however, that Greenpeace necessarily trivialise political communication by their sensationalist tactics. Indeed the historical role of Greenpeace, as the Dirty Man case testifies, has been influential in popularising environmental issues on the British public agenda. Unless the environment is sustained as a topic with a visibility on the public agenda there is no reason for Governments to be held accountable by environmental criteria for their actions.

Friends of the Earth's news discourse is less dependent than Greenpeace's on the *dramatic effect* of media stunts, direct actions and constructed "contests" between opponent actors in "news stories". Nonetheless, the organisation appears more frequently on the news agenda and exerts a potential for mobilising environmental critique into policy discourses. This indicates that Friends of the Earth's communication strategies raise and sustain "news values" on a different basis than Greenpeace. Friends of the Earth's communications penetrate the news coverage on environmental "events" as a matter of routine without necessarily *dramatising* actor oppositions into a "news story" narrative. Indeed the examples indicate that the dramatisation of "news events" is only a marginal element in Friends of the Earth's overall discursive action repertoire which instead tends to rely more on public "reasoning devices". Whereas Greenpeace has even generated its own *genre* of "news story", Friends of the Earth enters mainstream news structures as a *serious* environmental actor - a

---

[30] On the role of collective learning processes in the construction of social reality, see Eder and Miller (1986). The notion of social learning has been applied to the development of environmental politics (Princen and Finger 1994) and the development of environmental policy (Weale 1992).

legitimate "pressure group". Why is Friends of the Earth's "public image" taken more seriously than that of Greenpeace, and what type of opportunity structure does this provide for exerting "definitional power"?

In contrast to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth's discursive actions constitute a strategy for entering into a *dialogue* with opponent Government and Industry actors. This makes Friends of the Earth's role in the public communication of environmental affairs different from that of Greenpeace. Rather than popularising environmental themes by self-promotion, Friends of the Earth promotes the advent of an *environmental policy dialogue* by generating claims that are designed to permeate from within the public agenda and which exert influence over policy discourses. Friends of the Earth may be an unconventional policy actor, but it makes environmental problems a topic for political debate and at the same time relevant to everyday life and practices. Whereas Greenpeace makes environmental claims that are indivisible from the organisation's own "public image", Friends of the Earth's "public image" makes the organisation's own interests indivisible from the future for environmental claims. It acts within the structure of public communication to shape the political "outcomes" of environmental affairs in Britain.

This approach not only legitimises Friends of the Earth's actions and its "public image" but more importantly it legitimises the idea of a political dialogue on the environment in Britain. The environment is an emergent topic on the public agenda and Friends of the Earth's activities have contributed significantly to stimulating and shaping this process of *emergence* into mainstream politics. Friends of the Earth legitimates the notion of a political dialogue on environmental problems as the course of action that should be taken by both policy communities and the 'attentive public.' The claims which the organisation mobilises are designed to resonate with both policy-makers and the public, and serve to construct Friends of the Earth as the 'mediator' between the two in the emergent policy dialogue. In this way, the organisation makes environmental concern appear to be a 'normal' and rational element of political decision-making. Its activities attempt to "establish" environmental politics as a routine concern of conventional political actors, their advisors and their publics. This indicates that Friends of the Earth's communicative actions are strategic and defined by organisational interests within the agenda for environmental politics in Britain. By promoting the establishment of a national environmental policy agenda Friends of the Earth is also promoting the potential for its own future interests and activities.

A key institutional function of the organisation for a social movement is to maintain a future capacity for strategy at times when the popularity of the movement may fade from the public agenda, e.g. at the end of a "cycle" of mass mobilisation (Pizzorno 1978).[31] Friends of the Earth's "image politics" in the public sphere fulfils such a role for the British environmental movement. By maintaining an integral presence within the media coverage of environmental policy matters and promoting its favoured notion of policies, the Friends of the Earth "public image" ensures that public policies are held accountable for their environmental "effects", and that environmental policy decision making remains "visible" at times when the attention of the public is focusing on other topics, e.g. during the Gulf War.

Friends of the Earth's potential for "definitional power" in the structure of news is not wholly determined by the "news value" of the environment within current affairs.[32] The organisation can use its "public image" as a resource for forcing policy events onto the news agenda, as it does in the cases of discursive stunts. Policy-related news reports are the primary context in which the organisation acts as a "source" mobiliser for *environmental dialogue*. Friends of the Earth enters public communication and uses "reasoning devices" to make the claims of political, business and other actors open to legitimation or delegitimation on the basis of environmental criteria, whilst at the same time resonating with public accord (e.g. by identifying consumer preferences or benefits). It is this process of legitimation which the organisation seeks to influence by using its "public image" as a resource for mobilising cultural bias into the public media.

Whereas Greenpeace polemicises environmental claims into a popularity contest between opposing actors, Friends of the Earth constructs an environmentally based notion of the "public interest", i.e. the environment as a "common public good", as the legitimating basis for future social actions. This strategy raises the interests at stake in environmental policy decision-making from the "hidden" privacy of policy communities to the concerns of the 'attentive public' which are expressed in the public sphere. It is by working in the structure of public communication that Friends of the Earth is able to legitimise a specific

---

[31] See the discussion in the introduction to this section **E.1.1**.

[32] The environmental organisations own communicative actions play a constructive role in sustaining the quality and quantity of the "news value" of environmental affairs, but external factors beyond their control, e.g. the Chernobyl accident, British Government policy initiatives, the Rio Summit etc.., define the longer term and macro dimensions of the opportunity structure that is available in the public discourse for their discursive practices and communication strategies.

version of the emergent environmental public agenda. And it is by acting in the public sphere that the organisation exerts this "definitional power" over policy events in the environmental contest.

Whatever other actors do or say in the *environmental policy dialogue*, Friends of the Earth may always introduce environmental value criteria which dismiss, qualify or extend the context of the claims that are made. The organisation *politicises* the existing deleterious activities of opponent actors by presenting "alternatives" based on environmental norms and making these options seem more viable, rational and practical. Friends of the Earth's notion of the viability, rationality, and practicality of legitimate environmental actions is founded on the basis of research (scientific findings) and the evidence of practical experience (experience from environmental policies and practices), i.e. "sound science" and "common sense". Communicating publicly about these more viable, rational and practical "alternatives" delegitimises the existing Government regulatory policies, and industrial practices and stimulates the public discourse on 'sound' environment practices.

Friends of the Earth will only cease to have a permanent "news value" when it has an established basis for *consensus* with opponent policy and public actors - when it agrees and negotiates interests within a Government policy stream. At such a time the *environmental policy dialogue* will be "institutionalised" and remain 'closed' from the 'politics' of communication in the public agenda. This is an unlikely scenario for the foreseeable future in Britain[33], which is not only due to Conservative Government's intransigence in producing a national environmental policy agenda. Indeed an 'institutionalisation' of the *environmental dialogue* also runs counter to the interests of Friends of the Earth. The organisation draws its potentiality for "definitional power" by permanently re-constructing an "attentive public". As in the case of Greenpeace's cultural populism, Friends of the Earth's political activism is also dependent on maintaining a resonance within British public culture.

---

[33] Since environmental problems are socially defined and constructed on the basis of competing sets of scientific facts, their resolution is always dogged by the incommensurability of claims that are made. For this reason environmental problems that are founded on technological risks invite more rather than less communication in the public sphere (Beck 1992; Eder 1992; 1995). For this reason it is unlikely that they will disappear from the news agenda regardless of whether Friends of the Earth are at some time in the future included in the policy community or not.

2.ii) The World Wide Fund for Nature

Unlike Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, which have emerged to prominence over the last decade riding the wave of public concern for technological risks to everyday life, the World Wide Fund for Nature is a longstanding and established pressure group. The preceding discussion (Sections C and D) on the World Wide Fund for Nature case has confirmed that the organisation enters the news discourse on a different basis than the two media-oriented organisations Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. As an organisation that is engaged in practical conservation activities and supra-national development programmes, the World Wide Fund for Nature uses the public discourse as an institutional resource for publicising, promoting and legitimising its own interests and activities. However it does not depend solely on resonance in the public discourse and the contributions of private individual donations to ensure its existence. Although the flora and fauna themes which the organisation raises do have a widespread popular appeal, the World Wide Fund for Nature tends to enter the public discourse to communicate with specialist audiences. These audiences include the business sponsors who provide the major source of the organisations' financial resources, international policy makers and bodies such as the World Bank which have influence over the Governments in Third World regions, conservation and overseas development activists and environmentalists who maintain a special interest in the field of species, habitat and environmental protection.

This means that rather than being a 'primary definer' for mainstream environmental public affairs, the World Wide Fund for Nature uses the news coverage to promote and defend its established "public image" as an "expert" in the specialist field of species and habitat preservation and overseas environmental development. It tends only to be in circumstances created by the special topicality of conservation issues - whether due to natural disasters, international meetings to establish treaties for protection and preservation of species and habitat, or publications about the "success" or "failure" of the organisations' development programmes - that the World Wide Fund for Nature enters the public agenda. Section D indicated that unlike Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the organisation was not engaged in agenda building activities that were designed to influence the national environmental policy agenda throughout the "cycle" of the Dirty Man "news event". Instead the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilised criticisms against the British Government's

environmental policy agenda only when external circumstances provided an opportunity for "voicing" opinions and claims. Such an opportunity occurred at the peak of the Dirty Man "news event" and in the "epilogue" phase, when the Government's environmental policy preferences had been soundly discredited and the possibility arose for "alternatives" to be heard and raised in the public discourse.

When compared to the cases of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, the World Wide Fund for Nature is less likely to engage in discursive practices simply as a strategy for entering the public agenda. The organisation has less need for communicating with 'the masses' than Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. The supra-national conservation campaign issues of the World Wide Fund for Nature are less politically contentious in the national context that those of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace which tend to oppose the technological risks to everyday life. Public consensus for conservation issues is less contentious than for the 'unknown' problems of technological risks, and courting public favour is a less important element of the organisation's political strategy. The World Wide Fund for Nature has already established contacts with the national and international policy communities on overseas environmental development (Princen and Finger 1994) (Szersynski, Miles et al 1995). This means that the World Wide Fund for Nature enters the public agenda in special circumstances, when the reporting of "news events" by the media provides an opportunity for the organisation to "frame" an aspect of the debate which serves to promote its interests in the conservation field.

The basis of the World Wide Fund for Nature's claims-making activities is different from that of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. As a source actor, the organisation is less active in producing news narratives which define the environmental contest in the news.[34] The organisations claims tend to be lodged within linguistic structures of news that are produced by the journalists, e.g. "news events" covering the Government's planned changes to national policies for conservation or the protection of rare species (WWF M O), or reporting on international conferences for setting regulatory standards (WWF P R V), or attempts to enforce sanctions (WWF P T), or even the public scandals relating to the WWF's

[34] This claim is confirmed by the findings of the preliminary content analysis on environmental mobilisation indicators (B.6) and in the analysis of the news "cycle" in Section D which show that the World Wide Fund for Nature "stage" less "news events" to achieve news coverage and are less frequently the "source" of articles than either Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace.

own fundraising practices (WWF B C D E F G H I) or relating to the special problems of environmental development programmes and species preservation (WWF J Q S).

The World Wide Fund for Nature is nonetheless active in producing the thematic contents that appear in the narratives of such news reports. As the analysis of the WWF scandals demonstrates (Section D), the organisation is able to utilise good contacts and access to specialist environmental journalists to achieve favourable coverage at times of crucial importance. In less exceptional circumstances, the organisation is more likely to be reported in relation to an event concerning its specialist field of environmental interest or related policy discussions than actively seek mainstream publicity for its own activities. In contrast to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature is a more conventional "source" actor in the social production of news. Furthermore, the organisation tends to appear in a specialist *genre* of environmental news, namely that which covers conservation problems in relation to development practices, domestic policies for overseas aid and supranational regulatory bodies for species and habitat preservation.

For this combination of reasons the World Wide Fund for Nature does not use the tactic of direct actions to achieve media attention. As a pressure group in the estabished policy community for international and overseas development - serving as an advisor on supra-national regulatory bodies, such as CITES and IPCC[35] - the organisation's opinions are cited by journalists as a routine part of their reporting function.

The World Wide Fund for Nature also uses the tactic of discursive stunts less than Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. The legitimacy of the organisation's conservation aims and practices are not contested[36] and so the World Wide Fund for Nature is less "image" assertive than either Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace when it exerts "definitional power" over the news. The organisation is often directly involved in the production of a specialist structure of news, appearing in the *Environmental Section* of *The Guardian* when a sympathetic reporter uses the specialist knowledge of the World Wide Fund for Nature to report in detail on a conservation problem. In such cases the organisation itself keeps a low

---

[35] Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). For details of the WWF's actions with these bodies, see Princen and Finger (1994).

[36] Apart from the exceptional circumstances of the "scandal" relating to the World Wide Fund for Nature's finances. Even then the legitimacy of the conservation of habitat and species was not called into question; only the methods that the organisations had used to pursue these aims were contested.

profile in the news narrative, though it will be named and may be attributed with an explicit framing device.

As the campaign topics of the World Wide Fund for Nature are less conflictual than those of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the organisation has less need to embed a 'cultural bias' into the new narrative on the environmental contest. Rather than introducing self legitimation and opponent delegitmation strategies which 'bias' the "objective" reporting function of the journalist, the World Wide Fund for Nature tends to achieve legitimation for its environmental issue topic without mobilising discursive stunts. Examples of discursive stunts are rare in the World Wide Fund for Nature sample. The primary cultural technique by which the organisation enters the linguistic structure of a news narrative is through explicit framing devices.

In the case of the WWF scandal about the alleged "shoot to kill" policy against poachers (Section D) the World Wide Fund for Nature uses its direct links with a specialist environmental journalist to mobilise an explicit framing device that is self-legitimating as part of a 'damage limitation' strategy:

> *"Radical measures are needed to prevent the rhino from becoming extinct and to keep the elephant population from dwindling to insignificant numbers... We don't run the law in those countries, but we are aware that these guards are at great risk. In many countries the equipment they operate is well below the standard of that used by the poachers. Without the valiant efforts of those game wardens none of these animals would survive."* (WWF G)

In contrast to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace whose explicit framing devices are short and polemical, the World Wide Fund for Nature is attributed more space within the structure of the news narrative for developing its argumentation. In this case the organisation's controversial policy for supplying weapons to game wardens is defended by elaborating the dilemma that is faced in preventing animals from becoming extinct. Another example where the organisation is given the news space for developing its argumentation as an explicit framing device occurs when the Development and Conservation Officer, Clive Weeks, is cited elaborating the specific problems faced by overseas environmental development programmes:

"Huge sums of money are now available for aid work on the projects in the field. The trouble is that there are not enough people to back up the aid packages. Britain, for one, has not invested in training. We have over-specialised. We don't need people with Masters degrees but people who can integrate the different disciplines. There is a great need for renewable resource managers, for multi-disciplined teams. I am extremely worried that there will not be enough trained people to give sound advice. At the moment there is a great gap in the age profile of people working on overseas projects. There are a lot of people in their fifties and sixties. The next lot are in their twenties. This is a direct result of not sending enough technical people overseas as back up over many years. There has to be a fundamental change in training at Universities. What is the point of seeing agriculture, forestry, livestock as different disciplines? They should all be integrated. Conservation is, finally, people." (WWF C)

The reasoning here is that an "integrated" thinking should be taken towards conservation and that this requires an approach that includes people within the process. In this example a specialist environmental feature article provides the World Wide Fund for Nature with the opportunity for elaborating in detail the problems that are encountered in shifting from being a traditional conservationist organisation towards embracing a 'process' based approach to environmental conservation and development. This type of the organisation's explicit framing devices are part of a promotional and educational strategy. The World Wide Fund for Nature is able to directly state its case on the problems faced in the contemporary context of its specialist practice of environmental development. The news narrative provides the space for presenting these arguments to the specialist public who follow the environmental news section.

The World Wide Fund for Nature's supra-national campaign against the use of rhino horn by the pharmaceutical industry in China again uses this type of explicit framing device that is a "reasoning device" which elaborates the environmental problematic which the organisation is seeking to promote:

"(R)hinos are continually killed in Africa and Asia to supply the needs of the

large Chinese pharmaceutical industry... There was no way of knowing how many of these valuable works of art have been ground down into powder by the drug corporations. Clearly the main purpose is to earn as much foreign currency and as large a profit as possible." (WWF P)

"I was deeply saddened that such beautiful pieces, so rare, irreplaceable, were going to be ground down." (WWF T)

In the first case (WWF P) the organisation serves as a conservationist specialist identifying the context of the problem in a way that relates "causes" (demand and need for foreign currency) and "effects" (killing of rhinos). In the second case (WWF T) the explict framing device has a reasoning device which claims that the destruction of beautiful antiques (made of rhino horn) is wrong on moral and aesthetic grounds. These two examples illustrate that the World Wide Fund for Nature attempts to achieve a public understanding and a cultural acceptance of the legitimacy of its campaigns by articulating them on the public agenda.

In cases of explicit framing devices that refer to policy events, the World Wide Fund for Nature is presented with less space in the structure of the news narrative for stating arguments. For example, in an article covering the prospective Conference on Climate Change held at an intergovernmental level (WWF), the World Wide Fund for Nature is restricted to the following explicit framing device:

"We are facing the prospect of total chaos" (WWF R)

This indicates that in the news coverage of international policy events the World Wide Fund for Nature is simply presented the news space to comment that the event is not going successfully. This constitutes a less explicit type of "blaming" strategy than those which are employed in the news discourse by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. However, the special opportunity that is presented by the 'Dirty Man' event enables the World Wide Fund for Nature to make a rare excursion into commenting on national political affairs and use explicit framing devices that are more confrontational than those which are usually mobilised by the organisation.

The week before the 'Dirty Man' event, the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilises

an explicit framing device that is directly critical of the Government's domestic road building policy:

> *"On average eight important wildlife sites were threatened by each Department of Transport roads scheme ... If this figure holds true for the whole of England the Government's current roads programme will damage or destroy over 1 500 wildlife sites."* (WWF M)

This criticism of the British Government's policy agenda indicates that the World Wide Fund for Nature is involved, although less centrally, in the construction of the 'Dirty Man' "news event" with Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.[37] Furthermore, the explicit framing device contains a discursive stunt which calculates that if the road-building programme is extended to the size of England 1 500 wildlife sites would be under threat. This use of a discursive stunt by the World Wide Fund for Nature indicates that in special circumstances the organisation will use news coverage for entering into conflict with the Government over national conservation interests. In such cases the claims that are made by the World Wide Fund for Nature tend to appear in an explicit framing device. During the Dirty Man "news event", Simon Lyster of the World Wide Fund for Nature is cited as follows on the *This Common Inheritance* policy document:

> *"We were hoping for much bigger measures to protect Britain's remaining wildlife habitats on land and in the sea."* (WWF O)

Once more this shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature will enter the national environmental contest when there is a favourable opportunity structure for political communication, however the organisation makes claims only within its special field of interest.

The World Wide Fund for Nature's influence on political decision-making hinges less on the "definitional power" that it exerts in the media than either Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace. Nonetheless, favourable coverage on the organisation's specialist environmental

---

[37] Section D indicated that the communications of the organisations were co-ordinated at the peak of the Dirty Man event.

issue topic - world conservation - with an educational orientation is an important part of its overall campaign strategy. In the World Wide Fund for Nature case, the opportunity structure for discursive practices that is provided by news coverage is based primarily on the explicit framing devices which the organisation uses to publicise conservation issues and their related supra-national policy communities. In special opportune circumstances the World Wide Fund for Nature will also criticise the Government's national policy on conservation.

3. "Image politics" - introducing a moral 'reflexivity' into the public culture

In the 'age of environmental communication' the "public images" which the organisations are able to lodge and sustain in the mass media discourse constitute a vital resource for collective action. In recent years environmentalists have become a *bête noire* for politicians in Britain. It is not simply by chance that politicians find the rhetoric of environmental claims so easy to co-opt but the implications of this new language so difficult to integrate with other competing policy demands. The special location of environmentalists as the representatives of a counter-cultural code in contemporary societies[38] means that a mere mention of the organisations, their "public images", introduces elements of a normative critique into the public discourse. After producing a "public image" through years of environmental activism, this "public image" of the collective actor becomes the basis for achieving news space for claims. This occurs once the environment becomes an established topic in the news. Necessarily, at this stage of development the organisations' actions are communications-based and media-oriented.[39] On the production side of news, this type of collective action promotes effective communication channels for the environmental organisations to become established as routine news sources for journalists. On the reception side, the mainstream news facilitates public access to the organisations' claims, where they are open to cognitive reflection, criticism and consumption.

Sustaining the potential for penetrating the structure of news with environmental claims over the long term involves the construction, formation and instrumental utilisation

---

[38] Environmentalism is a counter-cultural critique of the dominant code of modernity (Eder 1990; 1993).

[39] Gamson (1995:p.15) indicates that social movements that are challengers to cultural codes have the central site of their collective action in the mass media: "With an elusive target, like a cultural code, the mass media often become the central site of action."

of a "public image". This constructed "public image" constitutes how the environmental organisations present themeselves and appear as collective actors on the public stage. A "public image" is distinct from the collective identity through which an organisation sustains a constituency.[40] Operating as a routinised form of political expression, a "public image" mediates the existence of a legitimate claims-making actor to a wider public constituency.[41] Not only does a "public image" serve as a symbolic shorthand for the countercultural code with which it is associated in public knowledge, but its resonance in the media serves as a basis for negotiating objectives with political opponents. As it is easily recognisable by other actors, a "public image" becomes a shorthand for the normative critique which the mobilisation of identity carries as a basis for political action. In this sense a "public image" is a cultural "tool" (Swidler 1986) for constructing the normative critiques of political claims into the public culture. I have referred to the ability of a collective actor to exert this type of "definitional power" (Hansen 1993) in the media as "image politics". It is by using resources of "public image" that the organisations are able to legitimate their actions, appeal to their constituencies and delegitimate their opponents actions in the public sphere. This process of constructing "image politics" by the environmental organisations impacts on the social relations that define the environmental contest in Britain. It is the relative control or "definitional power" which the organisations have been able to exert over the public discourse which has brought them into a lasting confrontation with Government actors over environmental policy, most notably in the 'Dirty Man' event. At this historical stage in the environmental contest, the political "success" of environmental mobilisation - judged by its agenda-building potential - depends on the communications resources and media resonance of the environmental organisations. Political protest is no longer dependent on mass demonstrations. A small number of professional activists working in organisations based on communications media can exert power by legitimating their political claims in the public

---

[40] I distinguish between the "public image" of an organisation in the mass media and the collective identity of a social movement in the introduction to this section E.1.1. In the symbolic form of a "public image" the identity of a collective actor is manifest as a strategic resource for communicating in the mass media.

[41] In this sense the resonant "public image" of a collective actor in the mass media maintains a potential for communicating the frames of a protest campaign to a wider audience. The presence of the "public image" of the organisations in the mass media is a reminder of the normative critiques of environmental protest and as such constitutes a cognitive resource for the actors in society to re-evaluate their actions. See the discussion on the extension of the "frame alignment model" (Snow and Benford et al 1986) from consensus mobilisation to the mobilisation of frames in the public discourse (section A).

discourse.

The overall increase in the mass media coverage of environmental affairs in recent years (Love 1990) (Anderson 1991; 1993) has heralded a de-differentiation of environmental policy discourses and mainstream public discourses in the public sphere. This process is in part a result of the campaign activities of the environmental organisations, which have brought scientific knowledge on environmental problems into the public realm and placed the science that is used by the policy-makers into question.[42] Due to this change, environmental policy discourses must now achieve legitimation in the public sphere. Subsequently, the environmental organisations are able to profit from the "image" capital which they have accumulated relative to Government actors and exert a degree of "definitional power" over the public debate on the environment. It is not by an expertise in scientific investigation over the basis of environmental problems, but by an expertise in communicating to the public that the environmental organisations maintain a potential for delegitimising the Government's policy agenda.[43]

In this section E of the analysis I have compared the explicit framing devices and discursive stunts of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. The analysis has shown that the three organisations construct claims into news narratives in different ways.

In contrast to Friends of the Earth and the World Wide Fund for Nature, Greenpeace's claims tend to penetrate the structures rather than the thematic contents of news narratives. The environmental contest is made into an 'adventure story' that is acted out in the public culture between actors whose moral status has been predefined, Greenpeace the "goodies" v. British Government the "baddies". The dramaticist basis of Greenpeace's

---

[42] Beck's (1992) work on the reflexivity of scientific knowledge in conditions of uncertainty or "risk" is pertinent here. When experts dispute the scientific "facts", as in the case of environmental problems, actors must find other ways of legitimating their claims in the attempt to produce a *consensus* as the basis for a political strategy. This is why environmental problems produce a lot of political communication and cannot be "solved" internally by conventional public policy communities.

[43] It is perhaps worth noting that since the "Dirty Man" event the Government have responded to this situation and now use tax payers' money to buy prime time television advertising space to promote the "public image" of their own preferred environmental policy options. For example, "Helping the Earth begins at Home" was a glossy booklet sent by request to viewers of these televsion advertisements on January 11th, 1993 by the Dept. of the Environment's Energy Efficency Office. It addresses the problem of global warming as an issue of individual responsibility for energy conservation. The Department of Environment and Government policy takes a very low profile in the document. It appears that the environmental organisations' monopoly for building environmental agendas through symbolic actions in the public sphere may be waning.

discursive strategies may be seen to make the organisation the "dandy"[44] of the British environmental movement.

Greenpeace's "public image" in news narratives is that of a self-assertive, unconventional and morally justified "character". However, it is not for environmental dialogue with other actors that the organisation enters the system of public communication. Like that of a "dandy" the organisation's "public image" is a *sign* that aims to make other people talk. Greenpeace's discursive strategies have a populist orientation. More specifically, they introduce the environmental contest as an event in which the public can be involved by taking the side of Greenpeace. Freed from providing the rationality of scientific proofs, the organisation's communication strategies introduce the environmental contest as a moral narrative into the mainstream public culture. Greenpeace makes the environmental contest a reflexive element of British culture by de-differentiating the boundaries between the "expert" languages of policy discourse and the everyday languages of public discourse on environmental topics. Greenpeace's communication strategies *moralise* the characters in the environemtnal contest and have done much to produce the situation in contemporary societies whereby "we are all environmentalists now".

In contrast to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth "packages" claims into the thematic contents of the news rather than into the structure of the "news story". Friends of the Earth's brand of "blaming" strategies makes the thematic contents, namely "what the actors do", their aims, interests and proposals, their *action-contexts*, and not the *narrative roles*, namely "who they are", their character traits and "public images", the focus for legitimation. The organisation tends not to attribute explicitly prejudiced narrative roles to actors and raise the "news value" simply by *dramatising* "events" like Greenpeace. Instead it raises the significance of environmental "events" by *politicising* the activities of actors in the environmental policy discourse. Friends of the Earth constructs and mobilises environmental norms for policy discourses and social life. This effectively introduces environmental policy into the public discourse as a *dialogue* and constructs environmental policy discourse as an arena for "collective learning processes" on sounder environmental practices, thus placing the existing practices of actors under scrutiny. Friends of the Earth's communication

---

[44] A "dandy" does not break the codes of public convention by speech but by being unduly devoted to smartness in fashion and dress (Oxford English Dictionary), which causes a scandal and makes others talk or gossip.

strategies *moralise* the rationality of environmental policy dialogue.

Friends of the Earth's discursive actions constitute a strategy for political communication that maintains a degree of pragmatic flexibility. This flexibility enables the organisation to combine the long term aim of introducing "new thinking" into policy making with the short term aim of opposing the present Government's preference for non-interventionist market solutions to environmental problems. In both cases, Friends of the Earth mobilises environmental value criteria to construct an alternative environmental policy agenda. Furthermore, the organisation enters specific policy fields - e.g. roads, agriculture, energy - in a way that the practices of Government and Industry are linked to the action-contexts of the public (e.g. as motorists and consumers). In addition to confronting the public this promotes the notion of an 'integrated' environmental policy strategy.

In contrast to Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth which in different ways construct the environmental contest as a reflexive element into the mainstream public culture, the World Wide Fund for Nature uses discursive practices to publicise a specialist field of environmental activities. The organisation seeks to have the problematic of environmental overseas development and conservation described accurately in specialist sections of the mainstream public discourse. At opportune times the World Wide Fund for Nature comments on the policy related dimensions of supra-national negotiations in this specialist field, and was even prepared to criticise the national Government during the special opportunity structure that was provided by the 'Dirty Man' "news event". The World Wide Fund for Nature has benefitted from the de-differentiation of specialist "expert" discourses and public discourses using the greater resonance of environmental themes as an opportunity for raising the complex topics of species and habitat preservation. Unlike Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, however, the organisation appears to have been less active in producing this de-differentiation of specialist environmental discourses, policy discourses and mainstream public discourse. The World Wide Fund for Nature's communication strategies mobilise its issues into the media discourse as *moral* concerns. This promotional tactic has a long term educational goal.

Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature use their "public images" as a resource for constructing political confrontations with opponent actors in relation to the specific events in the ongoing contest. The analysis of the explicit framing devices and discursive stunts which are used by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the

World Wide Fund for Nature for penetrating the structure of news narratives, has shown that movement activists have a sophisticated repertoire of communication strategies for attributing a 'cultural bias' (Douglas 1975; Thompson 1984) to the media representation of the events which constitute the environmental contest. The organisations mobilise claims that are critiques of the policy positions of Government. This shows that communicative actions of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature are not only designed to achieve "visibility" for the social movement, but as cases of "image politics" constitute social critiques which make certain types of industrial practices, policy thinking and public policy measures contradictory. The "definitional power" which the environmental organisations exert in the public discourse serves the function of "problem specification" for the environmental contest in Britain. However, the organisations also define the basis of the arguments and social metaphors - the cultural "tools" (Swidler 1986) - through which such problems are viewed and interpreted. In this way the "image politics" of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature in the public discourse introduces a cultural reflexivity into the social relations of actors in the environmental contest in Britain. It mobilises a normative critique that challenges the image that British society has of itself.[45]

The communicative actions of the organisations literally provide the cultural tools for actors to relate the contemporary events of the environmental contest to their social relations - as consumers, voters, car drivers, ramblers, economists, policy makers, politicians etc.. This extends the notion of "framing" the environmental debate from that of building an environmental agenda to that of shaping the national political culture for the reception of environmental claims. The organisations promote an environmental agenda by seeking to introduce new forms of environmental policy thinking which are at the same time pertinent to the social sphere of everyday life. This introduces environmental norms into the language of public life and involves a de-differentiation of the cultural boundaries between public policy communities (scientists, policy makers) and the general public. It is this process of de-differentiation between the boundaries of the "experts" of closed policy communities and the everyday lives of the British public that is mobilised into the language of public discourse by the discursive actions of the environmental organisations.

Their access to the semantic and institutional resources for public communication

---

[45] Here I refer to the reflexive image that a society produces and reproduces about itself as a collectivity. Touraine (1981) sees this constitutive process of action as the "self-production" of society.

about environmental topics enables the movement activists to encode biased claims into the dialogue for environmental policy which is lodged in the news. The "public image" of the environmental organisations is continually constructed by this communication process and penetrates the perceptions of the actors in British society. In this way, the environmental organisations promote their policy preferences by mobilising cultural critiques which legitimate and sustain their partially based claims. Their success in framing the environmental debate with these communication techniques impacts upon the social relationships of the competing actors in the public contest over environmental policy. Not only do the environmental activists legitimate their own organisations, and delegitimate Government actors, but through the public communication media they are able to influence how British society looks at itself (and reconstructs its environmental future).

F) The Political Outcomes of 'Talking Dirty' - Environmental Organisations, Communication Strategies and the Policy Agenda.

1. Introduction

In the introduction (section A) I noted the cyclical pattern of the environment as a salient issue on the public agenda. The literature on social movements has also noted the periodic fluctuations of activism and mobilisation by the concept of "cycles of protest" (Tarrow 1982; 1989). The notion of a 'life cycle' is common to theoretical perspectives on social movements: the 'life cycle' starts with a phase of mass public mobilisation and finishes with the co-option of the movement's concerns by established actors in the political system. This process is referred to as the *institutionalisation* of a social movement and may be characterised by an increasing bureaucratisation of the organisational structure, a hierarchical leadership pattern, and the establishment of links with actors in the policy-making process.[1] Once the zenith of protest action is over, the 'life cycle' of the movement is declared dead. At this point it is common to shift to an organisational level of analysis where the issues of identity and life change that were considered an essential element for consensus mobilisation are no longer considered pertinent.[2] According to this perspective, the social movement - as a collective actor - gives way to a pressure group or political party, or its claims may

---

[1] This is the classic model for the *institutionaliation* of a social movement drawing on analysis of the development of the labour movement in a modern society; an example is the classic study by Michels on the German labour movement. A lesson to draw from the theoretical literature on "new social movements" (e.g. Olofsson 1988, Eder 1985; Offe 1985) is that the movements in contemporary societies are expressions of the changes in the condition of modernity. The model for the development of a contemporary social movement need not therefore follow the example set by the development of the labour movement in industrial society. On the contrary, the thesis for a 'risk society' (Beck 1992) implies the existence of a set of public concerns with a rationality that cannot be *institutionalised* within the logic of the existing political system.

[2] In social movement research this is expressed in the rational choice basis of the resource mobilisation approach to analysing social movement organisations, e.g. Zald and McCarthy (1977). Criticisms of such an approach have established that the symbolic resources of an identity - that represent a more expressive rationality - may also be an important component of a social movement, e.g. Melucci (1980; 1989). One of the key tasks for contemporary research is to make models for social movements that bridge this dichotomy between the analysis of collective identities and social movement organisations (Cohen 1985; McAdam and Tarrow 1988).

simply be co-opted by existing political actors, see e.g. Kaase 1990 and Cracknell 1993.[3]

The position of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature in Britain in 1990 presents something of a paradox to this model for the development of a social movement. All three organisations were experiencing the highpoint of a dynamic phase of development where their memberships had reached unprecedented levels. Such popular expressions of support for the environmental creed were also being expressed in public opinion polls, in the European election and in a developing green consumer movement (see section A). A new set of global environmental issues were emerging as a critique of traditional perspectives on the environment and the broadsheet and tabloid media were providing more news space for environmental concerns. In 1990 the social movement carrying the environmental critique to British society was in a rude state of health. At the same time the three largest environmental organisations were not part of the established policy community on the environment, nor was the environment an established feature on the public policy agenda. Likewise the British Green Party was conspicuous only for its marginal position in public life. Political concern for the environment could not be said to have been *institutionalised* into the political system in Britain.

That the emergence of the environmental movements in Western Europe and North America over the last quarter of a century has experienced cyclical phases of development is commonplace in sociology (Brand, Buesser et al 1986; Brand 1990; Ruedig 1995). The comparative work of Jamison and Eyerman et al. (1990) on Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands has described four phases in the development of a environmental movement. In chronological order these may be characterised as follows: a phase of initial public education ('62 to '68); a new kind of organised ecology movement ('69 to '73); a social movement at

---

[3] Organisational perspectives based on rational choice logics maintain this bias for seeing the *institutionalisation* of a movement or a co-option of its goals into the political system as a linear development. In social movement research, the concept of political opportunity structure POS (Eisinger 1973; McAdam 1982) was introduced to make the relative openness and responsiveness of a political system a factor that explained the effectiveness of social movement organisations beyond a mere discussion of the mobilisation of internal resources, i.e. the resource mobilisation model. When operationalised, the political opportunity structure model is at its most explanatory when comparing the levels of protest in different nations, see e.g. Kriesi, Koopmans et al. (1992). However the model is not able to provide an adequate explanation for cases of movements where the logic of collective action contradicts the rational basis or logic of the political system. It is for this reason that in the introduction (section A) I proposed a communications-based perspective on social movements that gives a cognitive twist to the notion of political opportunity structure. The claims of environmental organisations which contradict the technical logics of environmental policy-making can exist and be *institutionalised* as a counter-cultural critique into the mass media discourse without these 'effects' necessarily being translated or incorporated directly as issues into the political system.

its highpoint experiencing organisational specialisation and a practical orientation to politics ('74 to '80); a fragmented movement dominated by a cluster of specialist competitive organisations ('80s to '90s).[4] The environmental movement in Britain in 1990 exhibited features of these latter two phases: a network of specialised organisations in an emergent movement sector with an practical orientation to politics, where three organisations - Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature - were becoming the dominant public voices of the sector. However, there are important differences from the phases of development that are noted by Jamison and Eyerman et al. (1990).

Firstly, for the British case of an environmental movement in 1990, it would not be correct to characterise the activities of the big three organisations as 'competitive'. A specialisation of campaign interests and the division of target publics made it possible for all three to undertake dynamic expansion in a period of unprecedented popularity for environmental themes.[5] Neither did the organisational emergence of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature necessarily occur to the detriment of other smaller organisations. Organisations such as the Green Alliance specialise in making contacts and networks with policy communities and not achieving high public profiles. Their specialist activism was complemented by maintaining chains of interpersonal networks with the public campaign sectors of the larger organisations.[6]

Secondly, although the organised movement sector exhibited a practical orientation to politics, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature were also active in stimulating and mobilising the broader cultural movement of environmentalism by raising public awareness on the new issues of risk technology and global interdependency. Friends of the Earth's aerosol campaign which related responsibility for CFC production, ozone depletion and global climate change to individual consumer action illustrates this point. Governments could be pressurised whilst at the same time the 'risk society' (Beck 1992) could be mobilised. Through the media campaigns wider publics of individuals could be

---

[4] The dates in parentheses are offered by Eyerman, Jamison et al. only as a rough guidline of developments.

[5] Between 1986 and 1990 the memberships of Friends of the Earth increased from 25 000 to 200 000; Greenpeace from 70 000 to 380 000; and the World Wide Fund for Nature from 107 000 to 231 000. In 1992 Friends of the Earth had 119 paid staff; Greenpeace 110; and the World Wide Fund for Nature 205 (McCormick 1991; Szersynski, Miles et al. 1995).

[6] The Green Alliance is also financed for national campaigns partly by receiving contributions from the World Wide Fund for Nature (Rawcliffe 1993).

made aware of threats to the life-world posed by the 'risks' of dangerous technologies. By making the local/global linkage of the new environmentalism a known element of the public culture, the campaigns of the largest environmental organisations allowed wider sets of individuals access to the symbolic resources of identity, self-reference and involvement that are deemed essential components for collective action[7].

Thirdly, unlike the previous phases of mobilisation, collective action was no longer manifest in mass public protests against single issue concerns, but was determined by the potientiality of social networks of individuals that were less visible in the public sphere. The phase of professionalisation, specialisation and differentiation in the organisational development of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature was marked by an increase rather than a decrease in the cultural dynamism of the social movement. Supporters of the environmental creed had never been so plentiful, nor had such a range, wealth or depth of environmental ideas been present in the public culture. Furthermore, this increasing popularity of environmental knowledge constituted the environmental movement as a potentiality for inducing 'ad hoc' acts of social change. For example, the climate of public concern that facilitated the emergent green consumer and ethical consumption movements was produced by the media campaigns of the largest environmental organisations - such as Friends of the Earth's Aerosol campaign. At their high point in the early 1990s, the apparent emergence of this new sector of the environmental movement - the green consumer[8] - meant that businesses started to pre-empt what they perceived as public opinion and market their own brands of green products. Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature responded to the increasing awareness of business to environmental concern by entering into sponsorship deals and adding legitimacy to certain branded products.[9] This example illustrates that the permanent

---

[7] Here I refer to the concept of collective action developed by Melucci (1980; 1988; 1989; 1992) which rightly emphasizes that symbolic resources are a central element of the construction of collective action in contemporary societies.

[8] On the green consumer movement in Britain from the perspective of its key activist and advocate, see Elkington (1990); Elkington and Hailes (1988).

[9] Friends of the Earth has sponsored the activities of business sectors using tropical hardwoods. The World Wide Fund for Nature developed links with the Body Shop to promote consumer awareness of products made using rare species. Greenpeace focuses more on marketing its own brand products. None of these sponsorship activities by the major organisations have gone without criticism from within the movement. However such criticism has done much to sustain other strands of the movement, such as deep ecology, rather than cause its

salience of the major environmental organisations in market for "public image" became vital for the maintenance of a movement that could exert a degree of strategic influence over the practices of targeted opponents, and at the same time shape the potential for future changes in cultural perceptions.

The findings of the empirical sections of this dissertation have established that a significant dimension of the protest actions of the three largest environmental organisations in Britain were lodged in the news discourse. Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature employed communication strategies that framed the media's representation of the environmental contest. The organisations' actions were able to shape the deep thematic contents and linguistic news structures by which the environmental contest appeared in the public discourse. Their communicative actions were strategically co-ordinated to delegitimise the environmental credibility of the Government in the cycle of news coverage on a policy event. I have referred to the potential of the environmental organisations to influence political outcomes by using discursive media strategies as a form of "definitional power". I now discuss the policy outcomes that were produced by the symbolic actions of the environmental organisations in the 'Dirty Man' event (2.), before evaluating how the environmental organisations' actions in the public discourse make them a unique type of 'collective actor' (3.).

2. Beyond the Dirty Man: symbolic action and policy outcomes

We have seen that at the height of their popularity in 1990, the environmental organisations were able to unite in the 'Dirty Man of Europe' masterframe[10] and co-ordinate their activities at an unprecedented level. This was a potentially formative moment in the emergence of institutional links between the major organisations in the environmental movement. Prior to this, interorganisational strategies for communication campaigns had tended to be based on personalised and informal contacts between activists in the

---

demise.

[10] The concept of "masterframe" is taken from Snow and Benford (1988; 1992). A "masterframe" gives an identity to a unified campaign by a set of collective actors. It is constructive to the process of network-building.

organisations rather than providing the basis for collective action.[11] Acting within the 'Dirty Man' masterframe the three major environmental organisations pursued their own public agenda-building strategies: Friends of the Earth's media campaign aimed at alternative policy specification; Greenpeace's at cultural populism; and the World Wide Fund for Nature's at promoting a specialist environmental concern. In the 'Dirty Man' event, however, these different organisational objectives were actively united into a collective campaign against the British policy community. What then were the political outcomes of the 'Dirty Man of Europe' event, and to what extent can these be attributed to the actions of the environmental organisations?

In 1990 the political opportunity structure seemed favourable for environmental organisations to enter the national policy domain. In 1989 the new Secretary of State for the Environment Chris Patten had attempted to set the tone for an era of co-operation by offering the following commitment at his Party Conference:

> "as open a dialogue as I can with constructive and well-meaning environmental groups .. they have much to contribute to our understanding and to the development of policy."[12]

Following in the wake of the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's speech to the Royal Society in 1988, and later claim at Party Conference that "it is we Conservatives who are the true friends of the earth", it appeared that the political opportunity structure might be becoming responsive to the set of 'challengers' who had done so much to establish the credibility of environmental claims. Regardless of the Prime Minister's well documented opportunism for personalising the definition of contentious issues into a populist appeal, there can be little doubt that these statements of political intent placed the environment on the agenda for British politics (Grove-White 1993). Early in 1990 Parliament passed the

---

[11] Many professional activists have career patterns that move between one or more of the various organisations. Professional activists in specific organisations are given honorary positions on the board of others (Szerzynski, Miles et. al. 1995). Friendship ties are an important resource for co-ordination of organisational activities and extending the network of the organised sector of the environmental movement. Indeed this provides another indication that environmental organisations exhibit features between those of a social movment and a formal organisational structure.

[12] Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, 11th October 1989. For a discussion of the implications of the changes in Conservative Party thinking, see Flynn and Lowe (1992).

Environmental Protection Act which was the first major legislation on the environment since 1974. Mass media coverage on the environment became more specialised and detailed as the environment became a political topic (Anderson 1991). The Conservative Government had initiated a political opportunity structure that was conducive to environmental claims and had created a degree of expectation for action in the policy domain. A formative moment appeared to be coming for environmental policy in Britain.

The Environmental Protection Act 1990 introduced several features as up-dates to British environmental policy: a comprehensive licensing system for factories; Integrated Pollution Control; and controls over the release of genetically modified organism (Rose 1990; Weale 1992). Whereas the Environmental Protection Act 1990 introduced piecemeal measures into specific fields of environmental policy, the White Paper document *This Common Inheritance* was intended to produce a new integrated policy approach to the environment that would make a definitive commitment to environmental objectives. In theory this appeared to offer a unique opportunity for the environmental organisations to make inroads into the policy-making process.[13]

The British style of politics and policy-making is characterised by secrecy, elitism and social closure (Richardson and Watts 1984). Traditionally policy makers have placed faith in the expertise of scientists to come up with 'technical fix' solutions to environmental problems (Grove-White 1993). Moreover, in British policy communities the objective of economic development had always been considered to be incompatible with environmental protection (Weale 1992). The neo-liberal credentials of the Thatcher Government were well established. These factors created inbuilt barriers to the adoption of a new perspective on environmental concerns in Whitehall. Hence there was considerable speculation among environmental activists over how the Conservative Government would introduce environmental concern as an 'interest' into the policy community.[14] Would and could the environmental organisations be co-opted as pressure groups into the policy-making process?

---

[13] A White Paper is a statement on resolved government policy. It is usually preceded by the publication of a Green Paper which is a discussion document that is intended to offer an opportunity for comment and debate prior to the drafting of a White Paper. In the case of *This Common Inheritance* the Green Paper stage was omitted. This can be taken as an indication of the Government's urgency in establishing a commitment to the environment and at the same time its unwillingness to engage in a wider public discussion over the policy outcomes that such a commitment may take.

[14] For example, see the article "Will green pressure groups press on?" in the environmental journal *Samizdat* November/December 1989.

Following in this British policy tradition for trusting in technical expertise, an Environmental Charter from the Department of the Environment (DoE) in 1988 had stated that action should be based on the best scientific and economic information (Flynn and Lowe 1992). As a relative 'latecomer' to environmental politics, the Thatcher Government turned to a set of experts for their 'new' environmental policy thinking. An economist, Professor David Pearce, had been commissioned to write a 'think paper' on environmental pricing by the Central Policy Unit of the Department of the Environment. Entitled "Sustainable Development"[15] this report claims that environmental results can be achieved by market mechanisms without necessarily raising public expenditure (Rose 1990). Taking up the findings of this report as a justification, Conservative Government thinking explicitly favoured the market rather than the state as the mechanism for regulating environmental pollution.

Although the Government's new stance on the environment had established environmentalism as a political topic in the media, it had not radically altered the membership structure or thinking of the policy community. The knowledge resources which were incorporated by the policy community were those of economic and scientific experts. Innovative thinking for producing a new integrated policy strategy for environmental problems was restricted to the possible adoption of neo-liberal market mechanisms and technological advance. At the height of the green consumer movement and with the emergence of business opportunities for the development of 'clean technology', it appeared that controlling environmental pollution through the market might be a way for stimulating efficiency rather than retarding economic development. The Secretary of State for the Environment expressed his own preference for the introduction of a carbon tax. The movement intellectuals of the environmental organisations were faced with a dilemma. The rhetoric for environmental change was being promoted by the Government which in itself offered a prospect for institutional changes. However, the potential for the organisations to influence the direction of environmental change and policy innovation was limited by their inability to penetrate the embedded logics and social closure of the policy community.

In this dissertation I have documented how the strategies of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature were expressed in the public sphere.

---

[15] The Pearce report was published as a book with the title *Blueprint for a Green Economy* (Pearce 1989).

Whereas Greenpeace took responsiblity for staging criticism of the White Paper by constructing the 'Dirty Man of Europe' event, Friends of the Earth and the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilised constructive policy criticisms both before and after the peak of the news event. This *division of communicative labour* was designed to serve the 'dual' strategy of the movement: to discredit the cultural authority of the Government's chosen policy approach, whilst maintaining the possibility for a future agenda for 'ecological modernisation' within the institutional structure of the policy community. The environmental organisations had very little influence over the contents of the White Paper. It became essential therefore to exploit the knowledge resources which they had generated within the public domain to exert a degree of "definitional power" over the reception of the document. This symbolic action would influence the potential for future attempts by Governments acting beyond the limited perspective of the present attempt to construct an environmental policy agenda.

By the time that the document *This Common Inheritance* was launched in September 1990, the commitment of the Thatcher Government to a new environmental agenda had waned considerably. Even the innovative use of market mechanisms that had been proposed by the experts in its policy community was absent from the final document. Facing competition and resistance from Cabinet colleagues, the Secretary of State had been forced to drop his favoured legislative commitments. In addition to listing 350 measures that were already on the statute book the White Paper offered only minor piece-meal initiatives rather than a new thinking: the continuance of the new cabinet committee on the environment and naming of environmental responsibilities in each government department; a ministerial level energy efficiency committee to limit carbon dioxide emissions and counter global warming; countryside measures including the protection of hedgerows; a programme against noise nuisance; and proposals to protect architectual heritage.

The failure of the *This Common Inheritance* document to state a new commitment and outline a fundamentally new policy approach for environmental protection did not come as a surprise to the movement intellectuals of the environmental organisations. Although welcoming the new opportunities for making environmental claims, they had remained sceptical of the Government's commitment to environmental goals and its potential for translating environmental rhetoric into principles and acts of public policy. Neither did the environmental organisations favour an environmental policy approach based on the market.

The idea that a combination of consumer pressure, business competitiveness and new opportunities for technological development would provide solutions to environmental problems was anathema to the organisations. Such a perspective usurped the need for the role that they themselves had developed in generating environmental awareness. As a market project, the political discourse about the environment would be replaced by market exchanges between producers and consumers. Organisations such as Friends of the Earth and the World Wide Fund for Nature favoured a more state interventionist and regulatory system of environmental policy which might offer the future possibility of their introduction as 'specialists' into the decision-making process.

The symbolic actions of the environmental organisations over the news cycle of the 'Dirty Man' event did not simply discredit the public policy proposals of the Government, but used the White Paper as an opportunity for discrediting the technocratic logic of the policy community and regaining the initiative as the environmental knowledge specialists in the public domain. The Thatcher Government had failed to produce a radical environmental policy agenda because of a lack of ministerial commitment to environmental objectives.[16] However, its actions had introduced the environmental discourse to the institutional settings of the policy community which had begun to build its own agenda. Having made at least a minimal progress the Government expected the environmental organisations to respond with a set of 'could do better' proposals. Instead, as I have documented, the environmental organisations exaggerated the failure of the White Paper to fully discredit the cultural authority of Government and their policy advisors as environmental actors. Whereas Greenpeace boosted its public image by making Government actors appear foolish and unfit to make environmental policy, Friends of the Earth specified an alternative state regulatory policy agenda that was made to seem more rational than that of the Government. Through the image of the 'Dirty Man of Europe' the environmental movement used the public resonance of environmental themes as a strategic resource for re-asserting the incompatibility of economic and environmental values.[17] The symbolic actions of the environmental

---

[16] The ministerial level disputes between the Secretary of State for the Environment Chris Patten and the Treasury and Transport Departments in particular are well documented by 'leaks' that appeared in the press. See for example *Rival ministers 'will block Patten green initiatives'* which appeared in *The Guardian* on April 30th 1990.

[17] See the detailed discussion in Section D on the 'Dirty Man' frame.

organisations had the political objective of influencing the scope for future Governments to make environmental policies. In this way the environmental organisations re-asserted their authority as the 'architects' of the the new political spaces where the definitions of environmental problems and public policy solutions are made. The comments of a movement intellectual Tom Burke shortly after the 'Dirty Man' event show that the environmental organisations were aware that they were using resonance in the mass media discourse as the basis for this political strategy:

> "(Y)ou could say that we're sort of back to square one, in a sense, but not really in what we've done. We've closed off a load of options for them. They can't, you know, the idea that you can solve problems just with free market mechanisms, without any regulation or intervention, is finished as a political idea in the Conservative Party ... (I)t's in that sort of way that environmentalists make progress - really by making things, by redrawing the boundaries of what's possible politically, until you've gradually boxed in government into going your way, rather than getting them to agree to do a particular thing, because governments don't do that. Governments just work with the possible. They don't usually adopt. I mean, the idea that you can send them lobbyists, who'll sell them an idea and they'll just do it, .. it never happens."[18]

The symbolic actions of the environmental organisations in the mass media discourse did not achieve any specific policy goals. However they exposed the closed policy community to the public sphere and delegitimated its cultural authority as a set of environmental policy experts. Like the emperor in the children's fairy tale *The Emperor's New Clothes*, the Secretary of State for the Environment had the nakedness of his environmental policy proposals exposed to public ridicule. Where the environmental organisations triumphed over the Government was in an understanding of the need to define strategies for environmental action within the context where they achieve a legitimacy, namely the public culture of the mass media discourse. Legitimacy for environmental public policy may not simply be drawn

---

[18] Tom Burke interviewed for the *EUI Project No.42* on 5/12/90 by Bron Szersynski.

from the technical expertise of a closed policy community but must also be promoted within the public sphere.

After the Dirty Man event the political opportunity structure for environmental claims that had been opened by the Thatcher Government's environmental rhetoric closed once again as the environment drifted away from the public agenda. By the end of the year Thatcher had been replaced as Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party by John Major. Since 1990 environmentalism has experienced a downturn in its cycle of fortune being replaced by other issues on the public agenda. This has affected the environmental organisations which have experienced a leveling out and even a decline in subscriptions since 1990. Nonetheless Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature remain unchallenged as media-specialist environmental organisations and in place to act when a more favourable political opportunity structure presents itself. At present their actions make sure that the norms of the 'Dirty Man' rhetoric remain the authoritative public account of the Government's environmental policy actions.[19]

In the aftermath of the 'Dirty Man' debacle the Department of the Environment has learnt the necessity of symbolic action and publicity for legitimating environmental policy actions. In January 1993 the DoE's *Helping the Earth begins at Home* campaign was broadcast at the commercial break of a popular television soap opera. Without mentioning Government policy, the advertisement used the potent imagery of a child's perspective on global warming before giving a phone number which viewers could ring to receive further details. The booklet sent to people on request addresses the the problem of global warming as an issue of individual responsibility for household energy conservation. The actual contents of the proposals differ very little from the "Save it!" energy conservation campaigns that appeared after the oil crisis in the seventies. It would appear that the Department of the Environment has realised that even strategies of inaction require symbolic packaging.

3. Environmental organisations: towards a 'new' type of collective actor?

The professionalisation and strategic political orientation of Friends of the Earth,

---

[19] For example *'Dirty Man' delays clean-up of sea* appeared in *The Observer* on 11th December 1994. It is just one of the many examples where the organisations re-invoke the 'dirty man' rhetoric as the authoritative account of the Government's environmental policy actions.

Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature have been well documented.[20] Nonetheless, it would be premature simply to argue that this process of organisational development confirms the end of the existence of the social movement.[21] In 1990 the dynamic organisations of the movement were necessary to sustain, build and educate a broad consensus of public support. However, this new organisational impetus had brought only negligible rewards in achieving closer links to the environmental policy communities. It is perhaps more accurate to characterise these organisations as part of a new type of collective actor, one that is neither a pressure group nor a social movement that brings people onto the streets, but a movement which mobilises collective action in the arena between politics and culture. In such a perspective the function of the mass media in selecting themes for the public agenda makes the media discourse the arena for collective action. The ability of the organisations to achieve a resonance in the mass media discourse provides the vital link in their dual aim of raising cultural awareness and achieving political objectives. What are the features which define these environmental organisations as part of a special or 'new' type of collective actor?

One attempt to produce a model for the environmental organisations which acknowledges them as a new type of collective actor is the organisational perspective of Princen and Finger (1994). Drawing from case study analyses of the organisational relations that are made by environmental NGOs[22] at the transnational level of politics, Princen and Finger (1994) emphasize the historically unique qualities of these organisational actors and the opportunities for politics which they produce. This "translational linkages" perspective argues that environmental organisations act both as independent bargainers and as agents of social learning in environmental politics (1994:p.217). The distinctive basis of the environmental organisations' actions is that they challenge the limitations of the state-centric

---

[20] For details on the professionalisation, bureaucratisation and formal organisational structures in Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature in Britain, see Weston (1989), McCormick (1991) and Szersynski, Miles et al. (1995). For theoretical perspectives on the status and effectiveness of such strategic organisations, see Eyerman and Jamison (1989) and Rucht (1995) on the case of Greenpeace.

[21] This is the perspective of Weston's (1989) polemical attack on Friends of the Earth, where he accuses the leaders of self-interest and a 'betrayal' of ideals.

[22] Princen and Finger (1994) use the term environmental NGOs (Non governmental organisations) for the movement sector which is under discussion, e.g. Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature.

political system and identify the political implications of biophysical trends at local and global levels. Such actions are considered to be constitutive of a new type of environmental politics that is emerging in the transnational arena.[23]

That the actions of environmental organisations link the biophysical to the political world is acknowledged by other perspectives on the environmental movement.[24] The linking of local and global by environmental organisations is a much discussed element of the new environmentalist ideology, but is seldom seen as central to the political action of environmental organisations in the way that it is by Princen and Finger (1994). They are right to point out that the organisational structure of environmental organisations facilitates exchanges of knowledge and experience from the local community to the policy community that may in some cases introduce changes in the form of international policy agreements. However, this does not necessarily imply that the transnational level of environmental politics is in some way substituting and replacing the authority of the nation state as the arena for political action. On the contrary, the findings of this study, the social movements perspective of Jamison and Eyerman et al. (1990), and the policy perspective of Weale (1992) suggest that the political strategies of contemporary environmental organisations are both active and contextualised within the national level of a political culture.[25]

Princen and Finger (1994:p.226) identify the dynamic factors of "translational linkages" which produce social change as 'institutional change' and 'social learning'. This change is seen as the outcome of the organisations' actions. Princen and Finger's concept of

---

[23] Princen and Finger consider the actions of environmental organisations to re-define the basis of politics, they state (1994:p.232): "(W)hereas NGOs of all kinds - human rights, women's, public health, and so forth - also exploit transnational linkages, environmental NGOs inject scientific and earth-centred concerns into political and economic situations which would otherwise relegate such concerns to the margins. In this *translational* mode, environmental NGOs transform politics by redefining its subject matter."

[24] Indeed one might argue that Jamison and Eyerman et al.'s (1990) knowledge-based perspective and cognitive perspectives on risk communication, e.g. Conrad (1990), Thomson and Wildavsky (1982), are superior in that they consider the mediation of the scientific knowledge of experts about the natural world into the wider process of the social construction of political claims.

[25] Jamison and Eyerman et al. state (1990:p.7): "(S)ocial movements are national and local, even where they are global in scope and ambitions ... (T)he knowledge interests of environmentalism took historical shape through the prism of national political cultures." Albert Weale's perspective on the new politics of pollution states (1992:p.221): "Many observers have noticed an increased sensitivity to risk among modern populations, revealed in public concerns about product safety or occupational safety, and rising trends in the pursuit of professional negligence litigation, as well as in worries about environmental pollution. The regulatory institutions and processes of the modern state provide the focus for the political mobilisation of these concerns."

'institutional change' is little more than descriptive, its simply states that institutional arrangements for dealing with environmental problems have changed in response to environmental decline. Their concept of 'social learning' identifies three ways in which the actions of the environmental organisations contribute to societal transformation: framing issues; building communities and coalitions that oppose existing political structures; and setting examples and standing in for governments by environmental practice. Here the Princen and Finger perspective accurately lists some important dimensions of the 'new' features of the organisations' actions. However it is restricted in explanatory power: firstly, by the omission of communication from the notion of an organisation's action; and secondly, from the omission of communication as a context for action within the policy process that brings about institutional change.[26]

The "translational" mode of an environmental organisation's actions requires a basis and field for action. In this dissertation I have emphasised that the knowledge specialism of environmentalism as a counter-cultural critique is a resource for such actions and that the mass media discourse provides the context where this environmental critique may be 'translated' into political strategies that act against the authority of policy communities. This 'translational' mode of actions by the environmental organisations makes them a special type of collective actor - one which combines the desires of a social movement with the needs of a political organisation. In contrast to conventional political actors they do not seek to act as groups representing socio-economic interests in a redistributive conflict, but their protest actions are on behalf of an 'ascriptive collectivity' and not a social group.[27] At the same time, the environmental organisations have achieved legitimacy as collective actors from the mass media institutions, businesses and politicians and have developed organisational structures. This places their collective actions beyond the parameters of a social movement.

The problematic for environmental organisations and at the same time the factor

---

[26] Even their discussion of the framing of environmental issues fails to mention communication strategies or the achievement of mass media coverage as part of the process of social learning. Princen and Finger reduce framing to an ad hoc 'effect' of the organisations' actions rather than seeing it as a process that is constitutive of their collective actions. At one point they mention that the organisations' acts of 'norm enforcement' in a policy regime may bring about 'institutional transformation' but this point is acknowledged as a debt to a reviewer (1994:p.226).

[27] Offe (1987) writing on the new social movements sees this difference between the definition of political goals for social groups (interest-based politics) and for an 'ascriptive collectivity' as part of the distinction between the "old" and the "new" paradigms for politics.

which makes them a dynamic and new type of collective actor is that they act in an 'as if' scenario of politics. Environmental organisations mobilise political claims on behalf of an ascriptive collectivity. That the environmental organisations construct their political action on the basis of constructing an ascribed collective identity, the "public good" (a specific set of cultural norms)[28], is what makes their politics 'communicative' rather than 'representative'. The environmental organisations' political aims are defined on the basis of an ascriptive collective identity and not by the socio-economic interests of a social group. This makes the rational choice model for politics which is based on interest negotiation between social groups competing over the redistribution of resources unsuited for the collective actions of the organisations.[29] The actions of the environmental organisations subscribe to a different cultural logic and take a different social form. Their actions are strategies for 'communicative' rather than 'representative' political goals, but they must attempt to translate their 'communicative' goals into to a language that makes sense also to the 'representative' interest politics of policy communities. It is in attempting to mix the opposed cultural logics of these different sets of political claims that the communicative actions and political strategies of the environmental organisations draw their dinstinctive identity. In contrast, the policy communities which they target are not only guided by the logics of representing socio-economic interests but tend also to be characterised by social closure.[30]

This exclusion from the elitist policy communities forces the environmental organisations to orient their political strategies through the mass media discourse. Like a social movement, their collective actions create new public spaces in which the power and

---

[28] The environment is a "public good" in that it is a resource that is defined as belonging to everyone. The communicative actions of environmentalists not only construct the notion of the 'public' as an ascribed collectivity, but they also define the basis for a 'good life' for this society, a moral basis for its actions. Environmentalists tell society what ought to be the moral basis of its actions, i.e. they construct what should be the "public good" as a collective identity for society.

[29] It is for this reason that analyses which measure the success or influence of social movements organisations on the political system that are based on rational choice models - see for example the studies reviewed in Huberts (1989) and Gundelach (1989), and the resource mobilisation perspective - are unable to account for the true value of the cultural agenda-building properties of the organisations actions.

[30] Weale (1992:p.212) notes that habitual trust in scientific expertise and secrecy are characteristic of the the small and relatively closed policy elites in Britain. He states: "Britain's .. dogged attachment to secrecy in the enforcement of pollution control can only be understood in terms of long-standing features of its political system, not least in the social closure practised by policy elites." Grant (1990) and Richardson and Watts (1985) identify similar features in the British environmental policy process.

cultural logic of the policy elites is rendered visible. Unlike a social movement, however, the media messages which are mobilised by the organisations transform the ascriptive collective identity of environmentalism - "the public good" - into a set of strategic political communications.[31] In the 'Dirty Man of Europe' case the version of the "public good" defined by Thatcherite British national identity was questioned by the introduction of environmental norms. Such examples of collective action challenge the cultural authority of the scientific knowledge which is the basis on which the policy community acts. It also indicates that the closed policy communities of political actors may be pressurised into appearing in the public sphere to legitimate their actions. Mass media discourse becomes the new field for these political conflicts. The environmental organisations constitute a type of collective actor which exerts a "definitional power" over political actors and institutions through the media of public communication.

The environmental organisations are not easily co-opted as an actor into the bargaining of the political process, not least because their actions are part of the construction of a cultural ideal that is held for society - "the public good" - and do not represent the interests of a closed social grouping in society. The 'communicative' politics of the environmental organisations makes the political actors appear to be 'unrepresentative' of the interests of society. The potential of the environmental movement to exert an influence over the political structures and policy making processes in society will depend on its ability to change the logic of actors in the political system. In this sense, the environmental organisations are the structural manifestations of a new attempt to create a public space for a politics. Their communicative actions attempt to build networks with political actors that will facilitate the development of a new logic for politics - a politics for 'ecological modernisation'. This introduction of the cultural bias of environmental claims into politics, makes the basis of political action more 'reflexive', as society begins to negotiate a different rationality for its progression into the future. Emerging contacts between environmental organisations and policy communities that have been generated through media strategies are the first *institutional* steps towards changes in environmental policy thinking and action.[32]

---

[31] This highlights that symbolic production is central to the basis of the environmental organisations' actions and that the mass media discourse is the primary context for their collective actions.

[32] The perspectives of social theorists on 'reflexive institutionalization' as the new type of emergent structures in contemporary societies are pertinent here. See the contributions in Beck, Giddens and Lash (1995).

This emerging network of contacts between the policy community and the environmental organisations is generated in the structure of the public discourse. The exchanges of information between the actors are based on claims that are lodged and communicated in the media discourse. The policy community is exposed in the public sphere and needs to assert a political legitimacy for its claims. Actors in the policy community attempt to re-legitimise their political authority by negotiating the basis of the contradictory claims - their own and those of the environmental organisations. However, as they are based on different cultural logics these opposed claims may be 'incommensurable', it may not be possible to find a basis for compromise between the two positions. In such cases, the resultant conflicts are likely to keep the politics of the environment visible in the public arena.

When recurrently forced to seek political legitimacy for their actions, the networks of the policy community will take on a structural form that is characterised by the necessity for the production of knowledge and information and maintaining channels of communication to the mass media. As the environmental organisations do not have 'insider status' in the networks of policy community, they are forced to act as members of an 'as if' policy community. Their communication strategies in the public discourse are constructive of a policy discourse that defines options which are not yet accepted as possibilities by the 'insider' actors in the policy community. Under such conditions policy-making becomes a discursive process. The policy community is constituted as a loosely connected interorganisational field of actor networks built on exchanges of information - a "policy domain".[33] In this sense, the mass media discourse where the agenda-building communications of actors are lodged becomes a structure of the national policy domain. Environmental claims become *institutionalised* into the public discourse as a cultural element

[33] Analyses of the formation of public policy decisions from agenda-setting perspectives (e.g. Kingdon 1984) have noted the development of such interorganisational networks. So have cognitive and discursive models for the construction of "policy outcomes" as a process, see Knoke and Burleigh (1989), Laumann and Knoke (1987), Burstein (1991). By introducing the notion of culture to the policy process, such authors see the policy process as an interactive field, a "policy domain" over which core actors, collective actors and issue publics contest, negotiate and legitimate specific decisons. For the case of environmental policy, Weale (1992:p.217) identifies three functions of such a policy discourse: to define the nature of the policy problem; to conceptualise the relevant interests that agents may have in relation to that problem; and to formulate innovative, and potentially credible, solutions to those problems. This discursive model for the policy process moves beyond the rational choice based model for an organisation by acknowledging that the different logics by which the organisations interact, compete and are contextualised in a political culture.

that legitimates and shapes the boundaries of the possibilities for policy action.

In this new institutional arena the interest bargaining of pressure groups and experts is replaced by a policy discourse that actors contest and which must achieve public legitimacy in the media. Environmental knowledge and communications specialisms provide the resources for the environmental organisations to act as innovative agents in this process where politics is constructed and reconstituted. The extent to which the organisations maintain a capacity for introducing social changes will in part be dependent on the extent to which established political elites are responsive in their policy thinking to the charges brought against them.

Bibliography

Atwater T., Salwen M.B. and Anderson R.B. 1985. Media agenda-setting with environmental issues. Journalism Quarterly 62:393-397.

Almond G.A. and Verba S. Eds. 1980. The Civic Culture Thesis Revisited, Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

Altheide D. 1976. Creating Reality: how TV news distorts events. Newbury Park, California: Sage.

Anderson A. 1991. Source strategies and the communication of environmental affairs. Media, Culture and Society 13:459-476.

Beck U. 1992. Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage.

Beck U., Giddens A., and Lash S. 1995. Reflexive Modernization. Politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order. Cambridge: Polity.

Benford R.D. and Hunt S.A. 1992. Dramaturgy and social movements: the social construction and communication of power. Sociological Inquiry 62:36-55.

Blumler J. ed. 1983. Communicating to Voters: The role of television in the 1979 European election. London: Sage.

Brand K-W., Büsser D. and Rucht D. 1983 and 1986. Aufbruch in eine andere Gesellschaft. Neuesoziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik. Frankfurt: Campus.

Brand K-W. 1990. Cyclical aspects of new social movements: waves of cultural criticism and mobilization cycles of new middle class radicalism. R. Dalton and M. Keuchler Eds. Challenging the Political Order. New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Brookes S.K., Jordan A.G., Kimber R.H., and Richardson J.J. 1976. The growth of the environment as a political issue in Britain. British Journal of Political Science 6:p.245.

Bürklin W.P. 1984. Grüne Politik. Ideologische Zyklen, Wähler und Parteiensysteme. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Bürklin W.P. 1987. Why study political cycles? An introduction. European Journal of Political Research 15:131-143.

Burgess J. 1990. The production and consumption of environmental meanings in the mass media: a research agenda for the 1990s. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 15:139-161.

Burgess J. Harrison C. and Maiteny P. 1991. Contested meanings: the consumption of news about nature conservation. Media, Culture and Society 13:499-519.

Burgess J. and Harrison C.M. 1993. The circulation of claims in the cultural politics of change. A. Hansen. Ed. The Mass Media and Environmental Issues. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

Burstein P. 1991. Policy Domains: organization, culture, and policy outcomes. Annual Review of Sociology 17:327-50.

Cassidy S. 1992. The environment and the media: two strategies for challenging hegemony. J. Wasko and V. Mosco. Eds. Democratic Communications in the Information Age. Toronto: Garamont Press.

Centre for the Study of Environmental Change. 1991. The Emerging Ethical Mood on Environmental Issues in Britain. Report to the World Wide Fund for Nature UK. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Fylde College, Centre for the Study of Environmental Change.

Cobb R.W. and Elder C.D. 1983. Participation in American Politics. The Dynamics of

Agenda-Building. London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Cohen J. 1985. Strategy or identity: new theoretical paradigms and contemporary social movements. Social Research 52(4):663-716.
Conrad J. 1987. Risiko und Ritual. Discussion papers IIUG dp 87-14. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.
Corner J. and Harvey S. Eds. Enterprise and Heritage. Crosscurrents of national culture. Routledge.
Cotgrove S. and Duff A. 1980. Environmentalism, middle-class radicalism and politics. Sociological Review 28:333-351.
Cotgrove S. and Duff A. 1981. Environmentalism, values, and social change. British Journal of Sociology 32:92-110.
Cottle S. 1993. Mediating the environment: modalities of tv news. A. Hansen. Ed. The Mass Media and Environmental Issues. Leicester: Leicester University Press.
Cottle S. 1995. The production of news formats: determinants of mediated public contestation. Media, Culture and Society 17:275-291.
Cracknell J. 1993. Issue arenas, pressure groups and environmental agendas. A. Hansen. Ed. The Mass Media and Environmental Issues. Leicester: Leicester University Press.
Devall B. and Sessions G. 1985. Deep Ecology. Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith books.
Donati P.R. 1992. Political Discourse Analysis. M. Diani & R. Eyerman Eds. Studying Collective Action:136-167. London: Sage.
Donati P.R. 1992. Framing and communicating environmental issues. Some initial findings on the Italian case. European University Institute. Project No 42. Research paper No 2. Florence: Unpublished manuscript, European University Institute.
Douglas M. 1966. Purity and Danger: an analysis of concepts of pollution and taboo, London: Rouledge & Kegan Paul.
Douglas M. 1975. Implicit Meanings. London: Routledge Kegan & Paul.
Downs A. 1972. Up and down with ecology - the issue attention cycle. The Public Interest 28:38-50.
Eckersley R. 1992. Environmentalism and Political Theory: toward an ecocentric approach. London: UCL Press.
Edelman M. 1989. Constructing the Political Spectacle. London: University of Chicago Press.
Eder K. 1988. Die Vergesellschaftung der Natur. Studien zur sozialen Evolution der praktischen Vernunft. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Eder K. 1990a. Counterculture movements against modernity. Nature as a new field of class struggle. Theory Culture and Society. 7:21-47.
Eder K. 1990b. The cultural code of modernity and the problem of nature: a critique od the naturalistic notion of progress. J. Alexander and P. Szomptka Eds. Rethinking Progress: Movements, Forces and Ideas at the End of the Twentieth Century. London: Unwin Hyman.
Eder K. 1992. Framing and Communicating Environmental Issues. A discourse analysis of environmentalism. EUI Project No. 42 Paper. Florence: European University Institute.
Eder K. 1993. The New Politics of Class. Social Movements and Cultural Dynamics in Advanced Societies. London: Sage.
Eder K. 1995a. Rationality in environmental discourse: a cultural approach. Green Politics Three:9-37.
Eder K. 1995b. The Socialization of Nature. London: Sage.

Einseidel E. and Coughlan E. 1993. The Canadian press and the environment: reconstructing a social reality. A. Hansen. Ed. The Mass Media and Environmental Issues. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

Eisinger P. 1973. The conditions of protest behavior in American cities. American Political Science Review 67.

Eisenstadt S.N. and Giesen B. 1995. The construction of collective identity. Archives Européennes de Sociologie 36:72-102.

Elkington J., Burke T. and Hailes J. 1988. Green Pages. The Business of Saving the World. London: Routledge.

Elkington J. and Hailes J. 1988. The Green Consumer Guide. From shampoo to champagne - high-street shopping for a better environment. London: Victor Gollancz.

Elkington J. 1991. A Year in the Greenhouse. An Environmental Diary. London: Victor Gollancz.

Evernden N. 1992. The Social Creation of Nature. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Eyerman R. and Jamison A. 1989. Environmental knowledge as an organizational weapon: the case of Greenpeace. Social Science Information 28(1):99-119.

Featherstone M. 1989. Postmodernism, cultural change, and social practice. C.D. Kellner Ed. Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique. Washington DC: Maisonneuve Press.

Ferree M.M. and Miller F.D. 1985. Mobilization and meaning: toward an integration of social psychological and resource perspectives on social movements. Sociological Inquiry 55:38-61.

Fiddes N. 1991. Meat. A Natural Symbol. London: Routledge.

Flynn A. and Lowe P. 1992. The greening of the Tories: the Conservative Party and the environment. Ruedig ed. Green Politics Two:9-36.

Fowler R. 1991. Language in the news. Discourse and Ideology in the Press. London: Routledge.

Friends of the Earth. 1990. How Green is Britain? The Government's Environmental Record. London: Hutchinson Radius.

Gamble A. 1989. Thatcherism and the New Politics. J. Mohan. Ed. The Political Geography of Contemporary Britain. London: MacMillan.

Gamson W.A. 1988. Political discourse and collective action. B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi & S. Tarrow Eds. From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures Vol. 1 International Social Movement Research:219-244. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Gamson W.A. 1992. The social psychology of collective action. A.D Morris and McClurg Mueller C. Eds. Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Gamson W.A. 1992. Talking Politics. Boston, MA: MIT Press.

Gamson W.A. and Modigliani A. 1989. Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: a constructionist approach. American Journal of Sociology 95:1-38.

Gamson W.A. 1995. Hiroshima, the holocaust, and the politics of exclusion. American Sociological Review 60:1-20.

Gans H. 1979. Deciding What's News. New York: Pantheon.

Gerhards J. and Rucht D. 1991. Mesomobilization contexts: organizing and framing in two protest campaigns in West Germany. Discussion Paper FS III91-101. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.

Giddens A. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Giddens A. 1991. Modernity and Self-Identity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gitlin T. 1980. The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media and the Making and Unmaking of the New Left. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Glasgow University Media Group. 1976. Bad News. London: Routledge and Kegan.
Goffman E. 1974. Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
Grant W. 1989. Pressure Groups, politics and democracy in Britain. London: Philip Allan.
Greenberg D.W. 1985. Staging media events to achieve legitimacy: a case study of Britain's Friends of the Earth. Political Communication and Persuasion 2(4).
Grove-White R. and Burke T. 1989. The Role of Non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Paper to 'Awareness raising and public participation' Conference. UK Workshop, 24-26 September.
Grove-White R. 1993. Environmentalism: a new moral discourse for technological society?. Milton K. ed. Environmentalism. The View from Anthropology. London: Routledge.
Grundman R. 1991. Marxism and Ecology. Oxford: Blackwell.
Gundelach P. 1989. Effectiveness and the structure of new social movements. International Social Movement Research 2:427-442.
Gusfield J.R. 1981. The Culture of Public Problems: Drink-Driving and the Symbolic Order. Chicago, Il.:University of Chicago Press.
Habermas J. 1987. The Theory of Communicative Action. Lifeworld and System. A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Volume II. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Habermas J. 1989. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society, Cambridge, MA: MI Press.
Haigh N. 1984. EEC Environmental Policy in Britain. London: Environmental Data Services.
Hall S., Critcher C., Jefferson T., Clarke J. and Roberts B. 1978. Policing the Crisis: mugging, the state, and law and order. London: Macmillan.
Harries-Jones P. 1993. Between science and shamanism:the advocacy of environmentalism in Toronto. Milton K. ed. Environmentalism. The View from Anthropology. London: Routledge.
Hansen A. 1991. The media and the social construction of the environment. Media, Culture and Society 13:443-458.
Hansen A. and Linne O. 1991. Journalistic practices and television coverage of the environment: an international comparison. In C. Hamelink & O. Linne Eds. Mass Communication Research. On Problems and Policies. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Hansen A. 1993. Greenpeace and press coverage of environmental issues. Hansen A. Ed. The Mass Media and Environmental Issues. Leicester: Leicester University Press.
Harvey D. 1989. The Condition of Postmodernity. An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. Oxford: Blackwell.
van der Heijden H-A., Koopmans R. and Giugni M. 1992. The West European Environmental Movement. M. Finger Ed. The Green Movement Worldwide. Supplement to Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.
Hilgartner S. and Bosk C.L. 1988. The rise and fall of social problems: a public arenas model. American Journal of Sociology 94:53-78.
Huberts L.W. 1989. The influence of social movements on government policy. International Social Movement Research 2:395-426.

Inglehart R. 1982. Changing values and the rise of environmentalism in Western societies. Berlin: International Institute for Environment and Society. Science Centre Berlin.

Inglehart R. 1990. Values, ideology, and cognitive mobilization in new social movements. R. Dalton. and M. Keuchler Eds. Challenging the Political Order. New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Jamison A. Eyermann R. and Cramer J. 1990. The Making of the New Environmental Consciousness. A Comparative Study of Environmental Movements in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Jensen K.B. and Jankowski N.W. Eds. A Handbook of Qualitative Methodologies for Mass Communication Research. London: Sage.

Johnston H. 1992. "Fightin' Words": discourse, frames and the cultural analysis of social movements. San Diego, CA: Unpublished manuscript, UCSD.

Kaase M. 1990. Social movements and political innovation. R.J. Dalton and M. Kuechler Eds. Challenging the Political Order. New social movements in Western Democracies. Oxford: Polity Press.

Keat R. and Abercrombie N. Eds. 1991. Entreprise Culture. London: Routledge.

Kitschelt H. 1988. Political opportunity structures and protest: antinuclear movements in four democracies. British Journal of Political Science 16:57-85.

Klandermans B. 1984. Mobilization and participation: social psychological expansions of resource mobilization theory. American Sociological Review 49:583-600.

Klandermans B. 1988. The formation and mobilization of consensus. Klandermans B., Kriesi H-P and Tarrow S. Eds. International Social Movement Research 1. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.

Klandermans B. and Tarrow S. 1988. Mobilization into social movements. Klandermans B., Kriesi H-P and Tarrow S. Eds. International Social Movement Research 1. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.

Klandermans B. 1989. Introduction: organizational effectiveness. International Social Movement Research 2:383-393.

Kielbowicz R.B. and Scherer C. 1986. The role of the press in social movements. G. Lang and K. Lang Eds. Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change. Greenwich CT: JAI Press Inc: 71-96.

Kingdon J.W. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

Koopmans R. and Duyvendak J.W. 1994. The political construction of the nuclear energy issue and its impact on the mobilization of anti-nuclear movements in Western Europe. Discussion Paper FS III 94-102. Wissenschatfszentrum Berlin.

Knoke D. and Burleigh F. 1989. Collective action in National Policy Domains: constraints, cleavages and policy outcomes. Research in Political Sociology 4:187-208.

Kriesi H-P. 1991. The Political Opportunity Structure of News Social Movements: Its impact on their Development. Paper for Workshop on "Social Movements, Counterforces and Public Bystanders". Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. FS III:91-103.

Kriesi H-P., Koopmans R., Duyvendak J.W. and Guigni M.G. 1992. New Social Movements and Political Opportunities in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research 22:219-244.

Krimsky S. and Plough A. 1988. Environmental Hazards. Communicating Risks as a Social Process. Dover, MA: Auburn House.

Lang G. and Lang K. 1983. The Battle for Public Opinion: The President, the Press and

Watergate. New York: Columbia University Press.
Laumann E.O. and Knoke D. 1987. The Organizational State. Social Choice in National Policy Domains. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Lee J.A. 1989. Waging the seal war in the media: toward a content analysis of moral communication. Canadian Journal of Communication 14 (1):p.37055.
Lichtenberg J. and MacLean D. 1988. The role of media in risk communication. H. Jungermann, R.E. Kasperson & P.M. Wiedemann Eds. Themes and Tasks of Risk Communication. Proceedings of the International Workshop on Risk Communication held at the KFA Jülich, October 17-21, 1988:33-48. Jülich: Kernforschungsanlage Jülich GmbH.
Love A. 1990. The production of environmental meanings in the media: a new era. Media Education Journal. 10. Winter:18-20.
Lovelock J. 1979. Gaia. A New Look at the Life on Earth. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Lovelock J. 1989. The Ages of Gaia. A Biography of Our Living Earth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lowe P. and Goyder J1983. Environmental Groups in Politics. London: Allen & Unwin.
Lowe P. and Flynn A. 1989. Environmental politics and policy in the 1980s. Mohan J. ed. The Political Geography of Contemporary Britain. London: Macmillan.
Lowe P.D.and Morrison D.E. 1984. Bad new or good news: environmental politics and the mass media. Sociological Review 32:75-90.
Luke T.W. 1988. The dreams of deep ecology. Telos 76:65-92.
Luke T.W. 1989. Screens of Power. Ideology, Domination, and Resistance in Informational Society. Urbana IL: Univ. of Illinois Press.
Lyotard J. 1984. The Postmodern Condition. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Mazur A. 1987. Mass Media Effects on Public Opinion About Nuclear Power Plants. New York, NJ: Syracuse University Press.
Mazur A. 1990. Nuclear power, chemical hazards, and the quantity of reporting. Minerva 28:294-323.
McAdam D. 1982. Political process and the development of Black Insurgency. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
McAdam D. 1988. Micromobilization contexts and recruitment to activism. Klandermans B., Kriesi H-P and Tarrow S. Eds. International Social Movement Research 1:125-154. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.
McCarthy J.D. and Zald M.N. 1977. Resource mobilization and social movements: a partial theory. American Journal of Sociology 82:1212-1241.
McCombs M. and Shaw D. 1972. The Agenda-Setting function of Mass Media. Public Opinion Quarterly 36:176-187.
McCormick J. 1991. British Politics and the Environment. London: Earthscan.
McTaggart D. and Hunter R. 1978. Greenpeace III: Journey into the Bomb. London: William Collins Sons and Co..
Melucci A. 1980. The new social movements. A theoretical approach. Social Science Information 19:199-226.
Melucci A. 1988. Getting involved: identity and mobilization in social movements. Klandermans B., Kriesi H-P and Tarrow S. Eds. International Social Movement Research 1:329-348. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.
Melucci A. 1989. Nomads of the Present: social movements and individual needs in contemporary society. London: Hutchinson Radius.

Melucci A. 1992. Frontier Land: collective action between actors and systems. M. Diani & R. Eyerman Eds. Studying Collective Action:238-258. London: Sage.

Milbrath L.W. 1984. Environmentalists. Vanguard for a New Society. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Milsted D. 1990. The Green Bluffer's Guide. West Sussex: Ravette.

Morgan R. and Whitaker B. 1986. Rainbow Warrior: the French attempt to sink Greenpeace. London: Arrow Books.

Mormont M. and Dasnoy C. 1995. Source strategies and the mediatization of climate change. Media, Culture and Society 17:49-64.

Moscovici S. 1990. Questions for the twenty-first century. Theory Culture and Society 7:1-19.

Murphy D. 1985. Von Aldermaston nach Greenham Common. Politischer protest und neue soziale Bewegungen in Grossbritanien. K-W Brand. Ed. Neue soziale Bewegungen in Westeuropa und den USA. Ein internationaler Vergleich. Frankfurt: Campus.

Neuman W., Just M. and Crigler A. 1992. Common Knowledge. News and Construction of Political Meaning. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Nohrstedt S.A. 1991. The information crisis in Sweden after Chernobyl. Media, Culture and Society 13:477-497.

Nohrstedt S. 1993. Communicative action in the risk society. A. Hansen. Ed. The Mass Media and Environmental Issues. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

Olofsson G. 1988. After the working class movement? an essay on what's 'new' and what's 'social' in the news social movements. Acta Sociologica 31(1):15-34.

Olwig K. 1984. Nature's ideological landscape. London: Allen and Unwin.

O'Riordan T. 1988. The politics of environmental regulation in Great Britain. Environment 30(8):5-44.

Passmore J. 1974. Man's Responsibility for Nature. Ecological Problems and Western Traditions. London: Duckworths.

Pearce D. 1989. Blueprint for a Green Economy. London: Earthscan.

Pearce F. 1991. Green Warriors: the people and the politics behind the environmental revolution. London: Bodley Head.

Peltu M. 1988. Media reporting of risk information: uncertainties and the future. In H. Jungermann, R.E. Kasperson & P.W. Wiedemann Eds. Themes and Tasks of Risk Communication. Proceedings of the International Workshop on Risk Communication held at the KFA Jülich, October 17-21, 1988:11-32. Jülich: Kernforschungsanalage Jülich GmbH.

Pepper D. 1984. The Roots of Modern Environmentalism. London: Croom Helm.

Pizzorno A. 1978. Political exchange and collective identity in industrial conflict. C. Crouch and A. Pizzorno Eds. The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968. 2. London MacMillan.

Porritt J. and Winner D. 1988. The Coming of the Greens. London: Fontana.

Porritt J. Ed. 1990. Friends of the Earth Handbook. London: Macdonald Optima.

Princen T. and Finger M. 1994. Environmental NGOs in World Politics. Linking the local and the global. London: Routledge.

Offe C. 1985. New social movements: challenging the boundaries of institutional politics. Social Research 52(4):817-68.

Offe C. 1987. Challenging the boundaries of institutional politics: social movements since the 1960s. Maier C.S. Ed. Challenging the boundaries of the political. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rappaport R.A. 1979. Ecology, Meaning, and Religion. Richmond, CA: North Atlantic Books.

Rawcliffe P. 1993. The changing nature of national environmental groups 1984-1994. Lancaster University:unpublished PhD thesis chapter.

Richards P. 1993. Natural symbols and natural history: chimpanzees, elephants and experiments in Mende thought. K. Milton. Ed. Environmentalism: the View from Anthropology. London: Routledge.

Richardson J.J. and Watts N.S.J. 1985. National policy styles and the environment. Britain and West Germany compared. International Institute for Environment and Society. IIUGdp85-16. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.

Rose C. 1990. The Dirty Man of Europe. The Great British Pollution Scandal. London: Simon and Schuster.

Rosengren K., Wenner L. and Palmgreen P. Eds. 1985. Media Gratifications Research: current perspectives. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Rothgang H. 1990. Die Friedens- und Umweltbewegung in Großbritannien. Eine empirische Untersuchung im Hinblick auf das Konzept der "Neuen Sozialen Bewegungen". Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag.

Rucht D. 1995. Ecological protest as a calculated law-breaking: Greenpeace and Earth First! in comparative perspective. Green Politics Three:66-89.

Rüdig W. 1990. Anti-Nuclear Movements: A World Survey of Opposition to Nuclear Energy. London: Longman.

Rüdig W. 1995. Editorial. Green Politics Three:1-9.

Sachsman D.B. 1976. Public relations influence on coverage of environment in San Francisco Area. Journalism Quarterly 53:54-60.

Schlesinger P. 1990. Rethinking the sociology of journalism: source strategies and the limits of media centrism. M. Ferguson Ed. Public communication: the new imperatives. London: Sage.

Schlesinger P. 1991. Media the political order and national identity. Media, Culture and Society 13:297-308.

Shelley M. 1985. (orig. 1818.) Frankenstein or the Modern Prometheus. London: Penguin.

Smelser N. 1962. Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: Free Press.

Snow D.A., Rochford E.B., Worden S.K. and Benford, R.D. 1986. Frame alignment processes, micromobilization and movements participation. American Sociological Review 51:464-81.

Snow D.A. and Benford R.D. 1988. Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization. From Structure to Action 1 International Social Movement Research. Klandermans B., Kriesi H-P. and Tarrow S. Eds. Greenwich: JAI.

Snow D.A. and Benford R.D. 1992. Master frames and cycles of protest. Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. A.D. Morris and C. Clurgh Mueller Eds. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.

Statham P. 1992. Environmental mobilisation. Unpublished manuscript. Florence: EUI.

Statham P. 1993. "Landscape" language and imagery: a resonating national cultural theme in British news. EUI Project No.42 Paper. EUI: Florence. 48 pages.

Statham P. 1994a. An Overview of the British Media Discourse on Environmnetalism 1987 - 1991. EUI Project No.42 Paper. Florence: European University Institute.

Statham P. 1994b. Chernobyl's Tales of the Unexpected: From Soviet Disaster to Global Risks. The British media discourse 1987-91. EUI Project Paper No.42. EUI: Florence 38 pages.

Statham P. 1994c. Pressing matters: environmental organisations and public communication in an emergent policy agenda - the case of the British 'Dirty Man'. Paper for Political Communication Workshop. European Consortium for Political Research. Madrid, 17th-22nd April. 31 pages.

Statham P. 1995a. Framing and Communicating Environmental Issues. Part I. Setting the Stage: the media discourse on environmentalism in Britain. European University Institute Project No.42. Report to Commission of European Communities DGXII SEER PL 210943 Florence: European University Institute. 110 pages.

Statham P. 1995b. The New Politics of Intolerance. Political communication, mass media resources and the dynamic emergence of the Alleanza Nazionale and Forza Italia parties in Italy. Paper for Workshop "Racist Parties in Europe: A New Political Family". European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions. Bordeaux: 26th April to 2nd May. 24 pages.

Strodhoff G.C., Hawkins R.P., and Schoenfeld A.C. 1985. Media roles in a social movement: amodel of ideology diffusion. Journal of Communications 35(2). Spring:134-53.

Swidler A. 1986. Culture in Action: symbols and strategies. American Sociological Review 51.

Szerszynski B. 1991. Environmentalism, the mass media and public opinion - a report European University Institute. Project No 42. Research paper No 1. Lancaster: Unpublished manuscript, University of Lancaster.

Szerszynski B., Miles J. and Simmons P. 1995. Framing and Communicating Environmental Issues. Part II. Entering the stage: strategies of environmental communication in the UK. European University Institute Project No.42. Report to Commission of European Communities DGXII SEER PL 210943. Florence: European University Institute. 204 pages.

Tarrow S. 1982. Social movements, resource mobilization and reform during cycles of protest: a bibliographical and critical essay. Western Societies Program. Occasional Paper 15. Center for International Studies: Cornell University.

Tarrow S. 1989. Democracy and Disorder. Protest and Politics in Italy 1965-1975. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Tilly C. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Terdiman R. 1985. Discourse/Counterdiscourse: the theory and practice of symbolic resistance in nineteenth century France. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Thomas K. 1983. Man and the Natural World. A History of the Modern Sensibility. New York: Pantheon.

Thompson M. 1984. Among the energy tribes: a cultural framework for the analysis and design of energy policy. Policy Sciences 17:321-339.

Thompson M. 1988. Socially viable ideas of nature: a cultural hypothesis. E. Baark and U. Svedin Eds. Man, Nature and Technology. Essays on the role of ideological perceptions. London: MacMillan.

Thompson M. 1991. Plural rationalities: The rudiments of a practical science of the inchoate. J.A. Hansen Ed. Environmental Concerns. An Inter-disciplinary Exercise. London/New York: Elsevier Applied Science.

Thompson M. and Wildavsky A. 1982. A proposal to create a cultural theory of risk. H.C. Kunreuther and E.V. Ley Eds. The Risk Analysis Controversy: An Institutional Perspective. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

Touraine A. 1981. The Voice and the Eye. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Van Dijk T.A. 1985. Structure of news in the press. T. van Dijk Ed. Discourse and Communication. New Approaches to the Analysis of Mass Media Discourse and Communication:69-93. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Van Dijk T.A. 1988. News as Discourse. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Van Dijk T.A. 1991. Racism and the Press. London: Sage.

Van Dijk T.A. 1991. The interdisciplinary study of news as discourse. K.B. Jensen & N.W. Jankowski Eds. A Handbook of Qualitative Methodologies for Mass Communication Research:108-120. London: Sage.

Van Dijk T.A. and Kintsch W. 1983. Strategies of Discourse Comprehension. New York, NY: Academic Press.

Walsh E. and Cable S. 1989. Realities, images and management dilemmas in social movement organisations: the three mile island experience. International Social Movement Research 2:199-211.

Weale A. 1992. The New Politics of Pollution. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Weaver D. 1987. Thoughts on an agenda for mass communications research. M. Gurevitch and M. Levy. Eds. Mass Communications review Yearbook 6 Beverley Hills CA: Sage.

Weston J. 1989. The Friends of the Earth experience: the development of an environmental pressure group. Oxford: Oxford Polytechnic Planning School.

Williams R. 1972. Ideas of Nature. J. Benthall Ed. Ecology, The Shaping Enquiry. London: Longman Group Ltd.

Williams R. 1973. The Country and the City. London: Chatto and Windus.

Wynne B. 1982. Rationality and Ritual: The Windscale Inquiry and Nuclear Decisions in Britain. Chalfont St. Giles, Bucks: The British Society for the History of Science.

Wynne B. 1988. Risk Management and Hazardous Waste: Implementation and the Dialectics of Credibility. London: Springer.

Wynne B. 1992. Uncertainty and environmental learning. Reconceiving science and policy in the preventive paradigm. Global Environmental Change 2:111-127.

Yearly S. 1991. The Green Case. A Sociology of Environmental Issues, Arguments and Politics. London: Harper Collins Academic.

Young J. 1990. Post Environmentalism. London: Belhaven Press.

Zald M.N. and McCarthy J.D. Eds. 1987. Social Movements in Organizational Society. Collected Essays. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.